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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examined how people make and understand judgments of subjective 
experience using the categories of Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess (R, K, F, G), and 
represents the first attempt to use all four categories in a standard episodic recognition 
task. The key findings of this body of work are that Know and Familiar categories of 
subjective experience can be reliably differentiated, as can each of the four subjective 
experience categories from confidence. Chapter 2 examined lay understanding of 
subjective experience by asking participants to examine others’ memory justification 
statements. Participants reliably differentiated the four justification types (R, K, F, G) in 
terms of confidence (Experiment 2.1) and subjective experience (Experiments 2.2 and 2.3); 
manipulations of confidence influenced assignment of justifications to subjective 
experience categories for some types of justification more than others (Experiment 2.2); 
and participants were able to divide justification statements into Know and Familiar when 
no definitions of those concepts were provided (Experiment 2.4). Chapter 3 investigated 
the influence of experimentally imposed familiarity on subjective experience. Pre-exposure 
of target and lure items led to impaired recognition across all experiments, but differences 
in subjective experience were only observed when pre-exposure was performed between-
subjects (Experiment 3.1 vs. 3.2 and 3.3). Participants were able to use recollection 
strategically to overcome the familiarity induced by pre-exposure. Chapter 4 compared 
source, confidence, and subjective experience judgments and demonstrated subjective 
experience judgments to be more sensitive to source accuracy than confidence judgments; 
confidence judgments were more lenient than subjective experience; and confidence 
judgments were more affected by source manipulations than were subjective experience 
judgments. Across the thesis, analysis of reaction time also demonstrated reliable 
differences between and within judgment types. This thesis found critical differences 
between Remember, Know, and Familiar. Know and Familiar judgments were shown to 
dissociate on recognition accuracy, source accuracy, confidence, and response time. In 
contrast, Remember and Know judgments were only shown to be differentiated by source 
accuracy. The findings have implications for methodological and theory development and 
are discussed in terms of single- and dual-process accounts of memory. 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
“I enter a friend's room and see on the wall a painting. At first I have the strange, 
wondering consciousness, ‘surely I have seen that before’, but when or how does not 
become clear. There only clings to the picture a sort of penumbra of familiarity, - when 
suddenly I exclaim: ‘I have it, it is a copy of part of one of the Fra Angelicos in the  
Florentine Academy - I recollect it there!’” 
(William James, 1890, p. 658) 
 
1.1. OVERVIEW  
 
The above quote illustrates how people can have conscious awareness of their memory 
processes. Recognition can either occur with recollection, where the object of recognition 
evokes retrieval of other related thoughts, feelings or memories; or recognition can occur 
without triggering any such associations and instead is accompanied by feelings of 
familiarity (Gardiner, 2000). Importantly for the study of recognition memory, people are 
also able to consciously appreciate the differences between these processes (Wixted & 
Mickes, 2010).  
 
Psychology has sought to explain these two forms of recognition through a number of 
different models and approaches including the Remember-Know paradigm (Tulving, 1985) 
which is used in all experiments in this thesis. This chapter will introduce recollection and 
familiarity and the Remember-Know paradigm before describing important gaps in the 
existing literature and presenting a rationale for the programme of research presented in 
this thesis. In brief, this thesis aimed to further elucidate and classify the subjective 
experiences contributing to recognition memory, with a view to examine how subjective 
experience can be sensitive to and manipulated by experimental factors. This is an issue of 
value to those interested in how subjective experience might be used to understand 
recognition memory failure and strategy use in memory retrieval (see Section 1.3 on 
applications). 
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Human memory is a dynamic system relying on separate stores of information and 
different strategic and automatic retrieval processes. At a basic level, it is possible to 
differentiate between episodic (experience-based) and semantic (fact-based) memory 
stores and longer term and shorter term stores (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Tulving, 1972). 
Within the focus of this thesis, episodic memory, it is possible that previous experience is 
retrieved either through recall or recognition. Recall is a relatively effortful process 
whereby the instances of a previous experience are reproduced in response to cues, 
whereas in contrast, recognition (the focus of the current thesis) is a process whereby a 
previously encountered stimulus is re-experienced and is endorsed as either being 
something previously experienced (Old) or rejected as being novel (New). Within 
recognition memory research, a significant development has been the use of subjective 
experience to classify different forms of recognition memory. 
 
1.2. RECOLLECTION AND FAMILIARITY; REMEMBERING AND KNOWING 
 
As illustrated in the quote at the start of this chapter, recognition can be accompanied by 
different subjective experiences. Theoretical accounts detailing different memory 
processes, types of memory, and states of awareness that have been suggested to underlie 
different recognition experiences are detailed in Section 1.4; however, to foreshadow 
these theoretical accounts, the central idea is that recognition is sometimes accompanied 
by recollective experience. Recollective experience involves retrieval of details of a past 
encounter accompanied by a sensation of mental time travel or a feeling of oneself in the 
past (Gardiner, 2008). For example, when visiting a city for the second time you might 
chance upon a shady park and recall that last time you visited that city you came to the 
same park but it was a miserable rainy day and you could not sit and enjoy the 
surroundings. If recognition is not accompanied by recollective experience the subjective 
feeling may instead be one of familiarity; the shady park may feel familiar but no 
additional contextual details are retrieved about the previous visit to the park. Or you may 
know that you have been to the park before but it does not feel familiar and you do not 
have any recollective experience for the surroundings.  
 
Theoretical accounts have conceptualised subjective experiences as relating to the 
processes of recollection and familiarity (e.g., Mandler, 1980; Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 
1997) or to the states of awareness of remembering or knowing (e.g., Tulving, 1985; see 
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Section 1.4 for full details of these different accounts). This latter conceptualisation 
included the development of the Remember-Know paradigm where participants are 
instructed to categorise recognised items as either Remembered, where recognition is 
accompanied by recollective experience, or Known, where recognition is not accompanied 
by recollective experience and instead is accompanied by a feeling of familiarity (Yonelinas, 
2002). The differentiation of knowing and familiarity as independent subjective 
experiences is one of the key themes of this thesis and, while the majority of previous 
research reviewed in this chapter has conflated these two experience types, the 
importance of their separation is discussed in Section 1.6.5.3. The Remember-Know 
paradigm is the central focus of this thesis and detailed discussion of the dissociation of 
Remember and Know responses is undertaken in Section 1.6. However, the importance of 
subjective experience for understanding memory processes and behaviours is first 
reviewed. 
    
1.3. IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
 
When introspective techniques were banished in favour of more objective experimental 
procedures, psychology concentrated on examining memory performance through 
behavioural measures (cf. James, 1890, and Ebbinghaus, 1885). However, the re-
emergence of subjective experience as a valid means for exploring cognitive processes 
since the 1960s has enabled memory researchers to examine the feelings, thoughts, and 
cognitive control processes related to behavioural measures of memory (Gardiner, 2008). 
Two central questions of interest in this area are: What do subjective feelings tell us about 
our memory processes? And how do these feelings influence our subsequent behaviours? 
 
In recent decades, subjective experience has been explored in nearly every area of 
memory research. In autobiographical memory, retrieval accompanied by recollective 
experience has been found to differentiate between true and false memories (Conway, 
Collins, Gathercole, & Anderson, 1996) as well as whether childhood memories are viewed 
from an observer or field perspective (Crawley & French, 2005). Impairments in recollective 
experience have also been linked to the lack of autobiographical memory specificity which 
characterise disorders such as depression (Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004). 
Thus, recollective experience is important to many aspects of autobiographical memory 
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and, as such, recollective experience has been identified as one of the defining 
characteristics of episodic memory (Conway, 2005; Conway & Williams, 2008).  
 
Recollective experience has also been demonstrated to be of value in applied settings. In 
eyewitness memory, retrieval accompanied by recollective experience has been found to 
distinguish correct from incorrect line-up identifications (Palmer, Brewer, McKinnon, & 
Weber, 2010); and has been demonstrated to be the element of recognition crucially 
sensitive to the binding of faces to contextual information in the recognition of people 
(Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Masson, 2007). Differences in recollective experience are also of 
interest in terms of how people learn information in academic settings. Mirandola, Del 
Prete, Ghetti, and Cornoldi (2011) explored recollective experience for sentences from a 
text passage in adolescents with learning difficulties and found that poor learners reported 
lower levels of recollective experience for sentences than did participants without learning 
difficulties. Furthermore, as detailed in Section 1.6.5.3 below, Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, 
Anderson, and Cohen (1997) and Herbert and Burt (2001, 2003, 2004) have demonstrated 
that students’ retrieval shifts from Remember to Know, or from episodic retrieval to 
conceptual organisation of knowledge across time and this shift is associated with 
improvements in academic performance.  
 
Reduced levels of recollection have also been implicated as one of the fundamental 
changes associated with decreased episodic memory performance in normal aging 
(Friedman & Trott, 2000; Java, 1996; Norman & Schacter, 1997; Parkin & Walter, 1992; 
Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997; Perfect, Williams, & Anderton-Brown, 1995; Souchay, Moulin, 
Clarys, Taconnat, & Isingrini, 2007); and research has started to explore whether 
recollection can be improved in older adults (Jennings & Jacoby, 2003). Remembering has 
also been shown to be much reduced in conditions such  as Alzheimer’s disease, amnesia, 
schizophrenia, and autism spectrum disorders, while levels of Knowing remain unaffected 
or are affected to a much lesser extent than Remembering (Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 
2000; Dalla Barba, 1993, 1997; Huron et al., 1995; Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Schacter, 
Verfaellie, & Anes, 1997; Tanweer, Rathbone, & Souchay, 2009). Together these examples 
demonstrate how renewal of interest in subjective experience has led to increases in what 
we know about memory behaviours and processes in a wide variety of domains. 
Exploration of subjective experience therefore has both widespread implications for theory 
development and applications for improving memory. 
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1.4. THEORETICAL ISSUES 
 
1.4.1. Dual-process versus single-process accounts of recognition memory 
 
Dual-process models assume that two distinct processes or forms of memory underlie 
recognition and that successful recognition is determined by the relative contributions of 
both processes. Conversely, single-process accounts propose that recognition relies on 
only one continuous dimension of familiarity or memory strength, and successful 
recognition is determined by the strength of this single dimension. The following sections 
provide brief overviews of single- and dual-process accounts and highlight the major points 
of agreement, disagreement, and debate between the various models. For comprehensive 
reviews of the literature which summarize the opposing viewpoints see Yonelinas (2002), 
Diana, Reder, Arndt, and Park (2006), Dunn (2004, 2008), Parks and Yonelinas (2007), and 
Wixted and Stretch (2004).  
 
1.4.2. Dual-process models 
 
1.4.2.1. Mandler 
George Mandler and colleagues (Mandler, 1979, 1980, 1991, 2008; Mandler & Boeck, 
1974; Mandler, Pearlstone, & Koopmans, 1969) argue that memory consists of a fast 
perceptual matching process and a slower retrieval process. In the process of perceptual 
matching, if an item matches representations in memory this activation gives rise to 
subjective feelings of familiarity. Contrastingly, the slower retrieval process is recall-like 
and is based on an active search of memory. According to this model, familiarity will be 
higher if an item has been repeatedly and/or recently experienced as the item will have 
been more strongly integrated in memory. This familiarity process is considered to support 
recognition memory judgments and performance on implicit memory tasks such as word 
stem completion (Mandler, 1991). Contrastingly, a recollection-based search process is 
assumed to act if experience with an item has led to the item being elaborated into 
semantic networks in memory. These organisational structures can be searched and stored 
information may be accessed from a variety of directions. This recollection-based search 
process is assumed to support both recognition and recall performance. Though Mandler 
et al. (1969) initially suggested that active retrieval search processes are only initiated if 
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the result of the familiarity process is ambiguous, later conceptualisations of the model 
identified familiarity and recollection as independent processes which act in parallel, but 
with familiarity typically being faster than recollection and therefore ‘winning the race’ in 
recognition memory tests (Mandler, 1980, 2008). The issue of the time course of subjective 
experiences is of critical importance to experiments presented in Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
thesis and research related to the speed of recognition decisions is discussed there (e.g., 
Sections 3.2.3.4 and 4.1.3). 
 
1.4.2.2. Jacoby 
Jacoby’s model (Jacoby, 1983, 1984, 1991; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; 
Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Kelley & Jacoby, 1990; 
Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990) also focuses of speed of processing as a method of 
differentiating between recognition processes. This model stipulates that recognition of an 
item can be based on an assessment of processing fluency, seen as a relatively automatic 
process; or recollection of contextual or elaborative information linked to the item, 
conceived as an analytic, consciously controlled process. In this model, feelings of 
familiarity arise when fluent processing of an item is attributed to past experience with the 
item. Fluency of processing is also not limited to perceptual fluency; feelings of familiarity 
can also arise from increases in conceptual fluency (e.g., enhanced processing of the 
meaning of an item; Jacoby, 1984; 1991; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992). Similar to Mandler’s 
(1980) later modifications of his model, Jacoby conceptualised familiarity and recollection 
as independent processes that operate in parallel but with familiarity typically being a 
faster process than recollection (Jacoby, 1991). Jacoby went on to develop the process-
dissociation procedure (PDP) as a methodology for estimating the relative contributions of 
recollection and familiarity to recognition (Jacoby, 1991); this paradigm is discussed further 
in Section 1.5.2.1. 
 
1.4.2.3. Tulving 
Endel Tulving and colleagues (Nyberg, Cabeza, & Tulving, 1996; Tulving, 1982, 1985; 
Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998; Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997) 
suggested there are dual states of awareness underlying memory performance rather than 
dual processes. This conceptualisation developed from Tulving’s distinction between 
episodic and semantic memory systems (Tulving, 1972). The episodic system is stipulated 
to contain records of personally experienced events which, when retrieved, give rise to the 
state of autonoetic consciousness and the subjective experience of ‘remembering’. 
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Conversely, the semantic system stores general knowledge about the world, and when 
information is retrieved from this system it comes to mind with noetic consciousness, and 
the accompanying subjective feeling is one of ‘knowing’ or a feeling of familiarity without 
recollection (Yonelinas, 2002). The episodic memory system is considered to underlie 
recall, while both episodic and semantic systems are utilised for recognition. During 
memory retrieval, the two systems are assumed to be independent but operating in 
parallel as information can be retrieved from either system individually (Tulving, 1985, 
1995; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998).  
 
Tulving (1985) was the first of his contemporaries to explore memory retrieval through 
subjective report. He asked participants to report their state of awareness for each 
retrieved item by making a ‘Remember’ or ‘Know’ judgment. Items were categorised as 
Remembered when the participant retrieved some memory of something they had 
thought or experienced at the time of encoding and categorised as Know when the 
participant was aware that the item had been on the study list but could not recall 
anything experienced for the item at that time (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000; 
Tulving, 1985). While some view the subjective states of Remembering and Knowing as 
orthogonal to the underlying processes of recollection and familiarity (for example see 
Gardiner, 2000, and Wixted & Mickes, 2010), the majority of studies utilising the 
Remember-Know paradigm assume that the two categories map directly onto the 
underlying processes (Yonelinas, 2002). Furthermore, experiments using the Remember-
Know procedure have demonstrated similar patterns of findings to other methodologies 
exploring the contributions of recollection and familiarity processes to recognition (e.g., 
Yonelinas, 2001a). The Remember-Know paradigm forms the basis for all the experiments 
presented in this thesis and therefore is discussed in more detail in Section 1.6. 
 
1.4.2.4. Yonelinas 
The dual-process signal detection model (DPSD) put forward by Yonelinas and colleagues 
argues that recollection and familiarity are qualitatively different processes that each 
provide different information and levels of confidence to recognition (Dobbins, Kroll, 
Yonelinas, & Liu, 1998; Yonelinas, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Yonelinas, Aly, 
Wang, & Koen, 2010; Yonelinas, Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King, 1996; Yonelinas, 
Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, & Soltani, 1999). The 
DPSD conceptualisation of familiarity builds on single-process signal-detection models and 
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receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curve methodologies (see below, Sections 1.4.3 and 
1.5.2.2) whereby familiarity is considered to reflect a quantitative measure of memory 
strength that is temporarily increased when an item is studied. In contrast, recollection is 
conceptualised as a threshold process where qualitative information about a previous 
event is either retrieved or not. If qualitative information about the study episode is not 
retrieved, and therefore the threshold for recollection is not met, recognition must rely 
only on familiarity. In line with the previous models of Jacoby and Mandler, the DPSD 
model also assumes that recollection and familiarity are independent and are initiated in 
parallel, and familiarity is expected to be faster than recollection (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1994, 1996; Yonelinas, 2002). 
 
In relation to recognition confidence, the DPSD assumes that familiarity can support a wide 
range of confidence responses, while recollection is expected to support relatively high 
confidence recognition decisions only. This is reflected in the model’s assumption that all 
items will evoke a familiarity signal, but only some items will be recollected. Here 
recollection is conceptualised as a threshold process, although the model does assume 
that participants can recollect different types or amounts of information experienced at 
encoding. Whilst this may not seem to reflect a threshold process, it is conceptualised as 
such because of the fact that recollection can sometimes fail and no contextual 
information will be retrieved. A further assumption of the DPSD model is that recollection 
is assumed to have a distribution of strength, but the model does not specify what kind of 
distribution it is and therefore recollection is measured as the probability of success (Parks 
& Yonelinas, 2008). The DPSD was the first model to suggest a hybrid of SDT measures for 
familiarity and a threshold process for recollection, though other hybrid models have 
started to be put forward in the last decade, some of which conceptualise recollection as a 
continuous process and provide estimates for its distribution (Parks & Yonelinas, 2008; 
Wixted & Mickes, 2010; see Section 1.4.5). 
 
1.4.3. Single-process models 
 
Single-process accounts of recognition memory are based on signal detection theory (SDT). 
Two core assumptions of single-process accounts are that items in a memory task can be 
ordered along a single continuum of familiarity or strength of evidence and that the 
strength distribution curves for old and new items are overlapping and Gaussian (or 
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normal) in shape, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 (Dunn, 2004; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Parks 
& Yonelinas, 2008). Researchers who use SDT modelling tend to retrospectively fit models 
to data sets to examine which model parameters accurately describe the patterns of data 
obtained; further predictions are then able to be made from the best-fit model (e.g., Dunn, 
2004, 2008; Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004). 
  
 
Figure 1.1. Equal-Variance Signal Detection (EVSD) model (left panel) and Unequal-
Variance Signal Detection (UVSD) model (right panel) distribution curves for New and Old 
items. 
 
Within SDT, where a person places their recognition decision criterion along the memory 
strength axis determines the probability of their correctly recognising old items while not 
making false alarms for new items, and accuracy is measured by d’ which is the difference 
in average strength of the new and old item distributions1.  
 
A third assumption of single-process accounts comes into play when SDT is used to 
interpret Remember-Know responses. This assumption is that the proportions of 
Remember and Know responses are determined by the placement of two criteria on the 
familiarity or strength-of-evidence axis instead of one. A criterion placed low on the 
recognition decision axis is used to distinguish old (including both Remember and Know) 
from new responses, whilst a criterion placed higher on the decision axis is used to 
distinguish Remember from Know responses (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Hirshman & 
Master, 1997; Inoue & Bellezza, 1998; Parks & Yonelinas, 2008). 
 
                                                          
 
1
 d’ values are reported for all recognition memory experiments in this thesis and the full formula 
for calculating d’ is shown in Appendix C. 
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As is shown in Figure 1.1, two variants of SDT are the Equal-Variance Signal Detection 
(EVSD) model and Unequal-Variance Signal Detection (UVSD) model. The EVSD model is 
the simplest SDT model and it assumes that the variance of old and new items’ strength 
distributions are equal. In contrast, the UVSD model assumes that old and new items’ 
strength distributions differ in variance. This is suggested to occur because at study some 
items are likely to increase in strength more than others meaning that distribution for 
studied items will be more variable than the distribution for new items (Parks & Yonelinas, 
2008). In this model two parameters are measured: the distance between the means of 
the distributions (equivalent to d’) and the difference between the variances of the 
distributions.  
 
In their review of this literature, Parks and Yonelinas (2008; and Yonelinas & Parks, 2007) 
evaluate the underlying assumptions of these two signal detection models as well as other 
more recent variants including threshold and mixed models such as the hybrid Dual-
Process Signal Detection model discussed in Section 1.4.2.4. They also discuss 
methodological issues involved in analysing results from ROC curves, the shapes of which 
are important for determining which models can account for which data. Their discussion 
of ROC curves is returned to in Section 1.5.2.2 below. A comprehensive review of these 
models and their mathematical differences is beyond the scope of the current thesis. 
Furthermore, the thesis did not aim to discriminate between single- and dual-process 
accounts, principally because the interest is in how different forms of subjective 
experience in recognition differ. Thus, a theory-neutral position is taken whereby 
confidence (as a report of trace strength) and recollective experience (as a qualitative 
state) are compared within individuals. However, the following sections consider some key 
points regarding the debate between dual- and single-process accounts relating to 
subjective experiences and their relationship with recognition, since it is likely that studies 
comparing confidence and recollection may make a modest contribution to this debate. 
 
1.4.4. Single-process accounts of Remember-Know data 
 
A critical issue in recognition memory is whether the subjective states used to differentiate 
dual-process accounts of recognition have a sound basis. To this end, a number of meta-
analyses have examined recognition memory performance to examine the differences 
between memory strength for the different subjective experience responses. If SDT models 
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can accommodate dual-process data, it suggests that a more parsimonious account of 
human recognition is to consider a single, strength-based process. 
 
Donaldson (1996) initiated this SDT versus Remember-Know debate when he performed a 
meta-analysis of 80 experimental conditions to examine whether the recognition accuracy 
of the Remember criterion was significantly different to the accuracy of the recognition 
(Old-New) criterion. He did not find a significant difference. This supports a signal 
detection interpretation of Remember-Know judgments as it suggests that whether Know 
responses are included under a lenient decision criterion or whether only Remember 
responses are included using a strict criterion this does not result in differences in 
recognition sensitivity and therefore all recognition decisions must be based on the same 
underlying memory trace (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2002). However, 
Gardiner and Gregg (1997) determined that Donaldson’s values of A’ (.86 for recognition 
and .83 for Remember) were significantly different when compared using a sign test, and 
thus began a pattern of conflicting results from meta-analyses. 
 
Gardiner et al. (2002) performed a similar meta-analysis to that of Donaldson (1996) 
though data from none of the included 86 empirical conditions overlapped with 
Donaldson’s as Gardiner et al. included only experiments that had allowed a Guess 
response (see Section 1.6.5.2) while Donaldson had excluded these. This addition was 
crucial as it meant that three levels of response criterion could be compared – a Guess 
criterion (which includes all recognised items), a Know criterion and a Remember criterion. 
Contrary to the analysis conducted by Donaldson, Gardiner et al. found that the strength of 
the memory trace was not equal at these different decision criteria points; A’ was .799 for 
recognition (Remember + Know  + Guess), .813 for Remember plus Know responses, and 
.787 for Remember responses alone. Gardiner et al. (2002) concluded that “the addition of 
know responses to remember responses increased memory strength and therefore that 
these responses reflect an additional source of memory, not merely more lenient response 
criteria” (p. 91; and see results from Gardiner & Gregg, 1997, and Gardiner & Conway, 
1999). However, the underlying assumptions, model parameters, and statistical methods 
employed in dual-process interpretations of signal-detection analyses such as that of 
Gardiner et al. were subsequently questioned by Dunn (2004, 2008). In his 2004 paper, 
Dunn detailed five statistical arguments suggested by dual-process protagonists as to why 
SDT could not be used to interpret Remember-Know data. Dunn reasoned that these five 
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arguments were flawed and concluded that there was no evidence from Remember-Know 
paradigms that was inconsistent with an SDT interpretation. He later furthered this 
argument by involving state-trace analysis in a meta-analysis in an aim to determine the 
number and organisation of mediating psychological variables involved in recognition 
memory. He again concluded that a unidimensional model fit the data better than a 
bidimensional model (Dunn, 2008).  
 
In addition to the basic underlying premises of one or two processes and the complex 
statistical evidence put forward by the opposing viewpoints to support their premise, a 
further conceptual difference between the view held by single- and dual-process 
protagonists Dunn and Gardiner is whether recollection and familiarity are antecedent to 
or resultant from recognition decisions. Dunn (2008) suggests that even if it is agreed that 
Remember and Know responses are associated with different kinds of subjective 
experience, it does not automatically follow that these experiences are what give rise to 
the type of judgment made; instead they could be the result of what response is made. 
Dunn goes on to provide the following example “following evaluation that a test item has 
sufficient strength of evidence to be classified as old, an R response may also be 
interpreted, on the basis of the level of this strength of evidence, as an inference that 
some details of the earlier study episode could be retrieved if required” (2008, p. 442). By 
this way of thinking, Remember and Know are inferences based on the strength of 
evidence of an item and can be viewed as meta-memory judgments relating to the type of 
accompanying information that is expected to be retrieved. In contrast, as proposed by 
Tulving (1985) and Gardiner “…it is surely the subjective state of awareness that gives rise 
to confidence in memory, not confidence that gives rise to the state of awareness” 
(Gardiner, 2001, p. 1356). This is a more fundamental conceptual difference of opinion 
than arguments based around statistical sensitivity and one of more importance if your 
concern is with understanding the states of awareness and conscious experiences 
associated with Remember and Know responses, as this thesis is. 
 
1.4.5. Recent additions to the theoretical debate 
 
In the last decade a flurry of other dual-, single-, mixed and hybrid process models have 
been put forward. New dual-process models include the source of activation confusion 
(SAC) model proposed by Reder and colleagues (Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Park, 2006; Reder 
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et al., 2000), the theory of distributed associative memory (TODAM)–based model 
proposed by Murdock (2006), sum-difference theory of Remembering and Knowing 
(STREAK) proposed by Rotello et al. (2004), and models proposed by Wixted and Stretch 
(2004) and Hintzman (2001). As discussed by Macmillan and Rotello (2006; Rotello & 
Macmillan, 2006), these models can be classified according to which of three different 
decision rules are used. The SAC (Diana et al., 2006; Reder et al., 2000) and TODAM 
(Murdock, 2006) models use the “process-pure” rule whereby the two processes 
underlying recognition decisions are conceptualised as being uniquely relevant to either 
Remember or Know responses and operating in hierarchical fashion. If there is sufficient 
information available from the first process (recollection) to determine recognition, then a 
Remember response is made; otherwise, if there is sufficient information available from 
the second process (familiarity), then a Know response is made; otherwise, a new response 
is made (Dunn, 2008; Macmillan & Rotello, 2006; Rotello & Macmillan, 2006).  
 
The second decision rule is the “sum-difference” rule used in Rotello et al.’s (2004) STREAK 
model. According to this rule, Old-New decisions are based on global memory strength, 
which is related to the sum of evidence from the processes of recollection and familiarity. 
Contrastingly, Remember-Know decisions are based on the difference between the specific 
memory strength available from recollection, which should be relatively great compared 
with global memory strength, and the specific memory strength available from familiarity, 
which should be relatively weak. Thus in this model, the weighted sum of global and 
specific strengths results in a recognition decision, and the weighted difference of 
strengths results in either a Remember response or a Know response.  
  
The third type of decision rule characterizes the models proposed by Wixted and Stretch 
(2004) and Hintzman (2001). In these models, it is suggested that people combine 
information from different sources into a single strength-of-evidence value on which both 
recognition and Remember-Know decisions are based. This results in models which are 
mathematically equivalent to the single-process model of the Remember-Know task first 
proposed by Donaldson (1996). Although the models of Wixted and Stretch (2004) and 
Hintzman (2001) agree with the dual-process assumption that recognition memory 
judgments are based on two different processes or sources of information, they reject the 
other assumption that recognition decisions can be made on the basis of either 
recollection or familiarity. Instead, they suggest that the two sources of information are 
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pooled and mapped onto a single decision axis. A further suggestion from these models 
and others is that recollection is a graded process existing on a continuum like familiarity, 
as opposed to a threshold or all-or-none process as was originally suggested by the DPSD 
model (e.g., Mickes, Johnson, & Wixted, 2010; Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 2009; Onyper, 
Zhang, & Howard, 2010; Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; Rotello et al., 2004; Slotnick, 2010; 
Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Wixted, 2007, 2010; Wixted & Mickes, 2010; Wixted & Stretch, 
2004).  
 
Whilst these recent models can be differentiated in terms of the decision rules they 
employ, most of them provide a reasonably good fit to the data (Gardiner, 2008). Because 
of this, and the fact that the specifics of the models involve such complexity and technical 
sophistication, Gardiner (2008) highlighted that it has become increasingly difficult to see 
how to distinguish between them empirically. While these recent additions to the debate 
are interesting, and will be revisited in the General Discussion, the current thesis is not 
concerned with providing evidence which supports one or other of the models. Rather the 
experiments presented here take Remember-Know judgments at face value and are 
interested in understanding how people make and understand judgments of subjective 
experience. This move ‘back’ towards understanding Remembering and Knowing at a more 
conceptual level was advocated by both Dunn (2004) and Gardiner (2008). 
 
1.5. MEASURING RECOLLECTION AND FAMILIARITY 
 
To support the idea that multiple processes are involved in recognition memory, various 
measures have been put forward as being able to dissociate the processes of recollection 
and familiarity. These fall into two main camps: Task-dissociation methods and process-
dissociation methods.  
  
1.5.1. Task-dissociation methods 
 
Task-dissociation methods aim to find a task or experimental condition for which the 
results dissociate the processes of recollection and familiarity. To find this dissociation the 
task or condition has to produce results that are different from a standard recognition task 
where both recollection and familiarity processes are involved in performance. Inferences 
can then be made about the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to the 
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task or condition (Yonelinas, 2002). Task-dissociation methods include response speed 
methods and associative versus single-item recognition.  
 
1.5.1.1. Response-speed methods  
Many dual-process models, including those of Mandler, Jacoby, and Yonelinas (see Section 
1.4.2) consider familiarity to be a rapid and automatic process with relatively low demands 
on cognitive resources, while recollection is a slower and more effortful. Because of this, 
response speed has been suggested as a way to dissociate the two processes (Yonelinas, 
2002). Response speed can be measured by simply separately analysing recognition 
performance for fast and slow recognition responses or by setting a response deadline and 
comparing performance in this speeded condition to performance in a non-speeded 
condition. In both these methods, fast responses are thought to reflect familiarity, while 
slower responses (when allowed) are thought to involve more contribution from 
recollection (Yonelinas, 2002). 
 
Yonelinas (2002) reviewed the literature that has used response-speed methods and 
concluded that familiarity is indeed available earlier and contributes to performance earlier 
in the time course than recollection does. For example, in studies where participants are 
instructed to exclude lures that are related in some way to actually studied items (either 
visually, semantically, or previously paired with), accuracy in rejecting these lures has been 
shown to improve as response deadline is increased. At short deadlines, participants have 
a tendency to accept the lures due to familiarity but given additional retrieval time they 
are able to use recollection to avoid this incorrect recognition (e.g., Dosher, 1984; 
Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989; Hintzman & Curran, 1994; Jacoby, 1999; McElree, Dolan, & 
Jacoby, 1999; Rotello & Heit, 2000).  
 
Response-speed methods were combined with the Remember-Know process-estimate 
method (see Section 1.5.2) by Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1999). In this 
study, participants were required to make Remember-Know responses after making 
recognition decisions at short (500 ms) or long (1500 ms) response deadlines. While the 
Remember-Know responses themselves were not speeded, more Know and Remember 
responses were made following the longer deadline. Gardiner et al. (1999) concluded that 
Know responses do not index an automatic familiarity process as suggested by some dual-
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process models, as both Remember and Know responses increased when the longer 
deadline permitted more effortful, controlled retrieval.  
 
Further exceptions to the finding that familiarity is faster than recollection come from 
unspeeded Remember-Know studies where recognition decision RTs are analysed by which 
category of subjective experience the item was assigned to. Using this analysis many 
studies have shown recognition decisions for Remember responses to be reliably faster 
than for Know responses (e.g., Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Dewhurst, Hitch, & Barry, 1998, 
Dewhurst, Holmes, Brandt, & Dean, 2006; Henson, Rugg, Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; 
Vilberg & Rugg, 2007; Wixted & Stretch, 2004). However, it has been suggested that these 
patterns of findings occur because participants in Remember-Know experiments are 
instructed to respond Know only if the item is ‘familiar and not recollected’, i.e., they are 
required to wait until both processes have been completed before making a Know 
response (Yonelinas, 2002). In the current thesis, RTs were recorded for recognition 
decisions categorised by their later subjective experience judgment (Chapters 3 and 4) and 
in a novel analysis, RTs for post-recognition subjective experience, source, and confidence 
judgments were also measured (Chapter 4). The time course of recollection and familiarity 
processes is returned to in these chapters and discussed in terms of what the timing of 
responses can elucidate about how people make and understand judgments of subjective 
experience. 
 
1.5.1.2. Associative versus single-item recognition 
Dual-process models posit that recollection involves retrieval of qualitative information 
experienced when the item was encoded (Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985, 
Yonelinas, 1994, 2002). In associative recognition tests, where participants are asked to 
make judgments about some aspect of experimenter-controlled encoding such as whether 
two words were paired together for study, recollection should therefore aid retrieval of 
this associated information. On the other hand, familiarity or memory strength should be 
able to discriminate studied from non-studied items, but it should be less useful in tests of 
associative recognition. This is particularly true in ‘pure’ associative paradigms such as 
those used extensively by Naveh-Benjamin and colleagues (Kilb & Naveh-Benjamin, 2007; 
Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). Here items are studied in pairs and 
then participants are tested using both item and associative recognition tests. In the 
associative test, pairs of items are presented for test either in intact or recombined pairs 
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and the participant is required to give an ‘Old’ recognition response only to intact pairs. 
Familiarity is of no help to this type of associative judgment as all the items on the test are 
familiar; recollection is required to determine whether a pair is intact or recombined. 
Performance on this type of associative test can therefore be used to index recollection, 
and can be compared against performance on item recognition for the same set of stimuli 
as item recognition is considered to involve both recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 
2002). Item recognition and associative recognition can also be compared using a source 
monitoring procedure.  
 
In source monitoring participants are asked to judge some aspect of the context in which 
an item was originally presented, or from what source they learnt the item. For example 
this could be whether an item was written in a particular font/colour/size, was shown on 
the left or right of the screen, was spoken in a particular voice, or a combination of these 
contexts (e.g., Meiser & Bröder, 2002). Participants’ accuracy at retrieving this associative 
information is considered to index recollection (e.g., Wixted & Mickes, 2010), while their 
performance at identifying the item as old or new, regardless of whether their source 
judgment is correct, is taken as indexing both recollection and familiarity.  
 
An advantage of comparing associative and item performance over comparison of recall 
and recognition is that test items can be the same across both retrieval conditions, the 
only change being the information requested or judgment required of the participant. 
However, as Yonelinas (1999, 2002) highlights, performance on some associative tests, 
such as recency judgments (‘which list was this presented on, list 1 or list 2?’), may be 
influenced by familiarity as more recently studied items may be perceived as more familiar. 
In addition, the extent to which familiarity can contribute to associative recognition 
performance has been found to depend on whether the paired items or the item and the 
contextual information form a unified whole, with familiarity making a greater contribution 
to source memory if source and item information are unitized during encoding (Diana, 
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2008). 
 
Task-dissociation methods are of particular importance to experiments presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. Across the experiments presented in Chapter 3, three 
different type of recognition test are used: item recognition, associative 2-alternate-
forced-choice (2AFC) recognition, and non-associative 2-alternate-forced-choice (2AFC) 
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recognition. Within each of these test paradigms, experimental familiarity was 
manipulated in different ways and analysis examines how this influenced patterns of 
subjective experience. In Chapter 4, two experiments include measures of source memory 
and this objective measure of retrieval of context is compared to judgments concerning 
confidence and subjective experience.  
 
1.5.2. Process-estimate methods 
 
In contrast to task-dissociation methods where performance on different tasks is 
compared and inferences are made about the relative contributions of recollection and 
familiarity, process-estimate methods aim to provide quantitative estimates of the 
contribution of recollection and familiarity to overall recognition performance on a single 
task. There are three main process-estimate methods that have been used to examine 
recollection and familiarity parameters: the process-dissociation procedure, receiver-
operating characteristic curves, and the Remember-Know paradigm.  
 
1.5.2.1. Process-Dissociation-Procedure 
The process-dissociation-procedure (PDP) is an extension to associative recognition 
procedures, discussed above. The PDP was developed by Jacoby (1991) in conjunction with 
his dual-process model of memory. In the PDP, participants study two separate lists of 
items and are tested under both inclusion and exclusion conditions. Under inclusion 
conditions, participants are asked to recognise which items they had studied, regardless of 
whether they had been studied on List 1 or List 2. Under exclusion conditions, participants 
are asked to only respond ‘yes’ if they studied the item on a particular list, List 1 for 
example. Performance in the inclusion condition is taken to reflect both familiarity and 
recollection processes, as both may contribute towards accurate recognition. In contrast, 
performance in the exclusion condition is thought to reflect recollection, as recollection is 
required to determine which list the item was studied on. In the PDP, estimates of 
recollection and familiarity are therefore calculated by comparing inclusion and exclusion 
performance. The contribution of recollection to performance is estimated by subtracting 
proportion correct in the exclusion condition from proportion correct in the inclusion 
condition: R = P(Inclusion) – P(Exclusion). The contribution of familiarity to performance is 
calculated by dividing performance in the exclusion condition by 1 minus the probability of 
recollection: F = P(Exclusion)/(1 – R).  
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One potential problem with using the PDP to measure recollection and familiarity is that it 
involves a rather strict criterion for the measurement of recollection (Yonelinas, 2002). The 
only form of recollection which ‘counts’ in this paradigm is recollection which allows the 
individual to determine which list the item was shown on. Noncritical recollection, for 
example recalling that you pictured your favourite coffee shop when the word ‘café’ was 
shown, is not helpful unless it supports list discrimination. Unless you recall that you 
formed the image when ‘café’ was seen on List 1, as opposed to heard on List 2 (if 
encoding was manipulated in this way), or you recall that your image of the coffee shop 
was one of the earlier images you formed (and therefore it must have been on List 1), 
recollection of the visual image is not going to help you discriminate whether ‘café’ should 
be reported or not. Studies have demonstrated that this type of noncritical recollection can 
influence estimates of recollection and familiarity, particularly when the two study lists are 
purposely very similar and participants are able to recollect other details from the study 
lists which do not aid list discrimination (e.g., Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelly, 1997; Mulligan & 
Hirshman, 1997; Wagner, Gabrieli, & Verfaellie, 1997; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996). However, 
other studies have concluded that the incidence of this occurring is low in standard PDP 
paradigms (Yonelinas, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996).  
 
Yonelinas (2002) concludes that findings from the PDP converge with those of ROCs and 
the Remember-Know paradigm, which are detailed in the following sections, however, the 
similarity between the underlying assumptions of PDP and Remember-Know have been 
questioned. Gardiner, Java, and Richardson-Klavehn (1996) highlight that a major 
difference lies in that the Remember-Know procedure provides a first-person account of 
subjective experience, whereas the PDP account is third-person; and furthermore, that 
they differ in the way they define consciousness. For example, in their own comparison of 
these procedures Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings (1997) state that by focusing on 
subjective reports, the Remember-Know procedure “…identifies consciousness with 
awareness. The inclusion/exclusion procedure, in contrast, defines consciousness with 
reference to intentional control of responding” (p. 41). Gardiner et al. (1996) and 
Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, and Java (1996) conclude that it is more sensible to regard 
the Remember-Know paradigm and the PDP as different, but complementary, ways of 
exploring recollection and familiarity.  
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1.5.2.2. Receiver-Operating Characteristic curves 
Receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curves can be plotted on recognition data where 
responses are made at differing levels of confidence, e.g., 6 – ‘sure it was old’ to 1 –‘ sure it 
was new’. ROC curves plot correctly recognised targets (hits) against incorrectly recognised 
lures (false alarms) at each level of confidence or decision criterion. The first point on an 
ROC curve includes only the items at the highest level of confidence, i.e., the items eliciting 
a 6. The second point on the ROC includes both items eliciting the highest level of 
confidence and the items eliciting the next highest confidence, i.e., all the items assigned a 
5 or a 6. The shape of the ROC curve, the intercept with the y-axis, the area under the 
curve, and the slope of the zROC can then be calculated and compared across conditions. 
An example ROC and a zROC are plotted in Figure 1.2. Chance performance would be 
evidenced if the ROC was aligned on the diagonal (i.e., when hits are equal to false alarms), 
and the closer the ROC function gets to the upper left of the probability space, and the 
resulting greater area under the curve, the better the memory sensitivity or 
discriminability. A zROC is then used to quantify the shape of an ROC. The z-score of each 
hit and false alarm rate is calculated and plotted in z-space to produce a zROC. If the zROC 
is linear, then where it intercepts with the y-axis is taken as an estimate of recognition 
accuracy and the slope reflects the asymmetry of the ROC (Parks & Yonelinas, 2008). 
 
  
Figure 1.2. Example ROCs in probability space (left panel) and z-space (right panel) after 
Parks and Yonelinas (2008). The points in both panels represent pairs of hits and false 
alarms that are summed across a confidence scale ranging from 1 to 6, with 1 labelled 
‘Sure New’ and 6 labelled ‘Sure Old.’ Thus, the first point at the farthest left represents hits 
and false alarms for items given a confidence rating of 6. The next point represents hits 
and false alarms for items given a confidence rating of 5 and 6, and so on down the 
confidence scale. Nb., the final point (for 1 or ‘Sure New’) is not plotted because it is 
constrained to be (1,1). 
 
The analysis of ROC curves stems from signal detection theory (SDT) which assumes that a 
single process of familiarity or strength underlies recognition memory (see Section 1.4.3). 
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However, ROCs are now involved in the majority of models of recognition processes and 
the different models have different predictions regarding the shape of the ROC and the 
zROC (see Parks & Yonelinas, 2008; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007; for reviews). For example, 
because the EVSD model assumes that old and new distributions have the same shape, the 
model produces a symmetrical ROC that has a slope of 1.0 in z-space. In contrast, the UVSD 
model predicts asymmetrical ROCs with a slope in z-space of greater or less than 1.0 
because the variance in the distribution of old items can differ from that of new items. 
Regarding estimates of recollection and familiarity, these two models assume that 
Remember responses simply reflect high-confidence recognition (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; 
Hirshman & Master, 1997; Wixted & Stretch, 2004) and predict that Remember-Know data 
should fall on the same ROC curve that is observed in standard ROC recognition studies 
(Parks & Yonelinas, 2008).  
 
In contrast, the DPSD model predicts different ROC and zROC shapes depending on the 
relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to the type of recognition being tested. 
In item recognition, the model predicts curved asymmetrical ROCs that are pushed up on 
the left side due to the contribution of recollection to the symmetrical curve arising from 
the familiarity component. Additionally, the predicted item ROCs are approximately linear 
in z-space, however the threshold recollection process in the DPSD model leads the zROCs 
to be slightly U shaped (Glanzer et al., 1999; Parks & Yonelinas, 2008). For Remember-
Know judgments, this model again predicts that these data should map onto the same ROC 
curve as confidence (Parks & Yonelinas, 2008). 
 
In their reviews of ROC data from a wide range of recognition memory paradigms 
Yonelinas & Parks (2007; Parks & Yonelinas, 2008) concluded that single-component 
models of recognition memory do not adequately explain recognition and that there must 
be at least two processes underlying recognition. ROCs are at the centre of arguments 
regarding single- and dual-process models, but ROC analysis of data in the present thesis 
are not presented, as the focus was on manipulations of subjective awareness responses in 
different conditions and this was easier to interpret using measures of probability and 
ANOVA. 
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1.5.2.3. Remember-Know 
As discussed in Section 1.4.2.3 above, Tulving (1985) introduced the Remember-Know 
paradigm into the memory literature by asking his participants to report their state of 
awareness for each item as either Remembered or Known. Over the last 26 years the 
paradigm has been used to demonstrate a wide variety of dissociative effects of 
experimental manipulations on Remember and Know states or dissociative effects 
between subjective states when comparing different populations of participants. As the 
Remember-Know paradigm forms the basis for all the experiments presented in this thesis 
detailed discussion of this process-estimate method is undertaken in the following 
sections. 
 
1.6. THE REMEMBER-KNOW PARADIGM 
 
1.6.1. Experimental dissociations 
 
A wealth of studies have found evidence for experimental dissociations between 
Remembering and Knowing and four different patterns of results have been observed (for 
detailed reviews see Gardiner & Richardson-Klavenh, 2000, and Gardiner, 2008). Firstly, 
some experimental manipulations have been found to increase the proportion of 
Remember responses while not affecting Know responses. These manipulations typically 
include variables that engage more elaborative or conceptual processing at study. For 
example, increases in Remember responses have been found for deep versus shallow 
levels of processing, generation or vocalization versus reading of items at study (Gardiner, 
1988; Gregg & Gardiner, 1991), orthographically distinctive versus orthographically 
common words (Rajaram, 1998), repetition of items at study (Dewhurst & Anderson, 
1999), and for intentional versus incidental learning (Macken & Hampson, 1993). In 
addition, serial position effects have been shown to occur in Remembering but not in 
Knowing, and recall tests enhance later Remembering but do not improve Knowing (Jones 
& Roediger, 1995). 
 
Secondly, the opposite pattern, that Know responses increase while Remember responses 
are unaffected, has also been demonstrated, particularly in relation to increases in 
perceptual processing at study. For example, presenting identical (Rajaram, 1993) or 
associatively related (Rajaram & Geraci, 2000) primes prior to presentation of a test word, 
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implicit activation resulting from similar words being presented in a preceding lexical 
decision task (Dewhurst & Hitch, 1997), and suppression of focal attention (Mäntylä & 
Raudsepp, 1996) have all been shown to selectively enhance Know responses.  
 
Thirdly, some manipulations lead to increases in Know responses while Remember 
responses are reduced. For example, non-word versus word recognition (Gardiner & Java, 
1990), massed versus spaced repetitions of study list items (Parkin & Russo, 1993), and 
encoding faces with respect to their similarity versus encoding them with respect to their 
distinctiveness (Mäntylä, 1997) have all been found to elicit more Know responses and 
fewer Remember responses. Finally, the fourth pattern of results obtained through 
experimental manipulations is a parallel increase in both Remember and Know responses. 
This pattern has been demonstrated by manipulating response deadlines in recognition 
tests; both Remember and Know responses are increased in unspeeded compared to 
speeded recognition tests (Gardiner et al., 1999). 
 
These different patterns of Remember-Know findings demonstrate what is termed 
‘functional independence’ between Remembering and Knowing (Gardiner, 2008; Gardiner 
& Conway, 1999). Some variables affect Remembering but not Knowing; some variables 
affect Knowing but not Remembering; other variables have opposite effects on 
Remembering and Knowing; and yet other variables have similar effects on Remembering 
and Knowing. These functional dissociations have been taken as support for dual-process 
accounts by proponents of that viewpoint, however single-process protagonists such as 
Dunn (2004, 2008) have argued that the patterns observed can be explained using SDT 
models. 
 
1.6.2. Special populations 
 
In addition to experimental manipulations demonstrating dissociations between 
Remember and Know responses, dissociations are also evident in patterns of responding 
produced by different populations of participants. As mentioned in Section 1.3, reductions 
in recollection are considered to be one of the fundamental changes associated with 
decreased episodic memory performance in normal aging. This has been supported by 
experimental findings of older adults producing fewer Remember responses than younger 
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adults (Friedman & Trott, 2000; Java, 1996; Norman & Schacter, 1997; Parkin & Walter, 
1992; Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997; Perfect et al., 1995; Souchay et al., 2007). 
 
For example, Parkin and Walter (1992) and Experiment 1 of Perfect et al. (1995) found that 
younger adults assigned approximately two thirds of recognised items to the Remember 
category, compared to one-third for older adults. In these experiments, the reciprocal one 
third and two thirds of items respectively were accompanied by familiarity; therefore, 
aging was associated with both decreases in recollection and corresponding increases in 
familiarity (Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997). However, a different pattern of responding was 
demonstrated by Mäntylä (1993) who found that older adults showed less recollective 
experience than younger adults but level of familiarity did not differ between age groups. 
In Mäntylä’s task, recall cues had been self-generated at study and it was suggested that 
the stereotypic cues generated by older adults led to weaker encoding which then 
corresponded to a reduction of recollective experience at retrieval.  
 
This possibility of an encoding deficit leading to reductions in recollective experience was 
explored by Perfect and Dasgupta (1997) using a verbal ‘think aloud’ protocol at encoding. 
Older adults reported less recollective experience and were shown to differ from young 
adults in how they encoded study material. Older adults were more likely to report failing 
to come up with an encoding strategy, and were less likely to use elaborative encoding 
when the stimuli were non-words. Further analysis demonstrated that once the difference 
in encoding strategies was accounted for, there no longer remained any age differences in 
recollective experience. This link between quality of encoding and subjective experience at 
retrieval has recently been explored using the metacognitive measure of judgments-of-
learning (JOLs) made for items during study. Daniels, Toth, and Hertzog (2009; and also 
Souchay, Williams, Moulin, Isingrini, & Conway, 2006) instructed younger and older adults 
to predict the likelihood that they would retrieve an item later during study and then judge 
their retrieval as recollected or familiar at test. A strong association was found between 
prediction and level of recollection for younger adults, but the relationship was found to 
be much weaker for older adults, consistent with age-related deficits in recollection.  
 
In sum, these studies demonstrate that conscious awareness concerning both encoding 
and retrieval of items is implicated in age-related declines in memory performance. 
Furthermore, different patterns of findings regarding whether a decrease in Remembering 
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in aging is offset by an increase in Knowing, which can be used to support recognition 
performance, depends on how encoding strategies are controlled (Gardiner, 2008).  
 
Remembering has also been shown to be much reduced in conditions such as Alzheimer’s 
disease, amnesia, schizophrenia, and autism spectrum disorders. In these populations, 
while levels of Remembering are reduced, levels of Knowing are generally found to be 
unaffected or are affected to a much lesser extent than Remembering (Bowler et al., 2000; 
Dalla Barba, 1993, 1997; Huron et al., 1995; Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Schacter et al., 1997; 
Tanweer et al., 2009). As for older adults, the reduced levels of Remembering shown in 
these other populations are sometimes found to be offset by an increase in Knowing, 
resulting in no overall differences in memory performance between the population under 
study and the control group, e.g., in adults with Asperger’s syndrome (Bowler et al., 2000); 
whereas other comparisons have found reduced levels of both Remembering and Knowing 
(e.g., amnesic patients; Knowlton & Squire, 1995). 
 
The dissociations observed in these special populations using the Remember-Know 
paradigm are linked to the underlying changes in neurological functioning and/or anatomy 
for these groups. For example, the recollection deficits observed in aging have been linked 
to a decrease in frontal lobe functioning. Age-related neuronal loss has been found to be 
particularly pronounced in the frontal lobes (e.g., Haug & Eggers, 1991), and measures of 
frontal dysfunction such as performance on card sorting tasks and verbal fluency tasks 
have been shown to correlate with deficits in associative memory in aging (e.g., Craik, 
Morris, Morris, & Loewen, 1990; Fabiani & Friedman, 1996; Spencer & Raz, 1994) as well as 
with age-related decreases in Remember responses (Parkin & Walter, 1992; but see 
Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997). Further evidence linking behavioural responses to neurological 
findings are discussed in the following section. 
 
1.6.3. Evidence from neuropsychology 
 
Neuropsychological studies have demonstrated that patterns of recollection and familiarity 
impairment are related to patterns of brain damage in special populations, and functional 
neuroimaging has shown that different distributions of activation occur for different 
subjective experiences in normal functioning. Brief reviews of both are provided here; for 
comprehensive recent reviews see Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, and Ranganath (2007), Skinner 
Chapter 1 
42 
 
and Fernandes (2007), and Wais (2008). Comparing recall and recognition performance in 
patients with amnesia, brain damage that includes both the hippocampus and surrounding 
temporal lobe has been found to disrupt both recollection and familiarity. However, such 
brain damage has been found to be more disruptive for recollection, as indicated by more 
severe deficits for recall performance over recognition performance (e.g., Hirst, Johnson, 
Phelps, & Volpe, 1988; Isaac & Mayes, 1999; Johnson & Kim, 1985; Volpe, Holtzman, & 
Hirst, 1986). Furthermore, studies which have used Remember-Know, PDP, or ROC 
measures have shown that when temporal lobe damage is extensive, recollection is 
disrupted to a much greater extent than is familiarity (e.g., Blaxton & Theodore, 1997; 
Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Schacter, Verfaellie, & Pradere, 1996; Schacter, Verfaellie, & 
Anes, 1997; Verfaellie & Treadwell, 1993).  
 
If damage to the hippocampus is somewhat selective, some comparisons of recall and 
recognition performance suggest that recollection seems to be disrupted whereas 
familiarity is relatively spared (e.g., Aggleton & Shaw, 1996; Aggleton et al., 2000, 2005; 
Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001; Bowles et al., 2010; Hanley, Davies, Downes, 
& Mayes, 1994; Holdstock, et al., 2000; Jäger et al., 2009; Mayes, Holdstock, Isaac, Hunkin, 
& Roberts, 2002; Mayes, et al., 2001; Turriziani, Serra, Fadda, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 
2008; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Yonelinas et al., 2002); however, others have reported 
impairments in both recollection and familiarity (Cipolotti, et al., 2006; Gold et al., 2006; 
Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire, 2003; Wais, Wixted, Hopkins, & Squire, 2006). 
Differences in lesion extent and documentation, patient selection, the type of memory 
paradigm utilised, and overall memory impairment across studies have been identified as 
important factors to take into consideration in regard to the discrepancies in the literature 
(Bowles, et al., 2010). 
 
Distinct patterns of event-related potentials (ERPs) have also been associated with 
different subjective experiences. In general, correct responses to Old items elicit more 
positive-going ERPs than correctly rejected new items, termed the ‘Old-New’ effect (see 
Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & Allan, 2000, for reviews). This effect begins 
approximately 300 ms after the onset of the stimulus and may last for several hundreds of 
milliseconds. Within this effect, several important subcomponents have been identified. 
For example, an early mid-frontal Old-New effect (300-500 ms), often called the “FN400”, 
which is thought to reflect familiarity; and a slightly later effect (400-800 ms) which is 
Chapter 1 
43 
 
maximal over (left) parietal regions and is thought to index recollection (Curran & Doyle, 
2011; Johansson, Mecklinger, & Treese, 2004; and see reviews by Curran, Tepe, & Piatt, 
2006; Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Mecklinger, 2000, 2006; Rugg & Curran, 2007;). This later 
parietal effect, also referred to as the late positive component (LPC), has been associated 
with a variety of behavioural responses indicating recollection including both accurate 
source recognition (Senkfor & Van Petten, 1998; Wilding & Rugg, 1996), and Remember 
responses (Curran, 2004; Düzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze, & Tulving, 1997; Rugg, 
Schloerscheidt, & Mark, 1998; Smith, 1993; Trott, Friedman, Ritter, Fabiani, & Snodgrass, 
1999).  
 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
can locate activity related to different recognition experiences. Indexing recollection by 
looking at encoding has found activity in the prefrontal, parahippocampal, and fusiform 
regions to be greater for items that later go on to be assigned to Remember rather than to 
Know (Wagner, Koutstaal, & Schacter, 1999; Henson, et al., 1999). Activations throughout 
the medial temporal lobe (MTL), including the hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus, 
are found to predict subsequent free recall (Strange, Otten, Josephs, Rugg, & Dolan, 2002). 
Furthermore, hippocampal regions have been shown to be more active during encoding of 
pairs of items than during encoding of single items (e.g., Henke, Weber, Kneifel, Wieser, & 
Buck, 1999), and hippocampal activity has been found to be correlated with successful 
performance on source memory tests, thought to depend on recollection, whereas 
perirhinal cortex (PRc) activity has been shown to be correlated with item familiarity (e.g., 
Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Ranganath, et al., 2004; 
Tendolkar et al., 2008; Weis et al., 2004). 
 
Similar patterns of activity have been observed at retrieval also. Bilateral hippocampal and 
parahippocampal regions have been shown to be related to associative recognition, which 
is more reliant on recollection, but not to item recognition, to which recollection and 
familiarity processes contribute (Yonelinas, Hopfinger, Buonocore, Kroll, & Baynes, 2001). 
In addition, left hippocampal and parahippocampal activation has been associated with 
Remember as opposed to Know responses (Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski, Bookheimer, & 
Engel, 2000; Henson et al., 1999). In the prefrontal cortex, left anterior prefrontal regions 
have also been found to be more active for Remembered items compared to Known items 
(Henson et al., 1999), though the same pattern was not found by Eldridge et al. (2000). Left 
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anterior prefrontal regions have also been shown to be preferentially active in associative 
recognition compared to item recognition tests (Nolde, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 1998; 
Ranganath, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 2000; Raye, Johnson, Michell, Nolde, & D’Esposito, 
2000). These findings suggest that left anterior prefrontal regions are involved in 
discriminations based on recollection to a greater extent than those based on familiarity.  
 
In their review of the neuroimaging literature examining recollection and familiarity 
processes, Eichenbaum et al. (2007) conclude that the hippocampus is critical for 
recollection but not familiarity and that the parahippocampal cortex also contributes to 
recollection. In contrast, the perirhinal cortex is principally involved in familiarity-based 
recognition.  
 
However, Wais (2008) questioned this conclusion and proposed that it resulted from the 
use of dual-process theory to interpret the results. Wais suggested that instead of indexing 
recollection and familiarity processes, the behavioural methods employed in the reviewed 
studies (e.g., Remember-Know) actually differentiated strong from weak memories. Wais 
(2008) performed a meta-analysis on 17 fMRI studies and demonstrated the same patterns 
of activation discussed above. However, he posited that when interpreted in terms of 
reflecting strong and weak memory rather than recollection and familiarity, the results do 
not suggest that the hippocampus or adjacent MTL structures are related to particular 
recognition processes (see also Squire, Wixted, & Clark, 2007, and Wais et al., 2006). In 
contrast to this viewpoint, Diana, Yonelinas, Ranganath (2010) have recently demonstrated 
that activation in the perirhinal cortex was related to successful retrieval of item details, 
whereas activation in the hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex was associated with 
recollection-based source retrieval. They concluded that this pattern of results is consistent 
with the idea that different MTL regions process different types of episodic information, 
and cannot be accounted for by memory strength. 
 
These recent reviews and experimental findings demonstrate that while many areas have 
been demonstrated to be involved in recognition memory, the neural substrates of 
recollection and familiarity are not yet clearly delineated. Critically, interpretations of 
neuroimaging data are tied up within the pervading dual- versus single-process debate. 
Thus, a greater understanding of the basis of subjective report and the factors which 
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influence Remember and Know responses is likely to be critical for the interpretation of 
neuroimaging studies. 
 
1.6.4. Comparisons with confidence judgments 
 
One type of manipulation that is particularly interesting for the dual- versus single-process 
debate is when patterns of responses for Remember-Know judgments and confidence 
judgments are compared. As discussed above, single-process viewpoints suggest that 
recognition of items depends on the underlying strength of the memory trace or 
confidence in memory and that conceptualising two underlying processes does not add to 
our understanding of recognition processes (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004). However, 
experiments that have compared Remember-Know and confidence judgments have shown 
different patterns of responding elicited by these two judgment types.  
 
In early studies comparing confidence and Remember-Know, confidence was 
operationalised as a two-category scale of Sure-Unsure and proportion of items assigned 
to these two categories were compared against proportion assigned to Remember and 
Know. Gardiner and Java (1990) compared subjective experience judgments and 
confidence judgments to words and non-words in two separate experiments and 
demonstrated that these two types of judgment did not respond equivalently to word and 
non-word recognition. More Remember judgments were assigned to words compared to 
non-words while more Know judgments were made to non-words compared to words. In 
comparison, this interaction between word type and response was not found when Sure-
Unsure judgments were made instead of Remember-Know judgments. Rajaram (1993) 
observed similar patterns comparing Sure-Unsure and Remember-Know judgments using a 
masked-priming manipulation. This manipulation led to increases in Know judgments while 
Remember judgments were unaffected. However, in a separate experiment where 
participants made Sure-Unsure judgments these differences were not found and levels of 
Unsure judgments did not differ across manipulations of perceptual fluency. These 
experiments were replicated by Tunney and Fernie (2007) with the addition of a Guess 
category for both subjective experience and confidence judgments. While patterns of 
responses were somewhat different across the priming manipulation, patterns of 
subjective experience and confidence responses again demonstrated that these two 
judgment types are not equivalent.  
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In a later set of experiments, Rajaram, Hamilton, and Bolton (2002) also replicated 
Gardiner and Java’s (1990) word/non-word findings using a within-subjects design instead 
of a between-subjects design and in addition performed a between-subjects replication 
comparing amnesic patients and matched controls. This experiment demonstrated that 
while control participants produced the same patterns of results as participants in the 
within-subjects experiment, patterns of responses differed for amnesic patients. When 
making confidence judgments, patients’ responses matched those of controls as they 
made more Sure than Unsure responses to both words and non-words. However, for 
subjective experience judgments patients did not show the crossover effect that words 
received more Remember responses while non-words received more Know responses. 
Amnesic patients’ responses were evenly split across Remember and Know categories. 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that while judgments of confidence and 
subjective experience may be interrelated, Remember-Know judgments are not made 
solely on the basis of confidence and the two judgment types are not “experimentally 
interchangeable” (Rajaram et al., 2002, p. 234).  
 
Other experiments have compared Remember-Know and confidence judgments using a 
larger scale to measure confidence and have analysed them using ROC curves. Using this 
methodology, higher confidence has been consistently found to be associated with 
Remember responses, compared to Know responses (Rotello et al., 2004; Rotello, 
Macmillan, Reeder, & Wong, 2005; Slotnick, 2010; Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Yonelinas, 
2001a; Yonelinas et al., 1996). Although these results are interesting for the single- versus 
dual-process debate, these studies have different numbers of confidence levels and 
subjective experience categories and therefore participants’ response distributions for the 
two cannot be directly compared as was done when confidence was operationalised as 
Sure-Unsure. 
 
Results from experiments comparing subjective experience and confidence judgments 
have been analysed, meta-analysed, and been subjected to different modelling approaches 
in order to determine whether they can be explained by single-process models (e.g., 
Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004, 2008; Gardiner, et al., 2002; Macmillan, Rotello, Verde, 
2005). Gardiner (2008) highlights that this debate involves many technical arguments 
concerning the appropriateness of the various different assumptions and statistical 
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measures available for use in signal detection models. The current thesis does not aim to 
resolve this debate. When confidence and subjective experience are compared in 
experiments presented in Chapter 4, these judgments are taken at face value and 
conceptualised as reflecting the underlying awareness available to the participant for that 
item. Critically, the experiments in Chapter 4 also allow the subjective measures of 
confidence and subjective experience to be compared against source accuracy as a more 
objective measure of recollection. 
 
1.6.5. Measurement issues within the Remember-Know paradigm 
 
In the 26 years since Tulving (1985) introduced the Remember-Know paradigm researchers 
have tried and tested a number of variations on the paradigm and how best to calculate 
estimates of recollection and familiarity. Procedural questions include whether recognition 
and Remember-Know are best performed using one-step or two-step procedures and if 
this influences performance. A further question regards whether the original two 
categories of Remembering and Knowing are sufficient or whether other states of 
awareness can be identified. These measurement and procedural issues are discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
1.6.5.1. One-step or two-step? 
Hicks and Marsh (1999), Eldridge, Sarfatti, and Knowlton (2002), and Bruno and Rutherford 
(2010) have all examined whether recognition accuracy and patterns of responding differ if 
one-step or two-step recognition procedures are used. Two-step procedures involve 
separate judgments of recognition (Old-New) and subjective experience (Remember-
Know(-Guess) – see Section 1.6.5.2 regarding inclusion of a Guess option). At test, 
participants initially judge whether they recognise an item, and then only if they do 
recognise the item are they asked to judge their state of awareness regarding that 
recognition. One-step procedures combine the recognition judgment with the judgment of 
subjective experience. Participants are asked to judge whether an item is Remembered, 
Known, or New. As discussed by Hicks and Marsh (1999), psychologically it might be easier 
for participants to weigh the evidence separately for recognition and subjective experience 
in a two-step procedure as opposed to having to consider all three subjective states 
simultaneously in a one-step procedure. Thus performance accuracy might be better for 
two-step procedures as opposed to one-step. Hicks and Marsh (1999) were also interested 
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in whether asking participants to judge subjective experience in either one-step or two-
step procedures influenced their recognition performance. Perhaps asking participants to 
think about their subjective experience underlying recognition of each item might increase 
their metacognitive awareness and thereby their recognition performance? Alternatively, 
it could increase the difficulty of the task for participants and reduce performance 
accuracy?  
 
Hicks and Marsh (1999) compared recognition memory performance on a conventional 
Old-New recognition memory test with performance on using a one-step and two-step 
procedures. They examined hit rates, false alarm rates, SDT accuracy measures (d’ and A’) 
and response criterion (c and   
   indexes). Their results demonstrated that hit and false 
alarm rates with a conventional Old-New recognition test and a two-step Remember-Know 
procedure were equivalent, demonstrating that including Remember and Know as post-
recognition judgments did not influence memory performance. However, hit and false 
alarm rates in the Old-New test and the two-step procedure were lower than with the one-
step procedure. Additionally, Hicks and Marsh (1999) found that the one-step procedure 
provided more hits judged Remember than the two-step procedure. However, they also 
found that the one-step procedure also provided more false alarms judged as Remember 
and Know than the two-step procedure. Hicks and Marsh suggested that the more liberal 
response criterion observed in the one-step procedure was due to the greater difficulty of 
assessing all three states of awareness simultaneously in this task. Overall however, when 
both hit and false alarm rates were taken into account, none of the recognition test 
procedures resulted in differences in accuracy. 
 
Eldridge et al. (2002) obtained similar results to those of Hicks and Marsh (1999). Fewer 
Know false alarms were obtained using the two-step procedure than using the one-step 
procedure and Know accuracy (A’) did not differ from chance using the one-step 
procedure. However, Bruno and Rutherford (2010) recently criticised the accuracy 
statistics employed in these two studies (d’ and A’) and suggested that measuring 
recognition accuracy using da is preferable because it as a truly unbiased measure of 
recognition accuracy (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 
 
Bruno and Rutherford’s (2010) results demonstrated no differences in overall recognition 
accuracy between one-step and two-step procedures using either d’ or da measures. 
Chapter 1 
49 
 
However, in line with the findings of Eldridge et al. (2002) and Hicks and Marsh (1999), 
differences were obtained for Know hits and false alarms using the different procedures. A 
greater proportion of items were assigned to Know as both hits and false alarms in the 
one-step procedure than in the two-step procedure. In addition, overall hit and false alarm 
rates were found to be higher in the one-step procedure than in the two-step procedure. 
This suggests that participants were more liberal in their response criterion in the one-step 
procedure, as was found by Hicks and Marsh (1999). 
 
These findings suggest that when overall recognition accuracy is the primary measure of 
interest no differences are obtained through use of a one-step procedure in comparison to 
a two-step procedure. However, if you are more interested in the experiential states 
underlying recognition and how participants are using Remember and Know response 
options in different experimental conditions, these two methods have been shown to 
produce different patterns of responding, primarily for assignment of hits and false alarms 
to Know. In addition, if the focus is in measuring reaction time (RT) for recognition 
judgments separation of the recognition decision from the judgment of subjective 
experience, as in a two-step procedure, is critical for isolating the time taken to perform 
these separate processes. Reaction times for recognition decisions are analysed 
categorised by their subsequent post-recognition judgment in experiments presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. Moreover, in a novel analysis in Chapter 4, RTs for post-
recognition judgments were also measured. Analysis of recognition decision and judgment 
RTs are examined in terms of what the timing of responses can reveal about how people 
understand and make judgments of subjective experience. 
 
1.6.5.2. Permitting guessing 
In addition to comparing results obtained using one-step and two-step procedures, 
Eldridge et al. (2002) and Bruno and Rutherford (2010) also compared performance when 
participants were permitted to guess. A Guess category was first introduced to the 
Remember-Know paradigm by Mäntylä (1993), but papers by Gardiner and colleagues 
were the first that specifically set out to compare results from Remember-Know paradigms 
that did and did not allow Guess responses (Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; 
Gardiner, Kaminska, Dixon, & Java, 1996; and Gardiner, Richardson-Klavehn, & Ramponi, 
1997). 
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Gardiner, Java et al. (1996) identified that inconsistencies in false alarm rates for Know 
responses in previous studies exploring levels-of-processing (LOP) effects may have been 
due to differences in the extent to which participants reported responses as Know when in 
fact they were guessing (cf. Rajaram, 1993; Jacoby et al., 1997). Gardiner, Java et al. (1996) 
allowed participants to report Guesses in their LOP experiment and demonstrated that 
accuracy of Guess responses was no different from chance. For Remember and Know 
responses they observed similar patterns of responding as obtained in a prior study by 
Gardiner (1988) where participants had been strongly discouraged from guessing and a 
Guess option was not provided. They concluded that participants sometimes use Know 
responses as a substitute for guesses when guessing is neither deliberately prohibited nor 
allowed, but when a Guess response option is provided Know responses demonstrate 
memory for the experimental episode whereas Guesses show no discriminative power.  
 
Moreover, Gardiner et al. (1997) demonstrated that effects of a response criteria 
manipulation on patterns of Know responses by Strack and Förster (1995) were removed 
when a Guess option was permitted. Strack and Förster (1995) had concluded that 
patterns of Know responding were influenced by factors other than memory for the study 
episode; for example, judgmental strategies relating to response rates. In contrast, 
Gardiner et al. (1997) demonstrated that only Guess responses were affected by such 
factors.  
 
This conclusion was supported by a later study that examined participants’ reports of their 
conscious experiences underlying Remember, Know, and Guess responses. Gardiner, 
Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1998) found that justifications for Guesses showed 
evidence of various inferences and other judgmental strategies which were not directly 
related to the individual’s memory for a studied word. In particular, Guess justifications 
often reflected familiarity with the items from some source other than the study episode, 
e.g., “Holiday: I am eager to go on holiday so I am not sure whether I saw it here or 
whether I was thinking about it”; or strategic responding based on inferences regarding the 
type of words that were on the studied list, e.g., “Harp: It seemed that there were quite a 
few musical instruments, so I took a guess that it came up” (both p. 8). Importantly, Know 
justifications did not include any evidence of use of inferences or judgmental strategies. In 
the present thesis, the justifications reported by Gardiner et al.’s participants were used as 
stimuli for all four experiments reported in Chapter 2, which examines layperson’s 
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understanding of experiential states and their experimental terminology. Additional 
findings from Gardiner et al. (1998) such as differences between Remember and Know 
justifications are therefore discussed in detail in that chapter. 
 
The issue of whether inclusion of a Guess option alters patterns of responding was also 
examined by Eldridge et al. (2002) and Bruno and Rutherford (2010) in their comparisons 
of one-step and two-step procedures. Eldridge et al. (2002) demonstrated that including a 
Guess response in a one-step procedure increased accuracy of Know responses due to the 
removal of experimental ‘noise’ caused by participants assigning guesses to the Know 
category. This also led to a reduction of the false alarm rate for Know responses and an 
improvement in overall accuracy (A’). Bruno and Rutherford (2010) also found a reduction 
in false alarm rate for Know responses when a Guess option was included in a one-step 
procedure, however this was not accompanied by an improvement in overall accuracy 
when measured by da instead of A’. Bruno and Rutherford (2010) concluded that, using 
unbiased statistical comparisons, accuracy is not influenced by whether participants are 
permitted to Guess. However, as in the one-step versus two-step comparison above, if 
your primary interest is reports of subjective experience as opposed to overall memory 
accuracy, inclusion of a Guess category is beneficial as it reduces the likelihood that 
participants will assign guesses to the Know category (Gardiner, 2008).  
 
1.6.5.3. Fractionation of Knowing and Familiarity 
Whilst the addition of a Guess response option is now pretty standard in Remember-Know 
experiments, how Know responses are conceptualised varies greatly across studies. In their 
review of the Remember-Know literature in 2000, Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn 
identified interpretation of Know responses as “the most vexatious problem in the 
remember/know paradigm” (p. 238). The root of this problem lies in, firstly, whether Know 
responses are defined to participants in terms of familiarity or certainty; and relatedly, 
whether Know responses are interpreted as reflecting an underlying process of familiarity 
or a state of knowing.  
 
A number of researchers have acknowledged this problem and have attempted to clarify 
how they defined and interpreted Know responses in their experiments. For example, 
some researchers choose to ask participants to make Remember-Familiar judgments 
instead of Remember-Know. Dobbins, Kroll, and Liu (1998, p. 1309) state “We chose to use 
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the word ‘familiar’ because students often confuse the more standard ‘know’ response 
with an expression of high confidence”. Similarly, Donaldson, MacKenzie, and Underhill 
(1996) assert “…familiar rather than know was used to indicate nonrecollection, because 
the word know carries a connotation of certainty that is inconsistent with a confidence 
rating that indicates lack of certainty. Participants find it hard to say that they are unsure 
that an item was there but that they know it was.” (p. 487, italics in original). Other 
researchers choose to encompass both familiarity and knowing within one response 
category, for example, Kelley and Jacoby (1998) define Knowing as “…the inability to 
recollect any details of the study presentation in combination with a feeling of familiarity 
or certainty that the word was studied” (p. 134, italics added). The issue of how Know 
responses are defined and interpreted is not helped by the fact that many research 
reports, including those by Dobbins, Kroll, and Liu (1998) and Donaldson et al. (1996) 
above, do not publish the exact wording that was used to define response categories to 
participants.  
 
To overcome the problem of the concepts of familiarity and knowing being encompassed 
in one response option Conway et al. (1997) added a separate ‘Familiar’ category to their 
participants’ response options. Conway et al.’s (1997) experiment was a longitudinal study 
of student learning. In piloting their materials they found that for some multiple-choice 
questions (MCQs) students reported that their subjective state for an answer was one of 
neither recollection or familiarity, instead they felt that they ‘just knew’ the answer. In 
their conceptualisation of this subjective state, Conway et al. draw attention to two 
different bases of familiarity. Typically familiarity is considered to arise from a feeling that 
an item has been encountered recently, but without any recollection of the encounter. 
This feeling of familiarity leads participants to believe that the item was one they studied. 
However, Conway and colleagues point out that familiarity can also arise from having 
encountered an item frequently, as opposed to recently and uniquely. In this case an item 
may come to mind without recollection, but also without the feeling of a recent encounter 
which cannot be identified. Here, the item has become semanticised in memory and the 
subjective state accompanying recognition is one of ‘knowing’. This is akin to the original 
conceptualisation of Remembering and Knowing reflecting retrieval from episodic and 
semantic memory systems respectively (Tulving, 1985).  
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In Conway et al.’s (1997) study, students took MCQ exams following four psychology 
lecture courses and one course, Introduction to Psychology, was later retested. At initial 
testing higher performing students were found to designate more answers as 
Remembered than did poorer performing students, however at re-test this pattern had 
reversed and higher performing students assigned more answers to Know than they did to 
Remember. Conway et al. discuss this ‘R-to-K shift’ as reflecting a change in knowledge 
representation from episodic to semantic memory brought about by loss of episodic details 
from memory and the emergence of conceptual organisation. Students initially performed 
better when they could recollect some element of the learning episode, but six months 
later students performed better when their knowledge of psychology concepts had 
become more semantic in nature.  
 
Evidence of the R-to-K shift has been demonstrated in similar studies of student learning 
by Barber, Rajaram, and Marsh (2008) and Herbert and Burt (2001, 2003, 2004). Herbert 
and Burt (2003) examined the effects of different review opportunities on the R-to-K shift, 
comparing combinations of MCQs and short-answer questions (SA). Participants who had 
been given the most varied opportunity for re-study (MCQ plus SA) showed greater 
evidence of an R-to-K shift. They concluded that schematisation of knowledge was 
facilitated when students underwent regular testing as this gave them the opportunity to 
review their knowledge; and enhanced when a variety of test formats were used. The 
conclusion that the R-to-K shift reflected a schematisation of knowledge which enhanced 
performance was supported by results from a separate assessment of quality of student 
learning included by Herbert and Burt (2001, 2003) in their studies. 
 
In a study exploring learning of rare words definitions, Dewhurst, Conway, and Brandt 
(2009) also found a shift from Remembering to Knowing over time. Participants were 
tested at delays of five minutes, four weeks, eight weeks, and six months, and the 
proportion of Remember responses was found to dominate on the first test and decrease 
on subsequent tests, while Know responses increased. Dewhurst et al. (2009) also found 
that Remember and Know responses did not differ in accuracy or confidence, though both 
were significantly more accurate and associated with higher levels of confidence than 
Familiar and Guess responses. This further validates the separation of the Know and 
Familiar categories of subjective awareness. Taken together, these findings demonstrate 
that people are able to consciously appreciate the differences between the experiential 
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states of Remember, Know, Familiar, Guess; and that, for a range of materials, the 
subjective experiences associated with learning demonstrate consistent patterns over 
time. 
 
It could be argued that the separation of Know and Familiar might only apply to learning 
paradigms with rich materials such as used by Conway et al. (1997) and Herbert and Burt 
(2001, 2003, 2004). In typical recognition memory experiments, which use lists of words as 
the to-be-studied material and recognition is only measured at one time point, participants 
are not able to integrate or semanticise the studied information into any body of 
knowledge and therefore the experiential state of ‘Knowing’ might not appear to be 
applicable. However, Dewhurst et al. (2009) were interested in whether the R-to-K shift 
would be observed for less ‘meaningful’ materials and asked participants to learn rare 
words and their definitions specifically because these were unrelated facts that would be 
less easy to integrate into a wider schema. While these materials are arguably more 
meaningful than lists of words, they are still less meaningful than the academic material 
used in previous studies. In Dewhurst et al.’s (2009) study, participants assigned 10% of 
items to Know the first time they were tested, a situation which is analogous to a single-
time-point recognition experiment. While this proportion is a lot lower than the 22% 
assigned to Know in Conway et al.’s (1997) study, it demonstrates that even for less 
meaningful learning, participants considered that the Know response reflected their 
experiential state for some items only five minutes after study and with no opportunity for 
integration into a wider body of knowledge2. These 10% of unrelated facts were ‘just 
known’ without any recollection or feelings of familiarity regarding the study episode only 
a short time after said study episode. This suggests that the separation of Know and 
Familiar might also be applicable to the subjective experiences associated with learning of 
materials in more typical recognition paradigms such as words, names, and paired-
associates where the materials have lower intrinsic meaning. A key theme of the current 
thesis is to examine whether the separated concepts of Knowing and Familiarity have any 
utility in standard episodic recognition memory paradigms, and indeed whether there may 
be differences between Know and Familiar in the same way that there are differences 
                                                          
 
2
 Additionally, in Dewhurst et al. (2009) 78% of correct responses at Time 1 were Remembered so 
there were only 28% of items which could be assigned to any other category of subjective 
experience. 
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between Remember and Know. To this end, all four subjective experience response 
categories are employed in all experiments.  
 
1.6.5.4. Other variations on Remember-Know categories 
Other researchers, particularly those interested in the neural correlates of recollection and 
familiarity have modified the Remember-Know categories in other ways. Using complex 
scenes as stimuli, Montaldi, Spencer, Roberts, and Mayes (2006) trained participants to 
distinguish between recollection and three levels of familiarity: very weak familiarity, 
moderate familiarity, and strong familiarity. Using fMRI, Montaldi et al. demonstrated 
patterns of neural activation that increased or decreased linearly as familiarity increased 
from weak to strong. In addition, hippocampal activity was not modulated by changes in 
familiarity; the hippocampus was only activated for items that were recollected. Using a 
similar paradigm where participants were instructed to assign recollected items to 
Remember and non-recollected items to four levels of confidence, Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, 
and Rugg (2005) also observed patterns of neural activity that increased or decreased 
linearly with increasing familiarity and that were differentiated from the neural activity 
associated with recollection.  
 
In an eyewitness memory paradigm, Palmer et al. (2010) also adapted the typical 
Remember-Know judgment. Their procedure involved participants viewing a 3-minute 
video and later being asked to identify one male and one female ‘suspect’ from line-ups. 
Participants rated the confidence of their identification and were asked whether their 
identification was based on Remembering or Knowing. Additionally, participants were 
asked to justify their subjective experience judgment and these justifications were 
independently classified by trained raters as providing evidence of relevant recollection. 
Relevant recollection was that which contained clear and convincing evidence that the 
participant recollected contextual details from their previous exposure to the target in the 
video, e.g., “I remember seeing her outside the bank”. Non-relevant recollection included 
responses that indicated the absence of recollection, e.g., “she seemed familiar”, or 
uncertainty, e.g., “I remember a girl at a bank, but I’m not sure if it was her in the lineup” 
[sic]. In this strict classification procedure, responses that claimed the recollection of 
contextual detail but did not provide any specificity about the detail recalled, e.g., “I 
remember his face” or “I remember what she was doing in the video” were also classified 
as non-relevant recollection-based responses. Taking confidence ratings, Remember-Know 
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judgments, and recollection ratings into account, results demonstrated that positive 
identifications accompanied by Remember judgments were more likely to be accurate than 
those accompanied by Know judgments; however, further analysis demonstrated that 
taking Remember-Know responses into account did not improve identification accuracy 
beyond that found by examining confidence ratings. Critically however, considering 
relevant and non-relevant recollection statements was found to improve identification 
accuracy beyond that achieved by examining confidence ratings.  
 
While the procedures employed by Palmer et al. (2010), Montaldi et al. (2006), and 
Yonelinas et al. (2005) do not map directly onto the four states of subjective experience, 
Remember, Know, Familiar, Guess, used in the present thesis, they do demonstrate that 
other researchers are exploring alternatives to the dichotomous Remember-Know 
paradigm and the underlying theoretical suggestion that there are additional states of 
subjective awareness accessible for study. In particular, the Palmer et al. (2010) 
experiment demonstrates that participants are able to consciously access more 
information than is elucidated by a standard Remember-Know judgment and this further 
information can be diagnostic of memory accuracy. This is also being explored by 
proponents of the argument that recollection is a continuous process. For example, Wixted 
(2010; Wixted & Mickes, 2010) asked participants to make a Remember-Know judgment in 
conjunction with a 20-point confidence judgment and a judgment of source. His findings 
demonstrated that when only the highest confidence Remember and Know judgments 
were compared they were equally accurate in terms of recognition sensitivity, however 
they were accompanied by different levels of source accuracy. The relationship between 
confidence, accuracy, source, and recollective experience is the focus of experiments 
presented in Chapter 4. Critically, these experiments aimed to examine the relationship 
between source accuracy and the separated subjective experience categories of Know and 
Familiar, as well as Remember, and the overlap between objective and subjective reports 
concerning retrieval of contextual details.  
 
1.7. AIMS OF THIS THESIS 
 
The central aim of this thesis was to explore how people make and understand judgments 
of subjective experience. Within this, the experiments presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
explore lay conceptions of subjective awareness, how participants overcome experimental 
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familiarity, and the relationships between source, confidence, and subjective experience 
respectively.  
 
The key themes of this thesis are: How should the subjective experiences of Know and 
Familiar be defined and understood in recognition memory? What is the relationship 
between confidence and subjective experience? And how do objective manipulations 
influence subjective experience? How each of these key themes is explored in Chapters 2, 
3, and 4 is outlined below.  
 
The first aim of the current experiments was to explore how Know and Familiar subjective 
experiences can be differentiated. This was examined in terms of lay interpretations based 
on reports of others’ memory experiences (Chapter 2); how manipulations of familiarity 
(Chapter 3) and confidence (Chapter 2) influence Know and Familiar responding; and the 
accuracy, confidence, source accuracy, and speed with which people make Know and 
Familiar responses (Chapters 3 and 4). These experiments permit the examination of how 
the separate Know and Familiar categories of subjective experience are used in 
straightforward single-item episodic recognition memory tasks and whether there are 
differences between Know and Familiar in the same way that there are differences 
between Remember and Know. 
 
The second aim of this thesis was to examine the relationship between confidence and 
subjective experience. Lay interpretations of others’ memory experiences were explored in 
terms of confidence ratings and assignment of memory experience justifications to 
categories of subjective experience when confidence is manipulated (Chapter 2). The 
influence that confidence and subjective experience judgments have on each other when 
the two judgments are made consecutively post-recognition is then examined along with 
the relationship between these two subjective judgment types and source accuracy as an 
objective measure of retrieval of contextual detail (Chapter 4). Here the primary question 
of interest is how participants interpret and act upon the relationship between confidence 
and subjective experience. 
 
The final aim of this thesis was to investigate how subjective experience responses are 
influenced by objective manipulations of confidence (Chapter 2), familiarity (Chapter 3), 
and source (Chapter 4). An additional methodological point of interest here is whether any 
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influence of objective manipulations is dependent on whether the manipulation was 
carried out within- or between-subjects (see Section 3.1.5). The influence of objective 
manipulations on subjective experience responses is crucial to theoretical interpretations 
of how people understand their memory experiences.  
 
While findings from these experiments may add to support for dual-process and/or single-
process accounts of recognition, and are discussed in relation to these theoretical accounts 
where appropriate, this thesis did not set out to provide evidence in support of one 
particular viewpoint. Rather, the primary focus of the experiments presented here is the 
conscious awareness that people are able to access during recognition. In this thesis, 
reports of experiential state are taken at face value and analysis is interested in how, why, 
and when, participants retrieve items with particular subjective awareness. 
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2. USING LAY CONCEPTIONS OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE TO EXPLORE REMEMBERING 
AND KNOWING, AND FINDING FAMILIAR  
 “I did not rely much on the confidence ratings when I made 'Remember'  
judgements. However, I tended to rely more on the confidence ratings when I  
was hesitating between one of the three other categories, in the cases where  
subject's [sic] justifications were more fuzzy.”  
(Participant 83, Experiment 2.3) 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between subjective experience and confidence of 
recognition by exploring how lay-people interpret others’ memory experiences. Using 
three internet-based questionnaires, the relationship between subjective experience and 
confidence was examined (Experiment 2.1) and manipulated (Experiments 2.2 and 2.3) to 
assess to what extent people understand memory experiences in terms of confidence and 
how this interacts with use of the subjective experience categories of Remember, Know, 
Familiar, and Guess. Using a laboratory task, Experiment 2.4 explored the legitimacy of 
separating the classic Know category of subjective experience into separate Know and 
Familiar categories. 
 
2.1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
As described in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4.4), advocates of a single-process viewpoint such as 
Dunn (2004, 2008) posit that instead of Remember and Know responses reflecting two 
different underlying memory processes or subjective experiences they reflect different 
strengths on a single scale of memory trace or confidence. This contentious relationship 
between Remember-Know judgments and confidence has been around since the 
formulation of the Remember-Know paradigm by Tulving (1985) who, in the very first use 
of the paradigm, demonstrated that Remember responses were associated with higher 
confidence ratings than Know responses. This has been explored and replicated in a variety 
of experimental paradigms (e.g., Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Rajaram, 
1993; Rajaram et al., 2002; Rotello & Zeng, 2008; and Yonelinas, 2001a). Comparison of 
experimental confidence and subjective experience judgments is the focus of Chapter 4. 
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Although the relationship between subjective experience and confidence has been 
acknowledged from the conception of the paradigm, and has been the subject of much 
debate between single-process and dual-process theorists, how the lay-person 
understands, conceptualises, and acts upon subjective experiences of memory and 
confidence in memory are still not understood. 
 
An obstacle to gaining insight into lay-peoples’ understanding of subjective experiences of 
memory is that researchers have not been consistent in how they define categories of 
subjective experience. Previous research has shown that even subtle differences in 
Remember-Know procedures can lead to significant differences in how people assign 
responses to Remember and Know (e.g., Bastin & Van der Linden, 2003; Bodner & Lindsay, 
2003; Gardiner et al., 1997; Geraci & McCabe, 2006; Kihlstrom, Kim & Dabady, 1996; 
McCabe & Balota, 2007; Norman & Schacter, 1997; Rotello et al., 2005; Strack & Förster, 
1995). As stressed by McCabe and Geraci (2009), it is of critical importance to ensure that 
Remember-Know instructions are consistent across research studies due to the ongoing 
theoretical debates around interpretation of Remember-Know judgments and inferences 
based on meta-analyses and aggregated data (e.g. Dunn, 2004; Gardiner et al., 2002; Parks 
& Yonelinas, 2007; Wixted & Squire, 2004).  
 
In all experiments in the current thesis participants are asked to assign responses to one of 
four categories of subjective experience: Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. As 
discussed in the General Introduction (Section 1.6.5.3) these four categories of subjective 
experience were first delineated by Conway et al. (1997) and have subsequently been used 
by Barber et al. (2008), Dewhurst et al. (2009), and Herbert and Burt (2001, 2003, 2004). 
They could also be considered somewhat similar to the four categories utilised in the 
neuroimaging work of Montaldi et al. (2006) and the work of Kihlstrom et al. (1996) and 
Brewer and Sampaio (2006). As explained in Section 1.6.5.3, the central reason for splitting 
the classic Know category into separate Know and Familiar categories were problems of 
definition. Geraci, McCabe and Guillory (2009) recently informally collated experimental 
definitions of Remembering and Knowing from other researchers and found large 
differences in the amount of detail provided to experimental participants, whether 
instructions emphasised recollection should be specifically of something from the study 
episode, and whether Knowing was defined as a high-confidence state of certainty or a 
low-confidence state based on a feeling of familiarity. Kelley and Jacoby (1998) highlight 
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the problem of definition by describing Knowing as “. . .the inability to recollect any details 
of the study presentation in combination with a feeling of familiarity or certainty that the 
word was studied” (p. 134, italics added).  
 
2.1.1. The influence of terminology and confidence on Remember-Know judgments 
 
Geraci et al. (2009), McCabe and Geraci (2009), and Rotello et al. (2005) recently explored 
how experimental definitions of subjective experience categories influenced participants’ 
Remember-Know judgments in a variety of experimental manipulations. In two 
experiments, Rotello et al. (2005) compared traditional Remember instructions (after 
Rajaram, 1993) with more conservative Remember instructions. These conservative 
instructions specified that participants should only respond Remember if they could 
actually describe specific details of the study episode and that they might need to justify 
their responses to the experimenter. Results demonstrated that, under conservative 
instructions 83% of Remember responses were made at the highest level of confidence; 
however when instructions were less conservative only 65% of Remember responses were 
made at the highest level of confidence, with 16% made at the second highest level (with 
the remaining 19% assigned to the three lower levels of confidence).  
 
This influence of source-specific Remember instructions on Remember-Know judgments 
was explored more recently by McCabe and Geraci (2009), who demonstrated that 
instructions that aimed to constrain recollection to the study episode led to reduced 
Remember hits and false alarms and increased Know hits and false alarms. Replicating 
Rotello et al., participants became more conservative in their use of the Remember 
response. In a second experiment, McCabe and Geraci explored how the use of the neutral 
terms of ‘Type A’ and ‘Type B’ instead of Remember and Know influenced judgments. 
Results demonstrated that use of neutral terminology reduced the number of Remember 
false alarms for both younger and older adults thereby increasing memory accuracy. 
McCabe and Geraci highlighted that one of the problems with the use of the terms 
Remember and Know in memory experiments is that confusion may arise from the pre-
existing connotations participants have for them. Lay-persons’ understanding of 
‘remember’ and ‘know’ may well not be in relation to distinct states of awareness 
associated with retrieval from memory. McCabe and Geraci concluded that to obtain the 
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most accurate Remember-Know data from participants neutral terminology and source-
specific instructions should be utilised. 
 
In two further experiments, Geraci et al. (2009) explored whether Remember-Know 
responses reflected different subjective experiences or levels of confidence by emphasising 
Know responses as either highly confident or as less confident. Participants in Geraci et 
al.’s experiments underwent two study-test sessions one week apart. In both sessions they 
studied mixed lists of words and non-words, as this is a factor which has been shown to 
dissociate confidence judgments from Remember-Know judgments (Gardiner & Java, 1990; 
Rajaram et al., 2002; see General Introduction, Section 1.6.4). In the test phase of session 
one participants were asked to assign recognised items to Remember or Know, and in 
session two were asked to assign recognised items to the confidence categories of Sure 
and Unsure. When confidence was emphasised in the Know definition, results replicated 
the standard finding that Remembering and Knowing were differently influenced by words 
and non-words, whereas confidence responses were not. However, when confidence was 
not emphasised in the definition of Know responses the patterns of data were found to be 
similar for Remember-Know and Sure-Unsure responses. Geraci et al. (2009) concluded 
that the wording of instructions can have important theoretical implications for our 
understanding of Remembering, Knowing, and confidence. In all the experiments 
presented in this thesis, source-specific instructions are included in definitions of 
Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess responses and Remember, Know, and Familiar 
definitions are each accompanied by a real-world example of the subjective experience, 
see Appendix A.  
 
2.1.2. Participants’ understanding of Remember-Know definitions 
 
One further problem with the Remember-Know paradigm highlighted by Geraci et al. 
(2009) is the number of participants they found who did not understand how to apply the 
Remember-Know and confidence judgments. Geraci et al. asked participants to complete a 
post-test questionnaire to assess their understanding of experimental instructions. 
Responses demonstrated that approximately 20% of their participants did not understand 
the Remember-Know instructions and in one experiment a few participants did not 
understand the confidence instructions. Geraci et al. excluded these participants from 
analysis and highlighted how important it is to perform post-experiment manipulation 
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checks to ensure that participants are using responses in the way intended. One common 
way to do this is to ask participants to justify their recognition responses, i.e., state why 
they said they recognised that item. Gardiner et al. (1997) used this form of manipulation 
check, subsequently analysed the content of the obtained justification statements, and 
published a full list of 270 justifications of Remember, Know, and Guess recognition 
decisions in Gardiner et al. (1998). These justifications were used as stimuli3 in the four 
experiments presented in the current chapter and are shown in Appendix B.1. 
 
In the initial Gardiner et al. (1997) experiment, after participants had completed the 
recognition test and assigned each recognised item to Remember, Know, or Guess, the 
experimenter chose at random two responses from each category and asked the 
participant to explain what it was that led them to recognise the word as one they had 
studied. Importantly, the emphasis was on what led to the recognition decision, 
participants were not asked to justify why they had assigned a word to a particular 
category of subjective experience. When analysing the transcripts of the justifications 
Gardiner et al. (1998) classified responses by their most salient characteristics. For 
Remember justifications two expert raters classified the justifications as involving: intra-list 
associations, extra-list associations, item-specific images, the item’s physical features, and 
self-reference. The first four of these Gardiner et al. discussed as being related to 
participants’ attempts to memorise the study list via use of effortful strategies, 
associations, and imagery. The final category of self-reference was suggested as reflecting 
items automatically triggering awareness of a personal memory from everyday life. 
Examples of the responses for each category are shown in Table 2.1. 
  
                                                          
 
3
 With permission from John Gardiner. 
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Table 2.1. Example Remember justification statements for each classification type, from 
Gardiner et al. (1998). 
Cue Word Justification Classification 
President 
 
Yesterday I associated this word with the word “minister”. 
Today I automatically remembered about that association. 
Intra-list 
association 
Kilt I remembered that I thought of a Scottish man. 
Extra-list 
association 
Gun 
When I saw it yesterday I had an image of a gun and I 
thought it was a strange word to put in. 
Item-specific 
image 
Sauerkraut 
I remembered it because I could not pronounce it 
yesterday! 
Item’s physical 
features 
Harp 
On Friday I was in a restaurant with a harpist. I remember 
thinking of that yesterday. 
Self-reference 
  
In comparison to Remember justifications, for Know and Guess justifications Gardiner et al. 
(1998) noted that transcripts were shorter and used rather limited vocabulary. This was 
suggested to reflect the fact that participants found it harder to articulate the reasons 
behind their recognition decision and required more encouragement from the 
experimenter. Gardiner et al. indentified Know justifications as reflecting attributions of 
recent unremembered encounters as they were absent of recollection of specific 
contextual details and were instead characterised by feelings of familiarity, just knowing, 
thinking a word occurred, or reporting of the absence of recollective details. Examples of 
Know justifications are shown in Table 2.2. Also shown in Table 2.2 are examples of Guess 
justifications demonstrating the various inferences and other judgmental strategies 
employed by participants when their recognition decision was based on guessing. These 
show that Guess justifications were primarily speculations about recent encounters neither 
Remembered nor Known. Inferences were either to do with different types of words from 
the study list or knowledge inferred from information about appropriate response rates.  
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Table 2.2. Example Know and Guess justification statements from Gardiner et al. (1998). 
Type 
Cue 
Word 
Justification 
Know 
Gun I just knew that I knew it. 
Kilt It seemed familiar but I wondered. 
Butterfly It was one of those words that rang a bell. 
Gun There was no association, I just had a feeling that I saw it, I was sure. 
Professor 
It was not in any of the little stories I made up to remember the words, 
but I had a strong feeling of familiarity. 
Squirrel I remembered something about squirrels, but I cannot remember what. 
Guess 
Officer It was just a guess. 
Slipper 
I saw this word somewhere recently at some point, but I am not sure 
whether it was there yesterday. 
Father 
I kept saying “no” so I just guessed it was there because you said that 
50% of the words were there. 
Harp 
It seemed that there were quite a few musical instruments, so I took a 
guess that it came up. 
Holiday 
I am eager to go on holiday so I am not sure whether I saw it here or 
whether I was thinking about it. 
 
To assess the relationship between subjective experience and confidence expressed in 
people’s memory justifications, the expert raters in Gardiner et al. (1998) coded which 
Know and Guess justifications indicated certainty or uncertainty about the accuracy of the 
recognition decision. This was done through counting how many responses included 
phrases such as ‘sure’/‘not sure’, ‘confident’/‘not confident’, or ‘I know’/‘I think’. For Know 
responses both raters rated 25% of justifications as indicating participants felt sure of their 
recognition, and between 11 and 20% as indicating uncertainty. For Guess justifications 72-
77% were rated as uncertain and none were rated as certain.  
 
Through their exploration of how their participants differently justified recognition 
decisions based on Remembering, Knowing, and Guessing, Gardiner et al. (1998) 
demonstrated that these three categories of subjective experience reflected access to 
different memory processes at study and retrieval. Furthermore, rating of justifications 
also revealed differences in the confidence levels associated with the different subjective 
experience categories.  
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2.1.3. Aims of the current experiments 
 
The central aim of the four experiments presented here was to explore how lay-people 
understand reports of memory experiences in terms of confidence and categories of 
subjective experience. The novel approach used here is to not ask participants about their 
own memory experiences but to place participants in the role of ‘memory expert’ and ask 
them to classify other people’s reports of recognition decisions. Three internet-based 
questionnaires and one laboratory task are reported here which all used the justification 
statements of Gardiner et al. (1997, 1998) as stimuli. Experiment 2.1 asked questionnaire 
respondents to assign a confidence rating to the justification statements. These confidence 
ratings were then used to select justifications for use in Experiments 2.2 and 2.3 where 
participants were asked to categorise justifications as Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess 
when confidence was manipulated. Finally, in Experiment 2.4 participants were asked to 
split original Know justifications into two types (undefined by the experimenter) to 
examine whether the splitting of the Know response category into separate Know and 
Familiar categories fit with lay-persons’ understanding of memory experiences and to see if 
there were any systematic, rational means by which the Know items could be split. 
 
Previous experimental tasks have demonstrated that Remember responses are typically 
associated with higher confidence ratings than Know responses (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; 
Gardiner & Java, 1990; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram et al., 2002; Rotello & Zeng, 2008; Tulving, 
1985; and Yonelinas, 2001a). Experiment 2.1 was designed to examine whether this 
experimental finding was replicated when it is not the participants’ own contents of 
memory under study. The topic of exploration here was whether lay understanding of 
subjective experiences links reports of experiential state to confidence in the same way 
that experimental tasks have found. If people are able to interpret others’ justifications in 
terms of the memory processes underlying them, and these are linked to confidence, then 
each category of justification statement should be assigned different confidence ratings in 
Experiment 2.1. 
 
Experiments 2.2 and 2.3 were designed to manipulate the confidence associated with a 
report of subjective experience in a method somewhat akin to the experimental paradigms 
of Geraci et al. (2009), McCabe and Geraci (2009), and Rotello et al. (2005). In those 
experiments, the confidence associated with Remember-Know judgments was 
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manipulated through the terminology used to define Know responses (Geraci et al., 2009), 
or instructions regarding how conservative Remember responses should be (McCabe & 
Geraci, 2009; and Rotello et al., 2005). In Experiment 2.2, confidence was manipulated 
through use of justification statements which obtained high, medium, and low confidence 
ratings in Experiment 2.1. In Experiment 2.3, confidence was manipulated by each 
justification statement being accompanied by a confidence value that was either 
appropriate or inappropriate to the subjective experience category of the justification. In 
both experiments, instead of giving a confidence rating for the item, here the task for 
participants was to assign these justifications to one of the four subjective experience 
categories. If participants’ interpretations of the memory processes underlying the 
justifications are influenced by the confidence associated with the justification, then this 
should be reflected in how the justifications are assigned to the categories of subjective 
experience. 
 
Experiment 2.4 focuses on the issue of whether the Know category of subjective 
experience can be reliably divided into separate categories of Know and Familiar. Previous 
research has shown reliable patterns of results for Know and Familiar responses when 
participants are given the four response options of Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess 
in experimental tasks which demonstrates that people can differentiate these experiential 
states when exploring their own memory experiences (Barber et al., 2008; Conway et al., 
1997; Dewhurst et al., 2009; and Herbert & Burt, 2001, 2003, 2004). Using Gardiner et al.’s 
(1998) justification statements again, Experiment 2.4 explores whether participants can 
differentiate the underlying experiential states of Know and Familiar from others’ reports 
of their memory experiences. Based purely on intrinsic understanding of memory 
experiences, if participants are able to identify two different categories of subjective 
experience in the original Know justifications this would lend further support to the validity 
of the Know-Familiar separation. 
 
2.1.4. Splitting Know into Know and Familiar 
 
The problem of the unity of the concept of Knowing is exemplified by the fact that 
Gardiner et al.’s (1998) expert raters rated 25% of Know responses as indicating certainty 
and up to 20% as indicating uncertainty. This suggests that there was a great deal of 
variance within the subjective experiences underlying Know responses in their experiment. 
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One aim of the experiments in the current chapter was to examine whether some of the 
Know justifications provided by Gardiner et al.’s (1997, 1998) participants perhaps lent 
more towards being a justification of Familiarity rather than of Knowing. To address this, 
Chris Moulin and I independently categorised Gardiner et al.’s (1998) original 90 Know 
justifications as reflecting either a Familiar or Know recognition response based on the 
definitions of Know and Familiar shown in Appendix A. Comparing our independent ratings 
revealed that our categorisation had matched on 74 of the 90 items giving an inter-rater 
reliability of .82. For the remaining 16 items each was discussed until consensus was 
reached. Of the 90 items, final classification of expert ratings was that 47 were 
justifications reflecting a Know response and 43 were justifications based on Familiarity 
(see Appendix B.1 for which were classed as Know and which as Familiar). These separate 
Know and Familiar categories of justification statement were examined separately in all 
the experiments presented here. 
 
2.2. EXPERIMENT 2.1: LAY UNDERSTANDING OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES IN TERMS OF 
CONFIDENCE 
 
2.2.1. Introduction 
 
When subjective experience and confidence ratings are made by participants in a memory 
experiment Remember responses are typically associated with higher confidence ratings 
than Know responses (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Rajaram, 1993; 
Rajaram et al., 2002; Rotello & Zeng, 2008; Tulving, 1985; and Yonelinas, 2001a). It is not 
surprising that subjective experience and confidence are related, as information from one’s 
subjective awareness is likely used to judge how confident one is about a memory 
(Gardiner, 2001). However, the aim of the current experiment was to examine whether the 
differences in confidence associated with Remember-Know judgments are reflected in lay-
persons’ judgments of others’ memory experiences. To this end, questionnaire 
respondents were asked to rate how confident they thought a previous participant had 
been in their recognition decision based on only their justification statement. If 
participants’ confidence ratings are reliably different for justification statements reflecting 
the four types of subjective experience it would demonstrate that lay people are able to 
understand and interpret others’ reports of memory experiences in a systematic way. 
Importantly, after Gardiner et al.’s (1998) original Know justifications have been split into 
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separate Know and Familiar categories of justification, if reliable differences are found 
between confidence ratings to Know and Familiar justifications this will add support to the 
validity of using these two separate response categories in experiments.  
 
2.2.2. Method 
 
2.2.2.1. Participants  
Data was collected using an online questionnaire which was active from April 2008 to 
September 2009. The questionnaire was advertised on a number of international 
psychology web experiment lists as well as being sent out to friends, family, and Leeds 
Memory Group (LMG) participant email lists. Some participants were University of Leeds 
Psychology undergraduates and were given one Participant Pool credit for participation. 
Full data sets from 309 participants were obtained (225 female, 84 male; mean age = 28.1, 
SD = 10.78, range = 16 to 65).  
 
2.2.2.2. Materials and Design 
The cue words and justification statements to be used as items in the online questionnaire 
were those published in the appendix of Gardiner et al. (1998). In their experiment, 
participants had been asked to justify why they thought they had recognised an item and 
each participant provided six justifications, two for Remember responses, two for Know 
responses, and two for Guess responses. For use in the current questionnaire all 270 items 
were sorted into 10 lists of 27 items for ease of completion by participants online. Each list 
contained equal numbers of Remember, Know, and Guess justifications (9 of each). 
Participants were randomly assigned to list when they accessed the web page and within 
each list items were presented in random order4.  
 
Some participants in Gardiner et al. (1997, 1998) had not used all response categories, 
therefore there were 8 missing items (7 x Guess, 1 x Know). In the lists where these missing 
items occurred they were replaced with items from other lists, chosen at random. To 
ensure that participants’ responses to one justification were not influenced by another 
justification, any justifications that referred to other items were split onto separate lists or 
                                                          
 
4
 As participants were randomly assigned to which of the 10 lists of justifications they saw the exact 
number of responses per item was not equal. Each item received between 27 and 35 responses. 
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altered so as to no longer refer to another item. For example, for policeman “This word 
followed the word gun so I know they were both there”, here the items gun and policeman 
were split onto separate lists so that a participant would not see both the justification 
including “gun” and the cue word gun. 
 
2.2.2.3. Procedure 
On accessing the questionnaire online participants were presented with ethics and consent 
information and then proceeded to the questionnaire. Instructions stated participants 
would be presented with statements which were responses made by people in a previous 
memory experiment where people had to learn a series of words and were later tested 
using an Old-New recognition paradigm. In this paradigm, for each word that the person 
had said they recognised as being an Old word, the person had then been asked to justify 
their response – they were asked why they thought they recognised that word. 
Participants in the current experiment were instructed that they would be shown the 
justification statements and that their task was to rate how confident they thought the 
person had been about their word recognition. An example was then given before 
participants entered their demographic information and were shown the first item.  
 
For each item, participants were shown the cue word and justification statement 
accompanied by the question “How confident do you think this participant was that they 
had accurately recognised this word?”. They made their confidence rating by selecting a 
number from 0 to 100 (in increments of five) from a drop-down box. After seeing all 27 
items, participants were given debrief information, were permitted to provide comments 
about the experiment, and were asked whether they would like to provide their email 
address so they could be emailed about future online experiments. 
 
2.2.3. Results 
 
To examine whether confidence levels associated with memory justification statements 
differed, analysis was conducted in two ways. Firstly, the mean confidence ratings given to 
justifications of each subjective experience category were calculated. This was performed 
using an items-analysis whereby the mean confidence rating given to each of the 270 items 
was calculated and then these means became the data for further analysis. Secondly, 
analysis explored how usage of the confidence ratings differed across the subjective 
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experience categories so the proportion of responses that were assigned to Remember, 
Know, or Guess justifications at each confidence level was calculated. These analyses were 
then repeated with the Know justifications split into Know and Familiar justifications based 
on the expert ratings (Section 2.1.4). 
 
2.2.3.1. Confidence assigned to Remember, Know and Guess justifications 
The mean confidence ratings made to items from each subjective experience category are 
shown in Table 2.3. Remember justifications received the highest confidence ratings, 
followed by Know and then Guess. ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of 
subjective experience (as a between-items factor) F(2,267) = 424.38, p < .001, and t-tests 
showed significant differences between confidence ratings assigned to each category of 
subjective experience (all p < .001).  
 
Table 2.3. Mean confidence ratings assigned to Gardiner et al.’s (1998) Remember, Know, 
and Guess justifications (and standard deviations). 
Subjective Experience  Mean Confidence Rating (%) 
Remember 81.62    (7.21) 
Know 52.56    (13.50) 
Guess 34.34    (11.29) 
 
2.2.3.2. Proportion of responses at each confidence level 
To explore the patterns of usage of confidence ratings, the proportion of responses at each 
confidence level which were assigned to Remember, Know, and Guess were calculated and 
are shown in Figure 2.1. The proportion of Remember justifications assigned to each level 
of confidence remained below .12 until the 50% confidence level but then increased 
sharply with confidence level. The proportion of Know justifications assigned to each level 
of confidence was largest around the central levels of confidence, with between .38 and 
.50 of justifications that were assigned to confidence levels from 30 to 75% being Know 
justifications. The proportion of Guess justifications assigned to each level of confidence 
was found to decrease steadily as confidence level increased.  
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Figure 2.1. Proportion of Gardiner et al.’s (1998) Remember, Know, and Guess justification 
statements assigned to each level of confidence. 
  
2.2.3.3. Confidence assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess justifications 
To examine whether the split of the Know justifications provided by Gardiner et al.’s (1998) 
participants into separate Know and Familiar categories (based on expert categorisation of 
the statements by HLW and CM, see Section 2.1.4) was reflected in the confidence values 
assigned to the justifications, the above analysis was repeated using the four categories of 
subjective experience. The mean confidence ratings made to items from each subjective 
experience category are shown in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4. Mean confidence ratings for Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess justifications 
(and standard deviations)5. 
Subjective Experience  Mean Confidence Rating (%) Number of Items 
Remember 81.62    (7.21) 90 
Know 58.18    (11.29) 47 
Familiar 46.42    (9.47) 43 
Guess 34.34    (11.29) 90 
 
                                                          
 
5
 The values for Remember and Guess are identical to those shown in Table 2.3 as these 
justifications types were not affected by the splitting of Know into Know and Familiar. 
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Remember justifications received the highest confidence ratings, followed by Know, then 
Familiar, then Guess. ANOVA again demonstrated a significant main effect of subjective 
experience (as a between-items factor), F(3,266) = 321.43, p < .001, and t-tests showed 
significant differences between confidence ratings assigned to each category of subjective 
experience (all p < .001). Different levels of confidence were reliably associated with the 
separate Know and Familiar categories of subjective experience. 
 
2.2.3.4. Proportion of Know and Familiar responses at each confidence level 
To explore whether the separation of the Know category of subjective experience into 
Know and Familiar was also reflected in the patterns of usage of confidence ratings, the 
proportion of original Know responses at each confidence level which were assigned to 
Know and Familiar were calculated and are shown in Figure 2.2. The pattern of results 
shows large fluctuations with between .30 and .50 of responses at lower levels of 
confidence being to Know justifications. However, a steady increase in proportion of 
justifications assigned to Know was evident at confidence ratings from 60% upwards.  
 
Figure 2.2. Proportion of original Know responses that were assigned to Know and Familiar 
at each confidence level. 
 
2.2.4. Discussion 
 
The focus of this discussion is to summarise the central findings of this experiment; more 
substantive theoretical discussion is reserved until the General Discussion of this chapter. 
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Results demonstrated that mean confidence assigned to justification statements originally 
made for Remember, Know, and Guess responses differed significantly. Remember 
justifications were assigned higher confidence ratings than Know justifications and in turn 
Know confidence ratings were higher than Guess confidence ratings. This suggests that not 
only is there a relationship between subjective experience and confidence when it the 
contents of one’s own memory that is being assessed (Gardiner & Java, 1990; Dewhurst et 
al., 2009; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram, et al., 2002; Rotello & Zeng, 2008; Tulving, 1985; and 
Yonelinas, 2001a), but that judgments of confidence based on the experiential reports of 
others show a reliable relationship also. Lay people understand the relationship between 
subjective experience and confidence in the same way as observed in experimental 
paradigms. 
 
Critically, re-analysis of mean confidence values after fractionation of original Know 
justifications into Know and Familiar categories demonstrated significantly higher mean 
confidence values assigned to Know compared to Familiar justifications. This supports the 
experimental findings of Brewer and Sampaio (2006), Dewhurst et al. (2009) and Kihlstrom 
et al. (1996) that Know responses are associated with higher levels of confidence than 
Familiar responses. The current findings suggest that people are also able to differentiate 
these two experiential states based on others’ memory reports and, at least in part, this 
discrimination is related to the level of confidence associated with the subjective 
experience. This finding adds validity to these two subjective states being provided as 
separate response options in experimental paradigms. 
 
The patterns of usage of the confidence levels revealed that the relationship between 
confidence and subjective experience was not a direct one. Guess justifications had a near 
linear relationship with confidence, as the proportion of Guess justifications assigned 
decreased with confidence, whereas the proportion of Remember justifications assigned 
were small at low levels of confidence but then increased sharply above 50% confidence. A 
similar pattern was demonstrated by the fractionated Know and Familiar justifications with 
instability at lower levels of confidence but a steady increase in proportion of justifications 
assigned to Know at confidence ratings above 60%.  
 
This experiment has demonstrated that different categories of subjective experience 
justifications receive different ratings of confidence. Although this experiment did not take 
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a first-person approach to understanding subjective experience as it asked participants to 
rate others’ memory descriptions, the findings do lend support to the idea that it is 
subjective awareness that gives rise to confidence (Gardiner, 2001; Tulving, 1985). 
However, this experiment only examined the relationship between subjective experience 
and confidence in one direction, what about whether different levels of confidence can be 
categorised as different types of subjective experience? This is the direction of the 
relationship that is explored in Experiments 2.2 and 2.3.  
 
2.3. EXPERIMENT 2.2: LAY UNDERSTANDING OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN TERMS OF REMEMBER, 
KNOW, FAMILIAR, AND GUESS JUDGMENTS 
 
2.3.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this experiment was to examine how manipulations of confidence influence lay-
persons’ understanding of subjective experiences of memory. In previous experimental 
memory tasks, Geraci et al. (2009) manipulated the confidence associated with 
Remember-Know judgments by changing the confidence implied in the definition of 
Knowing and McCabe and Geraci (2009) and Rotello et al. (2005) changed how 
conservative the instructions were for Remember responses. Both these manipulations 
resulted in different patterns of Remember-Know responses. The current experiment was 
interested in whether different patterns of subjective experience categorisation were 
found when judging memory justifications associated with different levels of confidence. 
To manipulate confidence in the current experiment, the confidence ratings obtained in 
Experiment 2.1 were used to select justification statements associated with high, medium, 
and low levels of confidence to be used as stimuli. The task for participants was to assign 
justifications to the Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess categories of subjective 
experience.  
 
This experimental approach assumes that if subjective experience and confidence are 
related, then it should be possible to manipulate them. The current experiment presents 
justifications that are associated with different levels of confidence and explores whether 
the original subjective experience underlying the justification can be recovered. If 
participants’ categorisation of items is influenced by the confidence associated with a 
justification, results should show different patterns of categorisation at different levels of 
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confidence. For example, a statement that originally justified a Remember response (in 
Gardiner et al., 1998) but which only received a low confidence rating (in Experiment 2.1) 
may not be consistently assigned to the Remember category. There may also be 
differences in how confidence affects the categorisation of the different types of 
justification statement. For example, the evocative recollections, intra- and extra-list 
associations, specific item information and self-reference associated with Remember 
responses may permit these justifications to remain unaffected by manipulations of 
confidence, but assignment of Know, Familiar, and Guess justifications to the appropriate 
category might be more greatly influenced by the confidence level associated with the 
item.  
 
2.3.2. Method 
 
2.3.2.1. Participants  
Data was collected using an online questionnaire which was active between January and 
September 2009. Advertisement was undertaken in the same manner as in Experiment 2.1. 
Full data sets from 502 participants were obtained (388 female, 111 male, 3 no response; 
mean age = 26.71, SD = 12.40, range = 16 to 85). 
 
2.3.2.2. Materials and Design 
The cue words and justification statements to be used as items in the online questionnaire 
were a selection of those used in Experiment 2.1. Using the mean confidence ratings 
obtained from participants in Experiment 2.1, within each subjective experience category 
(Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess) statements were sorted from highest to lowest 
confidence assigned. The two statements with the highest, medium6, and lowest 
confidence values were selected from each category giving a set of 24 items to be used in 
this questionnaire7. For each participant items were presented in random order. 
 
                                                          
 
6
 Based on the median. 
7
 Where cue words were duplicated across categories one of the items was exchanged for the 
neighbouring item e.g. grasshopper + justification was swapped for body + justification, confidence 
values 33.45 and 33.83 respectively, see Appendix B.1. 
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During data collection a second selection of 24 items was collated from items with the next 
lowest, medium, and highest confidence ratings to be used as a second version of the 
questionnaire. The two versions were then swapped online intermittently in order that 
approximately equal numbers of participants completed each. Full data sets were obtained 
from 248 participants for version 1 and from 254 participants for version 2. As no 
differences were observed between the data from the two versions all analyses were 
conducted on both versions together. The justification statements used in this experiment 
are marked in Appendix B.1 and the maximum, minimum, and mean confidence ratings for 
High, Medium, and Low confidence justifications for each subjective experience category 
are shown in Table 2.5.  
 
Table 2.5. Maximum, minimum, and mean confidence ratings for the selected justifications 
from each subjective experience category. 
Subjective 
experience 
Confidence level 
Max. confidence 
rating 
Min. confidence 
rating 
Mean confidence 
rating 
Remember 
High 94.77 91.61 93.00 
Medium 82.12 82.04 82.07 
Low 66.61 46.36 58.28 
Know 
High 88.57 79.09 84.11 
Medium 58.13 54.17 56.40 
Low 41.67 30.56 34.88 
Familiar 
High 67.58 57.50 61.96 
Medium 46.07 43.33 44.90 
Low 35.87 30.54 32.50 
Guess 
High 62.59 55.00 57.66 
Medium 34.40 33.13 33.87 
Low 13.67 7.22 10.16 
 
As can be seen from Table 2.5, confidence ratings did overlap across subjective experience 
categories. For example, Remember justifications which had achieved the Lowest 
confidence ratings (mean = 58.28) had been assigned similar confidence ratings to both 
Medium confidence Know items (mean = 56.40) and High confidence Guess items (mean = 
57.66). This is interesting as whilst these justifications were rated as reflecting the same 
levels of confidence in recognition in Experiment 2.1, they had originally justified 
difference subjective experience responses in Gardiner et al.’s (1997, 1998) experiment. 
The current experiment was interested in whether the original subjective experience 
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categories could be ‘recovered’ from the justifications despite the differences in 
confidence within categories of subjective experience, and the similarities in confidence 
across the categories. 
 
2.3.2.3. Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment closely followed that of Experiment 2.1 though here 
instead of being asked to make a confidence rating, participants were presented with the 
cue word and justification statement and asked to classify that justification as a 
Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess judgment. The instructions given at the start of the 
online questionnaire regarding how the justifications statements were obtained matched 
those given for Experiment 2.1. Participants were then instructed that in this experiment 
they would be shown the justification statements and that their task was to make a 
judgment about the person’s recognition decision by classifying it as Remember, Know, 
Familiar, or Guess. Full definitions of the categories were provided (see Appendix A.1) and 
it was emphasised that participants should ensure that they fully understand the 
definitions before they left that web page as the definitions would not be shown again. It 
was suggested that participants could write down the definitions to refer to later. 
Participants were also told that they may only select one category for each statement but 
that they should try to use all the categories at least once, and to read all the justifications 
carefully as some of the justifications would be easier to categorise than others. 
Participants then entered their demographic information before being shown the first 
item. For each item, participants were shown the cue word and justification statement 
accompanied by the question “Which recognition category?” and the options Remember, 
Know, Familiar, and Guess. They made their decisions by clicking the appropriate button. 
After seeing all 24 items participants were debriefed as in Experiment 2.1. 
 
2.3.3. Results 
 
This experiment was concerned with whether participants were able to reliably match 
justification statements to their original category of subjective experience and whether 
categorisation would differ depending on the confidence level assigned to the statement 
by participants in Experiment 2.1. Analysis in this experiment took the form of items-
analysis with the original subjective experience of the item (REMEMBER, KNOW, FAMILIAR, 
GUESS) and the confidence level of the item (High, Medium, Low) being treated as 
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between-items factors and the subjective experience response of the participant 
(Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess) as a within-items factor. For clarity, within the 
Results section only, when CAPITALISED the terms REMEMBER, KNOW, FAMILIAR, GUESS 
refer to the original subjective experience of the item and when only Initial Letter is 
capitalised they refer to the subjective experience response of the participant.  
 
The proportion of items within an original subjective experience category and a particular 
level of confidence that were assigned to each of the subjective experience response 
categories were calculated across participants, e.g., the proportion of High confidence 
REMEMBER justifications that were assigned to Remember by participants. Firstly a 
4(original subjective experience) x 3(confidence level) x 4(subjective experience response) 
ANOVA was performed. Although the proportions summed to 1 within each confidence 
level and therefore between-items factors of confidence level and original subjective 
experience could not be calculated, this form of analysis was favoured as it allows 
interactions between variables to be explored. Separate ANOVAs and further comparisons 
were performed to examine patterns within the different levels of confidence and original 
subjective experience categories. 
 
The 4(original subjective experience) x 3(confidence level) x 4(subjective experience 
response) ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of subjective experience 
response, F(2.03,73.12) = 9.11, p < .001, and significant interactions between subjective 
experience response and original subjective experience, F(6.09,73.12) = 41.12, p < .001, 
and subjective experience response and confidence level, F(4.06,73.12) = 14.13, p < .001. 
There was also a significant three-way interaction between original subjective experience, 
confidence level, and subjective experience response, F(12.19,73.12) = 5.55, p < .001 (all 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). These interactions are now considered each in turn. 
 
2.3.3.1. Analysis of two-way interactions 
The means for the significant interaction between subjective experience response and 
original subjective experience are shown in Figure 2.3. When confidence level is not 
considered, the majority of REMEMBER and FAMILIAR justification statements were 
appropriately allocated to their original subjective experience category. Conversely, for 
KNOW justifications nearly as many were assigned to Familiar as to Know, and for GUESS 
statements a large proportion were assigned to Familiar instead of Guess. 
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Figure 2.3. Proportion of justifications of the four original subjective experience categories 
that were categorised as Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
 
The interaction of confidence level with subjective experience response is explored in the 
following four sections of analysis. Firstly, within each of the original subjective experience 
categories a 3(confidence level) x 4(subjective experience response) ANOVA was carried 
out. If significant effects were found then separate ANOVAs were performed comparing 
participants’ use of the four subjective experience responses at each of the three levels of 
confidence and comparing use of each of the four levels of subjective experience response 
across confidence levels. Results of these analyses are reported in the next four sections. 
 
2.3.3.2. Assignment of High, Medium, and Low confidence REMEMBER justifications to 
Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess  
How confidence level interacted with subjective experience response for REMEMBER 
justifications is shown in Figure 2.4. For statements originally justifying a REMEMBER 
recognition decision in Gardiner et al.’s (1998) experiment, irrespective of it receiving a 
High, Medium, or Low, confidence rating by participants in Experiment 2.1, the majority of 
these REMEMBER justifications (between .57 and .68) were appropriately assigned to the 
Remember category of subjective experience. A 3(confidence level) x 4(subjective 
experience response) ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of subjective 
experience response, F(3,27) = 209.50, p < .001, and a significant interaction between 
subjective experience and confidence level, F(3.75,16.86) = 3.64, p = .028 (Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected). Effect of confidence level was not calculated as proportions summed to 
1. Separate ANOVAs at each level of confidence demonstrated significant main effects of 
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subjective experience response at High, F(3,9) = 97.46, p < .001, Medium, F(3,9) = 261.46, p 
< .001, and Low, F(3,9) = 25.16, p < .001, confidence levels. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Proportion of REMEMBER justifications given High, Medium, and Low ratings of 
confidence in Experiment 2.1 that were assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. 
Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Planned t-tests for High confidence justifications demonstrated that all comparisons of 
subjective experience response were significantly different, confirming that the majority of 
justifications were assigned to Remember, followed by Know, then Familiar, then Guess (all 
at least p < .04). The same result was found for Medium confidence responses (all at least 
p < .04). For Low confidence responses, more justifications were assigned to Remember 
than to Know, Familiar, or Guess (all at least p < .02), however the only other significant 
comparison was that significantly more justifications were assigned to Familiar than to 
Guess, t(3) = 4.19, p = .025. 
 
ANOVAs comparing use of subjective experience response categories across confidence 
levels demonstrated that only for Familiar and Guess responses was a significant main 
effect of confidence level found: Familiar, F(2,9) = 9.69, p = .006, Guess, F(2,9) = 6.36, p = 
.019. Confidence level did not significantly influence the proportion of REMEMBER 
justifications assigned to Remember, F(2,9) = 2.49, p = .14, or Know, F(2,9) = 2.33, p = .15. 
Planned comparisons revealed that the likelihood of a justification being assigned to 
Familiar or Guess decreased as confidence level increased. A greater proportion of 
REMEMBER justifications were assigned to Familiar if they were of Medium confidence 
compared to High confidence, t(6) = 3.96, p = .007, and this comparison for Low compared 
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to Medium levels of confidence approached significance, t(6) = 2.21, p = .069. In addition, a 
greater proportion of REMEMBER justifications were assigned to Guess if they were of Low 
confidence compared to Medium confidence, t(6) = 2.44, p = .05.  
 
In sum, these results demonstrate that participants consistently assigned the majority of 
REMEMBER justifications to the Remember category, regardless of the confidence 
associated with the justification. In addition, the proportion of REMEMBER justifications 
that were assigned inappropriately to the Know category did not differ with confidence 
either, only the proportion of justifications assigned to Familiar and Guess were found to 
differ depending on the confidence level associated with the justification. 
 
2.3.3.3. Assignment of High, Medium, and Low confidence KNOW justifications to 
Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess  
In contrast to the results for REMEMBER justifications shown in Figure 2.4, the patterns for 
assignment of KNOW justifications to subjective experience categories demonstrate that 
categorisation of KNOW justifications was strongly influenced by confidence level, see 
Figure 2.5. For High confidence justifications the majority of KNOW justifications (over.60) 
were appropriately assigned to Know, however for both Medium and Low confidence 
KNOW justifications the majority of justifications were assigned to Familiar (.36 and .44 
respectively), followed by Know (.32) if confidence was Medium, and Guess (.31) if 
confidence was Low. A 3(confidence level) x 4(subjective experience response) ANOVA 
demonstrated a significant main effect of subjective experience response, F(3,27) = 6.79, p 
= .001, and a significant interaction between subjective experience and confidence level, 
F(6,27) = 10.30, p < .001. Separate ANOVAs at each level of confidence demonstrated 
significant main effects of subjective experience response at High, F(3,9) = 16.26, p = .001, 
Medium, F(3,9) = 8.10, p = .006, and Low, F(3,9) = 4.39, p = .037, confidence levels.  
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Figure 2.5. Proportion of KNOW justifications given High, Medium, and Low ratings of 
confidence in Experiment 2.1 that were assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. 
Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
For High confidence justifications, planned comparisons demonstrated that more KNOW 
justifications were assigned to Know than to Familiar, t(3) = 6.22, p = .008, or to Guess, t(3) 
= 5.97, p = .009; and more justifications were assigned to Remember than to Guess, t(3) = 
3.51, p = .039. The difference between the proportion of High confidence KNOW 
justifications assigned to Know and Remember was not significant, t(3) = 2.34, p = .10, nor 
were the differences between the proportions assigned to Familiar and Remember, t(3) = 
2.26, p = .11, or Familiar and Guess, t(3) = 1.28, p = .29. 
 
For Medium confidence justifications, more KNOW justifications were assigned to Know 
than to Remember, t(3) = 3.96, p = .029, and to Familiar than to Guess, t(3) = 9.55, p = .002. 
The difference between the proportion of Medium confidence KNOW justifications 
assigned to Remember and Familiar was not significant, t(3) = 2.18, p = .12, nor were the 
differences between the proportions assigned to Familiar and Know, t < 1, or Remember 
and Guess, t(3) = 1.59, p = .21. 
 
For Low confidence justifications, more were assigned to Familiar than to either 
Remember, t(3) = 3.74, p = .033, or Know, t(3) = 3.41, p = .042. The difference between the 
proportion assigned to Know and Remember approached significance, t(3) = 2.99, p = .058. 
The proportion of Low confidence KNOW justifications assigned to Guess was not 
significantly different from the proportion assigned to either Remember, t(3) = 2.24, p = 
.11, Know, t(3) = 1.46, p = .24, or Familiar, t < 1. 
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For these original KNOW justifications, ANOVAs comparing subjective experience 
responses across confidence levels demonstrated that a significant main effect of 
confidence level was evident for Know, F(2,9) = 19.55, p = .001, Familiar, F(2,9) = 12.06, p = 
.003, and Guess, F(2,9) = 5.58, p = .027, responses and Remember responses approached a 
significant main effect of confidence, F(2,9) = 3.45, p = .077. Planned comparisons 
demonstrated that the likelihood of a KNOW justification being assigned to Know fell with 
confidence level. A greater proportion of justifications were assigned to Know if they were 
High confidence compared to Medium confidence, t(6) = 3.39, p = .015, and if they were 
Medium confidence compared to Low confidence, t(6) = 3.82, p = .009. This pattern was 
reversed for the likelihood of a KNOW justification being assigned to Familiar. A greater 
proportion of Medium confidence justifications were assigned to Familiar than were High 
confidence justifications, t(6) = 7.00, p < .001, however the difference between the 
proportions of Medium and Low confidence KNOW justifications assigned to Familiar was 
not significant, t < 1. Finally, the likelihood of a KNOW justification being assigned to 
Remember was greater for Medium confidence KNOW justifications than for Low 
confidence KNOW justifications, t(6) = 3.10, p = .02. No other comparisons were significant. 
 
These results demonstrate that for KNOW justifications the confidence levels associated 
with the justifications strongly influenced how participants assigned justifications to 
categories of subjective experience. As confidence level increased, the proportion of 
KNOW justifications assigned to Know increased, as did the proportion assigned to 
Remember. In addition, the proportion of KNOW justifications assigned to Familiar and 
Guess fell as confidence level increased. 
 
2.3.3.4. Assignment of High, Medium, and Low confidence FAMILIAR justifications to 
Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess  
The pattern of categorisation of FAMILIAR justification statements parallels that for 
REMEMBER justifications shown in Figure 2.4. As is shown in Figure 2.6, between .50 and 
.60 of statements originally justifying a FAMILIAR recognition decision were appropriately 
assigned to the Familiar category of subjective experience irrespective of whether they 
were of High, Medium, or Low confidence. 
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Figure 2.6. Proportion of FAMILIAR justifications given High, Medium, and Low ratings of 
confidence in Experiment 2.1 that were assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. 
Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
For these originally FAMILIAR justifications a 3(confidence level) x 4(subjective experience 
response) ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of subjective experience, F(3,27) 
= 29.22, p < .001, but no interaction between subjective experience and confidence level, 
F(6,27) = 1.09, p = .40. Collapsed across confidence level, comparisons demonstrated that a 
greater proportion of FAMILIAR justifications had been appropriately assigned to Familiar 
than to any other category of subjective experience, all p < .001. No other comparisons 
were significant. 
 
2.3.3.5. Assignment of High, Medium, and Low confidence GUESS justifications to 
Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess  
As is shown in Figure 2.7 the patterns for how GUESS justifications were assigned to 
subjective experience category again differed according to confidence level. Justifications 
given a Low confidence rating in Experiment 2.1 were appropriately assigned to Guess over 
.85 of the time, however when the confidence level was Medium, over .40 of justifications 
were assigned to both Familiar and Guess, and for High confidence GUESS justifications the 
majority (.48) were inappropriately assigned to Familiar. A 3(confidence level) x 
4(subjective experience response) ANOVA on GUESS justifications demonstrated a 
significant main effect of subjective experience response, F(1.38,12.42) = 20.30, p < .001, 
and a significant interaction between subjective experience and confidence level, 
F(1.38,12.42) = 12.45, p = .001 (both Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). Separate ANOVAs at 
each level of confidence demonstrated significant main effects of subjective experience 
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response at High, F(3,9) = 6.49, p = .012, and Low, F(1.03,3.09) = 790.68, p < .001 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), confidence levels, and the ANOVA for Medium 
confidence justifications approached significance, F(3,9) = 3.53, p = .06. 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Proportion of GUESS justifications given High, Medium, and Low ratings of 
confidence in Experiment 2.1 that were assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. 
Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Planned comparisons demonstrated that for Low confidence justifications more GUESS 
justifications were assigned to Guess than to either Remember, Know, or Familiar (all p < 
.001); in addition more justifications were assigned to Know than to either Remember, t(3) 
= 10.11, p = .002, or Familiar, t(3) = 5.04, p = .015, though the proportions here were very 
small. For Medium confidence GUESS justifications, results of planned comparisons did not 
reach conventional significance levels; more justifications were assigned to Familiar than to 
Remember, t(3) = 2.96, p = .06, or to Know, t(3) = 2.80, p = .07, and more justifications 
were assigned to Guess than to Remember, t(3) = 2.37, p = .10, or to Know, t(3) = 2.58, p = 
.08. For High confidence GUESS justifications, more justifications were assigned to Familiar 
than to Guess, t(3) = 3.26, p = .047, or Know, t(3) = 3.00, p = .058, or to Remember, t(3) = 
2.72, p = .073, though these latter two comparisons did not reach significance. No other 
comparisons were significant. 
 
ANOVAs comparing subjective experience response categories across confidence levels 
demonstrated that a significant main effect of confidence level was evident for Remember, 
F(2,9) = 9.89, p = .005, Familiar, F(2,9) = 8.83, p = .008, and Guess, F(2,9) = 16.69, p = .001 
subjective experience responses and Know responses approached a significant main effect 
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of confidence, F(2,9) = 3.26, p = .086. Examination of the patterns in Figure 2.7 suggested 
that the likelihood of a GUESS justification being assigned to Guess increased as confidence 
level fell. However planned comparisons demonstrated only the difference between 
proportion assigned to Low and Medium confidence levels was significant, with a greater 
proportion of GUESS justifications being assigned to Guess if they were Low confidence 
compared to Medium confidence, t(6) = 2.97, p = .025. This pattern was reversed for the 
likelihood of a GUESS justification being inappropriately assigned to Familiar. A greater 
proportion of Medium confidence GUESS justifications were assigned to Familiar than were 
Low confidence justifications, t(6) = 3.09, p = .021. In addition, the likelihood of a GUESS 
justification being inappropriately assigned to Remember was significantly higher if it was a 
High confidence justification as opposed to a Medium confidence justification, t(6) = 2.79, 
p = .032. No other comparisons were significant. 
 
In sum, for GUESS justifications the confidence levels associated with the justifications 
strongly influenced how participants assigned these justifications to categories of 
subjective experience. As confidence level fell, the proportion of GUESS justifications 
assigned to Familiar became lower and the proportion assigned to Guess increased. 
 
2.3.4. Discussion 
 
This experiment aimed to explore lay-persons’ understanding of the relationships between 
how one justifies a memory and the confidence associated with that justification. This was 
performed by examining how the confidence rating associated with a justification 
statement influenced whether that statement would be assigned to the appropriate 
category of subjective experience. For Remember or Familiar justification statements 
results demonstrated that, irrespective of these statements receiving a High, Medium, or 
Low, confidence rating by participants in Experiment 2.1, the majority of these 
justifications were appropriately assigned to Remember or Familiar categories of 
subjective experience respectively. For Remember justifications, an interaction between 
confidence level and subjective experience response was observed, with planned 
comparisons revealing that the likelihood of a Remember justification being 
inappropriately assigned to Familiar or Guess decreased as confidence level increased. For 
Familiar justifications, no interaction between confidence level and subjective experience 
response was observed. Conversely, the confidence levels assigned by participants in 
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Experiment 2.1 strongly influenced how Know and Guess justifications were assigned to 
categories of subjective experience. The proportion of Know justifications appropriately 
assigned to Know was found to increase as confidence level increased and conversely the 
proportion of Guess justifications appropriately assigned to Guess was found to increase as 
confidence level fell. 
 
The suggestion that Remember justifications would be appropriately classified as 
Remember regardless of the confidence level of the justification was supported as at all 
levels of confidence the majority of justifications were assigned to Remember. Confidence 
level was only found to influence the assignment of a small proportion of Remember 
justifications to Familiar and Guess response categories. It is suggested that this is due to 
the nature of justifications made in support of recognition responses made on the basis of 
recollection. As Gardiner et al. (1998) reported, Remember justifications typically included 
details such as intra- and extra-list associations, item-related information, and self-
reference. These rich, evocative details, which Gardiner et al. reported that participants 
were able to bring to mind with ease, are suggested as being critically important for 
identifying these items as Remember justifications. As is evident from examining the 
justifications employed in this experiment (shown in Appendix B.1) even the Remember 
justifications that had been given the lowest confidence ratings by participants in 
Experiment 2.1 included many such associations and details. For example, even the lowest 
confidence Remember justification involved intra-list association: Ape “When it came up I 
remember thinking that there were lots of words with three letters”. 
 
The differential results obtained for the newly separated Know and Familiar justifications 
by splitting the original Know justifications based on expert ratings provide support that 
these two categories of subjective experience can be considered to be independent. 
Assignment of Know justifications to subjective experience categories was found to differ 
depending on the confidence level associated with the justification whereas Familiar 
justifications were consistently appropriately categorised as Familiar. This is in line with the 
previous findings of McCabe and Geraci (2009), Rotello et al. (2005), and Geraci et al. 
(2009) which demonstrated that the wording of instructions and Remember-Know 
definitions influenced participants’ use of the categories. Geraci et al. found different 
patterns of responding when confidence was or was not emphasised in Know definitions. 
Though Geraci et al. did not argue for two separate states of Knowing and Familiarity, their 
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results did show that two different patterns of subjective experience response were 
obtained when the definition of Knowing was altered. Considered alongside the present 
findings, the confidence level associated with Know has been found to influence patterns 
of responding both when participants are assessing their own memory experiences and 
when judging the memory experiences of others’.  
 
The justifications used in this experiment were those which had received the Highest, 
Medium, and Lowest confidence ratings for their subjective experience category in 
Experiment 2.1. However, examination of the Know and Familiar justifications used as 
stimuli in the current experiment (see Appendix B.1) highlighted differences between the 
types of reasons involved in justifications given High, Medium, and Low confidence ratings. 
High confidence Know justifications reflected certainty of recognition, e.g., Bluebell “I am 
sure about that one, there were a couple of words which were similar and were part of the 
category flower”; whereas Medium and Low confidence Know justifications mentioned 
absence of recollection, e.g., Ring “I think I remember seeing it, but there was no link or 
image. I can’t remember feeling anything”; and one Low confidence justification 
mentioned familiarity. Some familiar justifications at each level of confidence mentioned 
familiarity (though not all justifications did), however only High and Low confidence 
Familiar justifications mentioned absence of recollection, and only Medium and Low 
justifications mentioned uncertainty, e.g., Harbour “It was familiar, but I was confused. I 
knew it was there but could not be sure”. As systematic differences across confidence 
levels were not evident to a greater extent for Know justifications than for Familiar 
justifications the content of the justifications cannot directly explain why confidence 
influenced classification of Know justifications but not Familiar justifications. 
 
As with Know justifications, assignment of Guess justifications was also found to be 
dependent on confidence level. Examination of the High, Medium, and Low confidence 
Guess justifications selected for use in this experiment revealed that whereas Low 
confidence justifications were typically very short and explicitly discussed guessing, 
uncertainty or judgmental strategies, e.g., Father “I kept saying “no” so I just guessed it 
was there because you said that 50% of the words were there”; Medium and High 
confidence justifications also often mentioned confusion of certainty or familiarity of an 
item, e.g., Flea “I am almost certain that it was there. But not entirely”. It is suggested that 
these differences led participants in Experiment 2.1 to give these items different 
Chapter 2 
90 
 
confidence ratings and participants in Experiment 2.2 to categorise a large proportion of 
High and Medium confidence Guess justifications inappropriately as Familiar. That some 
Guess responses reflect strategic decisions based on appropriate response rates while 
other guesses are based on lower levels of familiarity, or confusion of familiarity, appears 
to have here led participants to categorise these justifications differently. 
 
One explanation for the finding that classification of Know and Guess justifications differed 
depending on confidence level whereas Remember and Familiar justifications were less 
sensitive to manipulated confidence is that Remember and Familiar justifications more 
directly describe the processes underlying their recognition decisions – recollection and 
familiarity, and this was evident to participants when they were categorising the 
statements. Although this could be taken as inferring that separate Know and Guess 
categories of subjective experience do not accurately assess the processes underlying 
recognition, an alternative suggestion is that Know responses should be conceptualised as 
subjective experiences reflecting high confidence without recollection, and Guess 
responses should be conceptualised as low-confidence familiarity-based responses. As 
demonstrated by Geraci et al. (2009), different patterns of responding are observed if 
confidence is emphasised in Know definitions. Additionally, as discussed above, some 
Guess justifications demonstrate confusion concerning the certainty or the source of 
familiarity of an item. If Know and Guess responses are related to a participant’s 
confidence in their evaluation of what is in memory then it follows that these responses 
would be influenced to a greater extent by confidence level when it is manipulated 
experimentally.  
 
Overall, these findings demonstrate that when understanding the memory experiences of 
others, participants’ judgments regarding subjective experience were influenced by 
confidence, and this influence was greater for Know and Guess categories of subjective 
experience. This novel method of using participants’ justification statements as stimuli has 
added to the experimental recognition findings of Rotello et al. (2005), McCabe and Geraci 
(2009), and Geraci et al. (2009), supporting the assertion that subjective experience 
judgments are influenced by manipulations of confidence. To further link this novel 
methodology to the prior experimental findings the confidence associated with each 
justification statement was manipulated more overtly in Experiment 2.3. 
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2.4. EXPERIMENT 2.3: LAY UNDERSTANDING OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE WHEN CONFIDENCE IS 
MANIPULATED 
 
2.4.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this experiment was to further explore the relationship between lay-persons’ 
understanding of subjective experience and confidence by providing participants with both 
a justification statement and a confidence value on which to base their judgment of 
subjective experience. In this case, confidence was manipulated systematically in order to 
assess whether it influenced the subjective experience category the statement was 
assigned to. Prototypical Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess justification statements 
were selected from around each category’s mean confidence justification and were 
presented to participants accompanied by a confidence value that was either appropriate 
(to that subjective experience category) or inappropriate (from the confidence values of a 
different subjective experience category). As in Experiment 2.2 the task for participants 
was to assign justifications to the Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess categories of 
subjective experience.  
 
The focus of this experiment was whether participants based their categorisation decisions 
on both the justification and the confidence value, or whether one lent more to the 
categorisation decision than the other. If confidence value was ignored by participants this 
would result in uniform patterns of categorisation within subjective experience category; 
on the other hand, high or low confidence values may lead participants to interpret a 
statement as reflecting a different subjective experience to that which it was originally 
justifying. This experiment was interested in how people weigh the evidence provided in 
reports of experiential state and confidence ratings when interpreting the type of 
subjective experience being justified. In line with the findings of Experiment 2.2, it was 
predicted that Remember and Familiar justifications would be impervious to the 
confidence manipulation, but that appropriate classification of Know and Guess 
justifications would be influenced by the confidence level accompanying them. 
  
Chapter 2 
92 
 
2.4.2. Method 
 
2.4.2.1. Participants  
Data was collected using an online questionnaire active from October 2009 to February 
2010. Advertisement was undertaken in the same manner as in Experiment 2.1 and 
Experiment 2.2. Full data sets from 258 participants were obtained (164 female, 92 male, 2 
no response; mean age = 31.04, SD = 17.17, range = 16 to 79).  
 
2.4.2.2. Materials and Design 
The cue words and justification statements to be used as items in the online questionnaire 
were a selection from those published by Gardiner et al. (1998) and used in Experiment 
2.1. Using the confidence ratings obtained from participants in Experiment 2.1, within each 
subjective experience category (Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess) eight statements 
from around the mean confidence value were selected as prototypical justifications for 
each category (shown in Appendix B.1). Where cue words were duplicates, one of the cue 
words was exchanged for a word from the MRC Psycholinguistic database which matched 
the original on familiarity, no. of letters, and first letter, e.g., bluebell swapped for blessing.  
 
In this experiment, as justifications were to be paired with confidence values, eight 
confidence values were selected around the mean for each subjective experience category 
and these are shown in Table 2.6. It was ensured that the ranges of values for each 
category were non-overlapping and that the mean of the selected values matched the 
original mean confidence as closely as possible8.  
 
In the pairing of items to confidence values, a Latin-square design was used. Within each of 
the four categories of subjective experience, two justifications were paired with plausible 
confidence values and two justifications were paired with confidence values derived from 
the confidence ranges for each of the other original subjective experience categories. For 
example, of the eight Remember justifications two were paired with Very High confidence 
values, two were paired with High confidence values, two with Medium confidence values, 
                                                          
 
8
 Means shown in Table 2.6 do not exactly match those in Table 2.4 as selection of items for this 
experiment was performed prior to final analysis of Experiment 2.1. Differences in means varies 
from 0.30% to 1.30%. 
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and two with Low confidence values. This pairing was then repeated for Know, Familiar, 
and Guess justifications. Using this design each participant saw 32 items. Four versions of 
the pairings were created. Careful pairing was done to ensure that each confidence value 
served as a plausible confidence once, for example a Very High confidence of 85 matched 
to a Remember justification, but on the other versions of the questionnaire that 
confidence value of 85 was paired with a either a Know, Familiar, or Guess justification. 
Each confidence value was only used once within each version of the questionnaire. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four versions when they accessed the 
web page and within each version items were presented in random order. 
 
Table 2.6. Means and ranges of confidence values for the justifications from each 
subjective experience category.  
Subjective 
experience 
category 
Mean confidence 
rating for category 
(from Exp. 2.1) 
Range of confidence 
values provided to 
participants 
Mean of 
range 
Confidence 
level* 
Remember 81.32 78 – 85 81.50 Very High 
Know 56.88 53 – 60 56.50 High 
Familiar 45.80 42 – 49 45.50 Medium 
Guess 34.84 31 – 38 34.50 Low 
* ‘Confidence level’ denotes the title used to refer to the confidence range throughout the 
following experimental report. 
 
2.4.2.3. Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment closely followed that of Experiment 2.2 though here 
participants were presented with both a justification statement and a confidence value on 
which to base their classification of the item as Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess. The 
instructions given at the start of the online questionnaire regarding how the justifications 
statements were made by previous participants matched those given for Experiment 2.2. 
Current participants were then instructed that in this experiment they would be shown 
justification statements and confidence ratings made by previous participants in a memory 
test and that their task was to make a judgment about the person’s recognition decision by 
classifying it as Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess. Full definitions of the categories were 
provided (see Appendix A.1) and further instructions matched those in Experiment 2.2 
except participants were also reminded to pay attention to both the justification and the 
confidence rating for each item. Participants then entered their demographic information 
before being shown the first item. For each item, participants were shown the cue word, 
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justification statement, and confidence rating, accompanied by the question “Which 
recognition category?” and the options Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. They made 
their decisions by clicking the appropriate button. After seeing all 32 items participants 
were debriefed as in Experiment 2.2.  
 
2.4.3. Results 
 
This experiment was interested in whether participants were able to reliably match 
justification statements to their original category of subjective experience when provided 
with a confidence value alongside the justification. Analysis in this experiment took the 
form of items-analysis with the original subjective experience of the item (REMEMBER, 
KNOW, FAMILIAR, GUESS) and the manipulated confidence level of the item (Very High, 
High, Medium, Low) being treated as between-items factors and the response of the 
participant – which category of subjective experience they assigned the justification to 
(Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess), being treated as a within-items factor. The 
dependent variable was the proportion of items within an original subjective experience 
category and a particular level of confidence that were assigned to each of the subjective 
experience response categories. For example, the proportion of REMEMBER justifications 
accompanied by a Very High level of confidence that were assigned to Remember, Know, 
Familiar, and Guess. Proportions were calculated across participants and firstly a 4(original 
subjective experience) x 4(manipulated confidence level) x 4(subjective experience 
response) ANOVA was performed. Separate ANOVAs and further comparisons were then 
performed to examine patterns within the different levels of confidence and original 
subjective experience categories. 
 
The 4(original subjective experience) x 4(manipulated confidence level) x 4(subjective 
experience response) ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of subjective 
experience response, F(2.02,226.42) = 35.22, p < .001, and a significant interaction 
between subjective experience response and original subjective experience, F(6.09,226.42) 
= 102.45, p < .001 (both Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). This interaction suggests that the 
pattern of responses across subjective experience categories differed depending on the 
original subjective experience of the item. For this significant interaction, separate ANOVAs 
and further comparisons were conducted to examine patterns within the original 
subjective experience categories and different subjective experience responses; these are 
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reported in Section 2.4.3.2. The interaction between subjective experience response and 
manipulated confidence level was not significant, F < 1, and neither was the three-way 
interaction between original subjective experience, manipulated confidence level, and 
subjective experience response, F < 1. The non-significant three-way interaction is 
discussed first, followed by the two-way interactions.  
 
2.4.3.1. Assignment of justifications to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess when 
confidence was manipulated 
As was demonstrated by the lack of an interaction between manipulated confidence level 
and subjective experience response or a three-way interaction between these two 
variables and original subjective experience, in general, manipulated confidence level did 
not influence how participants assigned the REMEMBER, KNOW, FAMILIAR, and GUESS 
justifications. This is illustrated by Figure 2.8, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, and Figure 2.11, which 
show for each of the four original subjective experience categories the proportion of 
justifications that were categorised as Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess split by 
manipulated confidence level.  
 
Figure 2.8 shows that for statements originally justifying a REMEMBER recognition 
decision, over .50 were appropriately assigned to the Remember category of subjective 
experience regardless of what level of confidence the statement was paired with on the 
questionnaire. Approximately .25 were assigned to Know, .10 to Familiar, and under .05 to 
Guess. For KNOW justification statements, Figure 2.9 shows that regardless of what level 
of confidence the statement was paired with on the questionnaire approximately equal 
proportions of justifications (between .28 and .38) were assigned to Know and Familiar. 
Likewise for FAMILIAR justification statements, Figure 2.10 demonstrates that at all levels 
of manipulated confidence approximately .50 of justifications were appropriately assigned 
to the Familiar category of subjective experience, with approximately .25 assigned to 
Guess. Finally, for statements originally justifying a GUESS recognition decision, Figure 2.11 
shows that at all levels of manipulated confidence around .40 of justifications were 
assigned to both Familiar and Guess. 
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Figure 2.8. Proportion of REMEMBER justifications matched with Very High, High, Medium, 
and Low confidence values that were assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. 
Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Proportion of KNOW justifications matched with Very High, High, Medium, and 
Low confidence values that were assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. Error 
bars = 1 SeM. 
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Figure 2.10. Proportion of FAMILIAR justifications matched with Very High, High, Medium, 
and Low confidence values that were assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. 
Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
 
Figure 2.11. Proportion of GUESS justifications matched with Very High, High, Medium, and 
Low confidence values that were assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess. Error 
bars = 1 SeM. 
 
In sum, these results demonstrate that patterns of responding were stable across 
confidence level. The confidence value that was provided alongside the justification 
statement did not influence how participants assigned the item to a category of subjective 
experience; participants primarily based their assignment of the item to Remember, Know, 
Familiar, or Guess on the experiential state reported in the justification statement. 
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2.4.3.2. Analysis of two-way interactions 
As discussed above, there was no significant interaction between manipulated confidence 
and subjective experience response. This is demonstrated by the means in Figure 2.12, 
which show that, regardless of what the original subjective experience category the 
statement was justifying, the proportion of justification statements assigned to each of the 
subjective experience response categories were very similar across the levels of 
manipulated confidence. Over .30 were consistently assigned to Familiar, around .22 to 
Remember, and around .20 to both Know and Guess. 
 
In contrast, there was a significant two-way interaction between subjective experience 
response and original subjective experience category. Means for this interaction are shown 
in Figure 2.13. This figure shows very similar patterns to those shown for this interaction in 
Experiment 2.2, shown in Figure 2.3. When manipulated confidence level is not 
considered, the majority of REMEMBER and FAMILIAR justification statements were 
appropriately allocated to their original subjective experience category. For KNOW 
justifications nearly as many were assigned to Familiar as to Know, and for GUESS 
statements nearly as many were assigned to Familiar as to Guess. 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Proportion of justifications at each level of manipulated confidence that were 
categorised as Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess irrespective of original subjective 
experience category. Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
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Figure 2.13. Proportion of justifications of the four original subjective experience 
categories that were categorised as Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess regardless of 
manipulated confidence level. Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Further comparisons were performed for this significant two-way interaction. Within each 
original subjective experience category ANOVAs demonstrated significant within-subjects 
effects of subjective experience response. In each original subjective experience category, 
proportion of justifications assigned to the four subjective experience responses differed: 
REMEMBER, F(1.97,61.16) = 546.10, p < .001, KNOW, F(2.34,72.49) = 38.85, p < .001, 
FAMILIAR, F(1.41,43.64) = 81.48, p < .001, and GUESS, F(1.24,38.50) = 48.44, p < .001. 
Planned comparisons were carried out between each of the subjective experience 
responses within the four original subjective experience categories.  
 
For REMEMBER justifications, all comparisons were significantly different (all p < .001); a 
significantly greater proportion of justifications were assigned to Remember compared to 
all other categories, Know compared to Familiar and Guess, and Familiar compared to 
Guess. For KNOW justifications, comparisons between the proportion of justifications 
assigned to Know and Familiar, and Remember and Guess were not significant (both t < 1); 
.34 of KNOW justifications were assigned to both Know and Familiar and .17 to Remember 
and .15 to Guess. All other comparisons for KNOW justifications were significant (all p < 
.001). For FAMILIAR justifications, the comparison between the proportion assigned to 
Remember and Know was not significant, t(31) = 1.54, p = .13; all other comparisons were 
significant (all p < .001), a significantly larger proportion of FAMILIAR justifications were 
appropriately assigned to Familiar than to any other response category. Finally, for GUESS 
justifications, no significant difference was found between the proportion of justifications 
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assigned to Familiar and Guess, t < 1; .38 of GUESS justifications were assigned to Familiar 
and .42 to Guess. All other comparisons for GUESS justifications were significant (all at 
least p < .02); significantly more GUESS justifications were assigned to Familiar and Guess 
than to either Remember and Know, and more were assigned to Know than to Remember, 
though the proportion assigned to each of these was below .11.  
 
These results demonstrate that when confidence is not considered, REMEMBER and 
FAMILIAR justification statements were appropriately allocated to their original subjective 
experience category whereas assignment of KNOW and GUESS justifications to their 
respective categories was not as clear-cut; nearly as many KNOW and GUESS justifications 
were assigned to Familiar as were appropriately categorised.  
 
ANOVAs across the four original subjective experience categories demonstrated significant 
between-items effects for the four subjective experience response categories. For each 
response category, the proportion of justifications assigned to that category differed 
according to the original subjective experience category of the item: Remember, F(3,124) = 
414.65, p < .001, Know, F(3,124) = 89.59, p < .001, Familiar, F(3,124) = 56.75, p < .001, and 
Guess, F(3,124) = 70.82, p < .001. Planned comparisons were carried out for each of the 
subjective experience responses across the four original subjective experience categories. 
Comparing across REMEMBER and KNOW original subjective experience categories of 
justifications, a larger proportion of REMEMBER justifications were assigned to a 
Remember response than were KNOW justifications; and conversely a higher proportion of 
KNOW justifications were assigned to Know, Familiar, and Guess than were REMEMBER 
justifications (all p < .001).  
 
Comparing across REMEMBER and FAMILIAR original subjective experience categories, a 
larger proportion of REMEMBER justifications were assigned to Remember and Know than 
were FAMILIAR justifications; conversely a higher proportion of FAMILIAR justifications 
were assigned to Familiar and Guess than were REMEMBER justifications (all p < .001). This 
pattern was repeated for the comparison of REMEMBER and GUESS original categories of 
justifications (all p < .001).  
 
Comparing across KNOW and FAMILIAR original subjective experience categories, a larger 
proportion of KNOW justifications were assigned to Remember and Know than were 
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FAMILIAR justifications; conversely a higher proportion of FAMILIAR justifications were 
assigned to Familiar and Guess than were KNOW justifications (all at least p = .001). This 
pattern was repeated for the comparison of KNOW and GUESS original categories of 
justifications, though here there was no difference between the proportion of KNOW and 
GUESS justifications that were inappropriately assigned to Familiar (.34 and .38 
respectively), t(62) = 1.31, p = .20. All other comparisons p < .001.  
 
Comparing across FAMILIAR and GUESS original subjective experience categories, a larger 
proportion of FAMILIAR justifications were assigned to Familiar than were GUESS 
justifications; conversely a higher proportion of GUESS justifications were appropriately 
assigned to Guess than were FAMILIAR justifications (both at least p = .004). There were no 
significant differences between the proportion of FAMILIAR and GUESS justifications that 
were inappropriately assigned to Remember, t(62) = 1.52, p = .13, or to Know, t(62) = 1.58, 
p = .12. 
 
In sum, these results demonstrate that reliable patterns of data are observed both within 
and across the original subjective experience categories the justifications belonged to. The 
proportion of justifications categorised as Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess were 
highest when the justification was originally a REMEMBER, KNOW, FAMILIAR, or GUESS 
justification respectively, i.e., of the justifications assigned to each response option the 
majority come from the appropriate original subjective experience category. Whilst some 
KNOW and GUESS justifications were allocated to Familiar instead of to their appropriate 
category, the largest proportion of justifications that were assigned to Know and Guess 
were KNOW and GUESS justifications.  
 
2.4.3.3. Anecdotal reports 
After completing the questionnaire participants provided comments on what they thought 
of the questionnaire. Some comments demonstrated that, in line with the findings from 
the experiment as a whole, the participant had used the justifications to a much greater 
extent than the confidence values when assigning the item to Remember, Know, Familiar, 
or Guess. In addition to the comment provided as a quote at the start of this chapter, three 
further example comments are:  
The most important criterion is the description of the mental process behind 
the recognition. If it is associated with something else in the surrounding then 
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is 'Remembering'. If there is only the knowledge then is 'Know'. If it is neither 
but the person is more or less sure to having seen it (and the score must reflect 
that) then it is 'Familiar'. It is 'Guess' when no other case feels right and/or the 
score is very low. 
 
I tried to make my category decisions on how certain the participant sounded 
in their verbal answer. Vague answers like, it feels like it was there, I ranked as 
'familiar', and more definite descriptions of how they remembered the word I 
ranked as 'know'. I found some of the confidence scores conflicted with my 
interpretation of the participants statement, but I found the statements more 
compelling. 
 
I thought that the certainty ratings were very subjective, and depended too 
much on the participants' feeling at the time (some people who basically 
justified their response as guesses seemed to have ratings that were higher 
than ratings where people were fairly certain they remembered). So, my 
decisions took into account the ratings, but put more weighting on 
justifications. 
 
This anecdotal evidence supports the experimental data and highlights that some 
participants were also able to reflect on the process of using both a justification statement 
and a confidence value to categorise an item to a subjective experience category. 
 
2.4.4. Discussion 
 
In this experiment, participants were provided with a confidence value alongside the 
justification statement that they were to assign to a category of subjective experience. 
Results demonstrated that participants’ assignment of justifications to subjective 
experience categories was not influenced by confidence. There was no three-way 
interaction between original subjective experience, manipulated confidence level, and 
subjective experience response, and no two-way interaction between subjective 
experience response and manipulated confidence level. Participants focused their 
categorisation on the experiential reports provided by the justification statements; they 
did not seem to use the provided confidence value when categorising the justifications as 
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Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess. Furthermore, the anecdotal reports provided by 
some participants at the end of the questionnaire revealed that they had insight into their 
use of the justification statement in preference to the confidence value as a basis for their 
categorisation.  
 
With regard to the patterns of responses, as in Experiment 2.2 Remember and Familiar 
justifications were consistently appropriately categorised as Remember or Familiar whilst 
Know and Guess statements were often inappropriately categorised as Familiar. 
Examination of the Know justifications utilised in this experiment revealed that they 
typically referred to lack of recollection or uncertainty about recognition of the word; for 
example, Tangerine “I recognised it as a word from yesterday, but I cannot really remember 
what I thought, I could not remember seeing it on the screen but I was sure it was there 
yesterday”. None of the Know statements included the word ‘familiarity’ so it was not the 
use of this word which led to Know justifications being inappropriately assigned to 
Familiar. Instead it could be suggested that the uncertainty evident in some of the Know 
justifications (see Tangerine above) is what led participants to categorise some 
justifications as Familiar instead of Know. This could suggest that the separation of 
traditional Know category into separate Know and Familiar categories could require more 
refinement of definitions; however, evidence from previous research that has separated 
these categories (e.g., Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; Conway et al., 1997; Dewhurst et al., 
2009; Herbert & Burt, 2001, 2003, 2004; Kihlstrom et al., 1996) and other experiments 
presented in this thesis suggests that many aspects of this split are reliable. This issue will 
be returned to in the General Discussion (Section 2.6.1).  
 
Examination of the Guess justifications revealed that all statements utilised in this 
experiment referred to uncertainty about recognition; for example, Harbour “I lived by the 
sea all my life, so I was not sure whether I have encountered that word here or whether it is 
to do with home”. Only one of the eight Guess justifications included the word ‘familiar’. 
Furthermore, while Gardiner et al. (1998) demonstrated that Guess justifications can often 
reflect inferences or judgmental strategies (see Section 2.1.2), only one of the statements 
used in the current experiment contained an inference concerning types of words from the 
study list: Harp “It seemed that there were quite a few musical instruments, so I took a 
guess that it came up”. Instead of judgmental strategies and inferences, it is suggested that 
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the uncertainty about why an item felt familiar inherent in the Guess justifications used in 
this experiment is what led many of these justifications to be categorised as Familiar. 
 
In conjunction with the findings from Experiment 2.2, the current findings demonstrate 
that when confidence is manipulated as an internal attribute of the justification statement 
(Experiment 2.2) it influences how the justification is assigned to subjective experience 
category, especially for Know and Guess justifications. However, when confidence is 
manipulated as a linked but external feature of the justification (Experiment 2.3) it does 
not influence how justifications are assigned. Tentatively this could be taken as support for 
the view that confidence derives from subjective experience as proposed by Tulving (1985) 
and Gardiner “…it is surely the subjective state of awareness that gives rise to confidence 
in memory, not confidence that gives rise to the state of awareness” (Gardiner, 2001, p. 
1356). When both a statement and a confidence value were provided, categorisation 
appeared to be largely based on the justification report rather than the confidence value. It 
could be suggested that this occurred because participants used their lay understanding of 
memory experiences to determine that subjective experience is of more importance than 
confidence. 
 
An alternative suggestion could be that participants overlooked the confidence value in 
making their subjective experience judgment as they guessed the purpose of the 
experiment, or thought the two items were not linked, or the justification included more 
details and therefore occupied their attention. To follow this up, future experiments could 
manipulate confidence by providing a confidence value but could make it internal to the 
justification statement, for example “I was about 30% confident because I remembered 
there had been animals on the list of words but I wasn’t sure if elephant had been there”, 
or “I knew I’d thought about a ‘frog’ yesterday so I thought it was there, I’d say I was about 
42% confident”. In the current experiments it was considered important to remain true to 
Gardiner et al.’s (1998) justification statements as they were real justifications obtained 
from actual participants. However, in future, if justifications were carefully worded and 
thorough matching was performed, manipulating confidence within the justification 
statement would be a valuable line of enquiry. 
 
In sum, the current findings demonstrate that when a confidence value is provided 
alongside a justification statement this does not influence lay persons’ understanding of 
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memory experiences. Remember justifications were classified as Remember, Familiar 
justifications were classified as Familiar, Know justifications were classified as either Know 
or Familiar, and Guess justifications were classified as either Guess or Familiar. The 
different patterns of categorisation of Know and Familiar justifications demonstrate that 
there is something within the justifications which enables people to categorise them 
differently. The memory processes that are reflected in these justification types were the 
focus of investigation in Experiment 2.4. 
 
2.5. EXPERIMENT 2.4: LAY-PERSON CATEGORISATION OF KNOW JUSTIFICATIONS INTO KNOW AND 
FAMILIAR 
 
2.5.1. Introduction 
 
The previous experiments have shown that Know and Familiar justification statements 
receive different ratings of confidence (Experiment 2.1), demonstrate different patterns of 
assignment to categories of subjective experience (Experiments 2.2 and 2.3), and their 
patterns of assignment are differentially influenced by the confidence associated with the 
justification (Experiment 2.2). The aim of the current experiment was to test whether non-
experts could observe the differences between statements justifying a Know subjective 
experience and a Familiar subjective experience as a test of the validity of the Know-
Familiar split. Crucially, here participants were not asked to match the justification 
statement to its category based on experimental definitions, participants were simply 
asked to split the 90 original Gardiner et al. (1998) Know justifications into two different 
types. It was predicted that, based purely on intrinsic understanding of memory 
experiences, participants would recognize two different types of subjective experience 
from the justifications made by others to items recognised on a memory test. If people 
have access to information at retrieval which maps onto the states of Knowing and 
Familiarity, and which is reflected in their statements made when asked to justify their 
recognition, it might be expected that other people are able to recognise those mnemonic 
processes and identify that different justifications are a sign of different underlying 
experiential states. 
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2.5.2. Method 
 
2.5.2.1. Participants 
Participants were 50 psychology students (41 female) from the University of Leeds. 
Individual ages were not recorded but participants confirmed that they were aged 
between 18 and 35 on the consent form. Undergraduate students received Participant 
Pool Credits for taking part. Participants were tested in groups of between two and ten in a 
classroom. One participant failed to follow experimental instructions and her data were 
excluded from analysis.  
 
2.5.2.2. Materials and Design 
The cue words and justification statements to be used as items in the online questionnaire 
were those 90 classified as Know justifications by participants in the experiment by 
Gardiner et al. (1998) which had previously been expertly categorised as Familiar (n = 43) 
and Know (n = 47; see Section 2.1.4). Each cue word and its justification statement were 
printed on small cards and each participant was given an envelope with the 90 cards in at 
the start of the experiment. A debrief questionnaire asking participants what criteria they 
had based their sorting decisions on was also created for participants to complete at the 
end of the experiment (see Appendix F). 
 
2.5.2.3. Procedure 
Participants were given the experiment instructions along with an envelope and a set of 
justification cards. They were informed that no further instructions would be provided so 
they should read the instruction sheet carefully. The instructions specified that this 
experiment was interested in whether participants could differentiate between two types 
of memory justification statement. Participants were told that in the envelope were 90 
cards on which were written 90 cue words and statements and that their task was to sort 
these into Type A and Type B statements. The statements were defined as justifications of 
memory provided by participants in a previous memory experiment with the following 
explanation: “on a previous memory test participants had said yes, they recognised that 
cue word, and the justification on the card is the reason they gave for why they thought 
they recognised that cue word.”  
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Participants were instructed to read the statements and then begin sorting them into Type 
A and Type B statements along whatever criteria they thought the statements differed. The 
instructions specified that there were no right or wrong answers, and participants did not 
have to end up with equal numbers of Type A and Type B statements. Participants were 
instructed to place Type A cards in one pile and Type B cards in another pile, check that 
they were happy with their sorting decisions as many times as needed, and write their 
initials and ‘Type A’ or ‘Type B’ on the back of the cards before placing the cards back in 
the envelope and completing the decision criteria questionnaire. In this questionnaire 
participants were asked how they made their decisions, how easy it was to sort the cards, 
how similar or different they thought their Type A and Type B statements were, and how 
confident they thought the participants who had made the Type A and B statements 
had been. Finally participants were shown definitions of Know and Familiar and asked 
how their Type A and B statements mapped onto those definitions (see Appendix F for full 
questionnaire). 
 
2.5.3. Results 
 
Analysis of the data from this experiment was conducted in a number of different ways. 
Firstly, to test the association between participant and expert classification of Know and 
Familiar justifications, Goodman-Kruskal’s gamma correlations (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954) 
were used. Gamma is a non-parametric measure of association which, in the current 
experiment, was used to assess the likelihood that a justification labelled as Know by 
experts would be labelled as Know by participants and not as Familiar (see Appendix E for 
full explanation of the gamma correlation formula). Subsequent analysis explored the 
proportion of items that had been appropriately classified as Know and Familiar and 
participants’ responses on the decision criteria questionnaire were analysed to see on 
what basis participants’ reported sorting the justifications. 
 
2.5.3.1. Mapping of Know and Familiar to Type A and Type B labels. 
In this experiment, instead of participants being provided with definitions of Know and 
Familiar subjective experiences and asking them to match the memory justification 
statements to these labels they had simply been asked to sort the justifications along any 
criteria on which they thought they differed and then label them as Type A and Type B. 
Consequently, it was not known whether their conception of what defined a Type A 
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justification mapped onto our definition of Know or whether they had labelled Know 
justifications as Type B, and so on. To ensure that the mapping of participant Type A and B 
labels to the expert Know-Familiar categorisation was accurate it was conducted in three 
ways. Each method resulted in four values for each participant – the number of Know 
justifications that were labelled Type A, the number of Know justifications that were 
labelled Type B, the number of Familiar justifications that were labelled Type A, and the 
number of Familiar justifications that were labelled Type B.  
 
Firstly, at the end of the decision criteria questionnaire participants were provided with 
definitions of Know and Familiar and were asked which fit their Type A and B justifications. 
However, eight participants did not respond appropriately to this question: four did not 
respond at all and four put the same response for both Know and Familiar definitions, i.e., 
reported that the definition of Know fit their Type A and their Type B statements. For the 
remaining 41 participants the first method used for mapping of Type A and B to Know and 
Familiar was to use their questionnaire responses. For each participant the number of 
Know and Familiar justifications “correctly” and “incorrectly” categorised were then 
calculated. 
 
Using this first method of mapping Type A and B to Know and Familiar it became apparent 
that, for some participants, although their questionnaire responses stated that, for 
example, they thought their Type A statements mapped onto the Know definition and their 
Type B to Familiar, their actual sorting results demonstrated that the majority of their Type 
A pile were Familiar justifications, suggesting that their conceptualisation of Type A 
actually mapped onto the Familiar definition. This is reasonable as participants were only 
asked to label their piles as A and B after they had finished sorting the statements into two 
types, and were only asked to link their A and B to the definitions of Know and Familiar at 
the end of the decision criteria questionnaire.  
 
The second method used for mapping of Type A and B to Know and Familiar was to base 
the classification around the majority response. For example, looking at the data for 
Participant A in Table 2.7, as the largest value of this participants four response options is 
44 for number of Know justifications labelled as Type A, for this participant their label Type 
A would be considered to map onto Know and accordingly their label Type B would be 
considered to map onto Familiar. Not all participants’ data was this ‘clean’ however; for 
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example, mapping of Type A to Know and Type B to Familiar would be the same for 
Participant B in Table 2.7. Even though for this participant the majority of both the Type A 
and Type B justifications were actually Know justifications this method of mapping was 
based around the single largest value which here is 27 Know justifications labelled as Type 
A. 
 
Table 2.7. Example data of Know and Familiar justifications sorted into Type A and Type B. 
 Participant A’s Response Participant B’s Response 
Correct Answer Type A Type B Type A Type B 
Know 44 3 27 20 
Familiar 13 30 25 18 
 
For 66% of the 41 participants who provided appropriate questionnaire responses, how 
Type A and B mapped onto Know and Familiar based on their questionnaire response 
matched the mapping based on the majority response. However, there were 14 
participants for whom their questionnaire mapping of Type A and B to Know and Familiar 
did not match the mapping based on the majority response, data for these participants 
was analysed separately.  
 
2.5.3.2. Association between participant and expert categorisation of Know and Familiar 
justifications 
Using each of the above methods of mapping Type A and Type B responses onto Know and 
Familiar definitions, Goodman-Kruskal (1954) gamma correlations were calculated for each 
participant. This correlation results in a score of between -1 and +1. The more positive this 
correlation coefficient the stronger the association between participant and expert 
classification of Know and Familiar justifications. Mean gammas were calculated across 
participants and are shown in Table 2.8. Each of these gammas was subjected to a one-
sample t-test and all were found to be significantly different from 0 (all at least p < .004). 
Comparing the mean gammas in the top two rows of Table 2.8 it is evident that when 
calculating the association between participant and expert classification of Know and 
Familiar justifications, if this was based on participants’ questionnaire response the 
resulting gamma was lower (.26) than when calculated on majority response (.54) and this 
difference was found to be significant, t(40) = 3.51, p = .001. When calculated using 
majority response the association between participant and expert classification of Know 
and Familiar justifications was significantly stronger than when calculation was based on 
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questionnaire response. This suggests participants were good at splitting the justifications 
into their respective Know and Familiar categories but some were not so good at 
articulating their reasoning on the decision criteria questionnaire. 
 
As is shown in the bottom two rows of Table 2.8 however, by splitting this analysis by 
whether the participants’ questionnaire response had matched their majority response it 
becomes clear that the lower overall gamma based on questionnaire response was due to 
a negative mean gamma (-.41) being obtained for the 14 participants whose questionnaire 
response did not match the response based on the majority value. 
 
Table 2.8. Mean gamma correlation coefficients (and standard deviations) calculated using 
different methods of mapping Type A and B to Know and Familiar definitions. 
Mapping of A and B to Know and Familiar based on N Gamma 
Questionnaire response (all valid responses) 41 .26    (.55) 
Majority response  49 .54    (.28) 
Questionnaire response (where questionnaire 
response matched majority response) 
27 .61    (.25) 
Questionnaire response (where questionnaire 
response did not match majority response) 
14 -.41    (.29) 
 
For these participants, how they had mapped their Type A and B statements onto Know 
and Familiar (based on their questionnaire response) lay in opposition to the expert 
classifications of Know and Familiar. There was no objective truth to their mapping of A 
and B to Know and Familiar. Because of this problem with some participants providing, 
what were deemed to be, incorrect questionnaire responses regarding how their Type A 
and Type B statements mapped onto the Know and Familiar categories, all subsequent 
analysis was conducted using mapping based on the majority response. 
 
2.5.3.3. Proportion categorised correctly 
The second method of analysis conducted on this data was calculation of the proportion of 
Know and Familiar justifications that were “correctly” labelled as Know and Familiar. For 
Know justifications the mean proportion categorised as Know was .74 (SD = .17), which 
was significantly higher than the mean proportion of Familiar justifications that were 
assigned to Familiar, M = .52 (SD = .21), t(48) = 4.35, p < .001. Participants were 
significantly better at appropriately categorising Know justifications than Familiar 
justifications. One-sample t-tests comparing these mean performance scores to chance 
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(.50) revealed that performance for categorisation of Know justifications was significantly 
above chance, t(48) = 10.02, p < .001, however performance for categorisation of Familiar 
justifications was not, t(48) = .68, p = .50. In sum, participants were reliably able to assign 
Know justifications correctly to Know but were not consistently able to correctly categorise 
Familiar justifications9.  
 
2.5.3.4. Decision criteria 
After sorting of the statements into Type A and Type B was completed, participants were 
instructed to fill in a questionnaire asking about the criteria they used to sort the 
justifications. Firstly, participants were asked to rate how easy it was to sort the 
statements, how similar or dissimilar they found the statements, and whether they 
thought other people would sort the statements in the same way as them. For each 
question a five-point scale was used from -2 to +2. Mean scores are shown in Table 2.9. 
One-sample t-tests against the mid-point score of 0 demonstrated that participants rated 
the statements as significantly difficult to sort, t(48) = 5.54, p < .001; thought Type A and B 
statements were significantly similar as opposed to different, t(48) = 3.50, p = .001; and 
considered it neither unlikely or likely that others would sort the statements in the same 
way as them, t < 1. 
 
Table 2.9. Mean scores and standard deviations for ratings of ease, similarity, and other 
peoples’ sorting. 
Question Mean score  Standard deviation 
Ease of sorting -.67 .85 
Similarity of statements .47 .94 
Other people make same sorting decisions .02 .95 
 
Participants were then shown a list of possible criteria on which they may have made their 
sorting decisions and were asked to tick those which they had used. The majority of 
reasons were phrased as a comparison of statements, e.g., for ‘More sure’: I thought that 
for one Type of memory statement the people making the statements sounded more sure 
of their memories than for the other Type of memory statement. The full questionnaire can 
be seen in Appendix F. The percentages of participants who endorsed each of the reasons 
                                                          
 
9
 This analysis was repeated in the form of items-analysis and is shown in Appendix G. 
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are shown in Table 2.10. The most common criterion endorsed was the above example 
relating to how sure the people making the justifications had been. Around half the 
participants also cited that they had based their sorting decisions on one type of statement 
involving recall of more information, a deeper level of processing, and reflecting more 
confidence than the other type of statement. The reasons that were endorsed by the 
fewest participants were those regarding use of more abstract words in one statement 
type and basing sorting decisions on gut instinct or guessing. On average participants 
selected 3.63 reasons (SD = 1.27) from the list of 10 (min. = 1, max. = 7). 
 
Table 2.10. Decision criteria for statement sorting and the percentage of participants who 
endorsed each option. 
Decision criterion Percentage of participants who endorsed 
More sure 67.3% 
Recalled more information 55.1% 
Deeper level of processing 53.1% 
Confident 49.0% 
Visual imagery 40.8% 
Concrete words 36.7% 
Emotional language 26.5% 
Gut instinct 14.3% 
Abstract words 12.2% 
Mainly guessing 8.2% 
 
Finally, participants were asked how confident they thought participants making the Type 
A and Type B statements had been and how much information or how many details they 
thought the participants had recalled in their memories for the cue words. Confidence was 
rated on a 0 to 100 percentage scale and information on a scale of 0 to 4. Using matching 
of Type A and B to Know and Familiar based on majority response, the mean confidence 
rating given for Know justifications was 60.27% (SD = 20.42) and for Familiar justifications 
was 56.53% (SD = 22.53), this difference was not significant, t < 1. Whilst the sorting 
criterion endorsed most by participants was differences in certainty (‘More sure’) between 
statement types, this was not reflected in the confidence values they assigned to the two 
types of justifications. However, ratings of how detailed the recall involved in the memory 
justifications had been did demonstrate a significant difference between Know and 
Familiar justifications. Familiar justifications were rated as containing more information 
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and details than Know justifications, means 1.96 (SD = .84) and 1.47 (SD = .87) respectively, 
t(48) = 2.24, p = .03. ‘Recalled more information’ was the decision criterion with second 
highest endorsement by participants and this was reflected in their ratings of how detailed 
the Know and Familiar justifications were. This finding was explored further in three 
additional analyses. 
 
Firstly, Know and Familiar justifications were compared on number of characters to see 
whether the higher level of information or details perceived in Familiar justifications might 
be due to the fact that they were longer. No difference in justification length was 
observed. Mean number of characters was 86.28 (SD = 33.57) for Know justifications and 
91.56 (SD = 43.57) for Familiar justifications; t(78.79) = 0.64, p = .52. Secondly, it was 
examined whether ratings of level of information in Know and Familiar justifications 
differed for participants who endorsed or did not endorse ‘Recalled more information’ as a 
criterion they had used to split the justifications. Mean ratings are shown in Table 2.11.  
 
Table 2.11. Mean information ratings (and standard deviations) split by whether the 
participant had endorsed ‘Recalled more information’ as a decision criterion. 
 Endorsed ‘Recalled more information’ 
Justification type Yes No 
Know 1.26    (.98) 1.73    (.63) 
Familiar 2.15    (.82) 1.73    (.82) 
 
A 2(endorsement) x 2(justification type) ANOVA was conducted with endorsement as a 
between-subjects factor and justification type as a within-subjects factor. ANOVA 
demonstrated a significant main effect of justification type, F(1,47) = 4.39, p = .04, and a 
significant interaction between justification type and endorsement, F(1,47) = 4.39, p = .04. 
No significant main effect of endorsement was observed, F < 1. Participants who had not 
endorsed ‘Recalled more information’ as a criterion they had used to sort the justifications 
did not rate Know and Familiar justifications as containing different levels of information or 
amount of details, t < 1. Conversely, participants who reported that they did base some of 
their sorting decisions on ‘Recalled more Information’ rated Familiar justifications as 
containing more information or details than Know justifications, t(26) = 2.84, p = .009. This 
interaction qualifies the significant main effect of justification type obtained from the 
ANOVA and the earlier t-test. While Familiar justifications were not seen as containing 
more information and details than Know justifications by all participants, for those 
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participants who did identify differences in level of information as a decision criterion, 
these participants rated Familiar justifications as containing more information and details 
than Know justifications10.  
 
Finally, correlations were performed to examine whether there was a relationship between 
confidence ratings and ratings of level of information contained in the justifications. For 
both Know and Familiar justifications, correlational analysis demonstrated a significant 
positive relationship between confidence and information ratings, Know: r(49) = .41, p = 
.003, Familiar: r(49) = .52, p < .001. For both types of justification, the higher the amount of 
information and details the participant considered were reported in the memory 
justifications the more confidence they thought was reflected in the justifications. This 
demonstrates an element of construct validity between the ratings and suggests that, 
although participants’ confidence ratings themselves were not significantly different for 
Know and Familiar justifications, there was a meaningful relationship between their 
interpretations of the confidence and information in the justifications. 
 
2.5.4. Discussion 
 
The central aim of this experiment was to examine whether participants were reliably able 
to identify two types of statement within the original Know justifications. Participants were 
not asked to categorise statements as Know or Familiar based on definitions, instead they 
were simply asked to split the statements into two types – Type A and Type B. How Type A 
and B mapped onto Know and Familiar was analysed in different ways. Using gamma 
correlation as a measure of association, results demonstrated that how participants split 
the justifications into Know and Familiar was reliably associated with expert classifications 
of Know and Familiar statements. Further analysis demonstrated that this association was 
stronger if mapping of Type A and B statement types was based on majority response 
rather than how participants reported they had mapped the statements on the 
                                                          
 
10
 A corresponding ANOVA comparing confidence ratings given to Know and Familiar justifications 
by participants who had endorsed ‘More sure’ as a decision criterion did not demonstrate any 
significant main effects of endorsement or justification type and no significant interaction (all p > 
.25). 
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questionnaire. This was due to some participants’ questionnaire reports having no 
objective truth to them when compared to their sorting responses.  
 
In addition to gamma correlations, the proportion of Know and Familiar statements that 
were correctly categorised was analysed. Know justifications were found to be categorised 
more reliably than Familiar justifications. Participants reported using amount of detail and 
certainty as the criteria they had most used to divide the statements into two types. 
Although there was no reliable difference between the confidence ratings assigned to the 
two statement types, participants did rate Familiar justifications as containing more 
information or details than Know justifications. In addition, further exploration of this 
difference revealed that it was only those participants who had endorsed amount of 
information or details as a decision criterion who rated Familiar justifications as containing 
more information than Know justifications. Participants had insight into their decision 
making processes and their endorsement and ratings on the decision criteria questionnaire 
reflected this.  
 
The finding that Know justifications were considered to contain less information and fewer 
details than Familiar justifications provides a further element of support to the validity of 
separating these types of subjective experience. Gardiner et al. (1998) noted that their 
participants’ Know justifications (which included all Know and Familiar justifications that 
were separated in the current experiment) were shorter and used rather limited 
vocabulary compared to Remember justifications. In the current experiment, Know and 
Familiar justifications were not found to differ in number of characters, so it was not length 
of statement which led participants to rate Familiar justifications as containing more 
information and details than Know justifications. Instead it is suggested that the type of 
memory processes that Gardiner et al.’s participants reported in their justifications is what 
led to these differences in ratings. Gardiner et al. indentified the original Know 
justifications as being absent of recollection of specific contextual details and instead being 
characterised by feelings of familiarity, just knowing, thinking a word occurred, or 
reporting of the absence of recollective details. It is suggested that it is aspects of these 
memory processes which differed when the original Know justifications were separated 
into Know and Familiar by expert raters CM and HLW. Participants in the current 
experiment appear to have identified the same differences, also used these to split the 
statements into two types, and given Know and Familiar justifications different ratings 
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based on their own assessment of the underlying memory processes. Comprehensive 
linguistic analysis could be undertaken to further analyse the differences between the 
justification types and in future work it would be valuable to examine the justifications 
provided when participants are able to use all four response options of Remember, Know, 
Familiar, and Guess in the same manner which Gardiner et al. used to examine those for 
Remember, Know, and Guess. 
 
In the current experiment the central analyses of interest demonstrated that participants 
were able to split Know justifications into separate Know and Familiar categories. Gamma 
correlations demonstrated that participants’ categorisation of justifications as Know and 
Familiar was reliably associated with expert categorisation and the proportion of Know 
justifications categorised as Know was also found to be reliable. However, categorisation of 
Familiar justifications was not reliable; instead of consistently assigning Familiar 
justifications to Familiar, participants instead categorised some Familiar justifications as 
Know (as it was forced-choice; participants were simply splitting the justifications into two 
types). This is the opposite type of inappropriate categorisation to that observed in 
Experiments 2.2 and 2.3. In those experiments it was Know justifications which were often 
categorised as Familiar, particularly those Know justifications associated with low 
confidence (Experiment 2.2). The current experiment involved a very different task to 
those two experiments however. In Experiments 2.2 and 2.3 participants were provided 
with definitions of Remember, Know, Familiar and Guess and were asked to assign 
justifications to one type of subjective experience. In the current experiment participants 
were simply given a set of justification statements and were asked to sort them into two 
types; no further information was provided regarding types of subjective experience or 
how the statements should be sorted. It is suggested that it is these differences which led 
to the different patterns of categorisation of Know and Familiar justification statements 
across these three experiments. However, all three experiments found reliable differences 
between Know and Familiar justifications using a variety of different analyses. While 
patterns of results differed across the different tasks, together the results support the idea 
that Know and Familiar justifications reflect different underlying subjective experiences.  
 
One surprising result in the current experiment was that there was no difference in 
confidence ratings for Know and Familiar justifications, as would be predicted from 
previous literature (e.g., Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; Dewhurst et al., 2009; Kihlstrom et al., 
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1996; Experiment 2.1 this chapter). If this finding is considered alongside the fact that 
categorisation of Familiar justifications was unreliable whereby they were quite often 
categorised inappropriately as Know, it could have been that the problems with 
categorisation influenced the confidence ratings and that performance for both was 
influenced by how difficult the task seemed. Participants reported that they found the two 
statement types very similar and the task was difficult. This is reflected in the fact that 14 
participants’ questionnaire reports of how they had mapped Type A and B to Know and 
Familiar did not match their actual sorting responses and eight participants did not provide 
an appropriate response to this question. Although there were limits to participants’ 
awareness of the differences between categories of subjective experience in this difficult 
task, results indicate that, on the whole, people were able to distinguish two types of 
subjective experience from justifications that were all originally Know justifications. This 
further validates the separation of Know and Familiar as response options in experimental 
tasks.  
 
2.6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
2.6.1. The split of Know into Know and Familiar 
 
Results demonstrate that Know and Familiar can be reliably differentiated by lay people 
both in terms of inherent differences in the justification statements (Experiment 2.4) and 
in terms of the confidence associated with the justification (Experiment 2.1). The finding 
that Know and Familiar are associated with different levels of confidence extends previous 
findings observed in recognition memory paradigms to understandings of how lay people 
interpret reports of others’ memory experiences (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; Dewhurst et 
al., 2009; and Kihlstrom et al., 1996). Furthermore, Experiment 2.4 demonstrates that even 
when participants are not told how experts conceive of the differences between 
justifications, lay persons’ interpretations of intrinsic differences are evident from their 
sorting responses and ratings of how detailed Know and Familiar justifications are.  
 
However, the confidence associated with Know judgments was found to influence how 
they were categorised. In Experiment 2.2 a large proportion of Know justifications were 
assigned to Familiar if they were Medium or Low confidence justifications and in 
Experiment 2.3 medium-confidence Know justifications paired with any level of confidence 
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were equally likely to be assigned to Familiar as to Know. As discussed in Section 2.4.4, it is 
suggested that this categorisation stems from the high confidence without recollection 
conceived as the basis of Know subjective experiences. Although these findings could 
suggest that the division of the Know category into separate categories of Know and 
Familiar is not valid, results from all experiments in this chapter have demonstrated 
different patterns of data for Know and Familiar justifications. Experiment 2.1 
demonstrated significantly different confidence ratings for Know and Familiar 
justifications. Experiment 2.4 demonstrated that participants were able to reliably separate 
Know and Familiar justifications into two types and Familiar justifications were rated as 
containing significantly more information and details than Know justifications. Experiments 
2.2 and 2.3 demonstrated that while Familiar justifications were consistently categorised 
as Familiar and not influenced by associated confidence level, Know justifications were. 
These different patterns of data support the idea that Know and Familiar subjective 
experiences are dissociable and validates the use of the four separate categories of 
subjective experience in episodic memory paradigms. All further experiments in this thesis 
asked participants to assign recognition responses to Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess. 
 
In sum, whereas the subjective experience of Familiarity appears to reflect the process of 
familiarity, the subjective state of Knowing appears to reflect high confidence in 
recognition without recollection. 
 
2.6.2. Confidence and subjective experience 
 
Experiment 2.1 demonstrated that mean confidence assigned to justification statements 
originally made for Remember, Know, Familiar and Guess responses differed significantly. 
Remember justifications were assigned higher confidence ratings than Know justifications, 
Know were higher than Familiar, Familiar higher than Guess. This demonstrates that lay 
people understand the relationship between subjective experience and confidence from 
others’ memory experiences in the same way as is observed in experimental paradigms 
(Gardiner & Java, 1990; Dewhurst et al., 2009; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram et al., 2002; Rotello 
& Zeng, 2008; Tulving, 1985; and Yonelinas, 2001a). Extending this, Experiment 2.2 
demonstrated that when the confidence associated with a justification is manipulated 
intrinsically to the statement (High, Medium, and Low confidence statements selected as 
stimuli) this influenced how these justifications were assigned to subjective experience 
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categories. Remember and Familiar justifications were demonstrated to be little-
influenced by associated confidence level, whereas Know and Guess justifications were 
often categorised according to confidence. This suggests that the qualitative nature of 
Remember and Familiar justifications are not sensitive to manipulations of confidence 
while Know and Guess are.  
 
Conversely, Experiment 2.3 demonstrated that when confidence was manipulated 
externally to the justification (a confidence value was provided alongside the statement) 
this had no influence over participants’ categorisation of justifications. In Experiment 2.3 
justifications were selected as ‘prototypical’ statements from around the mean level of 
confidence for each category of subjective experience and were paired with confidence 
values either appropriate to their original category or appropriate to another category of 
subjective experience. At all levels of confidence, Remember and Familiar justifications 
were again found to be consistently assigned to Remember and Familiar, while whatever 
confidence value was presented alongside Know and Guess justifications a large proportion 
of justifications were assigned to Familiar, paralleling the results obtained for Medium 
confidence justifications in Experiment 2.2. Participants did not take into account the 
confidence value presented alongside the justification statement. Across all levels of 
manipulated confidence, how Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess justifications were 
assigned to categories of subjective experience remained consistent. 
 
Given these findings, it seems difficult to suggest that confidence is merely the driving 
force behind judgments of subjective experience (Dunn, 2008). Instead it is suggested that 
people use experiential state to derive confidence. The importance of this was stressed by 
Tulving (1985) when he suggested that “the adaptive value of episodic memory and 
autonoetic consciousness lies in the heightened subjective certainty with which organisms 
endowed with such memory and consciousness believe, and are willing to act upon, 
information retrieved from memory” (p. 10). The current experiments have demonstrated 
that in understanding memory, reliable confidence values can be derived from subjective 
experiences, even when participants have not been involved in the original memory task. 
 
In sum, the findings of the current experiments concur with Gardiner et al.’s conclusion: 
“The contents of any particular mental experience are idiosyncratic. But the states of 
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awareness are lawful” (Gardiner et al., 1998, p. 10). The novel finding of these experiments 
is that lay-persons’ understanding of others’ memory experiences is also lawful.  
 
The experiments presented in this chapter examined how different types of subjective 
experience are understood by people and found that confidence, confusion over source 
and familiarity, and level of detail involved in recall of a memory are all related to 
understanding of experiential state. These themes are carried forward in Chapters 3 and 4 
of this thesis. In the experiments presented in Chapter 3, the familiarity of items is 
manipulated prior to study to explore how participants use different subjective 
experiences to overcome the confusion caused when all items are familiar. In Chapter 4, 
confidence, source, and subjective experience judgments are compared experimentally to 
examine how these are related for items recognised with and without recollection. 
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3. THE USE OF RECOLLECTION WHEN ITEMS ARE FAMILIAR 
“…estimates of recollection do not directly reflect the amount of qualitative 
 information retrieved during item presentation, but rather the usefulness of this 
information in terms of selective responding.”  
(Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 1998, p. 395) 
 
In this chapter three experiments are presented where experimental familiarity of target 
and lure items was manipulated. Across three experimental designs and three types of 
recognition test, pre-exposure of items prior to study was found to impair memory 
performance. However, different patterns of subjective experience across pre-exposed and 
non pre-exposed items were only observed when a between-subjects design was used. The 
importance of experimental design when exploring subjective experience is discussed, as is 
the relationship between memory performance and subjective experience.  
 
In Chapter 2, confusion over the source of familiarity for items was suggested to influence 
how justification statements were assigned to categories of subjective experience and 
levels of confidence. Confusion over the source of familiarity was manipulated 
experimentally in the current chapter, and the relationship between source, subjective 
experience and confidence were further examined in Chapter 4. 
 
3.1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Received wisdom suggests that the more familiar you are with material the better you will 
remember it. However, actually it is items that are more novel and distinctive (and 
therefore less familiar) that have been shown to be recognised better than items which are 
less distinctive (e.g., Gregg, 1976; Kinsbourne & George, 1974; Tulving & Kroll, 1995). How 
familiarity influences memory performance has been studied using two main paradigms: 
word frequency – using the frequency of a word’s occurrence in the language as a variable; 
and experimental familiarity – where participants are pre-exposed to (some) items prior to 
study so those items increase in familiarity.  
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3.1.1. Word frequency effects 
 
Word frequency effects are consistently found whereby words that are more frequent in 
the language, and therefore more familiar11, e.g., sausage, are more easily recalled, but 
less frequent words, e.g., soufflé, are more easily recognised, with greater hit rates and 
lower false alarm rates than high-frequency words (see Gregg, 1976, and Gillund & Shiffrin, 
1984, for reviews). However, for recall the pattern of results is not as consistent as it is for 
recognition. In recall, the design of the experiment has shown to be crucially important, 
with the advantage for high-frequency words being obtained when participants study pure 
lists consisting of either all high-frequency or all low-frequency words in a between-
subjects design, but often being reversed or removed when the design is within-subjects 
using mixed lists (e.g., DeLosh & McDaniel, 1996; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Gregg, 
Montgomery, & Castano, 1980).  
 
In contrast, the advantage for less frequent words in recognition is more consistent and 
has been obtained using item recognition (e.g., Balota & Neely, 1980), forced-choice 
recognition (e.g., Glanzer & Bowles, 1976), and when the dependent measure is response 
speed rather memory performance (Duchek & Neely, 1989). Although in associative 
recognition, where the task is to recognise whether a test pair is an intact pair of words 
that were studied together or a recombination of words from other studied pairs, effects 
of word frequency are not so clear-cut. Clark (1992; Clark & Burchett, 1994) found an 
advantage for high-frequency words in associative recognition whereas Hockley (1984) 
found no effect of word frequency. These associative recognition results are therefore 
more consistent with the word frequency effects found for recall than for recognition. The 
issue of associative compared to item recognition will be returned to later (Section 3.2.1). 
 
3.1.2. Word frequency effects and subjective experience 
 
Overall, low-frequency words have an advantage when it comes to recognition. Several 
theories posit that the lower familiarity of these words is the basis for this advantage. 
                                                          
 
11
 However, frequency and familiarity differ subtly. Frequency refers directly to how often a word 
occurs in written and spoken language whereas familiarity refers to subjective ratings of how often 
a word is seen or experienced. 
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Mandler (1980) and Macleod and Kampe (1996) assert that the pre-experimental 
familiarity of a word determines how much of a ‘boost’ in familiarity it receives during 
study. As low-frequency words receive a larger ‘boost’ relative to high-frequency words, 
due to, for example, differential attending or increased rehearsal (Dobbins, Kroll, 
Yonelinas, et al., 1998), this leads to higher rates of recognition. Alternatively, models 
which focus on perceptual fluency as a basis for recognition, e.g., Jacoby and Dallas (1981), 
suggest that feelings of familiarity arise because of fluency and thus words that are 
relatively easy to perceive are experienced as familiar. For low-frequency words, because 
these words are more distinctive they will more often be recognised. Both Jacoby and 
Dallas (1981) and Mandler (1980) suggest that familiarity dominates in tests of recognition 
and that recollection is only relevant in certain situations such as recall where retrieval 
must be self-initiated (Mandler, 1980). However, studies which have investigated the 
effects of both recollection and familiarity with word frequency have shown that the 
frequency effect is mainly found in recollection-based recognition as opposed to 
familiarity-based recognition. To give one example, using the Remember-Know paradigm 
Gardiner and Java (1990) found that the low-frequency word advantage was only found in 
responses assigned to Remember, whereas equal proportions of high- and low-frequency 
words were assigned to Know.  
 
Many other studies have since obtained similar findings. In his review of recollection and 
familiarity, Yonelinas (2002) concluded that the low-frequency advantage is almost always 
larger in recollection than in familiarity. Evidence comes from studies which have used the 
Remember-Know procedure (e.g., Cook, Marsh, & Hicks, 2005; Dewhurst et al., 1998; 
Gardiner & Java, 1990; Gardiner et al., 1997; Guttentag & Carroll, 1997; Huron, et al., 1995; 
Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Kinoshita, 1995; Reder, et al., 2000; Strack & Förster, 1995), the 
process-dissociation procedure (Guttentag & Carroll, 1997; Komatsu, Graf, & Uttl, 1995), 
and ROC studies (Arndt & Reder, 2002). Taken together, these studies demonstrate a low-
frequency advantage for recollection and a smaller but reliable advantage for familiarity. 
Yonelinas (2002) calculated that low- compared to high-frequency words led to .16 and .09 
mean increases in recollection and familiarity, respectively. Supporting evidence also 
comes from electroencephalography (EEG) studies. For example, Rugg, Cox, Doyle, and 
Wells (1995) demonstrated that event-related potentials (ERPs) to low-frequency words 
exhibited large and reliable Old-New effects (changes in the waveforms evoked by Old 
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compared to New stimuli) and that these effects were non-significant in the ERPs evoked 
by high-frequency words.  
 
Reder et al. (2000) proposed and tested a model they called the Source of Activation 
Confusion (SAC) theory of memory, which explains the word-frequency effect in terms of 
contributions of both recollection and familiarity. In the model, every word is considered 
to have a word node, information related to its pre-experimental familiarity; and an event 
node, information related to whether it has been encountered in the experiment. 
Activation can spread between nodes depending on the strength and amount of 
associations between nodes (Cary & Reder, 2003). Increases in false alarms for high-
frequency words result from higher base activation of the word node of these items; 
participants are more inclined to spuriously accept high-frequency words as old because 
they have misattributed their pre-experimental familiarity. According to the model these 
words are therefore likely to be given a Know response (Cary & Reder, 2003; Reder et al., 
2000). On the other hand, increases in correct recognition for low-frequency words occur 
because low-frequency words have fewer prior contextual associations competing with the 
current contextual association, more activation is able to reach their event nodes, making 
it more likely that the event node will pass over threshold and receive a Remember 
response. In summary, the studies discussed here have shown an advantage for less 
familiar, low-frequency words when familiarity is a facet of the word itself; however, 
manipulations of familiarity, or increases in competing contextual associations, have also 
been performed experimentally. 
 
3.1.3. Experimental manipulations of familiarity 
 
Manipulations of familiarity within an experiment have also demonstrated recognition 
advantages for less familiar items. An early study by Kinsbourne and George (1974) 
manipulated experimental familiarity by asking participants to complete a pre-exposure 
task on items where they rated the concreteness of the words. Half these pre-exposed 
items were then involved in the study-test procedure along with an equal number of novel 
words. Word-frequency was also examined with different lists containing high- and low-
frequency words. This study found the usual low-frequency advantage in memory 
performance but also revealed an effect of experimental familiarity such that pre-exposure 
to words prior to study impaired recognition for both the low- and high-frequency words.  
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Kinsbourne and George’s findings have been extended by a number of researchers over 
the last two decades (e.g., Åberg & Nilsson, 2001, 2003; Chalmers & Humphreys, 1998; 
Greene, 1999; Kormi-Nouri, Nilsson, & Ohta, 2005; Maddox & Estes, 1997; Tulving & Kroll, 
1995). All studies concur that recognition accuracy is impaired for items that are pre-
exposed prior to study. However, differences in source discriminability between pre-
exposure and study tasks, and whether pre-exposure imposes its influence in correct 
recognition and/or false alarm rates has led to different theoretical interpretations from a 
number of studies.  
 
Tulving and Kroll (1995) replicated Kinsbourne and George (1974) with the addition that 
participants were asked to rate their confidence in their responses. As well as finding that 
pre-exposed words were less well recognised, participants were also more confident in 
their correct recognition or correct rejection of words that had not undergone pre-
exposure, compared to their confidence in their recognition and rejection of words that 
had been pre-exposed. Tulving and Kroll (1995) interpreted these findings in terms of their 
‘novelty-encoding hypothesis’ which they derived largely from neuroimaging data 
regarding the existence of neurons which respond particularly to novelty (e.g., Tulving, 
Markowitsch, Craik, Habib, & Houle, 1996; Tulving, Markowitsch, Kapur, Habib, & Houle, 
1994). This hypothesis posits that encoding proficiency is directly related to novelty within 
the experiment at the time of study, i.e., items that have been pre-exposed during the 
experiment will not be encoded as well during study as items that appear for the first time 
in the study phase.  
 
Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al. (1998) used a similar experimental design but included two 
different levels of pre-exposure. Tulving and Kroll (1995) had pre-exposed participants to 
each item six times and used the same semantic orienting task (living/non-living) during 
pre-exposure and study. These extensive pre-exposure manipulations led to the predicted 
finding that novel (not pre-exposed) studied items were correctly recognised to a greater 
extent than familiar (pre-exposed) studied items, but in addition nearly 50% of the pre-
exposed but not studied items were falsely recognised. To explore whether the effects of 
pre-exposure on correct recognition would hold true when pre-exposure was not so 
extensive or whether the effect was mainly linked to the high amount of false recognition, 
Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al. (1998) varied pre-exposure to one, two, or five pre-
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exposures. In addition, to create a situation where recollection could also play a role in 
overcoming the familiarity induced by pre-exposure they varied whether the same or 
different orienting tasks were used at pre-exposure and study (living/non-living or 
pleasant/non-pleasant).  
 
Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al. (1998) found a small overall effect of pre-exposure, with 
items being more likely to be recognised correctly if they had not been pre-exposed. 
However, performance interacted with whether the participant had undertaken the same 
or different orienting tasks at pre-exposure and study. Orienting task was manipulated 
between-subjects and for correct recognition the two groups did not differ but the same-
task group produced more false alarms than the different-task group. Dobbins, Kroll, 
Yonelinas, et al. concluded that the main component of the difference in accuracy between 
the groups resulted from false alarms and that changing the orienting task improved 
recollection of items, making it easier for participants to discriminate between pre-
exposed targets and distracters, overcoming the familiarity brought on by pre-exposure. 
These data speak against the novelty-encoding hypothesis being the explanation for the 
effects of pre-exposure. One of the key tenets of the novelty-encoding hypothesis is that 
the novelty assessment system screens out familiar items from further processing, 
however if the effect of pre-exposure is only to increase false alarms, then novelty of items 
at encoding has not helped improve recognition performance (Åberg & Nilsson, 2003; 
Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 1998).  
 
Whether source discriminability was the main factor influencing recognition performance 
to pre-exposed and non pre-exposed items was the focus of Åberg and Nilsson (2001) and 
Kormi-Nouri et al.’s (2005) extensions of this paradigm. These authors set out to increase 
the differences between the pre-exposure phase and the study phase in their experiments 
to try to test whether the different recognition performance was due to participants not 
being able to determine whether an item had been experienced only in pre-exposure or 
had also been studied, or it could be interpreted via the novelty-encoding hypothesis.  
 
In two experiments by Kormi-Nouri et al. (2005) pre-exposure took the form of a, 
seemingly separate, subject-performed task (SPT) experiment (e.g., Cohen, 1981) where 
participants were presented with 90 commands (e.g., ‘roll the pen’). The verbs and nouns 
contained in these commands then became the materials for the critical phase, along with 
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matched novel items. The critical phase of the experiment took the form of an incidental 
encoding task where participants were asked to make a frequency judgment about how 
often they performed the actions (e.g., roll) in daily life, or how often they used the objects 
(e.g., pen). After this incidental encoding task, participants underwent a recognition test 
for the words they had rated for frequency. The other words they had encountered in the 
SPT phase were used as familiar distractors and additional novel distractor words were also 
included. Participants were told to respond ‘yes’ to words they had rated for frequency, 
and ‘no’ to words they had not rated, however no specific instruction was given regarding 
recognition responses for items they had seen in the SPT phase. 
 
Kormi-Nouri et al. (2005) found that, across their two experiments, pre-exposure to items 
led to impairments of recognition, or recognition superiority of novel items over familiar. 
This effect was found in recognition accuracy (hits minus false alarms), and in hits and false 
alarms analysed independently, contrary to Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al. (1998) who 
found that the effect of pre-exposure was primarily due to increases in false alarms. Kormi-
Nouri et al. found that pre-exposure reduced recognition for both types of material (verbs 
and nouns), in two languages (Swedish and Japanese), and for high- and low-frequency 
words, although it was more pronounced for verbs than for nouns, and for low-frequency 
words than for high-frequency words.  
 
A further explanation is that difficulties with source discriminability are behind the effects 
of pre-exposure. Åberg and Nilsson (2001) used the same critical incidental encoding task 
as Kormi-Nouri et al., rating the frequency of occurrence of words, but used two different 
pre-exposure tasks; participants were either instructed to make up a short sentence 
containing the word or had to count the number of consonants in the word. However, the 
crucial difference in the study of Åberg and Nilsson was that in the final recognition test 
participants were explicitly instructed to only respond ‘yes’ to an item if they thought it 
had been on the study list (the incidental encoding list), regardless of whether they 
remembered it from the pre-exposure phase. Åberg and Nilsson found the pre-exposure 
effect for recognition accuracy data (hits minus false alarms) but not for hit rates alone, 
and suggested that the effect is due, at least in part, to source discrimination difficulties 
leading to increased false alarms in the pre-exposed items. However, Kormi-Nouri et al. 
(2005) suggested that the explicit test instruction used by Åberg and Nilsson may have led 
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to them not finding an effect for hit rates because the explicit instruction increased 
problems of source discriminability rather than reducing it.  
 
These studies have shown that when items are made familiar through pre-exposure prior 
to study recognition performance is impaired. Two hypotheses have been suggested for 
this finding. The ‘novelty-encoding hypothesis’ suggests that items which are encountered 
for the first time at study will be encoded more easily than items which are already 
familiar, resulting in better recognition performance for novel over familiar items. In 
contrast, the ‘source discriminability hypothesis’ proposes that it is problems of source 
confusion for familiar items which leads to more false alarms for these items and therefore 
superior recognition performance for novel items compared to familiar. The results of the 
current experiments are interpreted in terms of these two hypotheses in the General 
Discussion (Section 3.5.2).  
 
3.1.4. Experimental manipulations of familiarity with measures of subjective experience 
 
One aspect of the effects of pre-exposure/novelty on recognition that has been little 
researched is the subjective experiences on which recognition decisions are based when 
items have been pre-exposed. In their discussion of how explicit instructions to only report 
items from the critical study phase may have influenced recognition behaviour, Kormi-
Nouri et al. (2005) state: “subjects had to think over Phases 1 and 2 and to decide whether 
they remember the information from the experiments or simply know the information” 
(Kormi-Nouri et al., 2005, p. 140, italics added). As reported above, Tulving and Kroll (1995) 
asked participants to make confidence judgments, with the finding that participants were 
more confident in their responses for words that had not undergone pre-exposure. In a 
later study, Åberg and Nilsson (2003) also had participants make confidence judgments to 
each item they recognised as being a studied item. Confidence judgments were made on a 
3-point scale: 3 = very confident, 2 = more or less sure, and 1 = guessing; a scale which 
Åberg and Nilsson (2003) likened to that of Remember, Know, and Guess judgments of 
subjective experience. While the validity of this comparison is the subject of other chapters 
of this thesis (see in particular Chapter 4), Åberg and Nilsson (2003) did make some 
interpretation of their findings in relation to dual-process models and the Remember-
Know paradigm. 
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In general, Åberg and Nilsson’s (2003) results replicated the pre-exposure effects found by 
Tulving and Kroll (1995) but the effect was found to be down to increases in false alarms 
for pre-exposed items, not increases in hits for novel items. However, when analysis was 
performed on only those items given the highest confidence rating, an increase in correct 
recognition for novel items was found, which the authors took to be strong evidence 
against the source-discriminability hypothesis and for the novelty-encoding hypothesis. 
Åberg and Nilsson suggested that the reason a recognition advantage for novel items was 
only observed for responses with a high level of confidence may be because the novelty 
effect requires recollection of the encoding occasion. This finding parallels those observed 
in the word-frequency literature where the finding that low-frequency words are more 
easily recognised than high-frequency words has been shown to be obtained for 
Remember responses to a greater extent than for Know responses (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 
1990; Yonelinas, 2002).  
 
One paradigm which is similar to those involving pre-exposure is the process-dissociation 
procedure (PDP) of Jacoby (1991). As discussed in the General Introduction (Section 
1.5.2.1) Jacoby (1991) developed the PDP to assess the contributions of recollection and 
familiarity to memory. In a PDP experiment participants study items from two lists (e.g., 
presented in different modalities) and then either recall items under inclusion conditions 
(‘include all items regardless of list’) – which is taken to measure the combination of 
familiarity and recollection processes; or under exclusion conditions (‘only recall items 
from the second list’) – taken to measure recollection. Recollection and familiarity are then 
calculated by comparing performance across these conditions. As mentioned above, 
findings of word-frequency effects using the PDP by Guttentag and Carroll (1997) and 
Komatsu et al. (1995) have found the same advantage for low-frequency words as those 
using the Remember-Know paradigm (Yonelinas, 2002).  
 
Although the PDP may appear very similar to the experimental manipulations of familiarity 
via pre-exposure the critical difference is one of source discrimination. The main task in a 
PDP experiment is a source discrimination task – where did I experience that item, was it 
List 1 or List 2? This is similar to the source discrimination needed in the pre-exposure 
experiments discussed above, however Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al. (1998) have 
pointed out that the inclusion and exclusion instructions are directly related to the 
qualitative processing undertaken at encoding (e.g., whether an item is spoken by a male 
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or female voice) which is very different to the source discriminability present in many pre-
exposure designs where typically either the pre-exposure phase or the study phase is one 
of incidental encoding and the instructions at recognition do not refer to the qualitative 
nature of the processing that took place at encoding. In line with this, many of the 
experiments discussed above were designed to try to increase the discriminability between 
pre-exposed and studied items, e.g., by changing the orienting task at pre-exposure and 
study (Åberg & Nilsson, 2001, 2003; Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 1998; Kormi-Nouri et 
al., 2005). The current experiments also employ different tasks at pre-exposure and study 
with the prediction that this should produce a situation where recollection can play a role 
in overcoming the familiarity induced by pre-exposure. 
 
The role of subjective experience in overcoming familiarity has been explored by 
Whittlesea and colleagues (e.g., Kronlund & Whittlesea, 2005, 2006; Whittlesea, 2002, 
2004; Whittlesea & Williams, 2000, 2001a, 2001b). Their standard paradigm uses a 
sentence stem completion task, which is modified to induce a feeling of familiarity by the 
inclusion of a pause (on some trials) before the final word of the sentence appears. Using 
this paradigm, Whittlesea (2002) found that including a pause between sentence stem and 
terminal word led to greater hits and false alarms following high-constraint stems, for 
example, “She swept the floor with the… (pause) BROOM”. High-constraint stems are 
those for which only a few words would be able to complete the sentence sensibly (e.g., 
MOP, BRUSH). Whittlesea suggested that the pause in the sentence allowed participants to 
develop an expectation about the word that would complete the sentence. This 
expectation then invoked a feeling of familiarity with the word when it appeared, leading 
them to endorse the item as one they had seen before, even if they actually had not. A 
feeling of familiarity would not be induced in a low-constraint sentence such as “She 
couldn’t find a place to put the…”, as there is no expectation of what word will complete 
the sentence. Whittlesea (2002; Experiments 6a-c) went on to explore subjective 
experience responses in this paradigm by asking participants to report recognition 
decisions as either recall or familiarity.  
 
In Experiment 6a, participants studied single words and were then presented with 
sentence stems at test; half the sentences were completed by the studied words and half 
were completely novel sentences. Here the feeling of familiarity induced by the pause 
between sentence stem and word at test led to more claims of recall in both hits and false 
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alarms for high-constraint compared to low-constraint sentences. For high-constraint 
sentences, the feeling of familiarity induced by the pause led participants to claim they 
recalled the word from the study phase, even when it was a novel sentence. There were no 
differences in reports of familiarity.  
 
In Experiment 6c, Whittlesea altered the procedure so that, at study, some words were 
studied as single words and others were studied in complete sentences. Later, at test, 
some words were presented with sentence stems that had been encountered with the 
word at study, and some were presented with novel sentence stems. With this procedure, 
both new and old high-constraint sentences were more likely to be claimed to be familiar 
than were low-constraint sentences. Here the feeling of familiarity induced when novel 
high-constraint sentence stems were presented led participants to endorse these new 
items as being familiar, not as being recalled as was found in Experiment 6a. Whittlesea 
explained these different findings by highlighting the differences in how items were 
experienced at test. In Experiment 6a all the sentence stems presented at test were novel, 
only single words had been presented at study. In contrast, in Experiment 6c, some of the 
stems had been encountered at study. In this experiment, encountering some pre-
familiarised stems at test resulted in novel stems being claimed as familiar, not recalled. 
Thus, in these experiments the subjective experiences reported by participants depended 
not only on what they experienced for that individual item or sentence, they also 
depended on the nature of the other sentences included on the test (Whittlesea, 2002).  
 
In contrast to the experiments which manipulated the actual familiarity of items 
experimentally (e.g., Åberg & Nilsson, 2001, 2003; Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 1998; 
Kormi-Nouri et al., 2005), using his sentence completion paradigm with a pause between 
stem and terminal word Whittlesea (2002) was able to manipulate the feelings of 
familiarity experienced on particular trials and explore how these were reflected in 
judgments of subjective experience (see also Kronlund & Whittlesea, 2005, 2006; 
Whittlesea, 2004; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001b). Furthermore, Whittlesea demonstrated 
that when feelings of familiarity are manipulated in this way the subjective experience with 
which an item is recognised can depend on how that item is perceived in relation to the 
other items on the test. In view of that, it is suggested that in the current experiments, 
whether pre-exposure is manipulated within- or between-subjects could influence how 
Chapter 3 
132 
 
recognition of items is experienced. Experiments that have examined subjective 
experience responses across experimental designs are discussed in the following section. 
 
3.1.5. Experimental design for subjective experience experiments 
 
One aspect of the experimental manipulations of familiarity not yet mentioned is that all 
the experiments discussed operationalised pre-exposure as a within-subjects variable. As 
the key area of interest is the subjective experiences that accompany decisions of 
recognition when items have been pre-exposed, it should be noted that, in addition to the 
Whittlesea (2002) findings discussed above, other manipulations have also demonstrated 
different patterns of subjective experience responses when carried out within- or 
between-subjects. For example, Dewhurst and Parry (2000) explored recognition for 
positive, negative, and neutral emotion words in both within- and between-subjects 
experimental designs. When mixed lists of words were presented (emotionality 
manipulated within-subject) positive and negative emotion words elicited more Remember 
responses than neutral words. However, this finding was eliminated when emotionality 
was manipulated between-subjects and participants studied pure lists of either positive, 
negative, or neutral words. Bodner and Lindsay (2003) also demonstrated the influence of 
test-list context on Remember-Know judgments in a levels-of-processing (LOP) experiment. 
They found that medium LOP items were more likely to be categorised as Remembered, 
and less likely to be classified as Known, when mixed with shallow rather than with deep 
LOP items, albeit overall recognition did not differ according to list context. 
 
Another factor that can be problematic in within-subjects designs is carry-over from one 
condition to the other. Bodner and Richardson-Champion (2007) have recently explored 
carry-over effects and test-list context in an experiment on eyewitness testimony. They 
examined how subjective experience for recognition of details of a crime event were 
influenced by the relative difficulty of the other details on the test. Details of medium 
difficulty were found to be more likely to be classified as Remembered when mixed with 
hard details rather than easy details. In addition, when detail difficultly was 
operationalised in a blocked design, medium details were more likely to be classified as 
Remembered when preceded by a block of hard details rather than a block of easy details. 
However, informing participants of the relative difficulty of the upcoming block was found 
to eliminate the effect of blocking. 
Chapter 3 
133 
 
 
Similarly, Conway and Dewhurst (1995a) found, using a between-subjects design, that 
when trait words were encoded with reference to the self, words correctly recognised 
were more likely to be accompanied by a Remember response than when they were rated 
for valence at encoding. However, Hirshman and Lanning (1999) later attempted to 
replicate these findings using a within-subjects manipulation of encoding task but failed; 
instead they found equal levels of Remember responses across conditions. Conway and 
colleagues suspected that differences in the experimental design of their experiment and 
that of Hirshman and Lanning may have influenced the findings and Conway, Dewhurst, 
Pearson, and Sapute (2001) performed another series of experiments comparing 
experimental designs. These experiments demonstrated that the self-reference effect did 
replicate across between- and within-subjects designs but, in addition, found that results 
only replicated when the interval between study and test was 1 hour or longer, a 
difference in experimental design Hirshman and Lanning had not addressed.  
 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate the importance of exploring subjective 
experiences using between-subjects experimental designs. As discussed by Conway et al. 
(2001), within-subjects designs can often be prone to one condition influencing another 
condition or ‘carry-over effects’. Experimental design for examination of subjective 
experience is critical to the three experiments presented in the current chapter. Here the 
effects of pre-exposure on subjective experience are examined using within-, between-, 
and blocked within-subjects designs. 
 
3.1.6. Aims of the current experiments 
 
The central aim of the three experiments presented here was to explore the subjective 
experiences underlying recognition decisions when items are pre-exposed prior to study. 
Experimental manipulations of familiarity have never before been investigated in 
conjunction with the Remember-Know paradigm. Here experimental familiarity and 
subjective experience were explored using between- (Experiment 3.1), within-subjects 
(Experiment 3.2), and a blocked within-subjects design (Experiment 3.3).  
 
In line with previous findings regarding word frequency and experimental familiarity, the 
main prediction for each of these experiments was that pre-exposure to items prior to 
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study would impair recognition performance. A second prediction was that pre-exposure 
would lead to higher levels of Remember judgments being made, as recollection can be 
used to determine which items were on the study list from those that were pre-exposed. It 
was also predicted that use of familiarity as a basis for recognition would lead to impaired 
memory performance for items that had been pre-exposed prior to study.  
 
With regard to the source-discriminability and novelty-encoding hypotheses, if an effect of 
pre-exposure is demonstrated in Experiment 3.1, where pre-exposure is manipulated 
between-subjects, this result would provide support for the source-discriminability 
hypothesis. However, the novelty-encoding hypothesis cannot be formally tested in 
Experiment 3.1 as there are no differences in the novelty/familiarity of items within-
subjects at encoding. In contrast, with the within-subjects manipulation of pre-exposure in 
Experiment 3.2 both the source-discriminability and the novelty-encoding hypotheses can 
be tested. Patterns of results for memory performance and subjective experience are 
discussed in relation to these two hypotheses in the General Discussion (Section 3.5.2).  
 
3.2. EXPERIMENT 3.1: RECOLLECTION IN ASSOCIATIVE RECOGNITION 
 
3.2.1. Introduction 
 
In this experiment, participants studied forename-surname pairs. At recognition 
participants were then presented with the studied surname and two forenames and their 
task was to select the forename which had been studied with that surname. The use of 
associative encoding here is due to previous findings regarding use of recollection 
processes in different types of recognition. Yonelinas (1997, 2002) argues that associative 
recognition is primarily based on recollection, whereas item recognition is based to a 
greater extent on familiarity. In line with this, Hockley and Consoli (1999) have shown that 
associative recognition decisions are identified as Remember responses to a greater extent 
than are item recognition decisions and other authors have suggested that associative 
recognition decisions are based, at least in part, on a recall-like retrieval process (e.g., 
Humphreys, 1978; Clark, 1992; Clark & Burchett, 1994; see Clark & Gronlund, 1996, for a 
review). By this line of reasoning, one might expect pre-exposure not to interfere with 
associative recognition to the same extent as it would item recognition. 
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As discussed earlier, having different orienting tasks at pre-exposure and study should also 
increase the role of recollection in overcoming familiarity (Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 
1998). In the current experiment, the use of associative encoding at study and single items 
at pre-exposure was introduced to bring about the same effect.  
 
3.2.2. Method 
 
3.2.2.1. Participants and Design 
Participants were 67 undergraduate students (59 female), mean age 19.01 years (range 18 
to 22), from the University of Leeds, who received either Participant Pool Credits or £5 
payment. Participants were tested in groups of between three and seven at individual PCs. 
The experiment employed a between-subjects design; in the Pre-Exposure condition (N = 
34) participants undertook the pre-exposure familiarisation task prior to the study phase 
whereas in the No Pre-Exposure condition (N = 33) participants did not. Participants were 
assigned to conditions in a pseudo-random manner based on the timeslot they had signed-
up for; conditions were equally distributed across the day. 
 
3.2.2.2. Materials 
The to-be-learnt items consisted of 40 high-frequency forename-surname pairs (e.g., 
Sophia Watson). Twenty female and twenty male forenames were taken from the Office of 
National Statistics (www.statistics.gov) as the most popular given names in England and 
Wales in 2007. The forenames were paired with the 40 most common surnames in England 
and Wales in 2007 taken from the National Health Service Central Register. Pairing was 
done pseudo-randomly, with matching initial letters (e.g., George Griffiths) avoided. 
Different spellings of the same name and unisex forenames (e.g., Alex) were excluded, and 
forename-like surnames (e.g., Thomas) were excluded as surnames. 
 
A further 20 female and 20 male forenames were taken from the same website to be the 
lure forenames in the 2-alternate-forced-choice (2AFC) recognition test. Matching ensured 
the lure did not have the same initial letter as the target forename or the surname. Target 
and lure forenames were also matched so that there were approximately equal numbers 
(13 or 14) of target-lure pairs which did and did not match on gender (e.g., Thomas & Ryan, 
versus Eva & Matthew; all target-lure-surname triads are shown in Appendix B.2). 
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3.2.2.3. Procedure 
In the Pre-Exposure condition, prior to studying the 40 forename-surname pairs, 
participants performed a separate pen and paper task – counting the number of vowels in 
each of the 120 names (40 surnames, 40 target forenames, and 40 lure forenames) with 
the aim of equating familiarity of the target and lure names. Participants in the No Pre-
Exposure condition did not perform this task. The subsequent study phase and test phase 
procedures and instructions were identical for all participants. All instructions, study 
materials, and recognition test materials were presented, and data collected, using E-Prime 
version 1.2. 
 
In the study phase, each of the 40 forename-surname pairs were presented, in a random 
order, individually on the computer screen for five seconds, separated by a fixation point 
presented for one second. Participants were instructed that they should study the name 
pairs and that later they would undergo a 2AFC recognition test where they would have to 
recognise which of two forenames had been studied with that surname. Prior to 
undergoing the test phase, participants completed 100 sums as a distracter task which 
took approximately 15 minutes.  
 
In the test phase, participants were presented with instructions and given time to 
familiarise themselves with the definitions of Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar (F), and 
Guess (G) which they were to use to judge their recognition experience for all items (see 
Appendix A.2). Participants were then presented with the 40 surnames each accompanied 
by two forenames – the target name and a lure name, placed above one another to the left 
of the surname (presentation order randomised and placement on screen counterbalanced 
across items). Participants selected which of the two forenames they recognised as having 
been previously paired with that surname using the mouse and reaction time was 
recorded. For each item, the participant then made a subjective experience rating by 
clicking the R, K, F, or G box on the computer screen. When each recognition screen and 
subjective experience screen appeared the mouse pointer returned to the centre of the 
screen. 
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3.2.3. Results 
 
Firstly, to ascertain whether pre-exposure to the names influenced memory performance, 
overall recognition performance by participants in the two conditions was examined. 
Proportions of correct responses assigned to each of the subjective experience categories 
(Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess) were then calculated using both a priori and a 
posteriori methods; the memory performance of participants in each condition was 
correlated with assignment of items to the different categories of subjective experience; 
and finally, recognition decision reaction times were analysed by their later subjective 
experience category. Prior to analysis, data from any responses which had been made 
faster than 300ms or slower than 8000ms were excluded from the dataset. 
 
3.2.3.1. Memory measures 
The proportions of forenames correctly selected in the 2AFC recognition test were 
examined to assess whether there was a difference in memory performance between 
participants in the Pre-Exposure condition and the No Pre-Exposure condition. In both 
conditions mean recognition performance was found to be high, being .83 (SD = .11) in the 
Pre-Exposure condition and .87 (SD = .07) in the No Pre-Exposure condition. Because the 
strong prediction was made that pre-exposure would reduce performance, the strategy 
adopted was to use one-tailed tests to compare performance in the two conditions. 
Recognition performance was indeed found to be significantly higher in the No Pre-
Exposure condition, t(65) = 1.85, p = .034 (one-tailed), indicating that prior exposure to 
experimental materials impaired memory performance. For the sake of completeness, 
recognition was also examined using d’. The d’ values12 in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-
Exposure conditions were 1.41 (SD = .60) and 1.66 (SD = .53) respectively, mirroring the 
significant difference in memory performance found using the raw recognition 
proportions, t(65) = 1.80, p = .038 (one-tailed). 
 
3.2.3.2. Subjective experience measures at retrieval 
The second analysis of interest was what subjective experiences had participants used to 
make their recognition decisions. Firstly a priori proportions were calculated – the 
proportion of correct responses assigned to each of the subjective experience categories. 
                                                          
 
12
 Formulas for d’ are shown in Appendix C. 
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These proportions sum to 1 for each participant which can be problematic for statistical 
analysis as it violates assumptions of independence; however, following approaches 
described elsewhere (e.g., Conway et al., 1997; Herbert & Burt, 2004), where this occurs it 
is noted and the variables are analysed together with planned comparisons used to further 
explore the data. As is shown in Figure 3.1, correct recognition was based on different 
types of subjective experience in the two conditions.  
 
Participants in the Pre-Exposure condition assigned .39 of correctly recognised names to 
the Remember category, and only .20 to the Know category, whilst participants in the No 
Pre-Exposure condition assigned .29 to Remember and .29 to Know. In both conditions, 
assignment of correctly recognised names to the Familiar and Guess categories were 
similar; .24 and .25 were assigned to Familiar in Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure 
respectively and .17 were assigned to Guess in both conditions. 
 
Figure 3.1. Proportion of correct responses assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and 
Guess by participants in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions. Errors bars = 1 
SeM. 
 
A 2(exposure condition) x 4(subjective experience) ANOVA demonstrated a significant 
main effect of subjective experience, F(3,195) = 9.61, p < .001, and a significant interaction 
between exposure condition and subjective experience, F(3,195) = 3.18, p = .025. No effect 
of exposure condition as a between-subjects factor was calculated as subjective experience 
categories summed to 1. Planned comparisons between the conditions found significantly 
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more responses were assigned to Remember in the Pre-Exposure condition than in the No 
Pre-Exposure condition, t(65) = 2.13, p = .037. Conversely, significantly fewer responses 
were assigned to Know in the Pre-Exposure condition than in the No Pre-Exposure 
condition, t(65) = 2.06, p = .044. Familiar and Guess comparisons were non-significant, t < 
1. Comparisons across subjective experience categories in the two conditions also revealed 
a significantly greater proportion of responses had been assigned to Remember as 
opposed to Know in the Pre-Exposure condition, t(33) = 3.28, p = .002, but not in the No 
Pre-Exposure condition, t < 1. In the Pre-Exposure condition proportion of responses 
assigned to Remember was significantly larger than proportion assigned to any other 
subjective experience category, all at least p < .006, and also significantly more responses 
had been assigned to Familiar than to Guess, t(33) = 2.70, p = .01. In contrast, in No Pre-
Exposure no differences were found between the proportions assigned to Remember, 
Know, or Familiar, all t < 1; here only Guess was assigned a significantly lower proportion of 
responses than all other categories, all at least p < .02.  
 
Since the critical hypothesis was that the Pre-Exposure condition would influence 
experiential states and in turn memory performance, a posteriori proportions were also of 
interest. These take into account the amount of incorrect responses as they calculate 
whether an item that had been assigned to a particular subjective experience category was 
more likely to have come from a correct or incorrect recognition response. For both 
exposure conditions, items were more likely to be correctly recognised if assigned to 
Remember and Know categories than to Familiar or Guess categories, see Figure 3.2. The 
proportion of responses that had been correctly recognised was over .90 for all Remember 
and Know responses. These were both higher than for Familiar responses, and finally 
Guess responses had the lowest likelihood of having been assigned to a correct response 
as opposed to assigned to an incorrect response.  
 
A 2(exposure condition) x 4(subjective experience) ANOVA demonstrated a significant 
main effect of exposure condition as a between-subjects factor, F(1,61) = 5.52, p = .022, 
and a significant main effect of subjective experience, F(3,183) = 57.07, p < .001, but no 
interaction between exposure condition and subjective experience, F < 1. Planned 
comparisons within conditions revealed that in both the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-
Exposure conditions there was no significant difference between the likelihood of 
recognition decisions having been correct when items were assigned to the Remember 
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category compared to the Know category, both t < 1, whereas all other comparisons 
between categories were significant, all p < .002. The likelihood of recognition decisions 
being correct was equally high for responses which went on to be classified as Remember 
or Know, and for both conditions was significantly higher than the likelihood of items being 
correct which went on to be assigned to Familiar or Guess. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Proportion of forenames assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess in 
the two conditions that had previously been correctly recognised. Errors bars = 1 SeM. N = 
31 in Pre-Exposure condition and N = 32 in No Pre-Exposure condition due to missing data. 
 
Comparisons between the conditions revealed that only for recognition decisions which 
were assigned to Familiar were responses in the No Pre-Exposure condition significantly 
more likely to have come from a correct response than responses in the Pre-Exposure 
condition, t(65) = 2.46, p = .017; all others p > .15. 
 
3.2.3.3. Correlational analyses 
To examine whether recognition based on a particular type of subjective experience was 
associated with improved or impaired performance, the proportion of names correctly 
recognised was correlated with the assignment of responses to the different levels of 
subjective experience; see Table 3.1. In the Pre-Exposure condition, memory performance 
was found to be significantly positively correlated with proportion of correct items 
assigned to Remember, and significantly negatively correlated to proportion of correct 
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items assigned to Familiar. That is, people who made more Remember responses tended 
to have higher levels of performance and people who made more Familiar responses 
tended towards lower levels of performance. Correlations between performance and 
number of items assigned to Know, and Guess, were not significant. In the No Pre-
Exposure condition, memory performance was not significantly correlated with proportion 
of names assigned to any of the levels of subjective experience.  
 
Table 3.1. Correlations between memory accuracy and proportion of items assigned to 
subjective experience categories in each condition.  
Condition Remember Know Familiar Guess 
Pre-Exposure .48** -.07 -.57** -.25 
No Pre-Exposure .17 -.01 -.01 -.21 
N = 34 Pre-Exposure, 33 No Pre-Exposure. ** p < .005. 
 
To test whether there were significant differences between the correlations of memory 
performance with use of subjective experience in the two conditions Fisher’s Z was 
calculated using Fisher’s r-to-z transformations of the correlation coefficients (Fisher, 1921; 
see Appendix D for full formulae). Although this does not allow for full exploration of the 
interactions between all coefficients, it does allow us to see whether key comparisons are 
significantly different. Comparing the coefficients for Remember, Know, and Guess across 
the two conditions revealed no significant differences, all Z < 1.4. However the negative 
correlation between memory performance and proportion of items assigned to Familiar in 
the Pre-Exposure condition was found to be significantly greater than that in the No Pre-
Exposure condition, Z = 2.49, p < .05. 
 
In summary, pre-exposure reduces correct responses, but increases the number of correct 
items assigned to Remember (as a proportion). An interpretation of this finding is that the 
experience of Remembering reflects recollection processes being used to disambiguate 
familiar stimuli. This is borne out in the correlational data – participants in the Pre-
Exposure condition who reported more Remember responses had higher performance. 
Conversely, one of the strongest findings was that participants who made more Familiar 
responses had poorer performance. Furthermore, the negative correlation between 
familiarity and performance for participants who had been Pre-Exposed was significantly 
larger than that for participants who had No Pre-Exposure where there was no relationship 
between objective performance and reports of subjective experience.  
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3.2.3.4. Reaction times for recognition decisions 
As discussed earlier (General Introduction, Section 1.5.1.1), a point of debate between 
dual-process and single-process theorists is whether there are differences in the time it 
takes to make recognition decisions based on different subjective experiences. Many dual-
process models predict that responses based on familiarity should be quicker than those 
based on recollection as familiarity is considered to be a rapid and automatic process with 
relatively low demands on cognitive resources while recollection is a slower and more 
effortful process (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994, 1996). 
However, many studies have shown recognition decisions for Remember responses to be 
reliably faster than for Know responses (e.g., Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Dewhurst et al., 
1998, 2006; Henson et al., 1999; Vilberg & Rugg, 2007; Wixted & Stretch, 2004). In the 
current experiment reaction times (RTs) for 2AFC correct recognition decisions were 
recorded and categorised by their later subjective experience judgment. As shown in 
Figure 3.3, mean RTs were faster for responses later categorised as Remember or Know 
than those categorised as Familiar or Guess. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean correct recognition RTs by later subjective experience category. Error 
bars show 1 SeM. N = 30 in both conditions due to missing data.  
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subjective experience, F(3,174) = 47.74, p < .001, and no interaction between exposure 
condition and subjective experience category, F(3,174) = 1.31, p = .27. Collapsed across 
group, comparisons demonstrated that the speed with which recognition decisions were 
made which were later classed as Remember or Know was not significantly different, t(59) 
= 1.02, p = .31. However Remember and Know decisions were significantly faster than both 
Familiar and Guess decisions, all p < .001; and finally, correct recognition decisions based 
on Familiarity were made significantly faster than Guesses, t(59) = 2.33, p = .02.  
 
Thus, although memory is impaired by pre-exposure, it does not lead to a significant 
difference in reaction times. Both groups made Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess 
responses equally according to the time taken to respond. Pre-exposure impairs 
performance and shifts responses to Remember, but it does not operate to shift reaction 
times. Reaction times show the same pattern in both conditions suggesting that subjective 
reports are reflective of the same underlying processes in each group.  
 
3.2.4. Discussion 
 
In this experiment the manipulation of pre-exposing participants in one condition to all the 
first names and surnames that would be encountered during the study and test phases of 
the experiment led to differences in all analyses. Overall, memory performance was found 
to be lower in the Pre-Exposure condition compared to the No Pre-Exposure condition 
which replicates the findings of Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al. (1998), Kormi-Nouri et al. 
(2005), Åberg & Nilsson (2001, 2003), Tulving and Kroll (1995), Maddox and Estes (1997), 
Chalmers and Humphreys (1998), and Greene (1999).  
 
The novel finding of the current experiment was that patterns of use of the subjective 
experience categories differed depending on whether items had been pre-exposed or not. 
More correctly-recognised names were assigned to Remember and less to Know in the Pre-
Exposure condition compared to the No Pre-Exposure condition. Taken in conjunction with 
the memory performance results, this analysis shows that with Pre-Exposure, while use of 
recollection increases – as indicated by a greater proportion of Remember responses, 
memory performance actually decreases. This goes against the implicit assumption that 
the more recollection you have the better your memory performance. 
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Analysis of a posteriori proportions also demonstrated that when participants made their 
recognition decisions based on familiarity, this decision was more likely to be incorrect in 
the Pre-Exposure condition than the No Pre-Exposure condition; the familiarity induced by 
pre-exposure was an inappropriate cue for making a decision. This finding was reiterated 
by the negative correlation between familiarity and poorer memory performance in the 
Pre-Exposure condition. No relationships between subjective experience and memory 
performance were demonstrated in the No Pre-Exposure condition indicating that when 
items did not undergo pre-exposure, it was not necessary to use a particular type of 
subjective experience to aid recognition. Discussion of these findings with respect to the 
previous literature on confidence and recollection in experimental manipulations of 
familiarity (e.g., Tulving & Kroll, 1995; Åberg & Nilsson, 2003) and theoretical explanations 
associated with the novelty-encoding and source-discriminability hypotheses (e.g., Kormi-
Nouri et al., 2005; Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 1998) are left until the General 
Discussion (Section 3.5.2).  
 
Reaction times in this experiment replicated previous findings, with recognition decisions 
based on recollection being made more quickly than those based on familiarity. However, 
in this experiment the use of separate Know and Familiar categories meant that the 
findings do not map neatly onto earlier Remember-Know data as here it was Remember 
and Familiar responses which demonstrated the difference, not Remember and Know 
responses. In the current experiment Know responses were made just as quickly as 
Remember responses. This issue is returned to in the General Discussion (Section 3.5.3).  
 
Overall, these findings replicate those observed in previous experiments on word 
frequency and experimental manipulations of familiarity: memory performance was 
impaired for items pre-exposed prior to study. The novel finding of this experiment was 
that the differences in performance observed in conditions of pre-exposure and no pre-
exposure can be understood by the underlying processes and subjective experiences on 
which recognition decisions are based in the different conditions. This experiment also 
demonstrated, for the first time, that pre-exposure can impair recognition when 
manipulated using a between-subjects design. 
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3.3. EXPERIMENT 3.2: RECOLLECTION WHEN FAMILIARITY IS MANIPULATED WITHIN-SUBJECTS 
 
3.3.1. Introduction 
 
As all previous experiments manipulating pre-exposure had used within-subjects designs 
the aim of Experiment 3.2 was to explore whether the results from Experiment 3.1 would 
be replicated within-subjects with participants undergoing pre-exposure on half the stimuli 
and not on the other half. It was expected that a within-subjects manipulation would 
influence participants’ use of the different categories of subjective experience, and that 
this could lead to changes in overall recognition performance. The methodology employed 
in this replication was also somewhat different to that of Experiment 3.1. Participants were 
recruited in lecture classes and therefore the study phase was presented on Powerpoint 
and all other tasks completed in a test booklet.  
 
3.3.2. Method 
 
3.3.2.1. Participants and Design 
Participants were 44 students, 27 from the University of Leeds (22 female) and 17 from 
Åbo Akademi, Turku, Finland (16 female). The British students had a mean age of 23.26 
years; 14 were third-year students and 13 were MSc students. The Finnish students came 
from a range of degree courses; their mean age was 21.24 years. The Finnish participants 
had been learning English for a minimum of six years (mean 8.24) and all rated their 
understanding of English as at least four on a scale of 1-7 (mean 5.59). All analyses were 
initially performed with nationality as a between-subjects variable and no differences were 
observed so this factor was removed. Participants were tested in their respective course 
groups in lecture theatres. This experiment employed a within-subjects design with 
participants being pre-exposed to only half the study stimuli. 
 
3.3.2.2. Materials 
The stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 3.1, however here the Pre-Exposure list 
of names included only half the target forenames, half the surnames and half the lure 
forenames (60 names total). The lure forenames which were pre-exposed were those 
which were later paired with those forenames and surnames also pre-exposed, i.e., for 
each 2AFC combination in the test phase participants had either been exposed to all 
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elements of the 2AFC combination (the target forename, lure forename, and surname) or 
had not been pre-exposed to any of those names. The Pre-Exposure set of names was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
 
A test booklet was created which included the consent form, demographics questionnaire, 
Pre-Exposure task, a short distracter task which consisted of a pattern comparison task 
(Salthouse, 1991), the definitions of R, K, F, and G, and finally the recognition test. Due to 
trying to limit the duration of the experimental session the distracter task was kept short 
and took participants approximately three minutes to complete. A Powerpoint slideshow 
was created to present the forename-surname pairs for study. 
 
3.3.2.3. Procedure 
Participants completed the demographic questionnaire and then performed the Pre-
Exposure task – counting the number of vowels in the 60 names (20 surnames, 20 target 
forenames, and 20 lure forenames). When all participants had completed this task the 
Powerpoint slideshow was presented on the screen at the front of the lecture theatre. 
 
In the study phase the 40 forename-surname pairs were presented individually; all 
participants studied the items in the same order. Participants were instructed that they 
should study the name pairs and that later they would undergo a 2AFC recognition test 
where they would have to recognise which of two forenames had been studied with that 
surname. Participants studied each name-pair for four seconds with a fixation point 
presented for one second between stimuli. Participants then returned to their test 
booklets and completed the distracter task, proceeding on to the recognition test in their 
booklets in their own time.  
 
In the test booklets participants were presented with instructions and told to familiarise 
themselves with the definitions of Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar (F), and Guess (G) 
which they were to use to judge their recognition experience for all items; these definitions 
were identical to those used in Experiment 3.1 (see Appendix A.2). Participants were then 
presented with the 40 surnames each accompanied by two forenames – the target name 
and a lure name, placed above one another to the left of the surname. Participants were 
instructed to circle which of the two forenames they recognised as having been previously 
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paired with that surname. For each item the participant was then instructed to circle either 
R, K, F, or G to make their subjective experience judgment. 
 
3.3.3. Results 
 
The analysis for Experiment 3.2 took the same approach as in Experiment 3.1. Firstly, to 
determine whether pre-exposure to the names influenced memory performance 
recognition accuracy for pre-exposed and non-pre-exposed names was examined. 
Proportions of responses assigned to each of the subjective experience categories 
(Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess) were then calculated using a priori and a 
posteriori methods. Lastly memory performance of participants to pre-exposed and non-
pre-exposed names was correlated with assignment of those items to the different 
categories of subjective experience.  
 
3.3.3.1. Memory measures 
To assess whether, using this within-subjects design, participant’s memory performance 
was better for names to which they had not been pre-exposed the proportions of 
forenames correctly selected in the 2AFC recognition test in the two conditions were 
examined. In both conditions mean recognition performance was found to be high, being 
.81 (SD = .12) in the Pre-Exposure condition and .86 (SD = .10) in the No Pre-Exposure 
condition. As found in Experiment 3.1, recognition performance was significantly higher in 
the No Pre-Exposure condition than in the Pre-Exposure condition – participants were able 
to recognise more forenames correctly when they had not encountered them on the 
vowel-counting task prior to study, t(43) = 3.65, p = .001 (one-tailed). Recognition was also 
examined using d’. The d’ values in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions were 
1.12 (SD = .53) and 1.41 (SD = .56) respectively, mirroring the significant difference in 
memory performance found using the raw recognition proportions, t(43) = 4.21, p < .001 
(one-tailed).  
 
3.3.3.2. Subjective experience measures at retrieval 
Both a priori and a posteriori proportions were calculated. In this experiment, proportion 
of correct recognition responses assigned to each of the categories of subjective 
experience did not differ between the two conditions; see Figure 3.4.  
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In comparison to the differing use of Remember and Know categories of subjective 
experience in Experiment 3.1, here similar proportions of correctly recognised names were 
assigned to the Remember category whether the name had undergone No Pre-Exposure 
(.37) or had been Pre-Exposed (.35). Additionally, similar levels were assigned to Know 
whether the name had undergone No Pre-Exposure or had been Pre-Exposed (.19 and .17 
respectively). Here proportions for Remember and Know in both conditions are similar to 
the proportion of responses assigned to Remember and Know in the Pre-Exposure 
condition in Experiment 3.1 (.39 and .20 respectively) – use of subjective experience 
categories in both conditions mirrors the patterns observed in the Pre-Exposure condition 
in Experiment 3.1. Proportions of correctly recognised names assigned to Familiar and 
Guess categories were approximately equal in the two conditions as they had been in 
Experiment 3.1, however use of Familiarity as a basis for recognition decisions was 
increased and use of Knowing reduced in this experiment compared to in Experiment 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Proportion of correct responses assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and 
Guess by participants in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions. Errors bars = 1 
SeM. 
 
A 2(exposure condition) x 4(subjective experience) within-subjects ANOVA was conducted 
on these proportions. A significant main effect of subjective experience, F(3,129) = 12.14, p 
< .001 was observed, but no interaction between exposure condition and subjective 
experience level, F < 1. As subjective experience proportions summed to 1, an effect of 
exposure was not analysed, however comparisons between exposure conditions within 
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each subjective experience category revealed no significant differences, all p > .20. 
Collapsed across conditions, t-tests demonstrated significantly more responses had been 
assigned to Remember than to any other category of subjective experience, all at least p < 
.01. A significantly greater proportion of responses had also been assigned to Familiar 
compared to Know, t(43) = 2.95, p = .005, and Familiar compared to Guess, t(43) = 2.43, p = 
.02. There was no significant difference between how many responses were assigned to 
Know and Guess, t < 1.  
 
A posteriori probabilities were then calculated on these data – whether an item that had 
been assigned to a particular subjective experience category was more likely to have come 
from a correct or incorrect recognition response. From Figure 3.5 it can be seen that the 
pattern of means matches those observed in Experiment 3.1 – for each category of 
subjective experience, the probability of an item coming from a correct recognition 
response was lower for items in the Pre-Exposure condition than in the No Pre-Exposure 
condition. In addition, in both exposure conditions items were more likely to be correctly 
recognised if assigned to Remember and Know than to Familiar or Guess.  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Proportion of forenames assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess in 
the two conditions that had previously been correctly recognised. Errors bars = 1 SeM. N = 
30 due to missing data. 
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A 2(exposure condition) x 4(subjective experience) within-subjects ANOVA demonstrated a 
significant main effect of exposure condition, F(1,29) = 14.83, p = .001, and a significant 
main effect of subjective experience, F(3,87) = 43.95, p < .001, but no interaction between 
the two, F < 1. Planned comparisons within conditions revealed that in the Pre-Exposure 
condition there was no significant difference between the likelihood of recognition having 
been correct when items were assigned to the Remember category compared to the Know 
category, t < 1. Conversely, in the No Pre-Exposure condition recognition decisions were 
significantly more likely to have been correct when items were assigned to Remember 
compared to Know, t(29) = 2.06, p = .048. All other comparisons between categories were 
significantly different at p < .01, except the comparison of items assigned to Know and 
Familiar in the No Pre-Exposure condition which was only marginally significant, t(29) = 
2.01, p = .054. As was found in Experiment 3.1, the likelihood of recognition decisions 
being correct was always over .90 for responses which went on to be classified as 
Remember or Know, and for both conditions was significantly higher than the likelihood of 
items being correct which went on to be assigned to Familiar or Guess. Planned 
comparisons between the exposure conditions revealed that decisions based on Familiarity 
were again less accurate for Pre-Exposed items compared to items which had undergone 
No Pre-Exposure, and this neared conventional significance levels, t(29) = 1.96, p = .06. 
Additionally, in this experiment recognition decisions based on Remembering also 
produced significantly lower performance when items had been Pre-Exposed compared to 
items in the No Pre-Exposure condition, t(29) = 2.56, p = .016. 
 
3.3.3.3. Correlational analyses 
The proportion of names correctly recognised in each condition was again correlated with 
the assignment of those names to the different categories of subjective experience. 
Memory performance was found to be significantly positively correlated with proportion of 
items assigned to Remember in both conditions and negatively correlated with proportion 
of items assigned to Familiar in both conditions, see Table 3.2. Negative correlations were 
also found between memory performance and proportion of items assigned to Guess in 
both conditions. Correlations between memory performance and Know were not 
significant.  
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Table 3.2. Correlations between memory accuracy and proportion of items assigned to 
subjective experience categories in each condition.  
Condition Remember Know Familiar Guess 
Pre-Exposure .38* .21 -.33* -.44** 
No Pre-Exposure .35* .15 -.28# -.36* 
N = 44 both Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure. ** p < .005, * p < .03, # p = .06. 
 
To test whether there were significant differences between the correlations in the two 
conditions Steiger’s   2* for dependent correlations was calculated (Steiger, 1980; see 
Appendix D for full formulae). No significant differences were observed between the two 
conditions, all   2*<1. In brief, both conditions yielded patterns of correlations similar to the 
Pre-Exposure condition in Experiment 3.1. 
 
3.3.4. Discussion 
 
Results from Experiment 3.2 replicated many aspects of those from Experiment 3.1 but 
they also add to them. In the current experiment pre-exposure was manipulated within-
subjects by exposing participants to half the names prior to study. This manipulation was 
operationalised by either all or none of the three components of the 2AFC associative 
recognition test (target forename, studied surname, lure forename) being included on the 
pre-exposure vowel-counting task. Either all items were familiar – studied forename and 
surname seen twice, but only paired once, lure forename only seen once; or the studied 
forename and surname had been seen once and the lure forename not at all. Replicating 
Experiment 3.1, memory performance was lower for items pre-exposed prior to study 
compared to items which had not undergone pre-exposure. This difference demonstrates 
that prior familiarity with experimental items impairs memory performance using both 
between- and within-subjects designs. 
 
However, in comparison to the differential use of subjective experience categories across 
the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions in Experiment 3.1, the current results 
demonstrate that when pre-exposure is manipulated within-subjects, patterns of 
subjective experience are the same across conditions. The proportion of responses 
assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess were the same regardless of whether 
the item had been pre-exposed or not, and the patterns paralleled those of the Pre-
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Exposure condition in Experiment 3.1 with the majority of items being assigned to 
Remember in both conditions. This same pattern of usage of subjective experience 
categories in the two conditions was also reflected in the correlational analysis which 
showed that use of Remembering as a basis for recognition judgments was positively 
related to correct recognition for both pre-exposed and not pre-exposed names, which 
differs from Experiment 3.1 where this was only found in the Pre-Exposure condition.  
 
Analysis of a posteriori proportions also demonstrated differences from the results found 
in Experiment 3.1. In the current experiment, when participants made their recognition 
decisions on either the basis of Remembering, or on the basis of Familiarity, both these 
decisions were more likely to be incorrect if the item had been on the pre-exposure list. 
The finding regarding familiarity-based recognition decisions parallels that found in 
Experiment 3.1; however, in that experiment no differences were found for recollection-
based decisions. Therefore, using both between- and within-subjects designs, when items 
are pre-exposed, basing a recognition decision on familiarity was found to significantly 
impair performance, however, only in the within-subjects design was this also true for 
recollection-based decisions. Here, when some target and lure forenames had all been pre-
exposed but others had not, recollection of a lure forename from its presence in the pre-
exposure task may have led to it being selected over the target forename.  
 
In this experiment, correlational analysis demonstrated memory performance to be 
positively related to proportion of items assigned to Remember in both conditions and 
negatively related to proportion of items assigned to Familiar in both conditions. This 
suggests that for all items in this within-subjects design, pre-exposed or not, it was 
necessary to use recollection to resolve the familiarity induced by pre-exposure. This 
initially seems to contradict the a posteriori data above, which indicates that recollection 
can impair recognition when items have been pre-exposed. However, taken together these 
results suggest that overall recollection aids recognition performance for all items when 
pre-exposure is manipulated within-subjects, but for a small proportion of items when the 
manipulation of pre-exposure is within-subjects incorrect recollection of pre-exposed lures 
can impair recognition in the Pre-Exposure condition.  
 
In summary, the memory performance advantage for items not pre-exposed replicated 
findings from Experiment 3.1 and findings from previous experiments on word frequency 
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and experimental manipulations of familiarity. However, results regarding use of subjective 
experience categories did not match those obtained in Experiment 3.1 and it is suggested 
that this is due to carry-over effects from the Pre-Exposure condition to the No Pre-
Exposure condition in this within-subjects design. As discussed by Conway et al. (2001) one 
problem in within-subjects designs is the potential for contamination of one condition by 
the other condition. Indeed, this is exactly what was observed in the Remember-Know 
experiments performed by Conway et al. (2001). In the current experiment, it appears that 
manipulating pre-exposure using a within-subjects design led participants to use the same 
underlying recognition processes or subjective experiences to make all their recognition 
decisions, regardless of whether items had been pre-exposed or not. The difference in the 
relative familiarity of target and lure names across pre-exposed and non-pre-exposed 
items was too subtle to be used by participants to judge for which items recollection was 
necessary for recognition and for which items it was not. The patterns observed in both 
conditions of Experiment 3.2 matched those from the Pre-Exposure condition of the 
between-subjects Experiment 3.1 suggesting that the patterns of subjective experience use 
‘carried-over’ from the Pre-Exposure condition to the No Pre-Exposure condition. This also 
relates to the patterns demonstrated by Whittlesea (2002). He found that subjective 
experience responses were dependent not only on the familiarity of the item itself, but 
also on how the item was perceived in relation to other items encountered at test. Results 
from Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate that the different contexts in which pre-
exposed and non-pre-exposed items are encountered influences how those items are 
subjectively experienced. These issues will be returned to in the General Discussion 
(Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.4).  
 
3.4. EXPERIMENT 3.3: RECOLLECTION IN ITEM AND NON-ASSOCIATIVE RECOGNITION IN A BLOCKED 
WITHIN-SUBJECTS DESIGN 
 
3.4.1. Introduction 
 
This experiment aimed to extend the findings of Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 in a number of 
ways by using a blocked within-subjects design. By manipulating pre-exposure using a 
blocked design this experiment aimed to examine whether the carry-over of use of 
subjective experience from pre-exposed to non-pre-exposed items would occur when 
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participants experienced both types of items but they were separated across different 
blocks.  
 
It was suggested that in Experiment 3.2, when pre-exposure was manipulated within the 
one experimental block, participants were not able to tell which items had been pre-
exposed and consequently their use of subjective experiences to judge recognition was the 
same for both types of item. In the current experiment, if participants are able to tell that 
in one block the lure words are completely novel whereas in another block the lure words 
are words they just performed the pre-exposure task on, then their patterns of subjective 
experience should differ across blocks. In other words, if participants are aware of the 
differences in relative familiarity of items across blocks then this should be reflected in 
their judgments of subjective experience. Conversely, if participants are unable to perceive 
the differences across blocks then patterns of subjective experience should show evidence 
of carry-over from pre-exposed to non-pre-exposed blocks. As discussed previously 
(Section 3.1.5), Bodner and Richardson-Champion (2007) recently explored carry-over 
effects and test-list context in an experiment on eyewitness testimony. They found that 
the relative difficulty of items on the test influenced subjective experience responses when 
difficulty was manipulated within list. In addition, when detail difficulty was manipulated 
across blocks the level of difficulty of one block influenced the subjective experience 
responses given to items in the next block. In the current experiment, if carry-over effects 
are observed then these are able to be examined by exploring the order in which 
participants completed the different blocks.  
 
Two further aims of this experiment were to see whether the previous findings would be 
replicated with words rather than names as stimuli and whether the findings obtained 
using an associative-2AFC paradigm would be replicated in non-associative-2AFC 
recognition and item (Yes/No) recognition. To these ends four experimental blocks were 
tested. The first two blocks employed a Yes/No recognition test and the latter two blocks 
employed a non-associative-2AFC test; full description of the design is given in Section 
3.4.2.2.  
 
Previous studies have found mixed results regarding whether use of recollection is greater 
in item versus AFC recognition. In a test of face recognition, Bastin and Van der Linden 
(2003) found recollection to be greater in item recognition compared to AFC recognition. 
Chapter 3 
155 
 
This fits with the widespread assumption that AFC recognition is thought to rely less on 
recollection than item recognition (e.g., Aggleton & Shaw, 1996) as in AFC recognition one 
can use the relative familiarity of items to make a recognition decision (e.g., Glanzer & 
Adams, 1990; Glanzer & Bowles, 1976). However, Khoe, Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, and 
Knight (2000) and Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, and Frederick (2002) found no differences in 
the amount of recollection in AFC and item recognition. Interestingly from the point of the 
current experiments, Cook et al. (2005) found contributions of recollection to AFC and item 
recognition to differ according to word frequency. Using a between-subjects design they 
found that for low-frequency words more items were assigned to Remember in item 
compared to AFC recognition, whereas for high-frequency words more were assigned to 
Remember in AFC than in item recognition. In the current experiment, patterns of 
subjective experience responses were compared across item and 2AFC recognition to 
explore whether pre-exposure influenced subjective experiences differentially in these two 
tasks.  
 
3.4.2. Method 
 
3.4.2.1. Participants 
Participants were 37 students and staff from the University of Leeds (31 female) with a 
mean age of 20.6 years who were members the Institute Participant Pool or on an email 
list of people willing to take part in Psychology experiments. They received either 
Participant Pool Credits or £6 payment for taking part. As an additional incentive to 
concentrate and perform as well as possible across this rather long experiment, 
participants received a further £5 if they achieved over 85% memory accuracy overall. 
Fifteen participants achieved this and were compensated. Participants were tested in 
groups of between three and nine at individual PCs in a laboratory computer cluster. All 
instructions and stimuli were presented, and data collected, using E-Prime version 1.2.  
 
3.4.2.2. Design and Materials  
The experiment employed a blocked within-subjects design. The experiment consisted of 
four blocks, each block consisting of a pre-exposure phase, study phase and test phase. 
Critically, in only two of the four blocks was the pre-exposure performed on the words that 
were then to be the target and lure words, in the other two blocks the ‘pre-exposure’ task 
was performed on distinct, i.e., non-studied, word lists. These blocks were the No Pre-
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Exposure blocks. For all participants the first two blocks (one Pre-exposure, one No Pre-
Exposure) were tested using Yes/No recognition tests whereas blocks three and four 
employed 2AFC recognition tests (again one Pre-exposure, one No Pre-Exposure). In 
contrast to the design employed in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 the 2AFC task here was not an 
associative recognition test. In the previous experiments participants studied two items 
together, a forename and a surname, and were presented with the surname and two 
forenames at test from which they had to choose the forename they had studied with that 
surname. Here items for study were presented individually and in the 2AFC test the correct 
response was presented together with a lure item. 
 
The stimuli were 480 medium- to high-frequency words13 (mean familiarity rating of 545; 
range 488-652) limited to between four and seven letters in length. The words were 
pseudo-randomly assigned to list to achieve approximately equal alphabetical spread 
across 12 lists of 40 words each (word lists shown in Appendix B.3). Eight versions of the 
experiment were created by counterbalancing which lists were to be used as target and 
lure words, and in which order participants would perform the Pre-Exposure blocks and 
the No Pre-Exposure blocks. Full explanation of this counterbalancing is shown in Appendix 
B.3. Pairing of target and lure words for the 2AFC blocks was also pseudo-random with 
matching initial letters avoided. In these blocks the side of the screen on which the targets 
and lures appeared was also counterbalanced. Presentation of all stimuli in all phases was 
randomised by E-Prime. 
 
3.4.2.3. Procedure 
Participants were instructed about the general procedure of the experiment and informed 
consent was obtained. Participants then accessed the experiment file and all further 
instructions for each phase were presented via computer screen. Participants completed 
four experimental blocks each consisting of a pre-exposure, study, and test phase. 
 
For the pre-exposure phases, participants were instructed that a word would be shown in 
the centre of the screen with a blue line below it and that their task was to count the 
                                                          
 
13
 Words obtained from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database. Familiarity values refer to the printed 
frequency in the language and were derived from merging three sets of familiarity norms: Pavio 
(unpublished), Toglia and Battig (1978) and Gilhooly and Logie (1980). 
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number of vowels in the word. Participants were instructed to use the number keys to 
input their response and that it would appear on the blue line as they typed. To proceed to 
the next word participants then pressed the enter key. For all trials the instruction “Count 
the number of vowels in this word” appeared at the top of the screen and “Press enter to 
continue” appeared at the bottom. In order that participants completed each trial quickly, 
a time limit of four seconds was given for each trial. If the participant took longer than four 
seconds to make a response the word disappeared and a message saying “Too Slow” was 
shown on the screen before the computer moved onto the next trial. In each pre-exposure 
phase, participants completed this vowel-counting task on 80 words (40 targets plus 40 
lures in the Pre-Exposure conditions, and 80 unrelated words in the No Pre-Exposure 
conditions). 
 
In the study phase, the 40 target items were presented individually on the screen for four 
seconds with a fixation point shown for 750 milliseconds between items. Participants were 
instructed that they should study the words and that later their memory would be tested. 
For each block participants were instructed, prior to study, which type of recognition test 
they would undergo in the test phase of that block: a Yes/No recognition test or a 2AFC 
recognition test.  
 
In each block, when the study phase was completed participants moved directly on to the 
test phase. Participants were again instructed as to which type of test was involved in this 
block, 2AFC or Yes/No and examples of the screen layouts were shown. Participants were 
also given time to familiarise themselves with the definitions of Remember (R), Know (K), 
Familiar (F), and Guess (G) which they were to use to judge their recognition experience for 
all items (see Appendix A.3). Each experimental trial began with a fixation point being 
shown for 750ms. In the blocks that had a Yes/No recognition test, a word was then 
presented in the centre of the screen with boxes labelled ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ positioned below it 
and towards the left and the right respectively. The instruction “Did you study this word in 
the Study Phase? Use the mouse to respond” appeared at the top of the screen and 
participants clicked on one of the boxes to make their response. The mouse pointer 
returned to the centre of the screen at the start of each trial. The 40 target words and 40 
lures were presented in random order. In the test phases of the 2AFC blocks, a target and a 
lure word were presented to the left and right of the centre of the screen (placement 
counterbalanced) with the instruction “Which of these words did you study in the Study 
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Phase? Use the mouse to respond” and participants clicked on the word they had studied 
previously. Again the mouse pointer returned to the centre of the screen at the start of 
each trial. After making their recognition decision, participants were shown the subjective 
experience judgment screen which consisted of four response boxes labelled R, K, F, and G, 
with the question “Please make a recognition rating” and made a subjective experience 
judgment by clicking the mouse on one of the boxes. Speed and accuracy of responses 
were emphasized in the instructions for the test phase and response times for recognition 
decisions and subjective experience judgments were recorded. Prior to a new trial 
commencing a blank screen was shown for 750ms.  
 
In between blocks participants were instructed that it was the end of the block and told 
“You will not be asked to remember any of those words again, the next block involves a 
completely new set of words.” They were also permitted to take a moment to take a break 
if they were feeling tired, and they began the next block when ready. After completion of 
the four blocks participants were debriefed. 
 
3.4.3. Results 
 
To determine whether pre-exposure or task type influenced memory performance 
recognition performance in each of the four blocks was examined. Within each block, 
proportions of correct responses assigned to each of the subjective experience categories 
(Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess) were again calculated using both a priori and a 
posteriori methods. To examine whether the order in which initial Yes/No Pre-Exposure 
and No Pre-Exposure blocks were performed had influenced data in these conditions, 
memory performance and use of subjective experience categories were also analysed split 
by counterbalancing group. Correlational analyses were also carried out. Finally, 
recognition decision reaction times were analysed by their later subjective experience 
category. Prior to analysis, data from any responses which had been made faster than 
300ms or slower than 8000ms were excluded from the dataset. 
 
3.4.3.1. Memory measures 
The proportion of items correctly recognised in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure 
conditions in the Yes/No task and the 2AFC task were examined. As can be seen from Table 
3.3, in both tasks recognition performance was lower when items had been pre-exposed. 
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As expected, raw proportions of recognition performance were much lower in the Yes/No 
task as opposed to the 2AFC task, however this difference was eliminated when 
performance was compared using d’ as the formula for calculating d’ in 2AFC recognition 
takes into account the performance advantage of 2AFC over Yes/No recognition14.  
 
Table 3.3. Means (and standard deviations) of recognition performance and d’ values in 
each of the blocks14.  
 Yes/No Task 2AFC Task 
Condition 
Recognition 
performance 
d’ value 
Recognition 
performance 
d’ value 
Pre-Exposure .61   (.23) 1.91   (.97) .89   (.14) 1.94   (.88) 
No Pre-Exposure .71   (.20) 2.36   (.98) .91   (.11) 2.06   (.78) 
 
A 2(task) x 2(exposure condition) within-subjects ANOVA on recognition performance 
demonstrated a main effect of task, F(1,36) = 120.19, p < .001, confirming that when 
looking at raw proportions memory performance was significantly lower in the Yes/No task 
compared to the 2AFC task; a main effect of exposure condition, F(1,36) = 13.44, p = .001; 
and an interaction between exposure and task, F(1,36) = 5.66, p = .02. Planned 
comparisons within task revealed that the effect of exposure condition was mainly due to 
the significant difference in memory performance in exposure conditions in the Yes/No 
task, t(36) = 3.31, p = .001 (one-tailed), as the difference in the means in the 2AFC task only 
approached significance, t(36) = 1.62, p = .057 (one-tailed). Although mean recognition 
performance in the 2AFC task was high, one-sample t-tests against the maximum score of 1 
demonstrated performance in both conditions was significantly below ceiling, both p < 
.001.  
 
The corresponding 2(task) x 2(exposure condition) within-subjects ANOVA on the d’ values 
showed no main effect of task, F(1,36) = 1.84, p = .18, demonstrating that the adjustment 
used when calculating d’ in 2AFC did eliminate the performance advantage typically seen 
for 2AFC recognition over Yes/No recognition. ANOVA did show a main effect of exposure 
condition, F(1,36) = 12.23, p = .001 and an interaction between exposure and task, F(1,36) 
                                                          
 
14
 In the Yes/No blocks the calculation used for recognition performance was: (hits-false 
alarms)/number of items; whereas in the 2AFC blocks it was = hits/number of items. The different 
formulas for d’ in Yes/No and 2AFC recognition are shown in Appendix C. 
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= 4.05, p = .05. To avoid repetition further comparisons were not performed using d’. As 
differences between Yes/No and 2AFC recognition were not the primary interest in this 
design, further analysis does not compare tasks but was performed on the Yes/No and 
2AFC data separately. 
 
3.4.3.2. Exposure condition order effects on memory performance 
To examine whether there were any carry-over effects seen in this blocked design whereby 
performance in participants’ second block was influenced by which condition they had 
experienced in their first block, memory performance on the Yes/No task was examined 
with participants’ counterbalancing group as a between-subjects factor. The means in 
Table 3.4 show that memory performance in the Pre-Exposure condition was 
approximately equal (around .60) whether that condition was performed as the first or 
second block. For No Pre-Exposure, mean performance was higher, .76 compared to .65, if 
this block was performed second as opposed to first. A 2(exposure condition) x 2(block 
order) ANOVA revealed no between-subjects main effect of block order, F < 1, but a 
significant main effect of exposure, F(1,35) = 11.97, p = .001, and a significant interaction 
between exposure and block order, F(1,35) = 6.02, p = .02.  
 
Table 3.4. Means (and standard deviations) of recognition performance in Pre-Exposure 
and No Pre-Exposure conditions split by which exposure condition was performed first or 
second. N = 19 for participants who performed Pre-Exposure first. N = 18 for participants 
who performed Pre-Exposure second. 
Condition 1st Block  2nd Block 
Pre-Exposure .59   (.23) .62   (.24) 
No Pre-Exposure .65   (.18) .76   (.21) 
 
Firstly a t-test was performed on only the first block data, as this comparison would be 
directly comparable to the between-subjects manipulation of pre-exposure in Experiment 
3.1. The difference in mean memory performance here (means .59 and .65 for Pre-
Exposure and No Pre-Exposure respectively), was not found to be significant, t(35) = .97, p 
= .17 (one-tailed). This is probably largely due to the reduction in N from splitting 
participants by their counterbalancing group. Comparisons within condition demonstrated 
no significant differences for performance dependent on whether block was carried out 
first or second for Pre-Exposure, t(35) = .48, p = .63, or No Pre-Exposure, t(35) = 1.63, p = 
.11. Contrastingly, comparisons within block order revealed memory performance was 
significantly better in the No Pre-Exposure condition if this condition was performed 
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second, after the Pre-Exposure condition (.76 compared to .59), t(18) = 4.28, p < .001. 
However, for participants who underwent Pre-Exposure second after No Pre-Exposure 
there was no significant difference in memory performance (.62 compared to .65), t(17) = 
.70, p = .50. This demonstrates that the order in which participants performed the blocks 
influenced their memory performance. For participants who experienced pre-exposure 
first, their memory performance increased significantly in the non-pre-exposure block that 
followed. In contrast, for participants who experienced the non-pre-exposure block first, 
their memory performance did not differ when they then encountered the pre-exposure 
block. 
 
3.4.3.3. Subjective experience measures at retrieval – a priori proportions 
The next analysis performed was to examine what type of subjective experience 
participants had been basing their recognition decisions on. A priori proportions were 
calculated – the proportion of correct responses assigned to each of the subjective 
experience categories. As is shown in Figure 3.6, correct recognition was based on similar 
usage of subjective experience across both exposure conditions and tasks. In all blocks, 
participants assigned nearly 50% of correctly recognised names to the Remember 
category, approximately 32% to Know, 15% to Familiar, and less than 6% to Guess.  
 
 
Figure 3.6. Proportion of correct responses assigned to Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar 
(F), and Guess (G) by participants in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions of 
the Yes/No task and the 2AFC task. Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
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Separate 2(exposure condition) x 4(subjective experience) within-subjects ANOVAs within 
each task demonstrated a significant main effect of subjective experience in both the 
Yes/No task, F(3,108) = 19.34, p < .001, and the 2AFC task, F(3,108) = 14.92, p < .001. 
Effects of exposure condition could not be calculated as proportions summed to 1 within 
conditions. There were no significant interactions between exposure condition and 
subjective experience, both F < 1.  
 
Planned comparisons showed there were no significant differences between the 
proportion of responses assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess in the different 
exposure conditions, all p > .20. Comparisons within conditions revealed no significant 
difference between the amount of responses assigned to Remember compared to Know 
in: Yes/No Pre-Exposure, t(36) = 1.38, p = .18; Yes/No No Pre-Exposure, t(36) = 1.55, p = 
.13; and 2AFC No Pre-Exposure, t(36) = 1.34, p = .19. However the difference between 
proportion assigned to Remember and Know in the 2AFC Pre-Exposure condition 
approached significance, t(36) = 1.77, p = .09. Although the means for proportion of 
responses assigned to Remember in Figure 3.6 appear to be much higher than those for 
Know, the large standard errors mean that these differences did not reach significance; 
participants assigned statistically identical proportions of responses to Remember and 
Know in all conditions. Comparisons of all other differences were significant, all at least p < 
.02. 
 
3.4.3.4. Exposure condition order effects on subjective experience at retrieval 
As memory performance was shown to interact with which order participants experienced 
conditions (see Section 3.4.3.2), the influence of block order on subjective experience at 
retrieval was also explored. Proportion of correct responses assigned to Remember, Know, 
Familiar, and Guess in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions of the Yes/No task 
were split by which order they performed the conditions in; means shown in Figure 3.7.  
 
A 2(exposure condition) x 2(block order) x 4(subjective experience) ANOVA demonstrated 
a significant main effect of subjective experience, F(3,105) = 19.13, p < .001. Effects of 
exposure and block order could not be computed as proportions summed to 1; however 
there was a significant three-way interaction between exposure, block order, and 
subjective experience, F(3,105) = 3.74, p = .013. Examining the means in Figure 3.7 this 
interaction would appear to be based on the differences in proportion of responses 
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assigned to Remember, and perhaps also Familiarity, in the different exposure conditions 
dependent on which order the conditions were undertaken. A greater proportion of items 
were assigned to Remember in the No Pre-Exposure condition when it followed the Pre-
Exposure condition (left panel), whereas if Pre-Exposure followed No Pre-Exposure the 
patterns are reversed and a greater proportion of items were assigned to Remember in 
Pre-Exposure (right panel). 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Proportion of correct responses assigned to Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar 
(F), and Guess (G) by participants in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions of 
the Yes/No task split by which order they performed the conditions in. N = 19 for 
participants who performed Pre-Exposure first. N = 18 for participants who performed Pre-
Exposure second. Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Separate 2(exposure condition) x 2(block order) ANOVAs were performed for each of the 
subjective experience categories. For both Remember and Familiar, there were no main 
effects of exposure or block order, however significant interactions between block order 
and exposure were found, Remember: F(1,35) = 5.52, p = .025, and Familiar: F(1,35) = 4.96, 
p = .032. This suggests that the counterbalancing of which order participants performed 
the Pre-Exposure or No Pre-Exposure blocks in influenced the subjective experience used 
to make recognition decisions. Participants used different strategies depending on which 
block they experienced first. The influence of counterbalancing on subjective experience 
and memory performance is returned to in the Discussion, Section 3.5.4. 
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3.4.3.5. Subjective experience measures at retrieval – a posteriori proportions 
To explore whether, in any condition, an item that had been assigned to a particular 
subjective experience category was more likely to have come from a correct or incorrect 
recognition response a posteriori probabilities were also calculated for this experiment15. 
Due to high performance, particularly in the 2AFC task, a lot of missing data was 
encountered as participants had not assigned responses to all subjective experience 
categories. As shown in Section 3.4.3.3, very few responses were assigned to Guess and 
therefore to increase N this category was excluded from analysis.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.8, recognition was more likely to have been accurate when it 
was later assigned to Remember or Know. In addition, for the majority of categories the 
probability of an item coming from a correct recognition response was lower for items in 
the Pre-Exposure condition than in the No Pre-Exposure condition. Both these patterns 
replicate those observed in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2. Comparing Yes/No and 2AFC 
probabilities it is evident that accuracy of items assigned to Remember and Know was 
higher in the 2AFC task (where overall memory performance was near ceiling) compared to 
in the Yes/No task. 
 
Separate 2(exposure condition) x 3(subjective experience) within-subjects ANOVAs were 
performed for the Yes/No task and the 2AFC task. ANOVA for the Yes/No task 
demonstrated a significant main effect of exposure condition, F(1,23) = 5.06, p = .03, a 
significant main effect of subjective experience category, F(2,46) = 17.30, p < .001, and an 
interaction between the two, F(2,46) = 3.25, p < .05. 
 
Planned comparisons within condition for the Yes/No task showed that in both the Pre-
Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions there was no significant difference between the 
likelihood of recognition decisions having been correct when items were assigned to the 
Remember category compared to the Know category, both t < 1, whereas all other 
comparisons between categories were significant, all at least p < .02. The likelihood of 
recognition decisions being correct was high (over .75 in Pre-Exposure and over .85 in No 
                                                          
 
15
 In light of the effects of counterbalancing observed in the a priori analysis, this a posteriori 
analysis was also conducted using a 2(exposure) x 2(block order) x 3(subjective experience category) 
ANOVA however no 3-way interaction was observed, F < 1, so block order was removed as a factor. 
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Pre-Exposure) for responses which went on to be classified as Remember or Know, and for 
both conditions was significantly higher than the likelihood of items being correct that 
were assigned to Familiar. Comparisons between the conditions revealed that for 
recognition decisions that were assigned to Remember or to Know, responses in the No 
Pre-Exposure condition were significantly more likely to have been correct than responses 
in the Pre-Exposure condition, Remember: t(23) = 3.91, p = .001, Know: t(23) = 3.00, p = 
.006. When participants made their recognition decisions on the basis of Familiarity the 
difference between conditions was not significant, t < 1.  
 
 
Figure 3.8. Proportion of items assigned to Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar (F), and 
Guess (G) in the in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions of the Yes/No task 
and the 2AFC task that had previously been correctly recognised. For R, K, and F: N = 24 for 
Yes/No and N = 14 for 2AFC due to missing data16. Proportions for Guess shown but not 
included in ANOVA. Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
 
The 2(exposure condition) x 3(subjective experience) within-subjects ANOVA for the 2AFC 
task revealed a significant main effect of exposure condition, F(1,13) = 8.13, p = .01, and a 
significant main effect of subjective experience category, F(2,26) = 10.26, p = .001, but no 
interaction between the two, F(2,26) = 1.09, p = .35. Planned comparisons within condition 
                                                          
 
16
Although N is greatly reduced by listwise exclusion for purposes of ANOVA, the inclusive means 
show the same patterns and are shown in Appendix H. 
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for the 2AFC task showed that in both the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions 
there was no significant difference between the likelihood of recognition decisions having 
been correct when items were assigned to Remember compared to Know, both t < 1, 
whereas all other comparisons between categories were significant, all at least p < .02, 
except the comparison of Know and Familiar in No Pre-Exposure which was marginally 
significant, t(13) = 2.01, p = .07. The likelihood of recognition decisions being correct was 
consistently high, over .87, for responses which went on to be classified as Remember or 
Know, and again for both conditions was higher than the likelihood of items being correct 
which went on to be assigned to Familiar. Comparisons between the conditions revealed 
contrasting results to those in the Yes/No task. Here it was only for recognition decisions 
which were assigned to Familiar that responses in the No Pre-Exposure condition were 
significantly more likely to have been to a correct response than responses in the Pre-
Exposure condition, t(13) = 2.72, p = .02. When participants made their recognition 
decisions on the basis of Remember or Know subjective experiences the difference 
between conditions was not significant, Remember: t(13) = 1.14, p = .28, Know: t(13) = 
1.21, p = .25.  
 
3.4.3.6. Correlational analyses 
Again, to examine whether recognition based on a particular type of subjective experience 
was related to performance, memory accuracy in each condition was correlated with 
proportion of correct responses assigned to the different levels of subjective experience, 
see Table 3.5.  
 
Table 3.5. Correlations between memory accuracy and proportion of items assigned to 
subjective experience categories in each condition.  
Task Condition Remember Know Familiar Guess 
Yes/No task 
Pre-Exposure .34* .00 -.57** -.53** 
No Pre-Exposure .60** -.16 -.67** -.45** 
2AFC Task 
Pre-Exposure .35* .03 -.62** -.49** 
No Pre-Exposure .30# .13 -.82** -.67** 
df = 37 in all conditions. ** p < .005, * p < .04, # p = .07. 
 
Across both tasks and both exposure conditions memory performance was found to be 
positively correlated with proportion of correct items assigned to Remember, although in 
the No Pre-Exposure condition of the 2AFC task this correlation only approached 
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significance, r(37) = .30, p = .07; all others at least p < .05. In all conditions memory 
performance was also negatively correlated to proportion of items assigned to Familiar and 
Guess, all p < .001. Proportion of items assigned to Know never significantly correlated to 
memory performance17.  
 
To test whether there were significant differences between the correlations Steiger’s   2* 
(Steiger, 1980) was again calculated (see Appendix D). Although this does not allow for full 
exploration of the interactions between all coefficients, it does allow us to see whether key 
comparisons are significantly different. Comparing the coefficients for the subjective 
experience categories across the two conditions revealed a significant difference between 
the coefficients for Remember in the Yes/No task. The positive correlation between 
memory performance and proportion of items assigned to Remember was significantly 
larger in the No Pre-Exposure condition than the Pre-Exposure condition,   2* = 1.97, p < 
.05. No other coefficients were significantly different in this task, all   2* < 1.1. However, in 
the 2AFC task the negative correlation between memory performance and proportion of 
items assigned to Familiar was significantly larger in the No Pre-Exposure condition than 
the Pre-Exposure condition,   2* = 2.47, p < .05. No other coefficients were significantly 
different, all   2* < 1.6.  
 
3.4.3.7. Reaction times for recognition decisions 
As this experiment was conducted using E-Prime, RTs to make recognition decisions 
categorised by their later subjective experience judgment could be analysed as per 
Experiment 3.1. As discussed previously, very few responses were assigned to Guess and 
therefore to increase N this category was excluded from analysis. As is shown in Figure 3.9, 
mean RTs for correct recognition decisions were faster for responses later categorised as 
Remember or Know than those categorised as Familiar or Guess which replicates the 
patterns from Experiment 3.1. 
                                                          
 
17
 Due to the loss of power associated with splitting this data by block order, analysis of 
counterbalancing effects was not performed. 
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Figure 3.9. Mean correct recognition RTs by later subjective experience category, 
Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar (F), and Guess (G), in the in the Pre-Exposure and No 
Pre-Exposure conditions of the Yes/No task and the 2AFC task. Error bars = 1 SeM. For R, K, 
and F: N = 22 for Yes/No and N = 14 for 2AFC due to missing data18. Proportions for Guess 
shown but not included in ANOVA. 
 
Separate 2(exposure condition) x 3(subjective experience) within-subjects ANOVAs were 
performed for the Yes/No task and the 2AFC task. In both tasks significant effects of 
subjective experience category were observed, Yes/No: F(2,42) = 17.83, p < .001; 2AFC: 
F(2,26) = 18.61, p < .001. No effects of exposure condition or interactions between 
exposure and subjective experience were revealed in either task, all F < 1. 
 
Collapsed across exposure condition, comparisons demonstrated that in the Yes/No task 
the speed with which recognition decisions were made which were later classed as 
Remember or Know was not significantly different, t(21) = .97, p = .34, however Remember 
and Know decisions were significantly faster than Familiar decisions, both p < .001. In the 
2AFC task however, recognition decisions were made significantly faster if they were later 
classed as Remember rather than Know, t(13) = .2.53, p = .03, and again Remember and 
Know decisions were significantly faster than Familiar decisions, both p < .001.   
                                                          
 
18
Although N is greatly reduced by listwise exclusion for purposes of ANOVA, the inclusive means 
show the same patterns and are shown in Appendix H. 
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3.4.4. Discussion 
 
3.4.4.1. Memory performance 
In the current experiment, manipulation of pre-exposure was carried out using a blocked 
within-subjects design and both Yes/No and 2AFC recognition. Using this design, prior 
exposure was demonstrated to impair memory performance in the Yes/No recognition 
task but not significantly in the 2AFC task. This latter finding contradicts the findings from 
Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, however, the 2AFC design in this experiment was subtly different 
from the prior experiments. Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 had used associative recognition 
using names as stimuli whereas in Experiment 3.3 the 2AFC task was non-associative and 
words were employed as stimuli. These differences appear to have made the task easier 
for participants as performance increased in the 2AFC task in this experiment to near 
ceiling, eliminating significant evidence of the exposure effect.  
 
Analysis regarding counterbalancing order effects on memory performance were carried 
out to determine whether the order in which participants had performed the initial two 
Yes/No blocks had influenced memory performance in these blocks. Firstly comparisons 
were made on only the first block data, as this would be directly comparable to the 
between-subjects manipulation of pre-exposure in Experiment 3.1. Although the 
difference in mean memory performance was considerable, it was not found to be 
significant, though it is suggested that this is due to loss of power associated with splitting 
participants by their counterbalancing group and conducting a between-subjects analysis 
(Conway et al., 2001).  
 
Comparisons within block order however revealed memory performance was significantly 
better in the No Pre-Exposure condition if this condition was performed second, after the 
Pre-Exposure condition. This suggests that if the first block encountered by the participant 
is Pre-Exposure, the fact that they have to overcome the experimenter-introduced 
familiarity in this block leads to improvement in performance in the second block where 
there is no familiarity that needs to be overcome. This influence of one condition on 
another is discussed in detail later in relation to analysis of use of subjective experience 
categories split by counterbalancing block.  
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For participants who performed the Pre-Exposure block second, after the No Pre-Exposure 
block there was no significant difference in memory performance across blocks. This is 
somewhat surprising as it might be expected that the standard advantage in memory 
performance in No Pre-Exposure would be shown if this is the first block, and that this 
would be followed by a reduction in performance when Pre-Exposure is performed in the 
second block, as this is where the confusion of where an item is familiar from has to be 
resolved for the first time. It is suggested that one reason this was not found here is that 
although items in the No Pre-Exposure condition were not themselves pre-exposed, 
participants were exposed to a distracter set of words prior to study in this condition. This 
‘irrelevant’ pre-exposure could have led to some problems of source discriminability being 
encountered in this condition, leading to a reduction in performance. A follow-up 
experiment could explore this further by comparing irrelevant pre-exposure (distractor 
words), relevant pre-exposure (lure and target words pre-exposed), and no pre-exposure 
in a blocked design. In this experiment, when a ‘pure’ no pre-exposure block is experienced 
first it would be expected that memory performance would be high and would be followed 
by a reduction in performance on subsequent blocks when any kind of pre-exposure 
(irrelevant or relevant) is encountered. 
 
3.4.4.2. Subjective experience  
In line with the results from Experiment 3.2, in the current experiment where pre-exposure 
was manipulated using a blocked within-subjects design, subjective experience was not 
found to differ according to exposure condition. A priori use of recollection was found to 
be the same in both conditions even though memory performance was lower with pre-
exposure. Even using this blocked design, it is evident that use of subjective experience as 
a basis for recognition was carried-over from the Pre-Exposure condition to the No Pre-
Exposure condition. Further evidence of this was obtained from the analysis split by which 
order participants had completed the different exposure blocks. 
 
Analysis of use of subjective experience in the Yes/No blocks split by counterbalancing 
group suggested that the fact that block order influenced memory performance could be 
due to differing processes being used to make recognition decisions by the different 
groups. A greater proportion of items were found to be assigned to Remember, and less to 
Familiar in the No Pre-Exposure condition when it followed the Pre-Exposure condition. 
However, if Pre-Exposure followed No Pre-Exposure the patterns were reversed and a 
Chapter 3 
171 
 
greater proportion of items were assigned to Remember, and less to Familiar, in the Pre-
Exposure condition. These results fit with the interpretations of the effect of block order 
on memory performance. As above, if the first block encountered by the participant is Pre-
Exposure, it is suggested that overcoming the experimenter-introduced familiarity in this 
condition led to improvement in performance in the second block: No Pre-Exposure. This 
improvement in performance across these blocks is reflected in the greater use of 
Remember responses in the No Pre-Exposure condition. Usually the pattern of use of 
Remember responses would be the reverse of this with more Remember responses made 
in Pre-Exposure, as was the finding in Experiment 3.1. This was also the pattern found if 
the conditions were performed in the opposing order. If Pre-Exposure followed No Pre-
Exposure the patterns were reversed and a greater proportion of items were assigned to 
Remember, and less to Familiar, in the Pre-Exposure condition. In this order, although no 
differences were found in memory performance, participants were changing their use of 
subjective experience categories in the expected direction to reflect the changing demands 
of the task: they were using recollection to a greater extent to overcome the exposure-
induced familiarity.  
 
This effect of block order is similar to that observed by Bodner and Richardson-Champion 
(2007) who found that when detail difficulty was manipulated across blocks the level of 
difficulty of one block influenced the subjective experience responses given to items in the 
next block. However, Bodner and Richardson-Champion also found that informing 
participants of the relative difficulty of the upcoming block eliminated this effect. Further 
experiments using the current pre-exposure paradigm could explore whether informing 
participants about whether a set of items are going to be pre-exposed, or whether that 
pre-exposure is going to be of irrelevant (distractor) words or target and lure words, 
changes their patterns of subjective experience responses. If informing participants about 
the nature of the pre-exposure was found to reduce the effects of blocking this would 
imply that the strategic use of recollection to overcome familiarity is able to be consciously 
controlled. However, the overall findings from these two experiments suggest that the 
differences in relative familiarity between pre-exposed and non-pre-exposed items were 
too small to be perceived by participants, thus it seems unlikely that people would be able 
to change how they interpreted this familiarity in light of experimental instructions. 
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One difference found between the results of the current experiment and Experiments 3.1 
and 3.2 was that here participants assigned the same proportions of responses to 
Remember and Know. Although the means for proportion of responses assigned to 
Remember in Figure 3.6 appear to be much higher than those for Know, the large standard 
errors mean that these differences did not reach significance. The use of Familiarity in both 
tasks was also reduced in this experiment. It is suggested that perhaps the different 
methodology in Experiment 3.3 – use of Yes/No and non-associative 2AFC recognition led 
to these changes and future studies could explore this further by employing Yes/No and 
non-associative 2AFC recognition in between-subjects manipulations of pre-exposure.  
 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, associative recognition is theorised to rely more on 
recollection than familiarity as both target and lure items are familiar (in a re-arranged 
pairs design; Yonelinas, 1997, 2002; and Hockley & Consoli, 1999). However, in the three 
experiments reported here, higher levels of recollection (nearly .50) were found in 
Experiment 3.3 across both the item and non-associative AFC recognition tasks than in the 
associative-2AFC task used in Experiments 3.1 (Pre-Exposure condition) and 3.2, where 
only .39 and .36 of correct responses were assigned to Remember. Although this would 
appear to go against Yonelinas (1997, 2002) and Hockley and Consoli (1999), this finding is 
actually intuitive, here introduction of pre-exposure made the item and AFC tasks similar 
to an associative task: participants needed to rely on recollection as target and lure items 
were all familiar.  
 
In comparing test formats, previous research had found mixed results with regard to levels 
of Remember responses in AFC and item recognition (e.g., Bastin & Van der Linden, 2003; 
Cook et al., 2005). Although not subject to statistical analysis, the results of the current 
experiment demonstrated no differences in use of subjective experience categories across 
test formats (see Figure 3.6) which fits with the results of Khoe et al., (2000) and Kroll et 
al., (2002).  
 
A posteriori calculations of how likely an item was to have been recognised correctly if it 
was assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess demonstrated similar, though not 
identical, patterns to those in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, and patterns differed across tasks. 
In the 2AFC task, items assigned to Familiar showed the only significant difference, being 
more likely to be incorrect if in the Pre-Exposure condition. This latter result replicates 
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results from Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 – when items were pre-exposed, using familiarity as a 
basis for recognition impaired performance. Conversely, in the Yes/No task, if an item was 
assigned to Remember or Know it was more likely to have been incorrect in the Pre-
Exposure condition than in the No Pre-Exposure condition but the difference for Familiar 
responses was not significant. These results may be related to the increased use of 
Remember and Know responses in this task compared to the previous experiments. For 
Remember responses, as discussed above, the introduction of pre-exposure may have led 
participants to rely more heavily on recollection than is typical in item recognition tasks. 
Here this recollection has, in a significant proportion of cases, led participants to endorse 
lure items that participants only encountered in the pre-exposure phase as recognised 
from the study phase. If Know responses are considered to be high confidence responses 
experienced without recollection, as was found in Experiment 2.1 (Chapter 2), high levels 
of confidence from seeing an item in the pre-exposure phase may also have led to 
incorrect recognition. These false alarms to pre-exposed lures based on high confidence or 
recollection are more understandable in item recognition when there is the added 
confusion of pre-exposure as each item is assessed in isolation. Conversely, in 2AFC tasks 
recognition of one item is compared to that of another item and recollection of the target 
from the study phase should surmount any familiarity from seeing the lure in the pre-
exposure phase.  
 
3.4.4.3. Correlational analyses 
Across both tasks and both exposure conditions memory performance was found to be 
positively correlated with proportion of correct items assigned to Remember and 
negatively correlated to proportion of items assigned to Familiar and Guess which 
replicates the correlations observed in Experiment 3.2. These data suggest that for all 
items in this blocked within-subjects design, pre-exposed or not, participants used 
recollection to resolve the familiarity induced by pre-exposure and this led to improved 
performance. 
 
Interesting differences were observed in relation to the strength of the correlations in the 
two conditions. In the Yes/No task the positive correlation between memory performance 
and proportion of responses assigned to Remember was larger in the No Pre-Exposure 
condition than in the Pre-Exposure condition. This difference appears counterintuitive as 
use of recollection to overcome familiarity induced by pre-exposure should aid 
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performance more in the Pre-Exposure condition. However, this result can easily be 
understood in terms of carry-over effects. Participants assigned the same proportion of 
responses to Remember in both conditions but as they did not ‘need’ to use recollection in 
the No Pre-Exposure condition, as there was no familiarity to overcome, this led to 
improved memory performance and a stronger relationship between memory 
performance and use of recollection. Conversely, in the 2AFC task the negative correlation 
between memory performance and proportion of responses assigned to Familiar was 
larger in the No Pre-Exposure condition than in the Pre-Exposure condition. This difference 
is not so easy to explain theoretically. As proportion of responses was so low in both 
conditions – around .15, and both correlation coefficients are over .60 it is suggested that 
the significant difference is an anomalous result. In reality, using familiarity as a basis for 
recognition, although not done to a great extent, impaired recognition in both conditions.  
 
3.4.4.4. Reaction time analysis 
In general the RT results demonstrated here matched those obtained in Experiment 3.1. 
Recognition decisions which were classified as Remember were made more quickly than 
other recognition decisions replicating Dewhurst et al. (2006) and Henson et al. (1999). 
However here there were differences between the tasks. In Yes/No, Remember and Know 
decisions were made significantly more quickly than Familiar decisions, a replication of 
patterns from Experiment 3.1; whereas in 2AFC Remember responses were faster than 
Know responses, which in turn were faster than Familiar responses. This different pattern 
could be because more Know responses, and fewer Familiar responses, were made in this 
experiment compared to in Experiment 3.1. For a full discussion of these findings see 
Section 3.5.3 in the General Discussion of this chapter. 
 
3.5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
3.5.1. Memory performance 
 
In all three experiments, the manipulation of pre-exposing participants to some/all of the 
stimuli that would be encountered during the study and test phases of the experiment led 
to impaired memory performance for items that had been pre-exposed. This replicates 
previous findings by Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al. (1998), Kormi-Nouri et al. (2005), 
Åberg & Nilsson (2001, 2003), Tulving and Kroll (1995), Maddox and Estes (1997), Chalmers 
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and Humphreys (1998), and Greene (1999). More importantly, the experiments reported 
here demonstrated that this memory performance effect is consistent across between-, 
within-, and blocked within-subjects designs and across item and 2AFC recognition.  
 
3.5.2. Subjective experience  
 
The a priori analysis of subjective experience responses demonstrated that the proportion 
of correct responses that were assigned to each category differed depending on the design 
of the experiment. Only in Experiment 3.1, which used a between-subjects methodology, 
were differences in the patterns of use of subjective experience categories observed. More 
responses were assigned to Remember and fewer to Know when items had been pre-
exposed. Taken together with the memory performance results above, results from 
Experiment 3.1 demonstrate a case, when items have been pre-exposed, where memory 
performance is reduced but proportion of Remember responses increases.  
 
In Experiments 3.2 and 3.3, high levels of Remember responses were observed across both 
pre-exposed and non pre-exposed items which is suggested to be due to carry-over effects 
between conditions (Conway et al., 2001). Here participants could not tell which items had 
been pre-exposed and used recollection to determine where they had encountered both 
pre-exposed and not pre-exposed items. Carry-over effects and the importance of 
experimental methodology in researching subjective experience are returned to later 
(Section 3.5.4). Comparing patterns of responses across the three experiments, other slight 
differences were observed, such as the same proportion of responses being assigned to 
Remember and Know and fewer responses being assigned to Familiar in Experiment 3.3. It 
is suggested that the different types of recognition tasks employed in Experiment 3.3 led to 
these changes. Future research could explore this by combining the between-subjects 
manipulation of Experiment 3.1 with the different types of recognition test employed in 
Experiment 3.3. 
 
In Experiment 3.1 where differences in subjective experience were found, the patterns of 
results do not fit with earlier findings and conclusions drawn by Tulving and Kroll (1995) 
and Åberg and Nilsson (2003). Both these earlier studies asked participants to make 
confidence judgments on a 3-2-1 scale, hypothesised to map onto Remember-Know-Guess 
judgments (Åberg & Nilsson, 2003). Their results showed higher confidence for correct 
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decisions when items had not been pre-exposed. If a high confidence response is thought 
to equal a Remember response then this pattern lies in direct opposition to the pattern 
observed in Experiment 3.1 where more Remember responses were obtained for items 
that had been pre-exposed. As was discussed in Chapter 2 (and is one of the focuses of 
Chapter 4), although confidence and Remember-Know judgments are no doubt related, 
this example highlights how the two can produce very different patterns of responses.  
 
Åberg and Nilsson (2003) discussed their results in terms of recollection as they performed 
separate analysis just on high-confidence responses. Here they found increased correct 
recognition for non-pre-exposed (novel) items and suggested that the novelty effect 
(Tulving et al., 1994, 1996; Tulving & Kroll, 1995) is reliant on recollection: increases in 
performance for novel items are only evident when recollection is the basis for 
recognition. Results of the a posteriori analysis of Experiment 3.2 support their conclusion. 
In this analysis, likelihood of a response being correct was higher in the No Pre-Exposure 
condition than in the Pre-Exposure condition if the response was assigned to Remember. 
With the within-subjects manipulation of pre-exposure in Experiment 3.2, recollection of 
items from encoding benefitted memory performance for novel (non-pre-exposed) items 
to a greater degree than it did for pre-exposed items. However, the a posteriori analysis for 
Experiment 3.3 demonstrated a different pattern of findings. In the Yes/No task the 
likelihood of a recognition decision being correct was higher in the No Pre-Exposure 
condition than in the Pre-Exposure condition for responses that were assigned to either 
Remember or to Know. Here it was not only recollection which aided recognition, knowing 
also improved performance. In contrast, in the 2AFC task of Experiment 3.3 there were no 
differences between conditions for the likelihood of Remember and Know responses being 
based on correct recognition decisions. Thus, these findings do not show a consistent 
pattern of support for Åberg and Nilsson’s suggestion that the novelty effect is reliant on 
recollection.  
 
In general, the results of the current experiments are somewhat difficult to interpret in 
terms of the novelty-encoding hypothesis (Tulving et al., 1994, 1996; Tulving & Kroll, 1995). 
One of the issues which has been debated between researchers is whether the novelty 
effect is evidenced in correct recognition or in false alarms (Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 
1998; Åberg & Nilsson, 2003). If differences are only found in false alarms then it is not 
novelty that aided recognition, it is pre-exposure that impaired it (Åberg & Nilsson, 2003). 
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However, as discussed previously, false alarms are different in item and 2AFC recognition. 
In 2AFC recognition a false alarm is not simply an endorsement of a lure item, it is 
endorsement of a lure item over a target item. In all experiments presented in this chapter, 
memory performance was more accurate when items had not undergone pre-exposure. 
The question is whether this was due to the novel, non-pre-exposed, items being encoded 
better – as predicted by the novelty-encoding hypothesis, or false alarms occurring for pre-
exposed items – due to problems of source discriminability (Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et 
al., 1998). 
 
Experiment 3.1 cannot directly test the novelty-encoding hypothesis as using the between-
subjects design all the items a participant studied were either novel (in the No Pre-
Exposure condition) or were all familiar (in the Pre-Exposure condition). Within condition, 
there were no differences of novelty/familiarity at encoding. However, there were 
differences in novelty/familiarity at retrieval in both conditions. In the No Pre-Exposure 
condition, the target items had been studied and were therefore more familiar than the 
lure items, which were completely novel. In contrast, in the Pre-Exposure condition, the 
lure items had been pre-exposed and therefore had some level of familiarity, however, the 
target items had been pre-exposed and studied, therefore they should have been more 
familiar to participants than the lures. Examination of the a posteriori data in Experiment 
3.1 shows how these relative differences in familiarity affected subjective experience 
judgments and memory performance. The only difference that was observed was that the 
likelihood of recognition being correct was lower in the Pre-Exposure condition than in the 
No Pre-Exposure condition when responses were assigned to Familiar. This can be 
interpreted as pre-exposure leading to impaired recognition due to more false alarms 
being based on familiarity and thus supports the source-discriminability hypothesis. When 
basing a recognition decision on familiarity participants found it hard to determine where 
an item was familiar from – had it been studied or had it only been encountered on the pre-
exposure task? 
 
In contrast to Experiment 3.1, Experiment 3.2 did include differences in the relative 
novelty/familiarity of items at encoding. When pre-exposure was manipulated within-
subjects some items were already familiar when encountered in the study phase (as they 
had been pre-exposed) whereas some items were novel when presented for study. Using 
this manipulation, the a posteriori analysis revealed that both Remember and Familiar 
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responses were less likely to have been made to a correct recognition decision for pre-
exposed compared to non-pre-exposed items. These findings can be interpreted in two 
ways. Pre-exposure could have led to impaired recognition due to more false alarms being 
based on familiarity or recollection of the item from the pre-exposure phase; or, the 
novelty of non-pre-exposed items when first encountered in the study phase could have 
led to deeper processing at encoding and enhanced recollection and familiarity at retrieval. 
Thus, both source-discriminability and novelty-encoding explanations can account for the 
pattern of findings observed. 
 
Across experiments, analysis of correlations between memory performance and subjective 
experience responses demonstrated similar patterns of findings as the a priori analysis. For 
Experiment 3.1, the a priori analysis demonstrated higher levels of Remember responses in 
the Pre-Exposure condition compared to the No Pre-Exposure condition. The correlational 
analysis revealed a positive correlation between Remember responses and memory 
performance and a negative correlation between Familiar responses and memory 
performance but only for the Pre-Exposure condition, in the No Pre-Exposure condition no 
type of subjective experience correlated with memory performance. However, in 
Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 these differences between conditions were not observed. 
Patterns of use of subjective experience responses were the same across conditions and 
memory performance was positively correlated with use of Remember responses and 
negatively correlated with use of Familiar responses whether items had been pre-exposed 
or not. As discussed previously, these results can be explained by carry-over occurring from 
one condition to another. In Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 participants could not tell which 
items had been pre-exposed and used recollection to determine where they had 
encountered both pre-exposed and not pre-exposed items.  
 
Taken together, results from all three experiments suggest that distinguishing between 
novelty-encoding and source-discriminability accounts of how pre-exposure impairs 
memory cannot be formally tested by examining subjective experience. Testing the 
novelty-encoding hypothesis requires a within-subjects manipulation of pre-exposure so 
that there are differences between novelty of items when they are being encoded. 
However, manipulating pre-exposure within-subjects was found to result in carry-over of 
use of subjective experience from one condition to the next. Participants were not able to 
determine which items have been pre-exposed and therefore which they would need to 
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use recollection to recognise so they used recollection as the basis for all recognition 
decisions. However, the very fact that this carry-over occurs suggests that the memory 
impairment found with pre-exposure is down to the retrieval of items from memory, not 
from their encoding, therefore supporting the source-discriminability hypothesis of 
Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al. (1998). 
 
This suggestion also fits with the SAC model proposed by Reder et al. (2000; Cary & Reder, 
2003) to explain word frequency effects. In their model of spreading activation between 
word nodes and event nodes, increases in false alarms for high-frequency words result 
from higher base activation of their word nodes. False alarms occur because participants 
accept high-frequency words as old because they have misattributed their pre-
experimental familiarity. For the current data, the emphasis in this model would simply 
have to be changed from word nodes to event nodes – from pre-experimental familiarity 
to experimentally manipulated familiarity. In the experiments presented here differences 
in memory performance occurred because participants misattributed experimental 
familiarity from the pre-exposure phase to the study phase.  
 
3.5.3. Reaction time  
 
Reaction times were found to be faster for Remember responses in both Experiment 3.1 
and 3.3 replicating previous findings (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Dewhurst et al., 1998, 
2006; Henson et al., 1999; Vilberg & Rugg, 2007; Wixted & Stretch, 2004), though in the 
current experiments in general the difference was found between Remember and Familiar 
responses, not Remember and Know. These findings go against assumptions that 
recollection is a slower and more effortful process than familiarity (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; Mandler, 1980).  
 
The current results demonstrate that recognition decisions based on recollection, and 
measured by Remember responses, can be made quickly and accurately. In contrast, RTs 
found here for Know and Familiar responses demonstrate that these may require 
additional post-retrieval processes to establish their familiarity relative to other items on 
the test (Dewhurst et al., 2006), or further attempts at retrieval (Henson et al., 1999), may 
be required. This suggestion is particularly poignant here as RTs to Know and Familiar 
responses showed different patterns between the two experiments. Know responses were 
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as fast as Remember responses in Experiment 3.1 and the Yes/No task of Experiment 3.3, 
and both were faster than Familiar responses; however in the 2AFC task of Experiment 3.3 
Remember were faster than Know which in turn were faster than Familiar. These reaction 
time findings could be associated with the differences in confidence associated with Know 
and Familiar responses (see Chapters 2 and 4). In the current experiments, high levels of 
confidence could have led to equally fast responding for Know responses as for Remember 
responses, whereas the lower confidence associated with Familiar responses may have led 
to them requiring additional processing and being made more slowly. This idea was 
explored experimentally by Rotello and Zeng (2008). Their results are discussed in detail in 
the Introduction of Chapter 4 (Section 4.1.3) as the relationship between judgments of 
subjective experience and varying levels of confidence is explored through reaction time 
analysis in the experiments in that chapter.  
 
3.5.4. Experimental design for subjective experience experiments 
 
One of the major conclusions to be drawn from the three experiments here is that in some 
cases differences in subjective experience can only be explored via between-subjects 
comparisons. Previous research has found the opposite to also be true in some cases; for 
example, Dewhurst and Parry (2000) found that effects of emotionality on Remember and 
Know judgments was only demonstrated using within-subjects manipulations. However, 
the findings of Conway and Dewhurst (1995a), the ‘non-replication’ by Hirshman and 
Lanning (1999) and re-replication by Conway et al. (2001) demonstrate how small 
differences in experimental manipulations can influence results when it is subjective 
experience you are interested in. It is always beneficial to explore relationships using 
multiple experimental designs. For the results of the experiments presented here this is 
particularly important as using the within-subjects designs the memory performance 
impairment for pre-exposed items was still demonstrated, but differences in patterns of 
subjective experience were not. 
 
Using within-subjects designs here demonstrated evidence of carry-over of use of 
subjective experience categories from the Pre-Exposure condition to the No Pre-Exposure 
condition. This carry-over was evidenced in the a priori, a posteriori, and correlational 
analyses. Examination of effects of block order in Experiment 3.3 demonstrated this 
contamination clearly, as use of subjective experience categories in the second block was 
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dependent on which condition had been experienced in the first block, and these changes 
in use of subjective experience were found to influence memory performance in the two 
blocks also. The differences in patterns of subjective experience responses observed across 
between- and within-subjects manipulations of pre-exposure are akin to the findings of 
Whittlesea (2002). Comparing across all three experiments in this chapter, the different 
contexts in which pre-exposed and non-pre-exposed items were encountered influenced 
how those items were subjectively experienced. As Whittlesea (2002) stated, “the specific 
phenomenology that a person experiences depends on his or her interpretation, within 
some specific context, of the significance of those aspects of performance which are 
salient within the event” (p. 325). As discussed previously (Section 3.4.4.2), in future 
research it would be interesting to examine whether explicit instructions about blocking 
(Bodner & Richardson-Champion, 2007) or about the relationship between pre-exposed 
and study items would remove the carry-over effects between blocks in a blocked design, 
or between items in a within-subjects design.  
 
3.5.5. Conclusions 
 
On a methodological note these experiments demonstrate the importance of using 
between-subjects designs to explore subjective experience. On a theoretical level they 
demonstrate that when familiarity is manipulated in such a way a situation occurs where 
increases in recollection are associated with reductions in memory performance which has 
implications for cognitive theories of recollection. The use of recollection to overcome the 
familiarity induced by pre-exposure also demonstrates the independence of the processes 
of recollection and familiarity (Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 1998, cf., Jacoby, 1991).  
 
In regard to a key theme of this thesis, the three experiments in this chapter provide 
further evidence that Know and Familiar can be separated as categories of subjective 
experience. The proportion of responses assigned to Know was found to be affected 
differently by pre-exposure in between- and within-subjects manipulations of pre-
exposure while the proportion of responses assigned to Familiar responses was unaffected 
by pre-exposure and remained the same across the different experimental designs. In 
contrast, Familiar responses were shown to differ in terms of accuracy across pre-exposure 
conditions and were shown to have a relationship with memory performance when items 
had been pre-exposed. Finally, Know and Familiar responses were also found to differ in 
Chapter 3 
182 
 
terms of reaction time and accuracy; Know responses being faster and more accurate than 
Familiar responses. The relationships between accuracy, reaction time, and subjective 
experience are further explored in Chapter 4.  
 
Results of the current experiments are also relevant to the question of how confidence and 
subjective experience are related. As discussed previously, results of Experiment 3.1 
demonstrated an opposite pattern of findings to those observed by Tulving and Kroll 
(1995) and Åberg and Nilsson (2003). These earlier studies found higher confidence for 
correct decisions when items had not been pre-exposed. In contrast, in Experiment 3.1 
more Remember responses were obtained for items that had been pre-exposed and in 
Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 there were no differences in proportion of items assigned to 
Remember across conditions. Thus, comparing these findings demonstrates that 
confidence and subjective experience do not respond in the same manner to 
manipulations of pre-exposure. The relationship between confidence and subjective 
experience is a central focus of the experiments presented in Chapter 4. 
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4. SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE, CONFIDENCE, AND SOURCE:  
DIFFERENCES, INFLUENCE, AND REACTION TIME 
“As remarked by an anonymous reviewer, whether confidence ratings can safely 
accompany an R-K(-G) judgement, and whether they should follow or precede such 
judgement, is as much an empirical as it is a theoretical question.”  
(Bruno & Rutherford, 2010, footnote 2, p. 127). 
 
In this chapter three experiments are presented which examine the influence that 
judgments of confidence, source, and subjective experience have on each other. Analysis 
focuses on distribution of responses across confidence levels, subjective experience 
categories, and source accuracy, dependent on whether judgments were made first or 
second following a recognition decision. Reaction times to make Old/New recognition 
responses are analysed dependent on subsequent judgment and, in a novel approach to 
this field, the time taken to make the actual judgments is also explored. The experiments 
presented here lead on from those in Chapter 2 which showed reliable differences 
between the four categories of subjective experience (Remember, Know, Familiar, and 
Guess) with regards to confidence. In the present chapter, these four categories of 
subjective experience are contrasted against four levels of confidence. These experiments 
also lead on from those in Chapter 3 which demonstrated that Know responses were as 
accurate and made as quickly as Remember responses. 
 
4.1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the relationship between confidence and subjective experience 
is of critical importance to the debate between single- versus dual-process accounts of 
memory (e.g., Dunn, 2004, 2008). If the two types of judgment produce the same patterns 
on a task then this suggests that the two are tapping the same underlying memory 
processes and thus would support a single-process account of memory. In contrast, if 
different patterns of findings are observed then this suggests that there is more than the 
one process of trace strength underlying memory decisions and would thereby provide 
support to dual-process accounts of memory (e.g., Gardiner, 2008). The current 
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experiments aim to gain a better understanding of subjective experience theoretically by 
comparing the subjective measures of Remember-Know and confidence  with the objective 
measure of source accuracy. 
 
As stated in the quote at the start of this chapter, the issue of whether judgments 
influence each other when made together is of interest both empirically and theoretically. 
However, many experimental paradigms combine judgments without the issue of influence 
having been explored. Experiments that have compared combinations of two of these 
three judgments are discussed in the following sections. In addition to focusing on 
response patterns for subjective experience, source, and confidence judgments when 
different judgments are compared, experiments which have explored reaction times 
associated with different responses are also reviewed. Reaction time to make judgments 
was a primary analysis of interest in the current experiments as, to my knowledge, no one 
has yet compared how long it takes participants to make these three different types of 
judgment.  
 
Within each of the following sections, methodological differences pertinent to the design 
of the current experiments are discussed. For example, one methodological issue in the 
Remember-Know paradigm is whether use of one-step or two-step Remember-Know 
procedures influences recognition accuracy or makes Remember responding more lenient. 
Bruno and Rutherford (2010), Eldridge et al. (2002), and Hicks and Marsh (1999) have 
explored this issue in depth and their findings were discussed in the General Introduction 
(Section 1.6.5.1). However, exploration of source, confidence, and subjective experience 
judgments using one-step and two-step procedures has produced some differing findings 
and methodological differences are therefore highlighted. In addition, the experimental 
design of the studies presented here, with two judgments being made post-recognition, is 
of particular importance for patterns of influence and reaction time analysis. 
 
4.1.1. Comparing subjective experience and confidence judgments 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Tulving (1985) originally demonstrated that Remember 
judgments are typically associated with higher confidence ratings than Know judgments. 
This finding has been widely replicated (e.g., Brewer & Sampaio, 2006) and in Chapter 2 
Experiment 2.1 yielded the same finding with the novel task of rating others’ recognition 
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memory justifications. These studies were interested in confidence ratings for items 
categorised as Remember or Know but other studies have explored the equivalence of 
subjective experience judgments and confidence judgments by comparing them in 
experimental paradigms. As discussed in depth in the General Introduction (Section 1.6.4), 
traditionally confidence was operationalised as a two-category scale of Sure-Unsure and 
proportion of items assigned to these two categories were compared against proportion 
assigned to Remember and Know. Gardiner and Java (1990) thus compared subjective 
experience and confidence to words and non-words and demonstrated that these two 
measures did not respond equivalently to word and non-word recognition. More 
Remember judgments were given to words while more Know judgments were given to 
non-words. This interaction between word type and response was not found when Sure-
Unsure judgments were made. These patterns were replicated in similar studies by 
Rajaram (1993), Rajaram et al. (2002), and Tunney and Fernie (2007) and together they 
demonstrate that while judgments of confidence and subjective experience may be 
interrelated, people do not use the judgment types in the same way.  
 
Analysis of subjective experience across differing levels of confidence has also been 
examined using ROC curves with the consistent finding that higher confidence is associated 
with Remember responses compared to Know responses (Rotello et al., 2004, 2005; 
Slotnick, 2010; Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Yonelinas, 2001a; Yonelinas et al., 1996). However, 
as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.1), distribution of Remember and Know responses 
across confidence levels has been found to be influenced by how conservative the 
Remember-Know instructions are (Rotello et al., 2005; Slotnick, 2010). Whilst these results 
are interesting for the single- versus dual-process debate, the manner in which confidence 
and subjective experience are operationalised in ROC studies means that participants’ 
response distributions for the two cannot be directly compared as was done when Sure-
Unsure were compared against Remember-Know. 
 
To foreshadow Experiments 4.2 and 4.3, source monitoring is another method used to 
explore recollection processes (see the General Introduction, Section 1.5.1.2). Experiments 
that have compared source judgments with confidence and/or subjective experience 
judgments are discussed after Experiment 4.1. 
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4.1.2. The influence of one judgment on another judgment 
 
To date, no studies have explored the influence that confidence and subjective experience 
judgments may have on each other when the two judgments are reported post 
recognition. The traditional viewpoint on this subject is summarised by Holmes, Waters, 
and Rajaram (1998) who stated that “…multiple judgments might affect performance in 
unforeseen ways” (p. 1031) and Humphreys et al. (2003) who thought that “When two 
judgments are made on the same trial, the knowledge that a second judgment will be 
required could distort the first judgment” (p. 806). This issue has also recently been 
considered by Bruno and Rutherford (2010). These authors chose to not combine 
confidence and subjective experience judgments in their experiment:  
It is our belief that collecting confidence ratings when also R–K(–G) 
judgements are provided is problematic because these measures may not be 
independent of each other. R–K(–G) judgements may directly influence 
confidence ratings (e.g., ‘if I remember an event, then I must assign a higher 
rating’) and, vice versa, confidence ratings may exert an influence on the R–
K(–G) judgement (e.g., ‘if I give a high rating, then it must be remember’). 
(italics in original; Bruno & Rutherford, 2010, p. 127) 
These comments highlight that this belief has existed in the Remember-Know paradigm 
across at least the last two decades but has not yet been subject to empirical testing.  
 
In line with the traditional viewpoint of Holmes et al. (1998), previous experiments 
comparing subjective experience and confidence judgments have employed measures to 
ensure that the two judgment types did not influence one another. In the original 
subjective experience and confidence judgment comparisons by Gardiner and Java (1990) 
and Rajaram (1993), judgment type was compared across two separate experiments. 
Rajaram et al. (2002) later replicated these findings using a within-subjects design, but 
even in this design testing sessions employing the two types of judgments took place one 
week apart and subjective experience was always tested first, “…to ensure that confidence 
judgments did not contaminate the remember-know judgments with a carryover effect to 
the second session” (p. 230). So although the same participants were making both types of 
judgment, Rajaram et al. were still worried about how one judgment might influence the 
other.  
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4.1.3. Reaction time data associated with confidence and subjective experience judgments 
 
As with the influence of judgments on each other, reaction times to make post-recognition 
judgments have not before been tested experimentally. In two-step procedures, when 
examining reaction times to items recognised with differing levels of confidence or 
subjective experience the standard analysis is to compare recognition decision RTs for 
items categorised by their subsequent judgment category. In one-step procedures it is the 
judgment of subjective experience or confidence which is timed, but this judgment is made 
in conjunction with the recognition decision so the timings of the two decision processes 
are indistinguishable. However, reliable differences have been demonstrated for both 
judgment types using both these types of RT analysis. 
 
Recognition is faster when confidence is higher19. Mandler and Boeck (1974) used a two-
step Yes/No then 3-point confidence scale procedure and found recognition decisions to 
highest confidence items to be approximately 1200ms faster than recognition decisions to 
items given the lowest confidence ratings. Using a one-step 6-point confidence recognition 
scale this pattern was replicated by Ratcliff and Murdock (1976) who demonstrated a 
1000ms (approx.) difference between highest and lowest confidence RTs. Recent evidence 
from neuroimaging has also produced similar findings. For example, Henson et al. (2000) 
demonstrated an advantage in RT of approximately 600ms for high confidence compared 
to low confidence recognition judgments. 
 
Recognition RTs are also faster for Remember items than for Know items (Dewhurst & 
Conway, 1994; Dewhurst et al., 1998, 2006; Henson et al., 1999; Vilberg & Rugg, 2007; 
Wixted & Stretch, 2004). Dewhurst et al. (2006) demonstrated this finding to be true when 
both one-step and two-step procedures are used, and also found reliable differences in 
recognition RTs when stimulus characteristics are varied; for example a larger RT 
advantage for Remember responses for words compared to non-words. However, 
differences in Remember and Know recognition RTs can be much smaller than those 
observed for confidence, for example Wixted and Stretch (2004) reported a difference of 
only 80ms to be reliable. In comparison, other researchers have found as large an RT 
                                                          
 
19
 While RTs for incorrect recognition decisions are worthy of note (cf. Wixted & Stretch, 2004), for 
the purposes of this chapter discussion will focus on RTs for correctly recognised items. 
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advantage for Remember over Know responses as that obtained for high compared to low 
confidence; for example a 730ms advantage was reported by Dewhurst et al. (2006) and an 
830ms advantage by Henson et al. (1999).  
 
The experiments presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis also demonstrated that recognition 
RTs were faster for correctly recognised items then assigned to Remember, though with 
the four categories of subjective experience that were employed in these experiments 
(Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess), in general the difference in RT was found to be 
between Remember and Familiar responses, with no differences in RTs for Remember and 
Know (except Experiment 3.3 which did find a difference between Remember and Know 
RTs for the 2AFC task). These results fit with the patterns observed by Rotello and Zeng 
(2008). They found Remember to be faster than Know responses, however participants in 
their experiments also made confidence judgments and when Remember and Know 
responses were equated for confidence the RT advantage for Remember responses was 
reduced. However, in the experiments presented in Chapter 3, whereas confidence 
judgments were not made, Remember and Know responses were equated for accuracy. No 
differences in recognition RTs or accuracy for Remember and Know responses was 
demonstrated, but Familiar responses, which had lower levels of accuracy, also had longer 
recognition RTs. This issue will be returned to in the General Discussion of this chapter 
(Section 4.4.3). 
 
So why have judgment RTs not been explored before? One methodological reason is that 
the participant often has to wait till a prompt appears on the screen before they can make 
their judgment (Wilding & Rugg, 1996). The assumption perhaps being that the participant 
would have decided on their response prior to the prompt and therefore no difference in 
RTs would be observed. In the experiments presented in this chapter this problem was 
avoided through counterbalancing of judgment order and the inclusion of ‘catch’ trials 
where participants were asked to make other non-critical judgments for the item. On these 
trials, the first judgment made by participants was one critical to the experiment (e.g., 
either confidence or subjective experience in Experiment 4.1); however, the second 
judgment was either a judgment of age of acquisition (AoA) or of pleasantness. As 
participants would not have known which judgment they would be required to make first 
post-recognition, and they certainly would not know what type of judgment would be 
Chapter 4 
189 
 
coming second, the issue of pre-prompt decisions being made for judgments is reduced. 
Participants could not systematically predict which judgment they would be making. 
 
As the experiments presented here were interested in comparing two judgments made 
post-recognition, a methodological reason for analysing judgment RTs in addition to 
recognition RTs classified by subsequent judgment is that both judgments made for a 
single item are dependent on the same recognition decision and therefore this RT could 
not be used to compare judgment types across judgment order. A theoretical reason for 
analysing judgment RTs is that whilst recollection and high confidence have each been 
shown to increase the speed at which a separate recognition decision is made, research 
has not yet examined whether these can influence RT for decisions which are independent 
of recognition. This separation of recognition decision time and judgment decision time 
also enables comparison of judgment types when employed in identical paradigms as in 
the literature RTs vary between studies. Here RT to make subjective experience and 
confidence judgments can be directly compared for the first time. It is predicted that 
confidence judgments will be made more quickly than judgments of experience as it is 
suggested that the consideration of whether anything is recollected about the encoding of 
the item will take longer than simply thinking about the confidence associated with 
recognition. RT for judgments is also interesting from an influence point of view. In 
addition to examining whether making a Remember judgment always leads to a secondary 
judgment of high confidence, for example (Bruno & Rutherford, 2010), RTs for judgments 
can explore whether making a Remember judgment also influences the speed at which 
that later confidence judgment is made, and vice versa.  
 
The current experiment was designed to explore whether when two judgments were made 
post-recognition the response to one judgment influenced the other judgment. The 
examination of influence of subjective experience and confidence judgments on each other 
is entirely novel, as is examination of RTs to make judgments that occur after, and are 
independent of, recognition. The three experiments presented here are identical in 
procedure except that the two post-recognition judgments differ across experiments. In 
Experiment 4.1 confidence judgments are compared with judgments of subjective 
experience. 
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4.2. EXPERIMENT 4.1: SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND CONFIDENCE JUDGMENTS 
 
4.2.1. Introduction 
 
In this experiment participants studied medium-frequency words and at test made an Old-
New recognition judgment followed by two post-recognition judgments. The two critical 
judgments made in this experiment were confidence and subjective experience. For both 
judgment types four response options were provided: Remember, Know, Familiar, and 
Guess for subjective experience judgments, and 3 (High), 2 (Medium), 1 (Low), and 0 
(None) for confidence judgments. The order in which participants made these judgments 
was counterbalanced across items.  
 
On the basis of previous findings it was predicted that Remember judgments would be 
associated with higher levels of confidence than Know, Familiar, and Guess judgments 
(e.g., Yonelinas, 2001a; Yonelinas et al., 1996) but that Know judgments would have as 
high recognition accuracy and as fast a recognition reaction time as Remember judgments 
(Rotello & Zeng, 2008; Experiments 3.1 and 3.3 of this thesis). It is assumed that the two 
judgment types are not “experimentally interchangeable” (Rajaram et al., 2002, p. 234) 
and to examine this, distribution patterns, accuracy, and RT data for the four categories of 
subjective experience and confidence are explored. If confidence and subjective 
experience are independent then it would be expected that a fully counterbalanced design 
would reveal dissociations between the two types of judgment on these key dependent 
variables.  
 
With regard to the influence of one judgment on the other, the order of judgments was 
explored. It is possible that Bruno and Rutherford’s (2010) suggestion is correct and that 
after making a Remember judgment participants will be more inclined to make a judgment 
of High confidence, for example; but comparing the order of judgments allows the reverse 
pattern to also be explored – whether more Remember judgments are made after a 
judgment of High confidence. Influence is also able to be explored in the RT analysis. As it 
is considered that subjective experience gives rise to confidence, not the other way around 
(Gardiner, 2001), it is suggested that confidence judgments that are made following a 
judgment of subjective experience may be speeded as assessment of recollection and 
familiarity has already occurred when the subjective experience judgment was made.  
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4.2.2. Method 
 
4.2.2.1. Participants and Design 
Participants were 44 undergraduate students (38 female), mean age 19.25 years (range 18 
to 23), from the University of Leeds, who received either Participant Pool Credits or £5 for 
taking part. Participants were tested in groups of between three and fourteen at individual 
PCs. Data from two further participants could not be analysed due to computer problems 
during testing. The experiment employed a within-subjects design and for the study and 
test phases all instructions and stimuli were presented, and data collected, using E-Prime 
version 1.2.  
 
4.2.2.2. Materials 
Information concerning materials and procedures are presented here in detail for all 
experiments in this chapter. Critical methodological differences are then discussed for 
Experiments 4.2 and 4.3. The target words were 56 medium-frequency words20 (mean 
familiarity rating of 424; range 350-480) limited to between five and eight letters in length. 
Targets were matched with 56 words to be used as lure items in the recognition test, and 
16 filler words. In total participants studied 64 words (56 targets plus 8 fillers, 4 shown at 
the start and 4 at the end of the study phase) and performed the recognition test on 128 
words21. This 128 included the 8 studied fillers and a further 8 lure fillers; all fillers were 
shown at the start of the test phase to acquaint the participants with the procedures for 
making recognition decisions and judgments. All fillers were excluded from analysis. 
 
Participants made four types of judgment in this experiment: subjective experience 
judgments (Remember, Know, Familiar, Guess), confidence judgments, age-of-acquisition 
(AoA) judgments, and pleasantness judgments. Participants were always required to make 
                                                          
 
20
 Words obtained from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database. Familiarity values refer to the printed 
frequency in the language and were derived from merging three sets of familiarity norms: Pavio 
(unpublished), Toglia and Battig (1978) and Gilhooly and Logie (1980). 
21
 After data sorting it was discovered that the word ‘wiggle’ had been used as both a target and a 
lure item. All data for this item were therefore deleted and analysis of target and lure lists consisted 
of 55 items each. This was done for all three experiments presented in this chapter. 
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either a subjective experience judgment or a confidence judgment first, followed by 
another type of judgment (of the three not already made). The critical trials were those 
where participants made a combination of a subjective experience judgment and a 
confidence judgment, either subjective experience then confidence or confidence then 
subjective experience. The AoA and pleasantness trials were included in an attempt to 
avoid participants guessing the manipulation of interest and so that participants were not 
able to predict what judgment would follow the first. Assigned to the 64 studied words (56 
targets, 8 fillers) were 16 trials of each judgment pairing, either: subjective experience + 
confidence, confidence + subjective experience, subjective experience + AoA/pleasantness 
(eight of each), and confidence + AoA/pleasantness (eight of each). Words were randomly 
assigned to judgment pairings, though it was ensured that filler words were always 
followed by a non-critical judgment pairing (involving AoA or pleasantness). Lure words 
were assigned to judgment pairings in an identical manner to target words. AoA and 
pleasantness responses were not analysed. 
 
Four word lists were utilised. Two sets of 64 words were counterbalanced as lure and 
target lists across participants. Two versions of each were constructed where each word 
was matched with a different judgment pairing and which also had differing inter-trial-
intervals (ITI) and inter-judgment-intervals (IJI) for each word in the test phase. Allocation 
of participants to list was random. 
 
4.2.2.3. Procedure 
In the study phase, target words were presented in random order individually in the centre 
of the computer screen. Participants were instructed that they should study the words and 
that later they would undergo an Old-New recognition test. It was emphasized that it was a 
long list of words and that participants should concentrate on the screen throughout. 
Participants studied each word for four seconds separated by a fixation point shown for 
750 milliseconds. The eight filler words were shown in random order at the start and the 
end of the target word list. Prior to undergoing the recognition test, participants 
completed the pattern comparison and letter comparison speed of processing tasks (e.g., 
Salthouse, 1991). Although not formally timed, participants took approximately five 
minutes to complete this.  
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In the test phase, participants were instructed that for each word recognised as Old they 
would then be asked to make two judgments from the list of four judgments. The four 
judgments were then explained on individual screens (with full definitions of Remember 
(R), Know (K), Familiar (F), and Guess (G) provided on paper; see Appendix A.3). Each 
explanation screen included an example of the scale that the participant would use for 
each type of judgment. The subjective experience judgment scale consisted of four 
response boxes labelled (from left to right) R, K, F, and G, with the question ‘What is your 
EXPERIENCE of recognising this word?’. The confidence scale consisted of four boxes 
labelled (from left to right) 0, 1, 2, 3, with 0 accompanied by the label ‘Not confident at all’ 
and 3 accompanied by ‘Extremely confident’, and the question ‘How CONFIDENT are you 
that you correctly recognised this word?’. For ease of description in discussing analyses, 
these numerical confidence levels are translated into verbal labels: 3 = High, 2 = Medium, 1 
= Low, 0 = None. The labelling of the subjective experience scale ‘R, K, F, G’ from left to 
right and the confidence scale ‘0, 1, 2, 3’ from left to right was purposefully done to ensure 
that on trials involving both these judgments, if assigning the item to both Remember and 
High confidence for example, participants were not moving the mouse to exactly the same 
position to make both responses. In between judgments the mouse pointer was 
repositioned to the centre of the screen. The AoA judgment scale consisted of four boxes 
labelled 0-4, 5-8, 9-12, and 13+, and the question ‘What AGE were you when you first 
learnt this word?’. Finally the pleasantness scale consisted of the question ‘How PLEASANT 
is this word?’ and four boxes labelled 1, 2, 3, and 4, with 1 accompanied by the label ‘Not 
pleasant’ and 4 accompanied by ‘Very pleasant’. For each judgment type, the response 
boxes were the same size, shape and positioned identically. 
 
Commencing with the 16 filler words, participants then underwent the recognition test. At 
the start of a trial a fixation point was shown for 750ms. Each word was then presented in 
the centre of the screen with the cues ‘New’ and ‘Old’ presented below and towards the 
left and right of the screen respectively, reflecting the number keys which participants 
were required to use to make their Old-New judgment: 1 for New, 2 for Old. Participants 
were instructed to press these keys with their left hand. Reminders for which numbers 
corresponded to Old and New were shown on all trials. When participants indicated that 
they recognised a word as Old the first judgment screen was shown. The word re-appeared 
in the centre of the screen with the response boxes and judgment question below. The 
mouse pointer appeared in the centre of the screen and participants made all judgments 
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using the mouse to click on one of the response boxes. Speed and accuracy of responses 
were emphasised in the instructions for the test phase and response times for all 
recognition decisions and judgments were recorded. In between the two judgment screens 
and prior to a new trial commencing a blank screen was shown as an IJI or ITI for a duration 
which ranged between 250ms and 1250ms. Every twelve trials during the test phase 
participants were allowed to take a break if they were fatigued. A ‘take a break’ slide 
appeared and remained until the participant pressed the spacebar, on this screen was also 
a reminder that all responses should be made as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
After completion of the test phase participants completed a debrief questionnaire to 
ensure that they had understood the different types of judgments made; no participants 
were excluded on the basis of their responses. 
 
4.2.3. Results 
 
Memory performance was examined, followed by the proportion of correct responses 
assigned to each of the confidence levels and subjective experience categories calculated 
using both a priori and a posteriori methods. The influence of First Judgment on Second 
Judgment was then explored using a priori and a posteriori methods. Reaction times for 
recognition decisions and judgments were analysed by confidence level or subjective 
experience category. Prior to analysis, data from any responses which had been made 
faster than 300ms or slower than 8000ms were excluded from the dataset. 
 
4.2.3.1. Memory measures 
The mean proportion of targets correctly recognised (hits) was .62 (SD = .18) and the mean 
proportion of false alarms (FA) made to lures was .08 (SD = .08). Overall recognition 
performance was therefore .54 (hits minus FA; SD = .20) which was significantly higher 
than chance (zero), t(43) = 17.86, p < .001. Recognition was also examined using d’. The d’ 
value obtained was 1.85 (SD = .77). As participants made FAs to only 8% of lures, analysis 
of lure data was not performed. 
 
4.2.3.2. Subjective experience and confidence measures 
Which levels of confidence or subjective experiences participants had based their 
recognition decisions on was the second analysis of interest. Firstly a priori proportions 
were calculated – the proportion of correct responses assigned to each of the confidence 
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levels or subjective experience categories. These proportions sum to 1 for each participant; 
where this occurs it is noted and the variables are analysed together with planned 
comparisons used to further explore the data. As is shown in Figure 4.1, there were only 
slight differences between assignment of First and Second Judgments to different 
responses, but patterns of responses across confidence levels differed from patterns of 
responses across subjective experience categories. A 2(judgment type) x 2(judgment order) 
x 4(response category) within-subjects ANOVA was conducted on these proportions. 
ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of response category, F(1.69,72.75) = 84.79, 
p < .001, and a significant interaction between judgment type and response category, 
F(1.43,61.61) = 13.61, p < .001; participants did not use confidence levels in the same 
manner as subjective experience categories. Nearly 60% of responses were assigned to 
High confidence, while just over 40% of responses were assigned to Remember. 
Approximately equal proportions of responses were assigned to Know and Familiar, whilst 
slightly more responses were assigned to Medium compared to Low confidence. The 
proportions assigned to Guess and None were approximately equal and were low, at under 
5%. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean proportion of correct responses assigned at First and Second Judgments 
to subjective experience categories Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar (F), and Guess (G), 
and confidence levels High, Medium, Low, and None. Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
 
There was no interaction between judgment order and response category F(1.97,84.86) = 
1.49, p = .22, the interaction between judgment type and judgment order was not 
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calculated as proportions summed to 1, and the three-way interaction was not significant, 
F < 1. As there was no main effect of judgment order, judgment order did not interact with 
response category, and there was no three-way interaction, further analysis was 
conducted with data for First and Second Judgments combined together. Confidence and 
subjective experience do not appear to differ as a function of the other judgment being 
made before or after.  
 
Aggregated across judgment order, separate 4(response category) ANOVAs for subjective 
experience and confidence were conducted to follow-up the significant interaction 
between judgment type and response category. The separate ANOVAs both demonstrated 
significant main effects of response category: subjective experience, F(1.81,77.77) = 32.26, 
p < .001, and confidence, F(1.48,63.75) = 114.38, p < .001. Planned comparisons were 
conducted between the different response categories for confidence judgments and 
judgments of subjective experience22. For subjective experience, planned comparisons 
across categories demonstrated there was no significant difference in the proportion of 
responses assigned to Know and Familiar, t < 1. All other comparisons were significant, all 
at least p < .007; more responses were assigned to Remember than to Know, Familiar or 
Guess, and fewer responses were assigned to Guess than to any other category. 
Comparisons across confidence levels demonstrated all proportions were significantly 
different, all at least p < .006. More responses were assigned to High confidence compared 
to Medium, Low, or None; more were assigned to Medium compared to Low confidence, 
and more were assigned to Medium or Low confidence compared to None. Planned 
comparisons across judgment type demonstrated that more responses were assigned to 
High confidence than to Remember, t(43) = 4.87, p < .001, and fewer responses were 
assigned to Low confidence than were assigned to Familiar, t(43) = 6.35, p < .001. 
Comparisons for Know against Medium confidence and Guess against None were not 
significant, t(43) = 1.35, p = .19, and t(43) = 1.23, p = .23, respectively. 
 
Thus far, analysis suggests that whereas order does not influence the relationship between 
one judgment type and another, there are not straightforward mappings between 
confidence and subjective experience judgments. For instance, Remember judgments do 
                                                          
 
22
 It should be noted that the data presented in Figure 4.1 is not exactly the data that was subject to 
further analysis as the analysed data was aggregated across First and Second Judgments. 
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not merely reflect the highest level of confidence, more items were assigned to High 
confidence than to Remember. 
 
To explore the level of accuracy associated with each response category a posteriori 
probabilities were calculated. Here proportions were based on First Judgments only as for 
each item both First and Second Judgments were conditional on the same recognition 
response. Analysis was conducted separately for subjective experience and confidence 
judgments as the main comparison of interest was accuracy of response categories within 
judgment type. Missing data was encountered in this analysis as participants had not 
assigned responses to all response categories; for example, as shown in the a priori 
analysis very few responses were assigned to None or Guess. To increase listwise N these 
categories were excluded from analysis. As is shown in Figure 4.2, accuracy for confidence 
judgments decreased as confidence decreased whereas for judgments of subjective 
experience accuracy was equally high for Remember and Know judgments and only 
decreased for Familiar and Guess judgments.   
 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean proportion of items assigned to Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar (F), 
and Guess (G) and High, Medium, Low, and None levels of confidence that had previously 
been correctly recognised. For R, K, and F, N = 40 and for High, Medium, and Low N = 39 
due to missing data. Proportions for Guess (N = 24) and None (N = 19) shown but not 
included in analysis. Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Separate 3(response category) ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of response 
category for subjective experience judgments, F(1.60,62.54) = 23.79, p < .001, and 
confidence judgments, F(1.57,59.54) = 11.26, p < .001. For subjective experience 
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judgments, no significant difference was found in the accuracy of responses assigned to 
Remember or Know, t < 1, and both Remember and Know responses were significantly 
more likely to be correct than were responses assigned to Familiar, both p < .001. 
Contrastingly, for confidence judgments, planned comparisons demonstrated that 
responses assigned to High confidence were significantly more likely to have been correct 
than responses assigned to Medium confidence, t(38) = 374, p = .001, or Low confidence, 
t(38) = 5.12, p < .001. Medium confidence responses were not found to be more accurate 
than Low confidence responses, t(38) = 1.36, p = .18.  
 
In sum, these analyses demonstrate that participants did not use confidence and 
subjective experience judgments in the same way. The different patterns of distribution of 
correct responses across confidence levels compared to subjective experience categories 
demonstrates that participants made significantly more responses as High confidence than 
Remember. Accuracy analysis further demonstrates the different ways participants used 
the two judgments. For subjective experience judgments, Know judgments were as 
accurate as Remember judgments. Whereas High confidence judgments were more likely 
to be correct than responses assigned to lower levels of confidence. That is, a linear 
pattern emerges across confidence which is absent for Remember and Know (although a 
linear pattern is evident for Familiar and Guess). With regards to the order in which the 
judgments were made, the a priori analysis provides initial evidence that the order of the 
two judgments did not influence distribution patterns across response categories. 
 
4.2.3.3. The influence of one judgment on the other 
To fully explore whether making two judgments per item led to one judgment influencing 
the other judgment, conditional probabilities were calculated on correct recognition 
decisions using both a priori and a posteriori methods. Firstly, the proportion of items 
assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess at Second Judgment was calculated split 
by which confidence level the item had been assigned to at First judgment; i.e., ‘of the 
items assigned to High confidence at First judgment, what proportion were then assigned 
to each of the categories of subjective experience at Second Judgment?’. As is shown in 
Figure 4.3, if an item had been assigned to High confidence at First Judgment then .61 of 
these items were then assigned to Remember at Second Judgment, .36 were assigned to 
Know, and .03 were assigned to Familiar. Contrastingly, if an item was assigned to Medium 
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confidence at First Judgment then at Second Judgment .24 were assigned to Remember, 
.29 to Know, and .47 to Familiar; and so on.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean proportion of items assigned to each level of confidence at First 
Judgment that were then assigned to each subjective experience category at Second 
Judgment. Proportions sum to 1 within confidence level. High N = 43, Medium N = 30, Low 
N = 26, None N = 4. Data for None shown but not analysed. Error bars = 1 SeM.  
 
These proportions were also calculated in the opposite direction. In the counterbalanced 
design, participants either judged confidence followed by subjective experience, or the 
order of these two judgments was reversed. Data was next examined by calculating the 
proportion of items assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess at First Judgment 
split by which confidence level the item had later been assigned to at Second judgment; 
i.e., ‘of the items that were assigned to High confidence at Second Judgment, what 
proportion of these had come from a Remember First Judgment?’. Mean proportions are 
shown in Figure 4.4.  
 
Comparing Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 it is evident that the order in which judgments were 
made did not influence the relationship between confidence and subjective experience; 
the graphs are very similar. For example, in Figure 4.4, if an item had been assigned to High 
confidence at Second Judgment then .64 of these items had previously been assigned to 
Remember at First Judgment, compared to .61 when the judgments were in the opposing 
order as shown in Figure 4.3. Across Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, within each level of 
confidence the patterns of means are paralleled for each category of subjective 
experience. 
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Figure 4.4. Mean proportion of items assigned to each level of confidence at Second 
Judgment that had previously been assigned to each subjective experience category at 
First Judgment. Proportions sum to 1 within confidence level. High N = 43, Medium N = 30, 
Low N = 26, None N = 10. Data for None shown but not analysed. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Separate 2(judgment order) x 4(response category) ANOVAs were conducted for items 
assigned to each of the confidence levels. These ANOVAs compare the distribution of 
subjective experience responses at each confidence level across Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, 
i.e., how correct recognition responses that were assigned to High confidence were 
distributed across subjective experience categories whether judgment order was 
confidence then subjective experience or the reverse. Effects of judgment order were not 
calculated as proportions summed to 1. 
 
For High confidence responses the 2(judgment order) x 4(response category) ANOVA 
demonstrated a significant main effect of response category, F(1.08,45.37) = 57.87, p < 
.001, and no interaction between judgment order and response category, F < 1. Planned 
comparisons aggregated across judgment order23 demonstrated that the proportion of 
High confidence responses assigned to each level of subjective experience all differed 
                                                          
 
23
 It should be noted that the means presented in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 were aggregated across 
judgment order for further analysis which led to an increase in N for some confidence levels. Where 
t-tests are presented on these aggregated means all results obtained were the same as the result 
when only listwise N subject to ANOVA were included. 
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significantly. A greater proportion were assigned to Remember compared to Know, 
Familiar, or Guess; Know compared to Familiar or Guess; and Familiar compared to Guess; 
all at least p < .015. For Medium confidence responses ANOVA demonstrated a significant 
main effect of response category, F(2.00,57.98) = 12.05, p < .001, and no interaction 
between judgment order and response category, F < 1. Planned comparisons aggregated 
across judgment order demonstrated that for Medium confidence responses a smaller 
proportion were assigned to Guess than to any other category of subjective experience, all 
at least p < .002, and a greater proportion were assigned to Familiar than to Remember, 
t(41) = 2.64, p = .012. There were no significant differences between the proportion of 
responses assigned to Know and Familiar, t(41) = 1.37, p = .18, or to Know and Remember, 
t < 1. For Low confidence responses ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of 
response category, F(1.34,33.42) = 40.38, p < .001, and no interaction between judgment 
order and response category, F < 1. Planned comparisons aggregated across judgment 
order demonstrated that for Low confidence responses a greater proportion were assigned 
to Familiar than to any other category of subjective experience, all p < .001, and a greater 
proportion were assigned to Guess than to Remember, t(37) = 2.75, p = .009, or to Know, 
t(37) = 1.34, p = .09, though this only approached significance. There were no significant 
differences between the proportion of responses assigned to Remember and Know, t < 1. 
ANOVA was not performed on responses with a confidence level of None as the listwise N 
was 4; less than 5% of responses had been assigned to None. In sum, at each level of 
confidence there was no interaction between judgment order and subjective experience 
response, thus demonstrating that the relationship between confidence and subjective 
experience was not influenced by the order in which the two types of judgment were 
made.  
 
Conditional proportions were also calculated in the opposing way. Data for proportion of 
items assigned to each level of confidence was split by the category of subjective 
experience to which the item had been assigned. Firstly, the proportion of items assigned 
to High, Medium, Low, and None at Second Judgment was calculated split by which 
category of subjective experience the item had been assigned to at First judgment; i.e., ‘of 
the items assigned to Familiar at First judgment, what proportion were assigned to each of 
the confidence levels at Second Judgment?’. As is shown in Figure 4.5, calculating the 
probabilities using this method reveals different patterns to those shown in Figure 4.3 and 
Figure 4.4. If an item was assigned to Remember at First Judgment, .83 went on to be 
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assigned to High confidence at Second Judgment, while .17 went on to be assigned to 
Medium confidence. Similarly, if an item was assigned to Know at First Judgment, .66 were 
later assigned to High confidence, while .31 went on to be assigned to Medium confidence. 
For items assigned to Familiar at First Judgment, .45 and .41 went on to be assigned to 
Medium and Low respectively at Second Judgment, while for Guess judgments .59 were 
later assigned to Low and .29 were assigned to None.  
 
These proportions were then calculated in the opposite direction. The proportion of items 
assigned to High, Medium, Low, and None at First Judgment was calculated split by which 
category of subjective experience the item had later been assigned to at Second judgment. 
Mean proportions are shown in Figure 4.6. Comparing Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 again 
demonstrates that the order in which judgments were made did not influence the 
relationship between confidence and subjective experience. Across Figure 4.5 and Figure 
4.6, within each category of subjective experience the patterns of means are paralleled for 
each level of confidence.  
 
 
Figure 4.5. Mean proportion of items assigned to each subjective experience category at 
First Judgment that were then assigned to each level of confidence at Second Judgment. 
Proportions sum to 1 within subjective experience category. Remember N = 38, Know N = 
30, Familiar N = 32, Guess N = 14. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Separate 2(judgment order) x 4(response category) ANOVAs were conducted for items 
assigned to each of the four categories of subjective experience. These ANOVAs compare 
the distribution of confidence judgments within each category of subjective experience 
across Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6.  
Chapter 4 
203 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Mean proportion of items assigned to each subjective experience category at 
Second Judgment that had previously been assigned to each level of confidence at First 
Judgment. Proportions sum to 1 within subjective experience category. Remember N = 38, 
Know N = 30, Familiar N = 32, Guess N = 10. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
For Remember responses the 2(judgment order) x 4(response category) ANOVA 
demonstrated a significant main effect of response category, F(1.00,37.09) = 120.38, p < 
.001, and no interaction between judgment order and response category, F < 1. Planned 
comparisons aggregated across judgment order24 demonstrated that a greater proportion 
of Remember responses were assigned to High compared to Medium, Low, or None 
confidence, and a greater proportion were assigned to Medium confidence compared to 
Low or None, all at least p < .01. There was no significant difference between the 
proportion of Remember responses assigned to Low and None levels of confidence, t(42) = 
1.47, p = .15. For Know responses ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of 
response category, F(3,87) = 52.23, p < .001, and no interaction between judgment order 
and response category, F < 1. Planned comparisons aggregated across judgment order 
demonstrated that all comparisons were significantly different. A greater proportion of 
Know responses were assigned to High compared to Medium, Low, or None confidence, 
                                                          
 
24
 It should be noted that the means presented in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 were aggregated across 
judgment order for further analysis which led to an increase in N for some subjective experience 
categories. Where t-tests are presented on these aggregated means all results obtained were the 
same as the result when only listwise N subject to ANOVA were included. 
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greater proportion were assigned to Medium confidence compared to Low or None, and 
greater proportion were assigned to Low compared to None levels of confidence, all at 
least p < .03. For Familiar responses ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of 
response category, F(1.88,58.27) = 20.25, p < .001, and no interaction between judgment 
order and response category, F < 1. Planned comparisons aggregated across judgment 
order demonstrated that a greater proportion of Familiar responses were assigned to 
Medium and Low confidence than to High or Low confidence, all p < .001. There was no 
significant difference between the proportion of Familiar responses assigned to Medium or 
Low confidence, t < 1, or between the proportion assigned to High or None levels of 
confidence, t < 1. ANOVA was not performed on Guess responses as the listwise N was 6; 
less than 5% of responses had been assigned to Guess. 
 
While a priori and a posteriori methods reveal identical patterns within judgment type and 
no influence of judgment order, comparing across which judgment type was used to split 
the analysis demonstrates that participants did not simply map the four levels of 
confidence onto the four categories of subjective experience, they used the two judgment 
types in very different ways. Comparing Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.5 we can see that while .61 
of items that were initially assigned to High confidence went on to be assigned to 
Remember, when order of judgments was reversed, .83 of items initially assigned to 
Remember later went onto be assigned to High confidence. Participants were not 100% 
confident about an item they Remembered; and if they did have High confidence for an 
item it did not mean they Remembered it. Comparisons of Familiar subjective experience 
and Low confidence demonstrate that it was not only Remember and High confidence 
which did not map onto each other. If an item was judged to be Familiar at First Judgment, 
.45 and .41 were later assigned to Medium and Low levels of confidence respectively 
(Figure 4.5). Conversely, if an item was first assigned to Low confidence, .74 then went on 
to be assigned to Familiar at Second Judgment and .21 went on to Guess (Figure 4.3). Items 
assigned to Low were often then assigned to Familiar, but not exclusively; and items 
initially assigned to Familiar were equally likely to be assigned to either Low or Medium 
levels of confidence.  
 
The above figures are illustrative of the different relationships and influence between 
successive post-recognition judgments. One further way to analyse this data was to 
calculate mean confidence ratings for items assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and 
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Guess. This analysis utilised the original numerical confidence levels of 3, 2, 1, and 0 that 
participants used to make their responses instead of the verbal labels High, Medium, Low, 
and None. As order of judgment had been shown not to influence patterns of responses 
above, mean confidence ratings were calculated irrespective of judgment order. Mean 
confidence ratings for items assigned to each of the subjective experience categories 
included all confidence judgment regardless of whether that judgment had been made 
before or after the judgment of subjective experience. As is shown in Figure 4.7, ratings of 
confidence decreased across the subjective experience categories from Remember, to 
Know, to Familiar, to Guess, though ratings assigned to Remember and Know items were 
approximately equal. Due to missing data the Guess category was excluded from the 
ANOVA. A 3(response category) ANOVA comparing confidence ratings to Remember, 
Know, and Familiar items demonstrated a significant main effect of response category, 
F(3,51) = 73.90, p < .001. Planned comparisons demonstrated that items assigned to 
Remember or Know were both given higher confidence ratings than items assigned to 
Familiar: t(38) = 12.41, p < .001 and t(38) = 12.73, p < .001 respectively; however there was 
no significant difference between the confidence ratings given to Remember or Know 
items, t < 1.  
 
 
Figure 4.7. Mean confidence ratings given to items assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, 
or Guess. N = 39 for Remember, Know, and Familiar. Guess (N = 18) shown but not 
included in analysis. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
In sum, proportional a priori and a posteriori analysis demonstrated participants did not 
simply map the four levels of confidence onto the four categories of subjective experience, 
the four categories of the two judgment types were utilised differently. Analysis of mean 
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confidence examines use of the two judgment types in a different way and demonstrates 
that items that were assigned to Remember and Know did not differ in terms of 
confidence. This adds to the previous finding that Remember and Know did not differ in 
terms of accuracy. 
 
4.2.3.4. Reaction times for recognition decisions 
As performed in the experiments presented in Chapter 3, the typical form of analysis to 
explore reaction time is to analyse RTs for recognition decisions split by which subjective 
experience category the item was later assigned to. In the current experiment this analysis 
was performed on correct recognition RTs classified by the confidence or subjective 
experience response category the item was then assigned to at First Judgment. To increase 
listwise N the categories of Guess and None were excluded from analysis. Mean correct 
recognition RTs are shown in Figure 4.8. Both judgment types show similar patterns; 
recognition decisions based on higher levels of confidence or Remember or Know 
categories of subjective experience were made faster than recognition decisions based on 
lower confidence or familiarity. 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Mean correct recognition RTs split by later response category. Means shown 
are those in the separate subjective experience and confidence 3(response category) 
ANOVAs. N = 39 for Remember (R), Know (K), and Familiar (F) responses and N = 36 for 
High, Medium, and Low responses due to missing data. Data for None (N = 12) and Guess 
(N = 17) shown but not included in analysis. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
A 2(judgment type) x 3(response category) ANOVA demonstrated no main effect of 
judgment type, F(1,32) = 1.93, p = .17, a significant main effect of response category, 
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F(1.38,44.24) = 38.97, p < .001, and no interaction between the two, F(1.53,48.88) = 1.06, p 
= .35. Separate 3(response category) ANOVAs for confidence judgments and subjective 
experience judgments demonstrated significant effects of response category for both: 
subjective experience, F(2,76) = 23.04, p < .001, and confidence, F(1.70,59.66) = 16.42, p < 
.001. Planned comparisons within judgment type revealed that, for subjective experience 
judgments, correct recognition decisions to items that went on to be categorised as either 
Remember and Know were made significantly faster than those for items later categorised 
as Familiar: t(38) = 6.05, p < .001 and t(38) = 5.43, p < .001 respectively. There was no 
significant difference in the speed with which recognition decisions were made to items 
that were later assigned to Remember or Know, t < 1. For confidence judgments, correct 
recognition decisions that went on to be assigned to High and Medium confidence were 
both found to be made significantly faster than decisions where the item was later 
assigned to Low confidence: t(35) = 5.08, p < .001 and t(35) = 3.68, p = .001 respectively. 
Additionally, recognition decisions made with High confidence were made more quickly 
than those of Medium confidence, this difference approached significance, t(35) = 1.89, p = 
.067. These findings for speed of recognition decision categorised by later subjective 
experience parallel those in Experiments 3.1 and 3.3 and are the same as those for 
confidence judgments. Whilst High and Medium confidence responses were not matched 
on accuracy as Remember and Know responses were, for recognition RTs patterns are 
matched across the two judgment types.  
 
4.2.3.5. Reaction times for subjective experience and confidence judgments 
A novel approach to RT analysis in this experiment was how quickly participants made the 
actual judgments of confidence and subjective experience. Firstly, the overall mean RTs for 
confidence and subjective experience judgments to correct recognition decisions were 
compared irrespective of response category. As shown in Figure 4.9, confidence judgments 
were made more quickly than judgments of subjective experience. This was confirmed by a 
2(judgment type) x 2(judgment order) ANOVA which demonstrated a significant main 
effect of judgment type, F(1,43) = 25.51, p < .001. The main effect of judgment order 
approached significance, F(1,43) = 3.04, p = .09, as for both judgment types Second 
Judgments were slightly faster than First Judgments. The interaction between judgment 
type and judgment order was not significant, F < 1.  
 
Chapter 4 
208 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Mean judgment RTs (ms) by judgment type and judgment order. Error bars = 1 
SeM. 
 
Further analysis was interested in whether differences in RT were observed for different 
response categories within judgment types. To increase N the categories of Guess and 
None were excluded from analysis. As the effect of order in the 2x2 ANOVA had not 
reached significance, data were also aggregated across judgment order. Mean judgment 
RTs split by response category are shown in Figure 4.10. Separate 3(response category) 
ANOVAs for confidence and subjective experience revealed a significant main effect of 
response for confidence judgments, F(1.25,50.06) = 6.61, p = .009, but no main effect of 
response for subjective experience, F < 1. As can be seen in Figure 4.10, time to make 
subjective experience judgments was stable at around 2000ms, whilst the time taken to 
make High, Medium, and Low confidence judgments differed: speed increased as 
confidence increased.  
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Figure 4.10. Mean judgment RTs (ms) by response category. N = 41 for Remember (R), 
Know (K), Familiar (F), High, Medium, and Low judgments due to missing data. Data for 
None (N = 13) and Guess (N = 20) shown but not included in analysis. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Planned comparisons for confidence judgments revealed that High confidence judgments 
were made significantly faster than both Medium and Low confidence judgments: t(40) = 
4.16, p < .001 and t(40) = 3.18, p = .003 respectively. The difference in speed between 
Medium and Low confidence judgments was not found to be significant, t(40) = 1.34, p = 
.19. Planned comparisons for subjective experience judgments confirmed that there were 
no significant differences between the time to make Remember, Know, or Familiar 
judgments, all at least p > .26. 
 
Analysis of judgment RTs demonstrated confidence judgments on the whole were made 
more quickly than judgments of subjective experience and within these two judgment 
types contrasting patterns were observed. For subjective experience judgment RTs no 
effect of response was observed, whilst for confidence judgments the RT advantage 
observed in recognition judgments for High confidence items was paralleled in the time to 
make post-recognition judgments of confidence.  
 
4.2.4. Discussion 
 
This experiment compared subjective experience judgments with confidence judgments 
when both were assessed using four categories of response. The focus of this Discussion is 
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to summarise the central findings of this experiment and more substantive theoretical 
discussion is carried out in the General Discussion of this Chapter.  
 
Patterns of distributions of responses and accuracy of responses revealed that participants 
did not use confidence and subjective experience judgments in the same way. Participants 
were more lenient in their use of confidence judgments than subjective experience 
judgments and more responses were assigned to High confidence than to Remember. This 
fits with the findings of Gardiner and Java (1990), Rajaram (1993), Rajaram et al., (2002), 
and Tunney and Fernie (2007) but demonstrates this without the inclusion of a 
manipulation such as a word/non-word comparison or masked priming. In the current 
experiment confidence and subjective experience judgments produced different patterns 
on identical stimuli.  
 
Accuracy analysis demonstrated a linear relationship between confidence and accuracy, 
whereas the relationship was not linear for subjective experience judgments as Know 
judgments were found to be just as accurate as Remember judgments; paralleling the 
findings presented in Chapter 3. Mean confidence ratings also demonstrated no 
differences between Known and Remembered items, however both accuracy and 
confidence ratings differentiated Know from Familiar responses. This important issue is 
returned to in the General Discussion of this chapter. 
 
Exploration of the influence of one judgment type on the other further demonstrated that 
participants did not simply map the four levels of confidence onto the four categories of 
subjective experience. Over 80% of Remember responses were also assigned to High 
confidence, but when proportions were calculated based on confidence response, only 
approximately 60% of items which were assigned to High confidence were also 
Remembered. Whilst subjective experience and confidence judgments are no doubt 
related, concerns such as those voiced by Bruno and Rutherford (2010) regarding the 
influence of one judgment on the other do not have credence. The two main points to take 
from this are that participants did not simply assign all Remember items to High 
confidence, Know items to Medium confidence, and Familiar items to Low confidence and 
vice versa; however, the patterns obtained for assignment of responses were matched 
across judgment order. While all items that were given Remember responses at First 
Judgment were not assigned to High confidence at Second judgment, the patterns 
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obtained in that judgment order matched the patterns of responding when the order of 
judgments was reversed. Responses at Second Judgment were not influenced by what 
response had been made at First Judgment. 
 
RTs were measured at two points: the time taken to make an initial recognition decision 
and the time taken to make a judgment of confidence or subjective experience. 
Recognition RT analysis demonstrated a case where confidence and subjective experience 
responses did not differ. Recognition RTs for subjective experience judgments paralleled 
those in the Experiments presented in Chapter 3. There was no difference in speed of 
recognition when items were later categorised as Remember or Know, and recognition of 
these items was faster than items later assigned to Familiar or Guess. Similarly, recognition 
of items later classed as High or Medium confidence was equally fast and was faster than 
for items assigned to Low or None levels of confidence. Taken together with the findings 
regarding accuracy, where a significant difference between High and Medium confidence 
responses was demonstrated, this again highlights that subjective experience and 
confidence judgments behave in different ways. 
 
The novel analysis of comparing RT to make judgments independent of recognition RT 
confirmed the prediction that confidence judgments would be made more quickly than 
judgments of subjective experience. It is suggested that it is simply easier to assess 
memory strength than whether or not you can recollect details from the study episode and 
this is demonstrated via reaction time. No interaction with judgment order was 
demonstrated however: confidence judgments were not found to be speeded when made 
following a judgment of recollective experience.  
 
Confidence judgments were found to be made more quickly the more confident they were 
but, as predicted, no differences in RT were demonstrated for subjective experience 
responses. It is suggested that this is related to recollection being a threshold process (e.g., 
Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). When making a subjective experience judgment, if no 
recollection of the study episode comes to mind, search is terminated and a different 
subjective experience response is made. The time to make a judgment of any category of 
subjective experience is therefore related to the time spent assessing recollection. This 
appears to be quite a long process compared to making a confidence judgment. 
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So why might judgments of subjective experience take so long? If making judgments which 
require recalling information from the encoding phase is a slow and effortful process 
involving retrieval reaching the threshold of activation for recollection (e.g., Yonelinas & 
Parks, 2007) or mental time travel (e.g., Tulving, 1985), it might be expected that making a 
judgment of source will take just as long as making a judgment of subjective experience. 
Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 were designed with the aim of following up the slower reaction 
times for subjective experience judgments in Experiment 4.1. However, designing these 
two experiments also enabled the examination of a number of previously un-researched 
relationships such as the relationship between source accuracy and confidence and source 
judgments and Remember, Know, Familiar and Guess subjective experiences. 
 
4.3. EXPERIMENTS 4.2 AND 4.3: SOURCE JUDGMENTS, SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE, AND CONFIDENCE 
 
4.3.1. Comparing subjective experience and source judgments 
 
In contrast to confidence and subjective experience judgments which cannot be objectively 
verified, source memory judgments can be objectively scored as correct or incorrect. Many 
researchers have therefore combined judgments of source with confidence and/or 
subjective experience in attempts to tap both subjective and objective measures of 
recollection. The central theoretical concern that has arisen from research comparing 
judgments of source and subjective experience is whether accurate source should be able 
to be retrieved from memory when an item is assigned to Know. Previous research has 
found mixed results regarding the accuracy of source for Know items. Some studies have 
demonstrated source accuracy to only be at chance levels for Know items, which reflects 
the interpretation of Know responses being recognition unaccompanied by any contextual 
details from encoding (Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; Perfect, 
Mayes, Downes, & Van Eijk, 1996, except for Experiment 3). However, other studies have 
found source accuracy to be above chance for items assigned to Know (Conway & 
Dewhurst, 1995b; Hicks, Marsh, & Ritschel, 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser & Sattler, 
2007; Starns & Hicks, 2005). This suggests that in some cases enough contextual details 
from the study phase are retrieved at recognition for source to be judged correctly but not 
enough details are recollected for the item to be assigned to Remember.  
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In these studies comparing subjective experience and source there were a number of 
methodological differences which are relevant for the current experiments. Five of the 
above eight studies used a standard Old-New recognition paradigm with judgments of 
source and/or subjective experience being made to only items judged Old, whereas three 
used a one-step procedure by including a ‘New’ category with the first judgment made. 
Perfect et al. (1996) and Starns and Hicks (2005) asked participants to make a Remember-
Know-New judgment followed by a source judgment and Hicks et al. (2002) had 
participants make a Left source-Right source-New judgment followed by a judgment of 
subjective experience. These methodological differences do not map onto the differences 
in findings however; the five studies which found Know items to have above chance source 
accuracy are not the five that incorporated a separate Old-New judgment. While one-step 
and two-step procedures have been shown to influence patterns of responding for 
Remember-Know judgments (cf., Bruno & Rutherford, 2010; Eldridge et al., 2002; Hicks & 
Marsh, 1999; see General Introduction, Section 1.6.5.1) and source judgments (Dodson & 
Johnson, 1993; Marsh & Hicks, 1998) individually, results from studies that employed both 
types of judgment do not show any clear patterns regarding judgment order.  
 
4.3.2. Comparing source and confidence judgments 
 
Confidence and source judgments have not been directly compared in the same way as 
confidence and subjective experience: do these judgments produce the same patterns of 
responding? (Gardiner & Java, 1990; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram et al., 2002), or in the same 
way as source and subjective experience have: can source for Know judgments be 
accurate? (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995b; Hicks et al., 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser 
& Sattler, 2007; Perfect et al., 1996; Starns & Hicks, 2005). Instead, studies comparing 
confidence and source have typically combined the two judgments into a source 
confidence judgment. For example, in four experiments Yonelinas (1999) compared 
recognition confidence and source confidence judgments. These were both measured on 
6-point scales from ‘1 = confident new’ to ‘6 = confident old’, and from ‘1 = sure it was 
spoken by the female voice’, to ‘6 = sure it was spoken by the male voice’. Results 
demonstrated that the higher the confidence or source confidence judgment made the 
higher the recognition or source accuracy. In addition, the ROC curves were found to differ 
for recognition confidence and source confidence and the shapes of the curves obtained 
were found to fit with the prediction that recognition confidence can rely on both 
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familiarity and recollection while source confidence relies primarily on recollection 
(Yonelinas, 1999). 
 
Researchers such as Rotello et al. (2005) and Slotnick (2010) have used similar approaches, 
combining source-confidence measures with recognition-confidence ratings (and 
judgments of subjective experience) and obtained similar findings with recognition-
confidence ratings being higher for accurate, and higher confidence, source judgments. 
However, the shapes of their ROC curves led these authors to suggest different 
interpretations of recollection and familiarity. Although these findings are relevant to the 
ongoing debates surrounding recollection and familiarity processes, they are not of direct 
interest for the experiments in this chapter. 
 
In relation to the subjective experience and confidence judgments made in these two 
experiments it is predicted that distribution patterns, accuracy, and RT will parallel those 
observed in Experiment 4.1. Distribution patterns, accuracy, and RT for these two 
judgment types are also then able to be explored split by whether the accompanying 
source judgment is correct or incorrect. As an accurate judgment of source requires 
retrieval of contextual information from the study episode it is predicted that correct 
source items will be associated with higher levels of confidence and a greater proportion of 
Remember responses than incorrect source items. In line with the majority of previous 
research it is also predicted that while source accuracy will be greatest for items assigned 
to Remember, a large proportion of items assigned to Know will also be accompanied by 
accurate source judgments (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995b; Hicks et al., 2002; Meiser & 
Bröder, 2002; Meiser & Sattler, 2007; Starns & Hicks, 2005).  
 
4.3.3. The influence of one judgment on another 
 
As with the influence of confidence and subjective experience judgments on each other, to 
date no direct manipulation of judgment order for source and subjective experience 
judgments has been published. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, experiments that have 
compared source accuracy and subjective experience judgments have employed a variety 
of different procedures and findings have been mixed. With regard to the order of source 
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and subjective experience judgments when made after Old-New recognition all five studies 
which used this procedure asked for subjective experience first and then source25. 
Although no published study has manipulated judgment order for source and subjective 
experience judgments, one Master’s thesis from Jason Hicks’ lab has examined this 
manipulation and has been made available online.  
 
Martin (2007, unpublished thesis) manipulated order of source and subjective experience 
judgments between participants. At study, words were presented either on the left or the 
right of the computer screen and at test half the participants made a Remember-Know- 
New judgment26 followed by a Left-Right source judgment, and the other half made a Left-
Right-New judgment followed by Remember-Know. Many of the general patterns of results 
replicated previous findings. Source accuracy to Remember items was higher than source 
accuracy for Know items; and source accuracy for Know items was found to be higher than 
chance (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995b; Hicks et al., 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser & 
Sattler, 2007; Starns & Hicks, 2005). However, findings regarding the effect of judgment 
order were mixed. Participants who had made subjective experience judgments first were 
found to give more Remember responses to hits than participants who made this 
judgment following a source judgment, though this finding was only marginal. For source 
accuracy, no main effect of judgment order was observed when source accuracy was 
analysed collapsed across subjective experience, though puzzlingly, when response 
category (Remember-Know) was included in analysis a main effect was reported with 
source accuracy found to be higher when source was the first judgment made. 
Additionally, the discussion states that the source-first group showed better source 
memory for Remember items than the subjective experience-first group, however an 
interaction between judgment order and subjective experience nor any separate analysis 
for Remember items was reported. In this unpublished thesis the author does not attempt 
to explain these discrepancies and it cannot be known which of these opposing findings 
may be an error in analysis, or an error in reporting. While no study has explored the 
influence of source and confidence judgments on each other, and these very mixed 
                                                          
 
25
 Though Conway and Dewhurst (1995b) actually asked participants to make separate Remember-
Know judgments for their recognition response and then their source judgment. 
26
 The categories utilised by Martin (2007) were actually ‘Recollect’ and ‘Familiar’ instead of 
Remember and Know but for consistency of explanation the standard labels are used here. 
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findings from an unpublished dissertation should be considered with caution, it is of 
interest that the influence of one judgment on the other has begun to be explored. 
 
The influence of one judgment on the other is again of key interest in both these 
experiments. While no effects of judgment order were obtained in Experiment 4.1, it is 
suggested that the objective nature of source judgments could lead them to have more 
influence over subsequent judgments. Perhaps when a source judgment is made first and 
one element of source context is retrieved this may influence the participant to make a 
Remember or High confidence response somewhat more leniently as was demonstrated, 
albeit only marginally, by Martin (2007). For example, if ‘only’ the required Left/Right 
source information is retrieved the item may still be assigned to Remember even if 
recognition is not accompanied by any feelings of mental time travel or recollection of 
thoughts that came to mind during study which would have normally be required for the 
item to exceed that individual’s Remember threshold. Additionally, the accuracy of source 
judgments could be influenced by whether they precede or follow a judgment of 
confidence or subjective experience as was suggested by some of Martin’s (2007) data. To 
examine these suggestions patterns of judgment distribution are explored by judgment 
order.  
 
4.3.4. Reaction time for judgments of source 
 
Recognition has also been demonstrated to be faster for items when source is accurate 
compared to inaccurate. Using a one-step source procedure where participants 
categorised items as either ‘Old - mentally imaged at study’, or ‘Old - read backwards at 
study’, or ‘New’, Kahn, Davachi, and Wagner (2004) found item + source recognition (Old + 
correct source) decisions were approximately 250ms faster than item only recognition (Old 
+ incorrect source), but only for items which had been mentally imaged at study. Similar 
results were obtained by Lundstrom, Ingvar, and Petersson (2005) who also used a one-
step procedure. However, opposing results have been demonstrated using a two-step 
procedure. Wilding and Rugg (1996) presented items in male or female voices at study and 
correct recognition responses were categorised by whether the subsequent judgment of 
source was correct. No differences in recognition RTs for correct and incorrect source 
items were found.  
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In the current two experiments, analysis of RTs to make post-recognition judgments again 
allows completely novel analysis to be performed: the comparison of how long it takes to 
make judgments of source, confidence, and subjective experience. As source judgments 
require assessment of retrieved contextual information it is predicted that RT for accurate 
source judgments will be approximately equal to those for subjective experience, which 
were demonstrated to be slower than confidence judgments in Experiment 4.1. Whether 
inaccurate source judgment RTs or their prior recognition decision RTs will be slower than 
those for accurate source judgments will also be explored as some previous research on 
source recognition RTs has demonstrated differences while other research has not (Kahn 
et al., 2004; Lundstrom et al., 2005; Wilding & Rugg, 1996).  
 
In these two experiments, influence is also able to be explored in the RT analysis by 
examining whether the subjective experience category or confidence level an item was 
assigned to differentiated how long it took to make an accurate source judgment. For 
example, it could be suggested that accurate judgments of source accompanied by High 
confidence or Remembering may be made more quickly than accurate judgments of source 
where confidence is not so high or the recognition is based on Familiarity. Final analysis in 
these experiments focuses on this original method of exploring judgment RTs. 
 
4.3.5. The current experiments 
 
The materials and basic procedures employed in Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 were identical to 
those in Experiment 4.1: participants studied medium-frequency words and at test made 
an Old-New recognition judgment followed by two post-recognition judgments. However, 
in order that retrieval of source could be tested at recognition, words were presented for 
study on either the left or the right of the screen with an encoding instruction to associate 
words on the left with one person and words on the right with another person (after 
Yonelinas, 1999). The two critical judgments made post-recognition were source and 
subjective experience in Experiment 4.2 and source and confidence in Experiment 4.3. 
Statistical comparisons across experiments are left until the Discussion (Section 4.3.8). 
Subjective experience and confidence judgments were made using the same four response 
options as in Experiment 4.1 and for source judgments participants selected whether they 
thought the word had been studied on the Left or the Right. The order in which participant 
made the two critical judgments was counterbalanced across items.  
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4.3.6. Methods 
 
4.3.6.1. Participants and Designs 
Thirty-two undergraduate students (30 female) participated in Experiment 4.2, mean age 
18.88 years (range 18 to 21). Thirty-four undergraduate students (32 female) participated 
in Experiment 4.3, mean age 18.62 years (range 18 to 20). All participants were from the 
University of Leeds and received Participant Pool Credits for taking part. Participants were 
tested in groups of between five and thirteen at individual PCs. In Experiment 4.2, data 
from two participants was excluded from analysis as they did not follow experimental 
instructions. Both experiments employed within-subjects designs and for the study and 
test phases all instructions and stimuli were presented, and data collected, using E-Prime 
version 1.2.  
 
4.3.6.2. Materials and Procedures 
The materials and procedures for Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 were identical to that of 
Experiment 4.1 except changes due to the source manipulation. In both experiments, in 
the study phase target words were presented individually to either the left or the right of 
the computer screen (placement randomised). Participants were instructed that as well as 
trying to remember all the words, they should also try to remember on which side of the 
screen the word was shown. To improve performance participants were instructed to 
associate words on the left with one person and words shown on the right with another 
person (Yonelinas, 1999). Participants were told they could associate the words with 
anyone, e.g., celebrities/family/friends, and were asked to write the names of their chosen 
people on their response booklet (to check they followed this instruction correctly). All 
other aspects of the study and distracter phases were identical to those of Experiment 4.1. 
 
In the test phases of both experiments participants were instructed that for each word 
recognised as Old they would then be asked to make two judgments from the list of four 
judgments. The four judgments were then explained on individual screens. The subjective 
experience (Experiment 4.2 only), confidence (Experiment 4.3 only), AoA, and pleasantness 
judgments and instructions were identical to those in Experiment 4.1. For source 
judgments the screen consisted of two boxes labelled ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ with the question 
‘Which side of the screen was this word shown on?’ below. These two response boxes 
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were the same size and shape as the four response boxes required for the subjective 
experience and confidence judgments. For each source judgment the two response boxes 
were positioned below the re-presented word, equidistant from the centre of the screen. 
Participants underwent the recognition test in the same manner as in Experiment 4.1. Each 
word was presented in the centre of the screen with the cues ‘New’ and ‘Old’ presented 
below and towards the left and right of the screen respectively, reflecting the number keys 
which participants were required to use to make their Old-New judgment: 1 for New, 2 for 
Old. When participants indicated that they recognised a word as Old the first judgment 
screen was shown. In Experiment 4.2 participants were always required to make either a 
source judgment or a subjective experience judgment first, followed by another type of 
judgment (of the three not already made). The critical trials were those where participants 
made a combination of a source judgment and a subjective experience judgment, either 
source then subjective experience or subjective experience then source. In Experiment 4.3 
participants were always required to make either a source judgment or a confidence 
judgment first, followed by another type of judgment. The critical trials were those where 
participants made either source then confidence or confidence then source. 
 
4.3.7. Results 
 
Analysis was conducted in the same manner as in Experiment 4.1 with the addition of 
comparisons split by source accuracy. Memory performance was examined, followed by 
overall source accuracy and the proportion of correct responses assigned to confidence 
levels and subjective experience categories using both a priori and a posteriori methods. 
The influence of First Judgment on Second Judgment was then explored using a priori and 
a posteriori methods. Reaction times for recognition decisions and judgments were 
analysed by source accuracy, confidence level, or subjective experience category. Prior to 
analysis, data from any responses which had been made faster than 300ms or slower than 
8000ms were excluded from the dataset. Statistical analysis comparing experiments is left 
until the Discussion (Section 4.3.8). 
 
4.3.7.1. Memory measures 
Memory performance measures for Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 are shown in Table 4.1. In 
both experiments memory performance was higher than in Experiment 4.1. The source 
encoding manipulation appears to have increased participants’ encoding proficiency 
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leading to higher performance. Participants made FAs to under 10% of lure items and 
therefore further analysis of FA data was not performed. 
 
Table 4.1. Mean memory measures (and standard deviations) in Experiments 4.2 and 4.3.  
Experiment Hits FAs 
Recognition 
performance 
d’ 
Experiment 4.2 .71    (.16) .07    (.06) .65    (.17) 2.18    (.70) 
Experiment 4.3 .79    (.12) .08    (.08) .71    (.15) 2.39    (.76) 
 
4.3.7.2. Source accuracy 
Judgments of whether an item appeared on the left or right of the screen for study were 
accurate over 80% of the time in both experiments. Mean proportion of source judgments 
correct in Experiment 4.2 was .85 (SD = .15) at First Judgment and .84 (SD = .13) at Second 
Judgment. In Experiment 4.3 proportion correct was .86 (SD = .10) at First Judgment and 
.88 (SD = .12) at Second Judgment. No effect of judgment order was found in either 
experiment, both t < 1. Source accuracy was high and remained stable whether the source 
judgment preceded or followed a judgment of confidence or subjective experience. In sum, 
both memory measures and source accuracy demonstrated that performance was strong 
and comparative across Experiments 4.2 and 4.3.  
 
4.3.7.3. Subjective experience and confidence measures 
The next analysis of interest was which levels of confidence or subjective experiences 
participants had based their recognition decisions on in the two experiments. Firstly a 
priori proportions were calculated – the proportion of correct responses assigned to each 
of the confidence levels or subjective experience categories. As is shown in Figure 4.11, 
there were only slight differences between assignment of First and Second Judgments to 
responses, but patterns of responses across confidence levels (in Experiment 4.3) differed 
from patterns of responses across subjective experience categories (in Experiment 4.2). In 
Experiment 4.3 over 70% of responses were assigned to High confidence, while in 
Experiment 4.2 just over 40% of responses were assigned to Remember. Approximately 
equal proportions of responses were assigned to Know and Familiar, whilst slightly more 
responses were assigned to Medium compared to Low confidence. Also, slightly more 
responses were assigned to Guess than to None, but both were low, at under 10%.  
 
Chapter 4 
221 
 
Patterns for subjective experience responses were very similar to those obtained in 
Experiment 4.1; however, for confidence judgments more responses were assigned to High 
confidence in Experiment 4.3 than in Experiment 4.1. This difference is examined further in 
the Discussion. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Mean proportion of correct responses assigned at First and Second Judgments 
to subjective experience categories Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar (F), and Guess (G) in 
Experiment 4.2 and confidence levels High, Medium, Low, and None in Experiment 4.3. 
Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Separate 2(judgment order) x 4(response category) ANOVAs were performed for 
Experiments 4.2 and 4.3. For subjective experience responses in Experiment 4.2 there was 
no main effect of judgment order, F(1,31) = 1.09, p = .31, a significant main effect of 
response category, F(2.06,63.88) = 18.92, p < .001, and no interaction between the two, F < 
1. Similarly, for confidence judgments in Experiment 4.3 there was no main effect of 
judgment order, F(1,33) = 1.34, p = .25, a significant main effect of response category, 
F(1.31,43.24) = 236.37, p < .001, and no interaction between judgment order and response 
category, F < 1.  
 
Aggregated across judgment order, planned comparisons were conducted between the 
different response categories for confidence judgments and judgments of subjective 
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experience27. For subjective experience judgments in Experiment 4.2, planned comparisons 
across categories demonstrated there was no significant difference in the proportion of 
responses assigned to Know and Familiar, t < 1. All other comparisons were significant, all 
at least p < .015; more responses were assigned to Remember than to Know, Familiar or 
Guess, and fewer responses were assigned to Guess than to any other category. In 
Experiment 4.3, comparisons across confidence levels demonstrated all proportions were 
significantly different, all p < .001. More responses were assigned to High confidence 
compared to Medium, Low, or None; more were assigned to Medium compared to Low 
confidence, and more were assigned to Medium or Low confidence compared to None.  
 
To explore the level of accuracy associated with each response category a posteriori 
probabilities were calculated. Here proportions were based on First Judgments only as for 
each item both First and Second Judgments were conditional on the same recognition 
response. Missing data was encountered in this analysis as participants had not assigned 
responses to all response categories; to increase N the categories of None and Guess were 
excluded from analysis. As is shown in Figure 4.12, accuracy for confidence judgments 
decreased as confidence decreased whereas for judgments of subjective experience 
accuracy for Know judgments was almost as high as for Remember judgments and only 
decreased for Familiar and Guess judgments. 
 
Separate 3(response category) ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of response 
category for subjective experience judgments in Experiment 4.2, F(1.43,31.49) = 20.51, p < 
.001, and for confidence judgments in Experiment 4.3, F(1.31,34.23) = 21.40, p < .001. For 
subjective experience judgments, no significant difference was found in the accuracy of 
responses assigned to Remember or Know, t(22) = 1.31, p = .20, and both Remember and 
Know responses were significantly more likely to be correct than were responses assigned 
to Familiar, both p < .001. In contrast, for confidence judgments, all comparisons were 
found to be significantly different from each other, all at least p < .003. Responses assigned 
to High confidence were significantly more likely to have been correct than responses 
assigned to Medium or Low confidence, and Medium confidence responses were found to 
be more accurate than Low confidence responses. 
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 It should be noted that the data presented in Figure 4.11 is not exactly the data that was subject 
to further analysis as the analysed data was aggregated across First and Second Judgments. 
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Figure 4.12. Mean proportion of items assigned to Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar (F), 
and Guess (G) in Experiment 4.2 and High, Medium, Low, and None levels of confidence in 
Experiment 4.3 that had previously been correctly recognised. For High, Medium, and Low 
N = 27 and for R, K, and F, N = 23 due to missing data. Proportions for Guess (N = 22) and 
None (N = 15) shown but not included in analysis. Errors bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Thus, these analyses again demonstrate that participants do not use confidence and 
subjective experience judgments in the same way. The patterns obtained in these two 
experiments replicate those obtained in Experiment 4.1. Accuracy analysis again 
demonstrated that for subjective experience judgments Know judgments were as accurate 
as Remember judgments, whereas only High confidence judgments were more likely to be 
correct than responses assigned to lower levels of confidence.  
 
4.3.7.4. The influence of one judgment on the other – Experiment 4.2 
To explore whether one judgment influenced the other, conditional probabilities were 
calculated on correct recognition decisions using both a priori and a posteriori methods. 
For Experiment 4.2, firstly the proportion of items assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, 
and Guess at Second Judgment was calculated split by whether a First judgment of source 
had been accurate or inaccurate; i.e., ‘of the items where source was judged correctly at 
First judgment, what proportion were then assigned to each of the categories of subjective 
experience at Second Judgment?’. These proportions were then calculated in the opposite 
direction. In the counterbalanced design participants either judged source followed by 
subjective experience, or the order of these two judgments was reversed. Data was next 
examined by calculating the proportion of items assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, 
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and Guess at First Judgment split by whether the source judgment at Second judgment had 
been accurate; i.e., ‘of the items where source was accurate at Second Judgment, what 
proportion of these had come from a Remember First Judgment?’. A priori and a posteriori 
proportions for accurate and inaccurate source judgments are both shown in Figure 4.1328.  
 
 
Figure 4.13. The influence of source and subjective experience judgments on one another, 
Experiment 4.2. Left panel: Mean proportion of items given correct or incorrect source 
judgments at First Judgment that were then assigned to each category of subjective 
experience at Second Judgment. Right panel: Mean proportion of items given correct or 
incorrect source judgments at Second Judgment that had previously been assigned to each 
category of subjective experience at First Judgment. Proportions sum to 1 within source 
accuracy and judgment order. Correct Source N = 31, Incorrect Source N = 19 due to 
missing data. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
As is evident from Figure 4.13, opposing patterns were observed when source judgments 
were accurate compared to inaccurate. For items where source was correct, the majority 
of these items were associated with Remember judgments. Approximately 45% of items 
given a correct source judgment were also assigned to Remember, approximately 30% to 
Know, 20% to Familiar, and less than 5% to Guess. In contrast, for incorrect source 
judgments (which made up less than 20% of source judgments) the opposite patterns were 
obtained for Remember, Know, and Familiar judgments. For items where source was 
incorrect, approximately 45% of items given an incorrect source judgment were assigned 
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 It should be noted that for ‘Influence’ data in Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 both a priori and a 
posteriori proportions are shown together on one figure (per experiment) whereas the comparable 
data in Experiment 4.1 was separated and shown across two figures. 
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to Familiar, around 20% to Know, and 6 to 11% were assigned to Remember. For incorrect 
source items, between 25% and 28% were also assigned to Guess. Separate 2(judgment 
order) x 4(response category) ANOVAs were performed on correct and incorrect source 
judgments. Effects of judgment order were not calculated as proportions summed to 1. For 
correct source judgment items ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of response 
category, F(1.59,47.73) = 25.72, p < .001, but no interaction between judgment order and 
response category, F < 1. For incorrect source judgment items, ANOVA again revealed a 
significant main effect of response category, F(3,54) = 6.34, p = .001, and no interaction 
between judgment order and response category, F < 1.  
 
As judgment order did not interact with response category, further comparisons were 
conducted with data aggregated across judgment order. For correct source judgment 
items, planned comparisons demonstrated that a greater proportion of items were 
assigned to Remember than to any other category of subjective experience, all at least p < 
.02. More correct source items were also assigned to Know than to Familiar and this 
difference approached significance; t(30) = 1.96, p = .059. More correct source items were 
also assigned to Know or Familiar compared to Guess, both p < .001. For incorrect source 
judgment items, planned comparisons demonstrated that a greater proportion of items 
were assigned to Familiar than to any other category of subjective experience, all at least p 
< .02. No other comparisons demonstrated significant differences, all p > .25. Patterns of 
subjective experience varied systematically depending on whether the source judgment for 
an item was correct or incorrect. Participants’ accurate judgments of source were not just 
random guesses as the subjective experience accompanying them was appropriate. The 
greatest proportion of items were assigned to Remember when source was correct 
whereas the greatest proportion of items were assigned to Familiar when source was 
incorrect. 
 
These proportions were then calculated in the opposite direction. The proportion of items 
given an accurate source judgment was calculated split by whether the item was assigned 
to Remember, Know, Familiar, or Guess. As shown in Figure 4.14, accuracy of source was 
highest for items assigned to Remember, slightly lower for items assigned to Know, then 
Familiar, then Guess. Missing data was encountered in this analysis as participants had not 
assigned responses to all response categories; to increase N Guess was excluded from 
analysis. A 2(judgment order) x 3(response category) ANOVA was performed on this data. 
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The main effect of judgment order approached significance, F(1,19) = 4.12, p = .057, 
suggesting that perhaps source judgments were more accurate when made as First 
Judgment (left panel, Figure 4.14). However, overall source accuracy, which took into 
account all data (Section 4.3.7.2), demonstrated no significant effect of judgment order. 
There was a significant main effect of response category, F(2,38) = 15.12, p < .001, and no 
significant interaction between judgment order and response category, F(2,38) = 2.20, p = 
.13.  
 
 
Figure 4.14. Source accuracy split by subjective experience judgment, Experiment 4.2. Left 
panel: Of the items assigned to each subjective experience category at Second Judgment, 
the mean proportion given correct source judgments at First Judgment. Right panel: Of 
items assigned to each subjective experience category at First Judgment, mean proportion 
given correct source judgments at Second Judgment. N = 20 for Remember (R), Know (K), 
and Familiar (F) due to missing data29. Data for Guess (G) shown but not included in 
analysis, Ns = 14 and 12 (left and right panels respectively). Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Planned comparisons aggregated across judgment order30 demonstrated significant 
differences between the accuracy of source judgments to items experienced with different 
subjective experiences. Remembered items were associated with higher source accuracy 
than Know or Familiar items, and Know items in turn were associated with higher source 
accuracy than Familiar items, all at least p < .02. One-sample t-tests against chance (.50) 
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 Although N is greatly reduced by listwise exclusion for purposes of ANOVA, the inclusive means 
show the same patterns and are shown in Appendix I. 
30
 It should be noted that the data presented in Figure 4.14 is not exactly the data that was subject 
to further analysis as the analysed data was aggregated across judgment order. 
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demonstrated that the likelihood of items assigned to Remember, Know, or Familiar being 
given an accurate source judgment was significantly higher than chance, all p < .001. The 
probability of Guessed items’ source judgments being accurate did not differ from chance, 
t < 1. In this experiment where source was a relatively easy 2AFC judgment and deep 
processing had been undertaken at study, Remember, Know, and Familiar items were 
associated with above-chance source accuracy.  
 
4.3.7.5. The influence of one judgment on the other – Experiment 4.3 
Analysis comparing the influence that judgments of source and confidence had on one 
another was then performed for Experiment 4.3. Firstly the proportion of items assigned to 
High, Medium, Low, and None levels of confidence at Second Judgment was calculated 
split by whether a First judgment of source had been accurate or inaccurate; i.e., ‘of the 
items where source was judged correctly at First judgment, what proportion were then 
assigned to each of the levels of confidence at Second Judgment?’. These proportions were 
then calculated in the opposite direction by calculating the proportion of items assigned to 
High, Medium, Low, and None levels of confidence at First Judgment split by whether the 
source judgment at Second judgment had been accurate; i.e., ‘of the items where source 
was accurate at Second Judgment, what proportion of these had come from a High 
confidence First Judgment?’. A priori and a posteriori proportions for accurate and 
inaccurate source judgments are shown in Figure 4.15. As is evident from this figure, very 
different patterns were observed when source judgments were accurate compared to 
inaccurate. For correct source items, a High level of confidence was generally associated 
with an accurate judgment of source. Over 75% of items given a correct source judgment 
were also assigned to High confidence. In contrast, for incorrect source judgments (which 
made up less than 20% of source judgments) patterns are very different. Approximately 
30% of items given incorrect source judgments at first judgment then went on to be 
assigned to each of High, Medium, and Low levels of confidence at second judgment 
whereas when judgment order was reversed and source followed confidence, 41% were 
assigned to Medium confidence and 17% to Low confidence. 
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Figure 4.15. The influence of source and confidence judgments on one another, 
Experiment 4.3. Left panel: Mean proportion of items given correct or incorrect source 
judgments at First Judgment that were then assigned to each confidence level at Second 
Judgment. Right panel: Mean proportion of items given correct or incorrect source 
judgments at Second Judgment that had previously been assigned to each confidence level 
at First Judgment. Proportions sum to 1 within source accuracy and judgment order. 
Correct Source N = 34, Incorrect Source N = 23. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Separate 2(judgment order) x 4(response category) ANOVAs were performed on correct 
and incorrect source judgments. Effects of judgment order were not calculated as 
proportions summed to 1. For correct source judgments ANOVA demonstrated a 
significant main effect of response category, F(3,99) = 334.63, p < .001, but no interaction 
between judgment order and response category, F < 1. As judgment order had not been 
found to interact with response category, further comparisons were conducted with data 
aggregated across judgment order31. Planned comparisons for correct source judgment 
items demonstrated that all comparisons between confidence levels demonstrated a 
significant difference of p < .001. When source judgment was correct, a greater proportion 
of items were assigned to High confidence than to any other levels of confidence; in turn 
more were assigned to Medium than to Low, and Low compared to None. For incorrect 
source judgments there was no significant main effect of response category, F(3,66) = 1.99, 
p = .12, and no interaction between judgment order and response category, F(3,66) = 1.63, 
p = .19. Planned comparisons for incorrect source items demonstrated that there was no 
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 It should be noted that the data presented in Figure 4.15 is not exactly the data that was subject 
to further analysis as the analysed data was aggregated across judgment order. 
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difference between the proportion of incorrect source items assigned to High, Medium, or 
Low confidence, all t < 1. However, more incorrect source items were assigned to High, 
Medium, or Low than were assigned to None, at least p < .015. In sum, whilst accurate 
source items were primarily retrieved with the highest level of confidence, for the less than 
20% of items that received incorrect source judgments the confidence judgments that 
accompanied these items did not vary systematically.  
 
These proportions were then calculated in the opposite direction. The proportion of items 
given an accurate source judgment was calculated split by whether the item was assigned 
to a confidence level of High, Medium, Low or None. As shown in Figure 4.16, patterns of 
source accuracy split by confidence level differed depending on judgment order, with a 
linear reduction in source accuracy as confidence level decreased when confidence 
judgments were made following source judgments (left panel), but a more mixed pattern 
shown when order of judgments was reversed (right panel). Accuracy of source was always 
highest for items assigned to High confidence and lowest for items assigned to None but 
source accuracy associated with Medium and Low levels of confidence was variable.  
 
 
Figure 4.16. Source accuracy split by confidence judgment, Experiment 4.3. Left panel: Of 
the items assigned to each confidence level at Second Judgment, the mean proportion 
given correct source judgments at First Judgment. Right panel: Of items assigned to each 
confidence level at First Judgment, mean proportion given correct source judgments at 
Second Judgment. Left panel Ns: High = 34, Medium = 30, Low = 24, None = 8. Right panel 
Ns: High = 34, Medium = 27, Low = 18, None = 7. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
A lot of missing data was encountered in this analysis as participants had not assigned 
responses to all confidence levels. As demonstrated by the distribution patterns of 
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confidence judgments (Section 4.3.7.3) over 70% of correctly recognised items were 
assigned to High confidence. A 2(judgment order) x 3(response category) ANOVA on this 
data led to an N of only 13 due to listwise exclusion. Due to the large reduction in N the 
conditional probabilities in this data were not analysed. Instead, the mean confidence 
value assigned to correctly recognised items was calculated split by the accuracy of the 
source judgment assigned to the item. This analysis used the original numerical confidence 
levels of 3, 2, 1, and 0 that participants used to make their responses instead of the verbal 
labels High, Medium, Low, and None. Mean confidence for items given a correct source 
judgment was 2.63 (SD = .28) at First Judgment and 2.58 (SD = .28) at Second Judgment. 
Contrastingly, mean confidence for incorrect source items was 1.76 (SD = .82) at First 
Judgment and 1.88 (SD = .83) at Second Judgment. This increased confidence for items that 
had been given a correct source judgment was demonstrated by a 2(judgment order) x 
2(source accuracy) ANOVA which revealed no main effect of judgment order, F < 1, a 
significant main effect of source accuracy, F(1,22) = 32.98, p < .001, and no interaction 
between the two. Confidence judgments were significantly higher for items where source 
judgment was correct compared to items for which source judgment was incorrect. 
 
In contrast to the patterns obtained for subjective experience judgments in Experiment 
4.2, confidence judgments varied systematically only for items where judgment was 
correct; for incorrect source items confidence judgments were evenly spread across 
responses. Analysis of mean confidence demonstrated that confidence judgments were 
significantly lower when source was incorrect.  
 
4.3.7.6. Reaction times for recognition decisions 
In the current experiments correct recognition RTs were classified by source accuracy at 
First Judgment or the confidence or subjective experience response category the item was 
assigned to at First Judgment. To increase listwise N the categories of Guess and None 
were excluded from analysis in their respective experiments. Mean correct recognition RTs 
for Experiment 4.2 are shown in Figure 4.17. A 2(response accuracy) ANOVA for 
recognition RTs categorised by later source accuracy demonstrated that the difference in 
RTs only approached significance, F(1,26) = 2.55, p = .12. Correct recognition decisions that 
were followed by correct source judgments were not made significantly faster than those 
followed by incorrect source judgments. However, patterns of RTs for judgments of 
subjective experience replicated those obtained in Experiment 4.1 and a 3(response 
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category) ANOVA for recognition RTs categorised by later subjective experience 
demonstrated a significant main effect of response category, F(1.37,30.10) = 4.90, p = .025. 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Mean correct recognition RTs split by later response category in Experiment 
4.2. N = 23 for Remember (R), Know (K), and Familiar (F) responses and N = 27 for source 
judgments due to missing data. Data for Guess shown but not included in analysis, N = 17. 
Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Planned comparisons demonstrated that correct recognition decisions for items that went 
on to be categorised as either Remember or Know were made significantly faster than 
decisions for items later categorised as Familiar: t(22) = 2.40, p = .025 and t(22) = 2.31, p = 
.031 respectively. There was no difference in the speed with which items were correctly 
recognised if later categorised as Remember or Know, t < 1. These findings for speed of 
recognition decision categorised by later subjective experience parallel those in 
Experiments 3.1, 3.3, and 4.1. 
 
Mean correct recognition RTs for Experiment 4.3 are shown in Figure 4.18. In this 
experiment the 2(response accuracy) ANOVA for recognition RTs categorised by later 
source accuracy found that the difference in means was significant, F(1,29) = 5.73, p = .023. 
Correct recognition decisions that were followed by correct source judgments were made 
significantly more quickly than those followed by incorrect source judgments. 
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Figure 4.18. Mean correct recognition RTs split by later response category in Experiment 
4.3. N = 24 for High, Medium, and Low responses and N = 30 for source judgments due to 
missing data. Data for Guess shown but not included in analysis, N = 9. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Obviously, Experiment 4.2 and 4.3 do not produce the same result in terms of RT for 
recognition split by source. As there seemed to be no influence of subjective judgment on 
source in Experiment 4.2, one might assume that the lack of an effect in Experiment 4.2 
was due to a lack of power. Since Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 are identical in terms of memory 
performance, source accuracy, stimuli, and all elements of methodology (except other 
critical post-recognition judgment), it is possible to increase power for this analysis by 
combining the tasks. Across experiments, overall mean correct recognition RT for later 
correct source items was 1557ms (SD = 511ms) and for incorrect source items was 1753ms 
(SD = 735ms). Furthermore, a 2(response accuracy) ANOVA demonstrated that, aggregated 
across experiment, correct recognition decisions that were followed by correct source 
judgments were made significantly faster than those followed by incorrect source 
judgments, F(1,56) = 7.88, p = .007. Thus it could tentatively be concluded that RTs are 
faster for recognition decisions where source judgments are ultimately correct. 
 
For recognition RTs categorised by later confidence judgment in Experiment 4.3 a 
3(response category) ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of response category, 
F(1.49,34.28) = 10.95, p = .001. Planned comparisons demonstrated that correct 
recognition decisions for items that went on to be categorised as either High or Medium 
confidence were made significantly faster than decisions for items later categorised as Low 
confidence: t(23) = 3.86, p = .001 and t(23) = 3.21, p = .004 respectively. There was no 
difference in the speed with which items were correctly recognised if later categorised as 
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High or Medium confidence, t(23) = 1.04, p = .31. These findings for speed of recognition 
decision categorised by later confidence level parallel those in Experiment 4.1. 
 
4.3.7.7. Reaction times for subjective experience, confidence, and source judgments 
These two experiments were again interested in how quickly participants had made their 
post-recognition judgments. Firstly, time to make source judgments was analysed. Figure 
4.19 shows mean source judgment RTs split by accuracy and judgment order for both 
experiments. A 2(experiment) x 2(source accuracy) x 2(judgment order) ANOVA was 
conducted with experiment as a between-subjects factor and source accuracy and 
judgment order as within-subjects factors. Experiment was included as a factor in order to 
examine whether RTs for source were consistent across experiments or whether source 
was speeded when participants were also required to report subjective experience or 
confidence. No main effect of experiment was demonstrated, F < 1. ANOVA did reveal a 
significant main effect of source accuracy, F(1,46) = 26.49, p < .001, but there was no main 
effect of judgment order, F < 1, and no significant interactions, all at least p > .30.  
 
 
Figure 4.19. Mean source judgment RTs (ms) by accuracy and judgment order in 
Experiments 4.2 and 4.3. Ns = 24 in both experiments. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Separate planned comparisons for each experiment, with data aggregated across judgment 
order, confirmed that correct source judgments were made more quickly than incorrect 
source judgments in both experiments, both p < .002. In sum, there were no differences in 
RT to make source judgments whether they were made as a First or Second judgment; and 
correct source judgments were made more quickly than incorrect source judgments. Taken 
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together with the recognition RT data these results show a clear picture: when accurate 
source information does not come to mind when an item is presented RTs are slower for 
both the initial recognition response and subsequent source judgment. 
 
The next analysis of interest was comparisons between source judgment RTs and RTs to 
make judgments of confidence or subjective experience. These comparisons were 
performed using RTs for correct source judgments. Figure 4.20 shows mean time to make 
source, confidence, and subjective experience judgments in the two experiments.  
 
 
Figure 4.20. Mean judgment RTs (ms) by judgment type and judgment order. Nb. RTs for 
source judgments here are slightly different to those in Figure 4.19 due to larger N for this 
analysis. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
For Experiment 4.2 a 2(judgment type) x 2(judgment order) ANOVA comparing subjective 
experience and source RTs demonstrated a significant main effect of judgment type, 
F(1,31) = 17.17, p < .001, no main effect of judgment order, F < 1, and no interaction 
between the two, F < 132. Source judgments were made significantly faster than judgments 
of subjective experience and order of judgment did not influence time to make judgment. 
For Experiment 4.3 a 2(judgment type) x 2(judgment order) ANOVA comparing confidence 
and source judgment RTs demonstrated a significant main effect of judgment type, F(1,33) 
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 An ANOVA using source judgment RT regardless of source accuracy demonstrated the same 
finding: source judgments were made faster than subjective experience judgments, F(1,31) = 13.46, 
p = .001, no main effect judgment order, F<1, and no interaction, F<1. 
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= 18.26, p < .001, no main effect of judgment order, F(1,33) = 1.75, p = .20, and no 
interaction between the two, F < 133. Source judgments were made significantly faster than 
confidence judgments and order of judgment did not influence time to make judgment. 
Mean RTs for confidence and subjective experience judgments in these experiments 
parallel those in Experiment 4.1.  
 
Further analysis was interested in whether differences in RT were observed for different 
response categories within the confidence and subjective experience judgment types. 
Guess and None were again excluded from analysis. As the effect of order in the 2x2 
ANOVA had not reached significance, data were also aggregated across judgment order. 
Mean judgment RTs split by response category are shown in Figure 4.21. 
  
 
Figure 4.21. Mean judgment RTs (ms) by response category. N = 26 for Remember (R), 
Know (K), Familiar (F), and N = 28 for High, Medium, and Low judgments due to missing 
data. Data for None (N = 12) and Guess (N = 20) categories shown but not included in 
analysis. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Separate 3(response category) ANOVAs for confidence and subjective experience revealed 
a significant main effect of response for confidence judgments, F(1.43,38.48) = 5.38, p = 
.016, but no main effect of response for subjective experience, F(1.50,37.50) = 1.84, p = 
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 An ANOVA using source judgment RT regardless of source accuracy demonstrated the same 
finding: source judgments were made faster than confidence judgments, F(1,33) = 6.32, p = .017, no 
main effect judgment order, F(1,33) = 2.47, p = .13, and no interaction, F<1. 
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.18. Results are equivalent to those obtained in Experiment 4.1. As can be seen in Figure 
4.21, in Experiment 4.3 time to make High, Medium, and Low confidence judgments 
differed, with speed increasing as confidence increased. Planned comparisons for 
confidence judgments revealed that High confidence judgments were made significantly 
faster than both Medium and Low confidence judgments: t(27) = 2.83, p = .009 and t(27) = 
2.93, p = .007 respectively. The difference in speed between Medium and Low confidence 
judgments was not found to be significant, t(27) = 1.33, p = .20. In Experiment 4.2 the time 
taken to make Remember, Know, and Familiar judgments was longer and planned 
comparisons demonstrated that there was no difference between speed of Remember and 
Know judgments, t(25) = 1.61, p = .12, or Know and Familiar judgments, t < 1. The 
difference between the speed of Remember and Familiar judgments approached 
significance, t(25) = 1.96, p = .06.    
 
4.3.7.8. The influence of one judgment on the other’s reaction time 
The finding that source judgments were made significantly faster than both judgments of 
subjective experience and judgments of confidence was not predicted. To explore the 
relationship between source judgments and the other two judgment types further, RTs to 
make correct source judgments were analysed split by what category of subjective 
experience or level of confidence the item was also assigned to. For example, ‘if an item 
was given an accurate source judgment and a High confidence rating, then how quickly was 
the source judgment made?’. Source judgment RTs were aggregated across whether the 
judgment was made First or Second and separate 3(response category) ANOVAs were 
performed for Experiment 4.2 and 4.3. Guess and None categories were excluded from 
analysis. Mean source judgment RTs split by the subjective experience category or 
confidence level the item was assigned to are shown in Figure 4.22. For both experiments, 
RT to make a source judgment differed across subjective experience categories or 
confidence levels; the fastest source judgments being those where the item was 
recognised with High confidence or Remembering. In both experiments ANOVA 
demonstrated a significant effect of response category: Experiment 4.2, F(1.46,34.98) = 
6.05, p = .01, and Experiment 4.3, F(1.43,31.45) = 6.24, p = .01. 
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Figure 4.22. Mean time to make correct source judgment split by the subjective experience 
category (Experiment 4.2, left panel) or confidence level (Experiment 4.3, right panel) the 
item was assigned to. N = 25 for Remember (R), Know (K), and Familiar (F). N = 23 for High, 
Medium, and Low. Data for Guess (G) and None shown but not included in analysis, Ns = 
14 and 5 respectively. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Planned comparisons in Experiment 4.2 demonstrated that source judgments to 
Remember items were made more quickly than those for items assigned to Know, t(24) = 
1.94, p = .065, though this only approached significance34. Source judgments to both 
Remember and Know items were also made more quickly than source judgments to 
Familiar items, Remember: t(24) = 3.18, p = .004, and Know: t(24) = 1.84, p = .078, though 
this only approached significance. Planned comparisons in Experiment 4.3 demonstrated 
that source judgments to High confidence items were made more quickly than those for 
Medium, t(22) = 3.06, p = .006, and Low, t(22) = 3.73, p = .001, confidence items. There 
was no significant difference between the time taken to make source judgments for items 
assigned to Medium or Low confidence, t(22) = 1.00, p = .33.  
 
These results demonstrate that the subjective experience or confidence associated with 
recognition of an item was related to how quickly a source judgment was made to that 
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 Based on the literature it would be predicted that Remember judgments are related to judgments 
of source and therefore a one-tailed t-test could be used here (and the p value obtained would be 
.033). A one-tailed test was not used as the analysis of source judgment RT split by response 
category was a post-hoc analysis. 
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item. This is of particular interest for the relationship between source and subjective 
experience in Experiment 4.2. In both Experiment 4.1 and 4.2 no clear differences were 
observed in RTs for Remember, Know, or Familiar judgments; the subjective experience 
associated with recognition of the item did not influence how long it look for participants 
to make their judgment of subjective experience (Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.21; although in 
Experiment 4.2 the difference in speed of Remember and Familiar judgments approached 
significance). However, the data from Experiment 4.2 concerning source judgment RT data 
split by subjective experience category demonstrates that, while the type of subjective 
experience associated with recognition of an item does not influence RTs for judgments of 
subjective experience, the type of subjective experience associated with recognition of an 
item does influence RTs for source judgments about the item. This issue is returned to in 
the Discussion. 
 
4.3.8. Discussion 
 
As predicted, distribution patterns, accuracy, and RT findings demonstrated for confidence 
and subjective experience judgments in Experiment 4.1 were replicated in Experiments 4.2 
and 4.3 demonstrating that participants do not use confidence and subjective experience 
judgments in the same way. Participants were again more liberal when making confidence 
judgments compared to subjective experience judgments and accuracy analysis 
demonstrated that for subjective experience judgments Know judgments were as accurate 
as Remember judgments, whereas only High confidence judgments were more likely to be 
correct than responses assigned to lower levels of confidence. Importantly, in these two 
experiments, patterns of data were also able to be explored split by whether the source 
judgment made for the item was correct or incorrect.  
 
The source encoding manipulation introduced in these experiments led to differences in 
memory performance and confidence, but not reports of subjective experience. 
Recognition performance in both experiments was over 65%, which was higher than the 
54% recognition accuracy obtained in Experiment 4.1. Analysis demonstrated that 
performance in both experiments was significantly higher than performance in Experiment 
4.1: Experiment 4.2, t(74) = 2.49, p = .015, Experiment 4.3, t(76) = 3.94, p < .001, and across 
Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 there were no differences between memory performance, t(64) = 
1.34, p = .19, or source accuracy, t < 1. Additionally, there were no differences in the 
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proportion of items assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess in Experiments 4.1 
and 4.2, all t < 1. However, in Experiment 4.1 nearly 60% of correct items were assigned to 
High confidence whereas in Experiment 4.3 this figure was higher, at over 70% (cf. Figure 
4.1 and Figure 4.11); significantly more responses were assigned to High confidence in 
Experiment 4.3 than in Experiment 4.1, t(76) = 2.71, p = .008 and the corresponding 
reduction was in the proportion of responses assigned to Low confidence where fewer 
were assigned in Experiment 4.3 than in Experiment 4.1, t(76) = 2.94, p = .004. No 
differences in Medium and Guess proportions were demonstrated across experiments, 
both at least p > .11. The two main points to take away from this are that while the source 
encoding instructions increased both memory performance and patterns of confidence 
judgments, they did not alter reports of subjective experience.  
 
Different patterns were also found for confidence and subjective experience when 
comparing how these judgments were distributed when accompanying source was correct 
or incorrect. For subjective experience, distribution patterns varied systematically 
depending on whether the source judgment for an item was correct or incorrect. The 
greatest proportion of items were assigned to Remember when source was correct 
whereas the greatest proportion of items were assigned to Familiar when source was 
incorrect. However, for confidence judgments, whilst accurate source items were primarily 
retrieved with the highest level of confidence, for items that received incorrect source 
judgments the confidence accompanying retrieval did not vary systematically. This issue is 
returned to in the General Discussion (Section 4.4.2).  
 
When proportions were calculated in the opposing direction both Know and Familiar items 
were found to be associated with above-chance source accuracy in addition to 
Remembered items. This fits with previous research that has demonstrated that accurate 
source can accompany retrieval of items assigned to Know (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995b; 
Hicks et al., 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser & Sattler, 2007; Starns & Hicks, 2005). 
While it may appear that the finding of above-chance source accuracy for Familiar items 
does not fit with this literature, it should be noted that previous studies have conflated 
Know and Familiar into one judgment. It is interesting that Familiar judgments have been 
demonstrated to have above-chance source accuracy in the current experiment though, as 
the majority of results in this thesis have found Know to be similar to Remember (in terms 
of accuracy and RT, for example) while Familiar is significantly different from Know. Here 
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Remembered items were found to be associated with higher source accuracy than Know or 
Familiar items, and Know items in turn were associated with higher source accuracy than 
Familiar items. Source accuracy was the only factor found to dissociate both Remember 
from Know and Know from Familiar. For confidence judgments, source accuracy was not 
able to be calculated for the different levels of confidence as participants had assigned 
over 70% of items to High confidence. However, as predicted, mean confidence ratings for 
accurate source items were significantly higher than for inaccurate source items.  
 
Analysis of recognition RTs split by level of confidence or subjective experience at First 
Judgment replicated the patterns obtained in Experiment 4.1; the patterns observed across 
all three experiments are considered together in the General Discussion (Section 4.4.3). 
Analysis of recognition RTs split by source accuracy demonstrated that correct source 
items were recognised more quickly than incorrect source items. In turn, analysis of 
judgment RTs also revealed that source judgments were faster when source was correct 
compared to incorrect and that source judgments were made more quickly than both 
confidence and subjective experience judgments. This was not predicted as it was thought 
that RTs for source judgments would be similar to those for subjective experience 
judgments as both require assessment of what contextual information is able to be 
retrieved from memory. A possible explanation for this finding is that in these experiments 
source judgments were able to be made quickly due to the ease of the judgment. Source 
judgments were only 2AFC (compared to some experimental designs where multiple types 
of source information are tested at once, e.g., Meiser & Bröder, 2002), and the encoding 
manipulation whereby participants were instructed to associate words on the left with one 
person and words on the right with another person led to improved recognition memory 
and source judgments being correct over 80% of the time. If the task had been more 
difficult source judgments may require more processing time and RTs may be longer. In 
future research, source could be made more difficult by increasing the delay between 
study and test, including multidimensional source judgments, and/or the encoding 
instructions could be eliminated. It would be of interest to examine which of these 
manipulations would lead to decreases in source performance while also focusing on 
whether source RTs and recognition performance are affected. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting that Experiment 4.2 presents a situation where source is accurate over 80% of 
the time and RTs for source judgments are fast whereas only 40% of items are assigned to 
Remember and judgment RTs are slow.  
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With regard to the influence of one judgment on another, no effects of judgment order 
were demonstrated and patterns of responses for conditional probabilities were identical 
whether source had been judged before or after subjective experience or confidence. This 
does not fit with the findings of Martin (2007) who reported that source judgments were 
more accurate when performed first and that higher levels of Remember were 
demonstrated when subjective experience was judged second. Over and above the fact 
that this data is unpublished and some of his reported findings contradict each other, the 
procedure used by Martin (2007) conflated the first judgment participants made with the 
recognition judgment. At test half Martin’s participants made a Remember-Know-New 
judgment followed by a Left-Right source judgment, and the other half made a Left-Right-
New judgment followed by Remember-Know. However, one-step and two-step procedures 
have been demonstrated to produce different patterns of responding for both subjective 
experience (Bruno & Rutherford, 2010; Eldridge et al., 2002; Hicks & Marsh, 1999) and 
source judgments (Dodson & Johnson, 1993; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). It is suggested that 
using a one-step procedure for his first judgment led to the results reported by Martin 
(2007). 
 
The approach taken in the current experiments was to directly compare source, confidence 
and subjective experience judgments independently of recognition. Using this procedure 
the only effect of influence was demonstrated in RTs to make source judgments. For both 
experiments, RTs to make source judgments differed across subjective experience 
categories or confidence levels. Source judgments were made more quickly for items 
recognised with High confidence or Remembering. This demonstrates that the subjective 
experience or confidence associated with recognition of an item influenced how quickly a 
source judgment was made to that item. For Experiment 4.3 this finding is in addition to 
the finding that confidence judgments are made more quickly the higher the confidence. 
However, the finding is of particular interest for the relationship between source and 
subjective experience in Experiment 4.2. In both Experiment 4.1 and 4.2 no significant 
differences were observed in RTs for Remember, Know, or Familiar judgments, the 
subjective experience associated with recognition of the item did not influence how long it 
look for participants to make their judgment of subjective experience. It was suggested 
that this is due to the threshold nature of the recollection process and that memory is 
assessed until something is recollected or retrieval is terminated and RTs are therefore the 
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same for these two outcomes. However, Experiment 4.2 demonstrates that, while the type 
of subjective experience associated with recognition of an item does not influence the time 
it takes to make a judgment of subjective experience, the type of subjective experience 
associated with recognition of an item does influence the time taken to make a source 
judgment about the item. This is particularly interesting as source judgments in the current 
experiments were extremely fast. This finding demonstrates that within that mean time to 
make an accurate source judgment there was significant variation which was influenced by 
the subjective experience or confidence with which the item was recognised.  
 
4.4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In these three experiments, as no differences in patterns of judgment, relationships with 
source, or reaction times across judgment order were observed it appears that the fear of 
contamination of one judgment by the other was unfounded (e.g., Bruno & Rutherford, 
2010; Holmes et al., 1998; Rajaram et al., 2002). On the other hand, it could be argued that 
perhaps all judgments were confounded by the judgment that accompanied them. 
Comparisons between experiments suggest that this is not the case. 
 
Experiment 4.1 compared subjective experience judgments with confidence judgments in a 
within-subjects design with judgment order counterbalanced across items. Conversely 
Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 only employed one of these judgment types and compared it 
against judgments of source. The patterns for subjective experience and confidence 
judgments obtained in these two latter experiments are very similar to the patterns 
obtained in Experiment 4.1, when subjective experience and confidence judgments were 
made together. These preliminary findings alone strongly support the assertion that 
making two judgments together does not lead to contamination of one judgment by the 
other. Comparing of two of the three judgments of interest in each of the experiments 
allowed both within-subjects comparisons within experiment and between-subjects 
comparisons across experiments. For example, if subjective experience was influenced 
when made alongside confidence judgments, then this influence must be identical to that 
exerted when subjective experience judgments are accompanied by source judgments, as 
the distribution of subjective experience responses and accuracy of these responses were 
the same in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2.  
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4.4.1. Comparing subjective experience and confidence 
 
Overall, patterns of distributions of responses and accuracy of responses revealed that 
participants did not use confidence and subjective experience judgments in the same way. 
Participants were more lenient in their use of confidence judgments than subjective 
experience judgments and more responses were assigned to High confidence than to 
Remember. This fits with the findings of Gardiner and Java (1990), Rajaram (1993), 
Rajaram et al., (2002), and Tunney and Fernie (2007). Accuracy analysis demonstrated that 
Medium confidence judgments were less accurate than High confidence judgments, 
whereas Know judgments were as accurate as Remember judgments. This latter finding 
replicates results of Experiments 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 from Chapter 3 of this thesis. In 
Experiment 4.1, mean confidence ratings also demonstrated no differences between 
Known and Remembered items. These findings are of particular note as in Experiments 3.1, 
3.2, and 3.3 recognition performance was usually over 80% accurate while in Experiments 
4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 performance was 54%, 65%, and 71% respectively. This replication 
demonstrates the stability of the finding that when you include two separate categories of 
Know and Familiar, Know responses are just as accurate as Remember responses even with 
very varied overall recognition performance. 
 
Distribution of responses conditional on previous response and whether the judgment had 
been made first or second further demonstrated that participants used subjective 
experience categories and confidence levels in different ways while also revealing that the 
order in which judgments were made did not influence response patterns. For example, 
there were no differences in the proportion of High confidence items also assigned to 
Remember whether the judgment order had been confidence followed by subjective 
experience or subjective experience followed by confidence. However, there was a 
difference when comparing the proportion of Remember responses assigned to High 
confidence with the proportion of High confidence responses that were assigned to 
Remember. The four categories of the two different type of judgment did not simply map 
onto each other. Fewer responses were assigned to Remember than to High confidence, 
and to Low confidence compared to Familiar. In addition, there was no difference in the 
proportion of responses assigned to Know and Familiar, while there were significant 
differences between the proportions assigned to all levels of confidence. Subjective 
experience and confidence are therefore not “experimentally interchangeable” (Rajaram 
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et al., 2002, p. 234), either holistically as judgment types, or when comparing individual 
categories such as Remember and High confidence. 
 
4.4.2. Comparing source, subjective experience, and confidence 
 
Source judgments cannot be directly compared with subjective experience or confidence 
judgments in the same way that subjective experience and confidence can be compared as 
source was a 2AFC judgment with an objectively right or wrong answer; however, the 
analysis of interest was the relationship between the judgments. Overall, source 
judgments were accurate over 80% of the time but, as predicted, source accuracy was 
found to be higher for items recognised with High confidence or Remembering.  
 
Source accuracy analysis was also the only analysis which differentiated Remember and 
Know responses. Remember and Know were matched on recognition accuracy and 
recognition RT and while source accuracy was above chance for both Remember and Know 
responses, the difference between their source accuracy was significant. This suggests that 
there were differences in how source was retrieved for Remember and Know items. As 
suggested by Hicks et al. (2002) it appears that judgments of source “can be based on 
recollection but can also effectively use qualitative characteristics that lack clarity and 
sufficient amounts of details to give rise to the subjective feeling of remembering” (p. 503). 
For participants this might mean that retrieval of source is semantic in nature, for example, 
using the encoding manipulation in the current task a participant might have the thought “I 
just know I associated ‘waltz’ with George Clooney, so it must have been shown on the 
left, but I can’t remember what association I made”.  
 
In Experiment 4.2, Familiar judgments were also found to be associated with above-chance 
source accuracy; though significantly lower source accuracy than for Know items. As 
discussed previously, although it may appear that this finding does not fit with prior 
research, those studies did not separate Know and Familiar into two separate categories 
(Conway & Dewhurst, 1995b; Hicks et al., 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser & Sattler, 
2007; Starns & Hicks, 2005). The current finding suggests that in addition to ‘just knowing’ 
the source information in a semantic way, feelings of familiarity at recognition can involve 
elements of the encoding episode leading to above-chance source accuracy. These findings 
could be explored further by increasing the difficulty of the source manipulation or 
Chapter 4 
245 
 
increasing the delay between study and encoding. If overall source accuracy is reduced it 
might be expected that Familiar recognition would no longer have accurate source.  
 
Exploring the relationship between source and other judgments in the opposite direction, 
patterns of subjective experience and confidence responses split by the accuracy of the 
accompanying source judgment demonstrated further differences between how subjective 
experience and confidence judgments were used. For subjective experience responses, a 
clear relationship between source and subjective experience was demonstrated for both 
correct and incorrect source judgments. When source was correct a greater proportion of 
items were assigned to Remember, compared to Know, compared to Familiar. In contrast, 
when source was incorrect more items were assigned to Familiar than to Know or 
Remember. Retrieval of source was associated with recollection whilst incorrect retrieval 
of source was associated with familiarity. Contrastingly, patterns of confidence judgments 
were only reliable for correct source items. When source was correct, a greater proportion 
of items were assigned to High, compared to Medium, compared to Low confidence; but 
when source was incorrect, confidence judgments were evenly split across High, Medium, 
and Low confidence levels. While this is not incorrect of participants as their confidence 
judgments were to do with their confidence in their recognition of the item, not their 
confidence in their source judgment, it shows that there was no relationship between 
recognition confidence and source when source was incorrect. Critically, it is suggested 
that judgments of subjective experience are more sensitive and more reflective of memory 
processes than judgments of confidence. In addition to judgments of confidence being 
more lenient than judgments of subjective experience, confidence was not found to vary 
systematically when items were recognised without retrieval of source.  
 
4.4.3. Reaction time for recognition 
 
Recognition was demonstrated to be quicker for items later recognised with Remembering 
or Knowing, High confidence, or accurate source. These findings fit with the previous 
literature for confidence (Henson et al., 2000; Mandler & Boeck, 1974; Ratcliff & Murdock, 
1976), and source (Kahn et al., 2004; Lundstrom, et al., 2005), and the literature on 
subjective experience when the split of Know into Know and Familiar is taken into 
consideration (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Dewhurst et al., 1998, 2006; Henson et al., 
1999; Rotello & Zeng, 2008; Vilberg & Rugg, 2007; Wixted & Stretch, 2004).  
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All experiments in this thesis that have measured recognition RTs categorised by later 
subjective experience response have demonstrated a difference in RT between Remember 
and Familiar responses, with no differences in RTs for Remember and Know (Experiments 
3.1, 3.3 (except 2AFC task), 4.1 and 4.2). Rotello and Zeng (2008) argued against such RT 
differences being support for dual-process theories by demonstrating that when 
Remember and Know responses were equated for confidence the RT advantage for 
Remember responses was reduced. However, the experiments presented in this thesis 
demonstrate that when Remember and Know responses are equated for accuracy 
(Experiments 3.1, 3.3, and 4.2) or equated for both accuracy and confidence (Experiment 
4.1), both Remember and Know responses are made more quickly than Familiar responses, 
which had lower levels of accuracy and confidence. This does not support Rotello and 
Zeng’s (2008) conclusion that Remember and Know judgments are based on the same 
underlying processes and instead demonstrates that splitting Know into separate Know 
and Familiar categories can reveal important patterns of data otherwise obscured. This key 
thesis issue is examined further in the General Discussion (Section 5.4).  
 
4.4.4. Reaction time to make judgments 
 
Mean RTs for confidence and subjective experience judgments in Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 
paralleled those obtained in Experiment 4.1 and between-subjects comparisons were 
performed to examine whether there were significant differences in RTs across 
experiments. No significant differences were demonstrated, all t < 1. The time it took 
participants to make judgments of subjective experience and confidence was equivalent 
across the three experiments. 
 
In these experiments the novel examination of RTs for source, confidence, and subjective 
experience judgments, independent of the recognition decision, demonstrated that source 
judgments were quicker than confidence, which in turn were quicker than subjective 
experience. This result was not predicted as it was thought that source judgments may 
take as long as subjective experience judgments as both require assessment of what 
information can be retrieved regarding context at encoding. However, as discussed 
already, it is suggested that source judgments may have been so quick in these 
experiments because it was only a one-dimensional source judgment and encoding 
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proficiency had been improved due to the instructions provided (after Yonelinas, 1999). 
Future experiments could increase the difficulty of the source judgment or increase the 
delay between study and test to examine whether these changes influence source 
judgment RTs. If source judgments are more difficult, or if there is a greater delay between 
study and test allowing source information to be forgotten, then participants might take 
longer to make judgments of source. 
 
Examination of source judgment RTs in conjunction with confidence and subjective 
experience judgments revealed further variation within the already quick source 
judgments. In addition to source judgments being more accurate when accompanied by 
Remembering or High confidence, source judgments were also made more quickly when 
accompanied by Remembering or High confidence. As previously discussed, this is 
particularly interesting for subjective experience, which itself does not demonstrate a 
difference in RT for Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess responses. Critically, the 
subjective experience associated with recognition of the item does not influence RTs for 
judgments of subjective experience; however, the subjective experience associated with 
recognition of the item does influence RTs for judgments of source.  
 
4.4.5. Concluding remarks 
 
The experiments presented here have used novel experimental designs and measures to 
explore the differences, similarities, and reaction times of confidence, source, and 
subjective experience judgments. Results demonstrate that making multiple judgments 
does not influence responding in unforeseen ways (Holmes et al., 1998), however 
participants use the three types of judgment in different ways, which adds support to the 
debate that there are differences between confidence and recollection. 
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5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
“The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and 
perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect.”  
(Chalmers, 1995, p. 201). 
 
5.1. OVERVIEW  
 
The central aim of this thesis was to examine how people make and understand judgments 
of subjective experience. To this end, the experiments presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
explored lay conceptions of subjective experience and how these relate to confidence; 
how participants are able to overcome experimental familiarity; and the relationships 
between source, confidence, and subjective experience.  
 
Across the ten experiments presented in this thesis the key themes were: How should the 
subjective experiences of Know and Familiar be defined and understood in recognition 
memory? What is the relationship between confidence and subjective experience? And 
how do objective manipulations influence subjective experience? This chapter summarises 
the central findings of this thesis and presents them in the context of these key themes as 
well as in the context of broader theoretical discussion surrounding the Remember-Know 
paradigm, subjective experience, confidence, and familiarity. 
 
5.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
The main findings from each experiment are shown in Table 5.1 and described in the 
subsequent sections. Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.3 discuss the central experimental findings from 
Chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis and Sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 discuss the findings regarding 
reaction time data across chapters. The implications of these findings for the key themes of 
this thesis are then discussed in Sections 5.3 through 5.6.  
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Table 5.1. Main findings from each experiment. 
Chapter Experiment Main findings 
2 2.1 
R, K, F, and G justification statements made by other people were 
rated as significantly more confident from R through to G. 
2 2.2 
Assignment of High, Medium, and Low confidence K and G 
justifications to categories of subjective experience was influenced 
by associated confidence but assignment of R and F justifications 
was not. 
2 2.3 
When R, K, F, and G justifications were accompanied by an 
external confidence value that was appropriate or inappropriate 
to the justification results of Experiment 2.2 were not replicated; 
the separate confidence value was not considered in assignment 
of justifications to categories of subjective experience. 
2 2.4 
K justifications were able to be reliably split into K and F even 
though explicit instructions defining the two categories of 
subjective experience were not provided. 
3 3.1 
In a between-subjects design, pre-exposure of items impaired 
recognition but R responses increased. Recollection was required 
to overcome the familiarity induced by pre-exposure. 
3 3.2 
In a within-subjects design, pre-exposure impaired recognition but 
levels of R responses were identical across conditions. 
3 3.3 
In a blocked design, pre-exposure impaired recognition but levels 
of R responses were identical across conditions. 
4 4.1 
The order of confidence and subjective experience judgments did 
not influence responses. However, the two judgment types were 
not utilised in the same manner, confidence judgments were more 
lenient, and K judgments were just as fast and accurate as R 
judgments. 
4 4.2 
The order of source and subjective experience judgments did not 
influence responses. However, whilst RT to make subjective 
experience judgments did not vary by response, speed of source 
judgment was faster if accompanied by an R or K response.  
4 4.3 
The order of confidence and subjective experience judgments did 
not influence responses. However, RT to make confidence 
judgments varied by response and speed of source judgment was 
faster if accompanied by higher confidence.  
 
5.2.1. Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 2 examined how participants interpreted memory justification statements in 
terms of confidence and subjective experience categories using three internet 
questionnaires (Experiments 2.1 to 2.3) and one laboratory task (Experiment 2.4). These 
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experiments used the novel methodology of asking participants to judge others’ memory 
justification statements. The justifications used as stimuli in all four experiments were 
statements made by participants of Gardiner et al. (1997, 1998) to justify their recognition 
decisions. In Experiment 2.1, participants gave confidence ratings to Remember, Know, 
Familiar, and Guess justification statements and confidence was found to decrease linearly 
across those categories of subjective experience. This demonstrated that, in addition to 
there being a relationship between confidence and subjective experience when these kinds 
of judgments are a first-person interpretation of the contents of one’s own memory 
(Gardiner & Java, 1990; Dewhurst et al., 2009; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram, et al., 2002; Rotello 
& Zeng, 2008; Tulving, 1985; and Yonelinas, 2001), the same relationship exists in how lay 
people understand others’ experiential memory reports. People are experienced in 
appreciating the relationship between subjective experience and confidence when 
interpreting their own memory experiences and thus are also able to reliably interpret the 
memory experiences of others.  
 
The same conclusion was reached from the results of Experiment 2.4 where participants 
sorted Gardiner et al.’s original Know justifications into two types. In this task, no 
instructions were given about how justifications should be sorted and the subjective 
experiences of Know and Familiar were not defined until after sorting was finished. 
Nevertheless, participants were able to identify two different types of statement within 
the original Know justifications and these two types mapped onto Know and Familiar. 
Furthermore, analysis of decision criteria responses identified that Familiar justifications 
were rated as containing more information and details and Know justifications. The 
implications of these findings for the separation of Know and Familiar are discussed in 
Section 5.3.  
 
Experiments 2.2 and 2.3 used the confidence ratings obtained in Experiment 2.1 to select 
justifications for further study and the task for participants was to assign justifications to 
categories of subjective experience. Experiment 2.2 used high, medium, and low 
confidence statements from each subjective experience category and demonstrated that 
when the confidence value associated with a justification differed, Remember and Familiar 
justifications were consistently categorised to Remember and Familiar respectively, 
whereas the majority of low confidence Know justifications and high confidence Guess 
justifications were categorised as Familiar. Through examining the content of the 
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justifications, it was suggested that these differences occurred because Remember and 
Familiar justifications at any confidence level directly described the processes underlying 
the recognition decisions whereas the cognitive processes reflected in Know and Guess 
justifications differed with confidence. A key theme of this thesis is that Know responses 
are considered to reflect high confidence without recollection and Guess responses are 
considered to be low-confidence familiarity-based responses. Thus, if Know and Guess 
responses are related to one’s confidence in evaluating the contents of memory then it 
follows that categorisation of these justifications would be influenced to a greater extent 
by confidence level when it is manipulated experimentally. Indeed, Geraci et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that different patterns of responding are observed if confidence is 
emphasised in how Know is defined to experimental participants. The current 
experimental methodology was very different from Geraci et al.; however, this comparison 
demonstrates that the same patterns are observed whether it is first-person subjective 
experiences under study or third-person interpretations of others’ experiential reports.  
 
Experiment 2.3 followed this up by manipulating confidence more overtly. Here 
prototypical justification statements from each category’s mean confidence level were 
presented accompanied by a confidence value that was either appropriate (to that 
subjective experience) or inappropriate (from the confidence values of a different 
subjective experience category). Here no effects of confidence were observed. Remember 
justifications were consistently categorised as Remember; Familiar were consistently 
assigned to Familiar; and assignment of Know and Guess justifications was split between 
their original category and Familiar. Though this might appear to be a negative result – that 
no influence of confidence was demonstrated – instead it is taken to reflect the implicit 
understanding of participants that the experiences of memory are more important than 
confidence and that confidence is derived from subjective experience, not the other way 
round (Gardiner, 2001; Tulving, 1985). If the confidence value accompanying a justification 
did not fit with the justification, participants aligned their responses to the experiential 
state and not the confidence level given.  
 
On the whole, the results of Chapter 2 suggest that confidence is a process which is in 
some part reliant upon inferences made during retrieval – the fact that appropriate 
confidence judgements can be invoked using third-person justifications of retrieval 
suggests that to some extent they may be ‘rules of thumb’ imposed on information 
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produced at retrieval. Given that confidence level, however, does not seem to influence 
the category of experience, the reverse cannot be claimed – reading off another’s trace 
strength does not recover information about recollective status. 
 
5.2.2. Chapter 3 
 
In Experiments 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 the familiarity of some or all items was manipulated prior 
to study using a pre-exposure vowel-counting task. This manipulation led to impaired 
recognition performance for pre-exposed items in all experiments, replicating previous 
findings by Åberg & Nilsson (2001, 2003), Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al. (1998), Kormi-
Nouri et al. (2005), Chalmers and Humphreys (1998), Greene (1999), Maddox and Estes 
(1997), and Tulving and Kroll (1995). However, subjective experience responses were only 
found to differ between exposure conditions when exposure was manipulated between-
subjects (Experiment 3.1). When pre-exposure was manipulated using a within-subjects 
design (Experiment 3.2) or a blocked within-subjects design (Experiment 3.3) patterns of 
subjective experience responses were the same across exposure conditions demonstrating 
carry-over from one condition to the other (e.g., Conway et al., 2001).  
 
In all three experiments, when any or all items had been pre-exposed, Remember 
responses were positively correlated with recognition performance while Familiar 
responses were negatively correlated with performance. The importance of 
methodological considerations in subjective experience experiments is returned to in 
Section 5.6. The current findings fit with the conclusions drawn by Dobbins, Kroll, 
Yonelinas, et al. (1998) and Whittlesea (2002) – manipulations imposed on stimuli can 
influence the subjective experiences used as the basis for recognition. Here, depending on 
whether pre-exposure was manipulated within- or between-subjects, subjective 
experience responses differed depending on how an item was perceived in relation to the 
other items on the test (see also Bodner & Lindsay, 2003; Bodner & Richardson-Champion, 
2007; and Dewhurst & Parry, 2000). 
 
The experiments in Chapter 3 were the first to manipulate pre-exposure between-subjects 
and the first that had examined subjective experience responses in pre-exposure. Tulving 
and Kroll (1995) and Åberg and Nilsson (2003) had had participants make confidence 
judgments on a 3-2-1 scale (hypothesised to map onto Remember-Know-Guess judgments 
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by Åberg & Nilsson, 2003) and had found higher confidence for correct decisions when 
items had not been pre-exposed; however, the opposite pattern was observed in 
Experiment 3.1 as more Remember responses were obtained for items that had been pre-
exposed. As discussed above, although confidence and Remember-Know judgments are no 
doubt related, this example highlights how the two can produce very different patterns of 
responses. The relationship between confidence and subjective experience is returned to 
in discussion of Chapter 4’s experiments and theoretical implications are examined in 
Section 5.4. Results of Chapter 3’s experiments were interpreted as supporting the source 
discriminability interpretation of pre-exposure (Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 1998) not 
the novelty-encoding hypothesis (Tulving et al., 1994, 1996; Tulving & Kroll, 1995). Novelty 
at study did not improve recognition performance for non-pre-exposed items, familiarity 
impaired recognition performance for pre-exposed items. Critically, the very fact that 
subjective experience was carried-over from pre-exposed to non-pre-exposed items 
suggests that the memory impairment in pre-exposure was due to retrieval of items from 
memory, not from their encoding. Participants were not able to determine which items 
had been pre-exposed and therefore which they would need to use recollection to 
recognise so they used recollection as the basis for all recognition decisions.  
 
5.2.3. Chapter 4 
 
In Chapter 4, three experiments examined the relationship between judgments of 
confidence, source, and subjective experience, when two judgments were made following 
each recognition decision. Previous researchers had suggested that when two judgments 
were made one judgment might be contaminated by the other judgment, for example, all 
Remember responses being assigned to High confidence (Bruno & Rutherford, 2010; 
Holmes et al., 1998; Rajaram et al., 2002). The current experiments found no differences in 
patterns of judgment, relationships with source, or reaction times across judgment order 
and patterns were consistent across experiments demonstrating that the fear of 
contamination was unfounded. Critically however, patterns of responses revealed that 
relationships between each of the three judgment types are different. 
 
Experiment 4.1 demonstrated that confidence and subjective experience categories are 
not used in the same way. Patterns of distributions of responses and accuracy of responses 
revealed that participants were more lenient in their use of confidence judgments than 
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subjective experience judgments. This supports the findings of Gardiner and Java (1990), 
Rajaram (1993), Rajaram et al., (2002), and Tunney and Fernie (2007), but the current 
experiments were the first to demonstrate this by contrasting the four categories of 
Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess against four levels of confidence. Subjective 
experience and confidence were demonstrated to not be “experimentally 
interchangeable” (Rajaram et al., 2002, p. 234), either holistically as judgment types or 
when comparing individual levels within judgment types. Furthermore, when a source 
encoding manipulation was introduced (in Experiments 4.2 and 4.3), overall recognition 
performance increased and use of confidence levels changed but patterns of subjective 
experience responses were unaltered. This finding is discussed further in Section 5.4.  
 
Comparing source judgments and judgments of subjective experience and confidence in 
Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrated that source accuracy was highest for items 
recognised with High confidence or Remembering, however Know and Familiar responses 
also achieved above-chance source accuracy35. That Know responses were accompanied by 
accurate source judgments supports the previous findings of Conway and Dewhurst 
(1995b), Hicks et al. (2002), Meiser and Bröder (2002), Meiser and Sattler (2007), and 
Starns and Hicks (2005) who found above-chance source accuracy for Know items. It 
appears that for a significant proportion of items which are Known, enough contextual 
details from the study phase are retrieved at recognition for source to be judged correctly 
but not enough details are recollected for the item to be assigned to Remember.  
 
These findings go against the previous research that had not found above-chance source 
accuracy for Know responses (Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; 
Perfect et al., 1996, except for Experiment 3); however, methodological differences could 
explain why these studies demonstrated opposing findings to those discussed above. For 
example, Dudukovic and Knowlton (2006) only measured retrieval of source details in a re-
test which took place one week after initial testing. This delay led to a decrease in 
Remember responses and an increase in Know responses indicating an overall reduction in 
retrieval of contextual details. It can be suggested that this forgetting of source 
information is what led to items being Known rather than Remembered and why Know 
                                                          
 
35
 Medium and Low confidence responses could not be analysed in terms of source accuracy as 70% 
of items had been assigned to High confidence resulting in a lot of missing data. 
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responses were not accompanied by accurate source judgments. Dewhurst and Hitch 
(1999) did not employ a delay but in their study participants were only required to make a 
source judgment if they were confident about their recognition decision. In light of this, 
Dewhurst and Hitch (1999) suggested that the low response rate for source might have led 
to the low source accuracy for Know items. For Perfect et al. (1996) it is the difficulty of the 
source judgment that can be suggested to have led to at chance source accuracy for Know 
items. Of their four source accuracy experiments, the three which found Know responses 
were not accompanied by accurate source employed a temporal order source judgment 
(Experiment 1), a List 1/List 2 source judgment where there were no differences between 
lists (Experiment 2), and a quadrant presentation where items were presented in one of 
four spatial locations but presentation was sequential (Experiment 4). These source 
manipulations are more difficult than that employed in their Experiment 3, which did find 
above-chance source accuracy for Know. Experiment 3 used the quadrant presentation but 
four stimuli were presented simultaneously. This would have allowed participants to more 
easily create associations between items. Some of these associations may have 
incorporated the spatial relationship between items and thus may have aided retrieval of 
location at test even if other elements of the association were not recollected and the 
experience of retrieval was one of Knowing rather than Remembering.  
 
That Familiar responses were also accompanied by above-chance source accuracy had not 
been demonstrated previously; the current experiments were the first to separate Know 
and Familiar when comparing subjective experience and source judgments. The current 
finding suggests that feelings of familiarity at recognition can include retrieval of elements 
of the encoding episode leading to above-chance source accuracy. It is not just recognition 
accompanied by recollection or recognition based on a subjective experience of high 
confidence without recollection that can involve retrieval of contextual information from 
encoding, in the current experiments recognition based on familiarity also had an above-
chance likelihood of being accompanied by retrieval of correct source information. As 
suggested in Chapter 4, future research could examine whether Know and/or Familiar 
responses lose their accurate source when the source judgment is made more difficult by 
increasing the delay between study and test, requiring multidimensional source 
judgments, or eliminating the deep encoding instructions that were used in the present 
experiments. Indeed, previous research has demonstrated that the specificity of the source 
judgment differentiates between whether Know responses have accurate source or not. 
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Meiser and Sattler (2007) found that specific source memory for the voice of an individual 
speaker was more accurate for Remember items than for Known items. However, partial 
source memory for the more global attribute of gender did not differentiate between 
Remember and Know items.  
 
To return to a critical theme of this thesis, further differences between subjective 
experience and confidence were observed when responses were split by the accuracy of 
the accompanying source judgment. For subjective experience, retrieval of source was 
primarily associated with recollection whilst incorrect retrieval of source was mainly 
associated with familiarity. Contrastingly, for confidence judgments, retrieval of source 
was primarily associated with High confidence but there was no relationship between 
recognition confidence and source when source was incorrect. This was taken to suggest 
that judgments of subjective experience are more sensitive and more reflective of memory 
processes than judgments of confidence; this issue is returned to in Section 5.4. 
 
5.2.4. Reaction time for recognition decisions 
 
Five experiments in this thesis examined reaction times to make recognition decisions. This 
analysis compared RTs for correct recognition decisions categorised by the judgment 
response they later received. For source judgments, Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 did not find a 
consistent speed advantage for accurate source items but re-analysis of data combined 
across both experiments demonstrated that recognition was faster for items when the 
subsequent source judgment was correct. The differing findings across experiments 
mirrors previous research. Some studies have found a difference between RT for incorrect 
and correct source items (e.g., Kahn et al., 2004; Lundstrom et al., 2005) and other studies 
have not (e.g., Wilding & Rugg, 1996). From the combined analysis in the present 
experiments, it is tentatively concluded that RTs are faster for correct recognition decisions 
where source judgments are ultimately correct. The retrieval of source information at 
recognition speeds the recognition decision.  
 
In contrast to the mixed results for source, for categories of subjective experience RT 
findings were very consistent across experiments. To my knowledge, the current 
experiments were the first to examine RTs using the four categories of Remember, Know, 
Familiar and Guess. Here, with the separation of Knowing and Familiarity, recognition 
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decisions for Know items were generally found to be equally fast as for Remember items 
(Experiments 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, and 4.2; though in the 2AFC task of Experiment 3.3 Remember 
were found to be significantly faster than Know) and Remember and Know were 
significantly faster than Familiar. These results therefore can be interpreted as agreeing 
with the findings of earlier studies that found Remember to be faster than Know, as in 
those studies Know and Familiar had not been separated (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; 
Dewhurst et al., 1998, 2006; Henson et al., 1999; Stretch & Wixted, 1998; Vilberg & Rugg, 
2007; Wixted & Stretch, 2004).  
 
However, as discussed earlier (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.4), many dual-process models 
predict that responses based on familiarity should be quicker than those based on 
recollection as familiarity is considered to be rapid and automatic while recollection is 
thought to be slower and more effortful (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas & 
Jacoby, 1994, 1996). This inconsistency between the models’ predictions and experimental 
findings led Yonelinas (2002) to suggest that the finding of Remember responses being 
faster than Know responses is an artefact of instructions which require participants to 
respond Know “only if an item is ‘familiar and not recollected’. *Thus+… subjects are 
essentially instructed to wait until both processes are complete before making a know 
response” (p. 462). If the processes of recollection and familiarity are considered to 
directly map onto Remember and Familiar subjective experiences then Yonelinas (2002) 
could be correct – Familiar responses are slower because experimental instructions require 
the recollection process to be completed first. Furthermore, with the separation of Know 
and Familiar categories, Yonelinas’s suggestion is still able to explain the present findings 
that Know and Remember RTs were equally fast. If Know is considered to be high 
confidence without recollection then whether the recollection process results in anything 
from encoding being recollected (Remember) or nothing being recollected (Know) this 
should take the same amount of time and recognition RTs for Remembering or Knowing 
should be equal, as was demonstrated in the current experiments.  
 
However, Dewhurst et al. (2006) provided evidence against the suggestion that Remember 
responses are faster than Know responses as an artefact of experimental instructions 
(Yonelinas, 2002). In their experiment, faster recognition decisions for Remember items 
were demonstrated even when the judgment of subjective experience was decoupled from 
the recognition decision. Under these conditions, experimental instructions regarding 
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Remembering and Knowing could not influence the timing of recognition decisions and 
thus Dewhurst et al. concluded against the demand characteristics account proposed by 
Yonelinas (2002). Furthermore, Dewhurst et al. suggested that instead of directly reflecting 
the time-course of the processes of recollection and familiarity, Remember and Know 
responses reflect the time taken to make recognition decisions based on the information 
which results from recollection and familiarity processes. If a test item cues retrieval of 
contextual information from encoding such as thoughts, images, or associations, then 
recognition decisions can be made more quickly than if it requires additional processing to 
evaluate its familiarity relative to other items on the test (Conway & Dewhurst, 1994; 
Dewhurst et al., 2006; Henson et al., 1999). For the present experiments, this explains the 
difference in speed of Remember and Familiar decisions but not the similarity in speed of 
Remember and Know decisions. Furthermore, in Experiment 4.2 for these RT findings both 
Know and Familiar responses were accompanied by above-chance source accuracy 
demonstrating that some contextual information from encoding was retrieved for these 
items, even if this retrieval was not accompanied by a subjective feeling of Remembering.  
 
As Know and Remember were equally fast in terms of RT, and Remember, Know, and 
Familiar were accompanied by above-chance source accuracy, it is suggested it is the 
subjective feeling concerning recognition that is critically important in influencing the 
speed with which decisions are made. For Remember and Know responses, whether an 
item is retrieved with recollection of contextual information from encoding or high 
confidence without recollection (accompanied by ‘just known’ contextual information or 
not) results in two different subjective experiences which are experienced equally rapidly 
and which result in fast recognition decisions. In contrast, when the subjective experience 
is one of Familiarity, additional processing regarding the source of this feeling of familiarity 
(and any accompanying contextual information retrieved) results in recognition decisions 
taking longer. The subjective feeling is related to the information in memory and in what 
manner context is retrieved, and assessment of all these elements of retrieval influence 
recognition decision RTs. 
 
For confidence judgments, Experiments 4.1 and 4.3 demonstrated that patterns of 
recognition RTs categorised by later confidence judgment were similar to those for 
subjective experience judgments. Recognition RTs for High and Medium confidence items 
were faster than for Low and None. The general finding that the higher the confidence the 
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faster the response replicates previous research (Henson et al., 2000; Mandler & Boeck, 
1974; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976). However, the similarity between the patterns for 
confidence and subjective experience RTs suggests that the two types of judgment are 
similar in terms of RT while they were not found to be similar in terms of distribution of 
responses or recognition accuracy (see Section 5.2.3). This key thesis theme of the 
relationship between confidence and subjective experience is discussed further in Section 
5.4. 
 
5.2.5. Reaction time to make judgments 
 
This thesis was the first time that reaction times to make post-recognition judgments of 
confidence, source, and subjective experience have been compared (Experiments 4.1, 4.2, 
and 4.3). Consequently, this is the first time that source judgments were shown to be 
faster than confidence judgments, which in turn were faster than subjective experience 
judgments. This second finding was predicted, the first was not. As both source and 
subjective experience judgments require assessment of what information can be retrieved 
regarding context at encoding it was predicted that both source and subjective experience 
judgments would be slower than judgments of confidence. One suggestion for the 
observed pattern is that judgments of subjective experience and confidence are both 
subjective types of assessment whereas source is objective. Thus, confidence and 
subjective experience judgments may require greater metacognitive processing because of 
their non-objective nature. Additionally, source judgments may have been so quick 
because only a one-dimensional source judgment was used and associative encoding had 
been performed at study. These manipulations led to source judgments being accurate 
over 80% of the time and may have also influenced RTs. As discussed In Chapter 4 (Section 
4.4.4), future experiments could examine whether source judgments are slower when the 
source judgment is more difficult, or when the delay between encoding and retrieval is 
longer, as this might increase forgetting of source information. Previous research has 
shown that coarse source discriminations are faster than finer ones (Lindsay, 2008). For 
example, Johnson, Kounios, and Reeder (1994) analysed the time-course of item 
recognition and source memory and found that item recognition became accurate more 
quickly than source memory. However, multi-dimensional source experiments have not yet 
investigated the time course of source judgments. If this was explored in future research it 
might be expected that, in line with the findings of Meiser and Sattler (2007; see Section 
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5.2.3), RTs might differ for source judgments which require retrieval of specific (e.g., 
individual voice) and global (e.g., gender of voice) information. 
 
In the present experiments, in addition to recognition judgments being faster when a 
subsequent judgment of source was correct, RTs to make source judgments were also 
shown to be faster when source was correct. This finding is novel, though unsurprising. It 
also adds to the findings of Kahn et al. (2004) and Lundstrom et al. (2005) who used one-
step methods where recognition and source were judged at the same time. The current 
findings demonstrate that when separate source and recognition judgments are made, 
both these types of judgment are faster when source is accurate. Critically, using the two-
step method in the current experiments, the speed advantage for correct source 
judgments demonstrated a larger and more reliable difference than the speed advantage 
observed for recognition decisions later shown to have correct source. Moreover, further 
analysis revealed that RTs for source judgments were faster when accompanied by 
Remember or High confidence. Thus, the subjective experience or confidence associated 
with recognition of an item was related to how quickly a source judgment was made to 
that item.  
 
This novel finding is particularly interesting in terms of the relationship between source 
and subjective experience as for subjective experience judgments themselves no reliable 
relationship was demonstrated between category of subjective experience and speed of 
judgment. The subjective experience associated with recognition of an item did not 
influence RTs to make subjective experience judgments yet it did influence RTs for source 
judgments. This is surprising due to the finding that source judgments were made 
significantly faster than subjective experience judgments. Though source judgments were 
made more quickly, within that quick response there was significant variation and this was 
linked to the subjective experience with which the item was recognised. It is suggested 
that this occurred because a judgment of source is an easier one-dimensional type of 
judgment compared to a subjective experience judgment, at least in these experiments. 
Thus, if the critical source information was recollected from encoding and this was 
experienced subjectively as Remembering then this led to speeding of the source 
judgment. This interplay between source and subjective experience fits with the 
suggestion made earlier (Section 5.2.4) that recognition decision RTs themselves are based 
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on the relationship between the subjective experience of recognition and the manner in 
which contextual information accompanying them is retrieved.  
 
In contrast to the finding that source judgments were speeded by accompanying 
recollection, Remember responses themselves were not made significantly more quickly 
than other subjective experience responses. One explanation for this could be that all 
processing of subjective experience has already taken place at recognition and judgment 
RT simply reflects time taken to make a response. However, as subjective experience 
judgments took longer to make than recognition decisions (1794ms compared to 1560ms 
respectively36), this suggests that some additional processing was being undertaken at the 
time of making the judgment. Participants could have been checking that they did not in 
fact retrieve any contextual information; or checking the content of the contextual 
information they had retrieved – was it accurate? Metacognitive processing such as this 
would result in the patterns observed; as soon as processing ends a response is made, and 
RT for this response is not dependent on the outcome of the processing. This suggestion 
fits with the pattern of results obtained for confidence judgments where judgments were 
found to be made more quickly as confidence increased. For these more inferential, less 
subjective judgments (see Section 5.4), it is suggested that the type of processing required 
for these judgments is easier than that for subjective experience judgments. Although the 
subjective experience with which an item is recognised is suggested to be what gives rise 
to feelings of confidence (Gardiner, 2002; Tulving, 1985; Section 5.4), once subjective 
experience has been triggered by presentation of an item at test, the lack of further 
processing required post-recognition results in quicker judgments when confidence is 
higher.  
 
To summarise the key take home points from each chapter, the experiments presented in 
Chapter 2 established that reports of others’ subjective experiences are interpreted, in 
part, by the confidence they convey but that the underlying experiential state is 
understood as being more important than the confidence for conceptualisations of 
subjective experience. Chapter 3’s experiments demonstrated that recollection can be 
used to overcome confusion arising from experimental familiarity but that when the 
relative familiarity of items is manipulated within-subjects subjective experience usage 
                                                          
 
36
 Average RTs calculated across experiments. RTs for Guess excluded from calculations.  
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carries-over to those items which are not familiar. In Chapter 4, experiments demonstrated 
that subjective experience and confidence judgments are not used in the same manner 
and both have different relationships with the objective measure of source accuracy. 
Across Chapters 3 and 4, recognition and judgment RTs also provided evidence of 
differences between source, confidence, and subjective experience. These findings are 
discussed in relation to the key thesis themes of the separation of Knowing and Familiarity, 
the differences between confidence and subjective experience, and the influence of 
objective manipulations on subjective experience in the following sections. 
 
5.3. THE SEPARATION OF KNOW AND FAMILIAR 
 
The key issue within the separation of Know and Familiar categories of subjective 
experience is how these categories should be defined and understood. What does a Know 
subjective experience entail? What does a Familiar subjective experience entail? And in 
what ways are these categories of subjective experience similar and, more importantly, 
different? The current thesis was the first to employ the four categories of Remember, 
Know, Familiar, and Guess in simple item and 2AFC recognition paradigms. Previous 
research has only employed the separation of Know and Familiar with objectively more 
meaningful stimuli such as learning of rare word definitions and student course material 
where the topic of interest was the semanticisation of knowledge over time (e.g., Conway 
et al., 1997; Dewhurst et al., 2009; Herbert & Burt, 2001, 2003, 2004). In these paradigms, 
separation of Know and Familiar makes intuitive sense as the Know category is seen as 
capturing the subjective experience of retrieving information from the semantic memory 
system once it has been integrated with other knowledge. A key question for the 
experiments in this thesis was therefore: Would participants use the Know response in the 
episodic memory tasks? And furthermore, would there be reliable differences between 
recognition responses assigned to Know and recognition responses assigned to Familiar? 
Findings from the present experiments that speak to these points are summarised in Table 
5.2.  
Chapter 5 
263 
 
 
Table 5.2. Main findings for the separated categories of Know and Familiar. 
Factor Know Familiar 
Recognition 
accuracy 
K was recognised just as accurately 
as R (Exp. 3.1, 3.21, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2)  
F was recognised less accurately 
than K (Exp. 3.1, 3.22, 3.33, 4.1, 4.2,) 
Recognition RT K was recognised just as quickly as R 
(Exp. 3.1, 3.34, 4.1, 4.2) 
F was recognised more slowly than 
K (Exp. 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2) 
Source 
accuracy 
Source judgments for K were less 
accurate than for R (exp. 4.2) 
Source judgments for F were less 
accurate than for K (Exp. 4.2) 
Manipulation 
of familiarity 
Pre-exposure led to reduced K (due 
to increased R, Exp. 3.1). 
K was less accurate in Pre-Exposure 
than in No Pre-Exposure (Exp. 3.3 
Yes/No task only). 
K was not correlated with memory 
performance (Exp. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) 
F was less accurate in Pre-Exposure 
than in No Pre-Exposure (Exp. 3.1, 
3.2, 3.35). 
F was negatively correlated with 
memory performance (Exp. 3.1 – 
Pre-Exposure, 3.2, 3.3) 
Manipulation 
of confidence 
Assignment of K justifications was 
influenced by associated confidence 
level (Exp. 2.2) 
F justifications were consistently 
assigned to F (Exp. 2.2) 
Confidence K justifications were given lower 
confidence ratings than R (Exp. 2.1). 
K and R items did not differ in terms 
of confidence (Exp. 4.1) 
F justifications were given lower 
confidence ratings than K (Exp. 2.1). 
F items were given lower 
confidence ratings than K (Exp. 4.1) 
Sorting task K justifications were reliably sorted 
to K 
F justifications were not reliably 
sorted. 
F were rated as containing more 
information and details than K 
1 Except in No Pre-Exposure   4 Except in the 2AFC task 
2 Except in Pre-Exposure   5 Except in the Yes/No task 
3 Except in No Pre-Exposure in 2AFC task 
 
In terms of similarities, the current experiments suggest that Know and Familiar 
experiences are similar in how often they are reported by participants. Experiments 4.1 
and 4.2 demonstrated very similar a priori usage of Know and Familiar responses by 
participants; approximately 25% of correct recognition responses were assigned each to 
Know and Familiar. However, this is where the similarity ends. In the recognition memory 
experiments of this thesis Know recognition was demonstrated to be more accurate 
(Experiments 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, and 4.2), more confident (Experiments 4.1), faster 
(Experiments 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, and 4.2), and have higher source accuracy (Experiment 4.2) than 
Familiar recognition. In fact, in the majority of analyses Know recognition was found to be 
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no different to Remember recognition on all of the above factors. The only factor that was 
shown to reliably differentiate Remember and Know responses was the source accuracy 
associated with the response (Experiment 4.2). That there were no differences in accuracy 
or confidence between Remember and Know recognition responses replicates the results 
of Dewhurst et al. (2009). From the current experiments, the novel findings regarding 
source accuracy and RT add to Dewhurst et al.’s results regarding how Remember, Know, 
and Familiar subjective experiences differ. 
 
Reliable differences for Know and Familiar were also observed in Experiment 3.1 where 
familiarity of items was manipulated through pre-exposure. The between-subjects design 
of Experiment 3.1 demonstrated an experimental dissociation between Know and Familiar 
as participants made more Remember responses and fewer Know responses in the Pre-
Exposure condition compared to the No Pre-Exposure condition while proportion of 
responses assigned to Familiar did not differ across conditions. When recollection was 
required to overcome the familiarity induced by pre-exposure the increase in Remember 
responses was accompanied by a decrease in Know responses, not a decrease in Familiar 
responses; indeed, all items would have felt familiar, they had been pre-exposed. The use 
of familiarity when items had been pre-exposed was primarily what led to the reduction in 
memory performance in Experiments 3.1 to 3.3. Familiar responses were associated with 
reduced recognition accuracy and a negative relationship with memory performance when 
any or all items had been pre-exposed. In contrast, there was no relationship between 
Know responses and memory performance and the accuracy of Know responses did not 
differ across conditions.  
 
These results establish that participants are able to use the Know response in episodic 
memory tasks. A subjective experience of ‘just knowing’ that an item was presented 
previously without any associated recollection of context or feelings of familiarity was how 
a significant proportion of items were recognised in the current experiments. Previous 
research had only used the separate categories of Know and Familiar with more 
meaningful stimuli (Conway et al., 1997; Dewhurst et al., 2009; Herbert & Burt, 2001, 2003, 
2004). The current experiments demonstrate that the separation of Know and Familiar is 
also valid for episodic recognition paradigms and use of these separate categories can 
result in valuable patterns of data which may have been obscured if a conflated Know-
Familiar response option had been utilised.  
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Further differences between Know and Familiar were also demonstrated by Experiments 
2.1 to 2.4, which examined lay-person interpretations of memory justification statements. 
Know justifications received higher confidence ratings (Experiment 2.1), were rated as 
containing fewer details (Experiment 2.4), were sorted to their category more reliably 
(Experiment 2.4), and were assigned to the appropriate response less consistently when 
confidence was manipulated (Experiment 2.2), compared to Familiar justifications. As 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Sections 2.4.4 and 2.6.1) it is suggested that Know justifications 
reflected a subjective feeling of high confidence occurring without recollection whereas 
Familiar justifications reflected feelings of familiarity. The different bases of these 
subjective experiences (as articulated in the justifications) are suggested to be what led to 
the differences in findings in the experiments in Chapter 2. 
 
That Know subjective experiences are conceived as reflecting high confidence without 
recollection and Familiar subjective experiences are conceived as reflecting feelings of 
familiarity with an item are not themselves surprising given that this was how these types 
of experience were defined for participants in Experiments 3.1, 3.2, 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2 (See 
Appendix A). However, the findings regarding recognition accuracy, RT, and confidence 
obtained for Know and Familiar responses in these experiments provide objective support 
to these conceptualisations of Know and Familiar. Moreover, the confidence ratings, 
sorting patterns, and information ratings obtained for Know and Familiar justifications in 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.4 demonstrated that even when no definitions of subjective 
experience categories were provided to participants, Know and Familiar responses were 
able to be differentiated. Critically, the bases for this differentiation also reflected the 
same differences in confidence and lack of recollection that comprised the experimental 
definitions. Know justifications were given higher confidence ratings and were considered 
to contain fewer memory details (indicating an absence of recollection) compared to 
Familiar justifications. 
 
That Know justifications are considered to reflect high confidence without recollection also 
explains the findings of Experiment 2.2. When Know justifications that had received 
differing confidence ratings in Experiment 2.1 were presented for classification, how these 
were assigned to subjective experience categories was greatly influenced by the associated 
confidence level. As these justifications were all about confidence and lacked recollective 
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details or mentioned that these were absent, if the confidence reflected in the 
justifications was low participants often classified the justification as reflecting a subjective 
experience associated with a lower level of confidence such as Familiar or Guess. In 
contrast, Familiar justifications of any level of confidence were consistently assigned to 
Familiar suggesting that the experiential state reflected in these justifications was 
understood by participants even when the confidence associated with that experiential 
state differed.  
 
There are two main points to take from these results. First, participants are able to use the 
Know response in recognition tasks with objectively less-meaningful stimuli such as words 
and names; and second, reliable differences are observed between items recognised with 
feelings of Knowing and feelings of Familiarity. As suggested by Gardiner (2001) concerning 
the traditional Remember-Know paradigm, “Other classifications of subjective conscious 
experiences of memory are undoubtedly possible and may even prove more useful, in the 
longer run, than this one.” (p. 1360). The separation of Know and Familiar is suggested to 
be one of these more useful classifications and one that may benefit future research in the 
areas of aging, neuropsychology, education, and in identifying the neurological bases of 
memory retrieval. The usefulness of the Know-Familiar split for each of these areas is 
discussed in Section 5.7. 
 
5.4. THE DISSOCIATION OF CONFIDENCE AND SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE 
 
With regard to the relationship between subjective experience and confidence, 
experiments from this thesis support two conclusions from previous research: Confidence 
and subjective experience are related; however, they are not one and the same. As already 
discussed (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.3), Experiments 2.1 and 4.1 demonstrated that levels 
of confidence decline across Remember, Know, Familiar and Guess experiences; this was 
found both when it was a first-person assessment of one’s own memory under study 
(Experiment 4.1) and when it was a third-person assessment concerning a justification 
statement provided by someone else (Experiment 2.1). Critically however, Experiment 4.1 
also demonstrated that participants did not use confidence and subjective experience 
judgments in the same way. Participants were much more lenient with their confidence 
judgments; over 60% of correctly recognised items were assigned to High confidence while 
only 40% of items were assigned to Remember. Moreover, participants did not map the 
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two judgment types onto one another – not all Low confidence responses were assigned to 
Familiar, not all Medium to Know, not all High to Remember; the judgment types and the 
levels within those judgment types were not interchangeable (Rajaram et al., 2002).  
 
A further critical dissociation of subjective experience and confidence is evident by 
comparing across experiments in Chapter 4. Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 employed a source 
manipulation at encoding where participants were instructed to associate words presented 
on one side of the screen with one person and words on the other side with a different 
person. In these experiments, confidence and subjective experience judgments 
demonstrated different relationships with source accuracy. Subjective experience had a 
relationship with source when source was both accurate and inaccurate. When source was 
accurate, more responses were assigned to Remember, followed by Know, followed by 
Familiar; in contrast, when source was inaccurate more responses were assigned to 
Familiar, then Know, then Remember. For confidence judgments, a relationship only 
existed between confidence and source when source was accurate; more responses were 
assigned to High, then Medium, then Low confidence. For inaccurate source judgments, 
equal proportions were assigned to High, Medium, and Low confidence. As discussed in 
Section 5.2.3, this was taken as indicating that subjective experience judgments are more 
sensitive and more reflective of memorial processes than judgments of confidence. It is 
hypothesised that both source and subjective experience judgments require assessment of 
whether contextual details have been retrieved, whereas this assessment is not required 
when a confidence judgment is made. 
 
Further dissociation of confidence and subjective experience is demonstrated by the fact 
that the source encoding manipulation employed in Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 led to 
increased recognition performance and higher confidence in these experiments compared 
to Experiment 4.1, but patterns of subjective experience did not change. This finding runs 
contrary to previous manipulations, which have demonstrated that when more elaborative 
or conceptual processing is performed at encoding more Remember responses are made. 
Such manipulations include deep versus shallow processing, generation or vocalization 
versus reading of items (Gardiner, 1988; Gregg & Gardiner, 1991), orthographically 
distinctive versus orthographically common words (Rajaram, 1998), repetition of items at 
study (Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999), and intentional versus incidental learning (Macken & 
Hampson, 1993). It is unclear why the source encoding manipulation employed in 
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Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 led to increases in recognition performance and confidence but no 
increases in Remember responses. In interpreting this result, it is important to remember 
that this difference was observed across experiments, not within. But the fact that 
confidence increases but Remembering does not suggests that the two processes are 
dissociable in some tasks and in response to some variables.  
 
To fully explore how subjective experience and confidence judgments respond to source 
encoding instruction manipulations, source encoding would need to be performed at study 
and both subjective experience and confidence judgments made at test. Using this design, 
it might be predicted that confidence judgments would not be so high when made in 
conjunction with subjective experience judgments. Though this might seem 
counterintuitive, this prediction is suggested as experiments in this thesis have 
demonstrated that subjective experience judgments are more sensitive to manipulations 
of source than confidence judgments are (see Section 5.2.3); and experiments in this thesis 
and previous research have demonstrated that judgments of confidence are more lenient 
than judgments of subjective experience (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1990; Rajaram, 1993; 
Rajaram et al., 2002; and Tunney & Fernie, 2007). As confidence is suggested to be derived 
from subjective experience (Gardiner, 2001; Tulving, 1985), it is suggested that a source 
encoding manipulation combined with subjective experience judgments at retrieval might 
lead confidence judgments to be adjusted to be in line with the accompanying subjective 
experience; i.e., rates of High confidence would be lowered to the levels shown in 
Experiment 4.1. 
 
That subjective experience gives rise to confidence is suggested to be what led to the 
results of Experiment 2.3. In that experiment, participants were provided with justification 
statements accompanied by confidence values that were either appropriate or 
inappropriate to that justification. Tulving asserts that “…the adaptive value of episodic 
memory and autonoetic consciousness lies in the heightened subjective certainty with 
which organisms endowed with such memory and consciousness believe, and are willing to 
act upon, information retrieved from memory” (1985; p. 10). Results of Experiment 2.3 
demonstrated that participants did not take into consideration confidence values when 
assigning justification statements to a category of subjective experience. Although this 
does not directly test the hypothesis that subjective experience gives rise to confidence, it 
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does demonstrate that experiential reports are considered of more importance than 
confidence in determining another’s recollective status.  
 
On the whole, this thesis interprets confidence as an inferential assessment of subjective 
experiences, whereas subjective experience judgments themselves are more reflective of 
the underlying memory processes and experiential states. Furthermore, the current 
experiments have demonstrated confidence and subjective experience to dissociate in 
many different ways. These findings are therefore interpreted as supporting dual-process 
as opposed to single-process accounts of recognition. In agreement with Dewhurst et al. 
(2006), subjective experience responses in the current experiments are not considered to 
be direct reflections of the underlying processes of recollection and familiarity, rather they 
are considered to be assessments of the information provided by these processes plus the 
experiential state which results. Although some of the present findings may be able to be 
interpreted using unidimensional SDT models, that Remember and Know responses were 
differentiated only by source accuracy while Know and Familiar responses were dissociated 
by many factors adds to evidence from other behavioural and brain imaging studies that 
subjective experience judgments differ in ways other than just confidence or familiarity 
(Dewhurst et al., 2006; and see Gardiner, 2008, and Gardiner & Richardson-Klavenh, 2000, 
for reviews).  
 
The results of this thesis may best be interpreted in terms of recent conceptualisations of 
recollection as a continuous process (e.g., Mickes et al., 2009, 2010; Onyper et al., 2010; 
Parks & Yonelinas, 2007; Rotello et al., 2004; Slotnick, 2010; Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; 
Wixted, 2007, 2010; Wixted & Mickes, 2010; Wixted & Stretch, 2004). With the separation 
of Know and Familiar responses, the finding that Know and Remember responses differ 
only in terms of source accuracy while Remember, Know, and Familiar responses were all 
accompanied by retrieval of varying degrees of source is taken to support the idea that 
there are varying degrees of recollection. Critically, it is not suggested that retrieval of 
source for Know and Familiar items was accompanied by recollective experience, instead 
the suggestion is that retrieval of source was experienced either as semantic knowledge 
(Know) or with feelings of familiarity (Familiar). In addition, the level of accuracy of this 
retrieval distinguished the different subjective experiences.  
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While conceptualising recollection as a continuous process may benefit interpretation of 
experimental findings in terms of the best-fit model, these models are primarily concerned 
with modelling the recognition decision process and not with theoretically understanding 
the subjective experience that accompanies recognition (Dewhurst et al., 2006). As 
Gardiner (2008) highlights:  
“There has recently been a spate of formal quantitative models. But the 
increasing technical sophistication and complexity of some of these models 
and the rather general ability of most of them to provide a reasonably good fit 
to the data make it increasingly difficult to see how to distinguish between 
them empirically… Confronted by a plethora of alternative versions of such 
models, it is hard (despite the claims sometimes made for this approach) to 
see any great advantage of quantitative modelling over a less mathematically, 
more conceptually driven approach” (pp. 301-302). 
The current thesis concentrated on examining how people make and understand 
judgments of subjective experience and interpreted findings in terms of psychological 
explanations of human memory. By using this approach, the current experiments 
demonstrated confidence and subjective experience to be differentiated in a variety of 
ways, on a variety of different tasks; such differences could not be observed using 
quantitative modelling approaches.  
 
5.5. HOW DO OBJECTIVE MANIPULATIONS AFFECT SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE? 
 
The effects of objective manipulations on subjective experience have long been studied. As 
discussed in the General Introduction (Section 1.6.1), some experimental manipulations 
have been found to increase Remember responses while Know responses are unchanged 
(e.g., Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Gardiner, 1988; Gregg & Gardiner, 1991; Jones & 
Roediger, 1995; Macken & Hampson, 1993; Rajaram, 1998); others have demonstrated 
situations where Know responses increase while Remember responses are unaffected 
(Dewhurst & Hitch, 1997; Mäntylä & Raudsepp, 1996; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 
2000). Other manipulations have been found to result in opposite effects on Remembering 
and Knowing (Gardiner & Java, 1990; Mäntylä, 1997; Parkin & Russo, 1993). This last 
pattern is what was obtained when familiarity was manipulated in Experiment 3.1. When 
pre-exposure increased the familiarity of items this led to increased Remember responses 
and a corresponding decrease in Know responses. Critically, this change in patterns of 
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subjective experiences was also accompanied by a reduction in memory performance. 
When items were pre-exposed, Remembering increased but recognition accuracy 
decreased.  
 
The different patterns of Remember-Know responses obtained using different 
manipulations have been taken as support for the ‘functional independence’ of 
Remembering and Knowing and support for dual-process accounts of memory (Gardiner, 
2008; Gardiner & Conway, 1999). The current findings further support these conclusions. 
Although single-process protagonists such as Dunn (2004, 2008) have demonstrated that 
SDT models can account for some previous Remember-Know dissociations it is suggested 
that the results of Experiment 3.1 present a challenge to SDT models. In this experiment, 
the ‘trace strength’ of both targets and lures was increased in the pre-exposure condition 
but the strength of targets should still have been higher than that of lures as targets were 
studied subsequent to pre-exposure. UVSD models may be able to explain the memory 
performance finding as pre-exposure of lures would have increased the variance of these 
items compared to non-pre-exposed lures and thus the difference between the variances 
of lure and target items would be smaller in the pre-exposure condition. However, that 
Remember responses are increased in pre-exposure while recognition performance is 
decreased is unable to be explained by SDT models. As greater recollection is assumed to 
go hand in hand with better memory performance, Conway et al. (2001) proposed that SDT 
interpretations are refuted if the proportion of Remember responses differs between two 
conditions while the overall hit rate remains the same. Dunn (2004) argued against this 
and stated that just because hit rates are equal across conditions does not imply that 
Remember rates should be equal across conditions. However, the current experiment 
poses a different challenge to SDT models; here memory performance was lower in the 
condition where more responses were assigned to Remember. From a first-person dual-
process standpoint this finding is interpreted as reflecting the use of recollection to 
overcome the familiarity induced by pre-exposure. How single-process models would 
explain this finding is open for debate. 
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5.6. METHODOLOGY IN SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE RESEARCH 
 
Experiments in the current thesis have provided evidence which warrants discussion 
regarding three topics of methodology: between- versus within-subjects designs, one-step 
versus two-step paradigms, and measuring reaction time to make judgments.  
 
Regarding between- and within-subjects designs, the experiments of Chapter 3 
demonstrated that while the effect of pre-exposure on memory performance was evident 
across all experimental designs, its effects on subjective experience were only evident 
when pre-exposure was manipulated between-subjects. Previous research has also 
demonstrated that in some cases experimental design can be critical for demonstrating 
effects on subjective experience (e.g., Conway et al., 2001; Dewhurst & Parry, 2000). 
However, to my knowledge, the current experiments are the first to demonstrate a 
situation where the effect of a manipulation on recognition performance is consistent 
across experimental designs but subjective experience responses are affected. This 
underscores the benefit of investigating the relationship between subjective experience 
and performance using multiple experimental designs.  
 
In relation to one-step versus two-step subjective experience paradigms, while the current 
thesis did not compare these directly, separation of recognition decisions from post-
recognition judgments enabled some key analysis to be performed which could not have 
been conducted if one-step procedures had been used. Firstly, separating recognition 
decisions from judgments in Chapter 4 permitted examination of the influence that making 
two types of judgment for an item might have on responses in a clearer fashion than would 
have been able if one of the judgments had been combined with recognition. Indeed, 
results of these experiments demonstrated no effects of ‘contamination’ of one judgment 
by the other in the patterns of responding, which challenges the marginal evidence of 
contamination demonstrated by Martin (2007) who had used one-step procedures to try 
to investigate this hypothesis.  
 
Secondly, the two-step procedures in these experiments enabled measurement of how 
long it took participants to make subjective judgments of Remember, Know, Familiar, and 
Guess. Separation of recognition and judgment here meant that the time course of both 
these decision processes could be analysed separately and that RTs for source, confidence, 
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and subjective experience judgments could be examined free from contamination by 
recognition decision time. Critically, this novel methodology also enabled the influence of 
one judgment on the other judgment’s RT to be examined and this demonstrated that the 
speed at which source judgments are made was influenced by the accompanying 
subjective experience. For this comparison, if either the source or subjective experience 
judgment had been conflated with recognition then this RT finding may have been 
obscured by recognition decision time. Fundamentally, the separation of recognition 
decision processes and judgments means that findings regarding subjective experience, 
source, and confidence, and the time courses of these types of assessment, are easier to 
interpret.  
 
5.7. APPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The findings presented in this thesis have implications for the advancement of theory and 
methodology in recognition memory research (see Sections 5.3 to 5.5). More importantly, 
they may also be able to benefit research in aging, neuropsychology, and education, as 
well as research exploring the neurological bases of memory retrieval.  
 
To take each of these areas in turn, in research into memory in aging, utilising separate 
Know and Familiar response options may help elucidate whether the increase in Know 
responses for older adults observed using the traditional Remember-Know paradigm 
actually results from increases in subjective experiences of Knowing or Familiarity. As 
discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6.2), some experiments have demonstrated that the 
reduction in Remembering in aging is accompanied by an increase in Knowing (e.g., Parkin 
& Walter, 1992; Perfect et al., 1995) while others have found that older adults make fewer 
Remember responses than younger adults but that level of Know responses do not differ 
between age groups (e.g., Mäntylä, 1993). Employing the separate categories of Know and 
Familiar in experimental manipulations may enable clarification of findings from 
experimental manipulations that have produced different patterns of responding in aging 
using the traditional Remember-Know paradigm. The separation of Know and Familiar 
would allow examination of whether it is patterns of Know or Familiar responses that are 
altered when fewer Remember responses are made. As semantic memory is generally 
found to remain intact in normal aging while episodic memory declines (Craik, 1999), it 
might be that reductions in Remember responses are accompanied by increases in Know 
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responses for older adults but that level of Familiar responses remains the same across age 
groups. As it is recollective experience which declines in aging it follows that increases 
would be demonstrated in Know responses rather than Familiar responses as Know reflect 
high confidence in the absence of recollection while Familiar responses reflect feelings of 
familiarity for an item in comparison to other items on the test.  
 
The separation of Know and Familiar would also permit this type of exploration in 
conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease, amnesia, schizophrenia, and autism spectrum 
disorders. In these populations, while levels of Remember responses are reduced, levels of 
Know responses are generally found to be unaffected or are affected to a much lesser 
extent than Remembering (Bowler et al., 2000; Dalla Barba, 1993, 1997; Huron et al., 1995; 
Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Schacter et al., 1997; Tanweer et al., 2009). The separation of 
Know and Familiar may aid clarification of which non-recollective states of awareness are 
spared in different populations and whether it is Knowing or Familiarity (or both) that are 
spared in particular experimental tasks. Furthermore, separation of these categories may 
be able to dissociate what types of memory are able to be improved in training paradigms 
such as that of Jennings and Jacoby (2003) which has examined training recollection in 
older adults.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6.3), the Remember-Know dissociations observed in 
neuropsychological populations have been linked to the underlying changes in neurological 
functioning and/or anatomy for these groups. The separation of Know and Familiar may 
aid clarification of which non-recollective states of awareness are associated with 
particular patterns of neuronal activation in both neuropsychologically impaired and 
normal functioning. Previous evidence regarding the neural substrates of recollection and 
familiarity is somewhat mixed. For example, when damage to the hippocampus is 
somewhat selective, some comparisons of recall and recognition performance have shown 
recollection to be disrupted while familiarity is relatively spared (e.g., Aggleton & Shaw, 
1996; Aggleton et al., 2000, 2005; Baddeley et al., 2001; Bowles et al., 2010; Hanley et al., 
1994; Holdstock, et al., 2000; Jäger et al., 2009; Mayes et al., 2001, 2002; Turriziani et al., 
2008; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Yonelinas et al., 2002); however, others have reported 
impairments in both recollection and familiarity (Cipolotti, et al., 2006; Gold et al., 2006; 
Manns et al., 2003; Wais et al., 2006). Additionally, left anterior prefrontal regions have 
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been demonstrated to be more active for Remembered items compared to Known items in 
some studies but not in others (cf. Henson et al., 1999, Eldridge et al., 2000).  
 
Recent research by Montaldi et al. (2006) demonstrated different patterns of neural 
activation for different levels of familiarity across a variety of brain areas, but hippocampal 
activity was not modulated by familiarity. In this study, participants responded using the 
four categories of Recollect, Very familiar, Moderately familiar, and Slightly familiar. 
Although these different response options do not correspond to the conceptualisations of 
Know, Familiar, and Guess in the current thesis, Montaldi et al.’s results do suggest that 
the neural substrates of recollection and familiarity are not yet clearly delineated. Further 
evidence of this comes from Diana et al. (2010), who demonstrated that retrieval of 
different types of source information were related to different patterns of MTL activation. 
They suggested that when assessing the roles of neural regions in episodic memory, 
instead of considering activation to be solely determined by memory strength or the 
processes of recollection and familiarity, “the types of memorial information involved at all 
stages of processing should be considered” (pp. 1816-1817). This relates to the current 
findings regarding the relationships between source, subjective experience, and 
confidence and the suggestion that recollection is a continuous process. These examples 
demonstrate that the neural substrates of subjective experience are not yet fully 
understood. As stated by Gardiner (2008, p. 302), “Gaining a better understanding of 
remembering and knowing theoretically will depend on further evidence that links these 
states of awareness not only with behaviour but also with the brain”. It is suggested that 
utilising the separate categories of Know and Familiar in both behavioural and 
neuroimaging studies will aid this theoretical understanding.  
 
The inspiration for the current body of work was the demonstration of an R-to-K shift in 
learning of academic material by Conway et al. (1997). Conway and colleagues were the 
first to separate the subjective experiences of Knowing and Familiarity and through this 
separation were able to show that material shifted from episodic to semantic memory over 
time. Subsequent experiments by Herbert and Burt (2001, 2003, 2004) replicated these 
findings using different academic learning materials and Dewhurst et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that even less objectively meaningful materials demonstrated 
semanticisation across learning. The current experiments were the first to employ the 
separate categories of Know and Familiar in standard item and associative recognition 
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memory paradigms and findings demonstrate that this separation is valid for these 
paradigms. Thus, the subjective experience responses of Remember, Know, Familiar, and 
Guess appear to be reflective of how items are retrieved from memory across many types 
of learning task. This extended Remember-Know paradigm is applicable to episodic 
immediately tested single-item memory experiments, multi-trial learning of semantic 
information, and longitudinal studies of learning in academic settings. Future research into 
how subjective experiences differ across different types of material and different methods 
of learning would be of value. Indeed, the initial study by Conway et al. showed that 
proportion of Remember and Know responses differed across academic courses; in lecture 
courses Remember responses were made more often whereas on a research methods 
course the dominant response was Know. Conway et al. suggested that the development 
of conceptualised knowledge structures in the research methods course was encouraged 
by the presentation of material in multiple contexts and the more interactive learning 
environment. Additionally, Herbert and Burt (2003) demonstrated that students were 
more likely to shift from Remembering to Knowing if the learning material was reviewed 
regularly and in different formats. The findings from these studies suggest that systematic 
examination of the R-to-K shift across different materials and different methods of learning 
could benefit teaching practises. 
  
5.8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis examined how people make and understand judgments of subjective 
experience and it was the first to employ the four categories of Remember, Know, Familiar, 
and Guess in a standard episodic memory task. The manipulations and experimental 
procedures utilised in the current experiments enabled critical differences between these 
categories to be demonstrated. Know and Familiar judgments were shown to dissociate on 
recognition accuracy, source accuracy, confidence, and response time. In contrast, 
Remember and Know judgments were only able to be differentiated by source accuracy. 
Results from the present experiments are able to inform psychological conceptualisations 
of how people understand and judge subjective experience and thus further advancement 
of theoretical models of memory processes. Looking at the wider picture, better 
psychological understanding of subjective experience and its relationship to recognition 
processes is of value to future research in a wide number of domains.  
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APPENDIX A: REMEMBER, KNOW, FAMILIAR, AND GUESS DEFINITIONS 
Across the experiments presented in this thesis, the definitions of Remember, Know, 
Familiar and Guess given to participants were kept as consistent as possible. Sometimes 
wording was changed slightly, particularly when the recognition test was 2AFC as opposed 
to Yes/No. Definitions from each experiment are shown below. 
 
A.1. DEFINITIONS OF REMEMBER, KNOW, FAMILIAR, AND GUESS FROM EXPERIMENTS 2.2 AND 
2.3.    
 
In these questionnaires the task was for respondents to judge which subjective experience 
category a previous experimental participant’s justification statement should be classed as. 
 
Remember: For this item they had an experience of Remembering the word, this could 
have included seeing the word in their mind’s eye, remembering what they thought or 
pictured when they saw the word on the original list, and/or having a sense of themselves 
in the past. For example, if you see someone on the street you may think ‘who is that? Oh 
yes, I remember, I was in the chemist shop, it’s the person I saw in the queue at the 
chemist, I remember thinking what a funny hat they had on…’ 
 
Know: For this item they simply Know the word without any of the other feelings 
associated with vividly remembering that they had seen the word before. For example, if 
you see someone on the street you may think ‘who is that? Oh yes, it’s my friend George, I 
know him really well…’ 
 
Familiar: For this word the person had a feeling of Familiarity with the word and because 
of that they think that the word was on the previous list. For example, if you see someone 
on the street you may think ‘who is that? They look very familiar… I don’t know where I 
know them from but they are definitely familiar…’  
 
Guess: For this word the person had no feeling of familiarity or any other memories 
associated with the word and simply Guessed that the word was on the previous list. 
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A.2. DEFINITIONS OF REMEMBER, KNOW, FAMILIAR, AND GUESS FROM EXPERIMENTS 3.1 AND 
3.2.    
 
These experiments involved a 2AFC task where participants had to select which of two 
forenames had previously been studied with a particular surname. The definitions were 
altered to reflect this. 
 
R = For this item you have an experience of Remembering the name, this could have 
included seeing the name pair in your mind’s eye, remembering what you thought or 
pictured when you saw the name pair on the original list, and/or having a sense of yourself 
in the past. For example, if you see someone on the street you may think ‘who is that? Oh 
yes, I remember, I was in the chemist shop, it’s the person I saw in the queue at the 
chemist, I remember thinking what a funny hat they had on…’ 
 
K = For this item you simply Know the first name that was paired with this surname 
without any of the other feelings associated with vividly remembering that you have seen 
the item before. For example, if you see someone on the street you may think ‘who is that? 
Oh yes, it’s my friend Rob, I know him really well…’ 
 
F = For this item you have a feeling of Familiarity with the first name and because of that 
you think that that first name had been paired with the surname. For example, if you see 
someone on the street you may think ‘who is that? They look very familiar… I don’t know 
where I know them from but they are definitely familiar…’ 
 
G = For this item you had no feeling of familiarity or any other memories associated with 
the name pair and simply Guessed that that first name had been paired with that surname. 
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A.3. DEFINITIONS OF REMEMBER, KNOW, FAMILIAR, AND GUESS FROM EXPERIMENTS 3.3, 4.1, 
AND 4.2.    
 
R = For this word you have an experience of Remembering the word, this could have 
included seeing the word in your mind’s eye, remembering what you thought or pictured 
when you saw the word on the original list, and/or having a sense of yourself in the past. 
For example, if you see someone on the street you may think ‘who is that? Oh yes, I 
remember, I was in the chemist shop, it’s the person I saw in the queue at the chemist, I 
remember thinking what a funny hat they had on…’ 
 
K = For this word you simply Know the word was on the previous list without any of the 
other feelings associated with vividly remembering that you have seen the word before. 
For example, if you see someone on the street you may think ‘who is that? Oh yes, it’s my 
friend Rob, I know him really well…’ 
 
F = For this word you have a feeling of Familiarity with the word and because of that you 
think that the word was on the previous list. For example, if you see someone on the street 
you may think ‘who is that? They look very familiar… I don’t know where I know them from 
but they are definitely familiar…’ 
 
G = For this word you had no feeling of familiarity or any other memories associated with 
the word and simply Guessed that the word had been on the previous list. 
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APPENDIX B: STIMULI FROM ALL EXPERIMENTS 
B.1. CUE WORDS AND JUSTIFICATION STATEMENTS USED AS STIMULI IN EXPERIMENTS 2.1 TO 2.4. 
 
The cue words and justification statements included in these experiments were those 
originally published by Gardiner et al. (1998). Experiment 2.1 involved participants making 
confidence judgments to all the justification statements. Items are sorted by their mean 
confidence value as obtained in Experiment 2.1 (from high to low within subjective 
experience category). Items were selected for inclusion in Experiments 2.2 and 2.3 on the 
basis of their confidence obtained in Experiment 2.1. Lowest, median, and highest values 
within subjective experience categories were chosen for Experiment 2.2, and eight items 
surrounding the mean confidence were selected for Experiment 2.3 (selections marked). 
Where items are not the exact lowest, median, highest, or mean item this is because the 
justification statement or cue word matched another included in that study and one had to 
be swapped for a neighbour, e.g., justification for ‘Piano’ given a mean confidence of 92.05 
(5th row of table) not included in Experiment 2.2 as another ‘Piano’ already included (mean 
confidence 93.33, 2nd row of table). All Know and Familiar items were originally Know items 
according to Gardiner et al.’s participants and were split into Know and Familiar by expert 
raters HW and CM. All Know and Familiar items were used in Experiment 2.4. 
 
Subjective 
Experience 
Mean 
Confidence 
Cue Word Justification Statement 
Item 
included 
in 
Remember 94.77 Cranberry 
I remembered it because when it came 
up it reminded me that we need more 
cranberry juice in the union bar where 
I work.  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 93.33 Piano 
When I saw it yesterday I remember 
saying. “Oh I can remember that 
because I can see myself playing the 
piano.”  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 93.13 Magazine 
My friends laugh at me because I buy 5 
magazines each week! This is the 
thought I had when I first saw the 
word.  
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Subjective 
Experience 
Mean 
Confidence 
Cue Word Justification Statement 
Item 
included 
in 
Remember 92.29 Hospital 
I remembered it because of my 
father’s condition; he is in a hospital. 
Seeing the word reminded me that I 
thought of that, it triggered a 
connection of thoughts.  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 92.05 Piano 
I remembered that there were a few 
musical instruments that came up and 
“piano” was one of those.  
 
Remember 91.61 Mother 
I remember that word strongly, the 
word is still in my memory in the way I 
saw it yesterday.  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 91.48 Kilt 
I saw it yesterday for definite, I 
remember seeing the word on the 
screen.  
 
Remember 90.42 Athlete 
I had an outline of a cartoon image of 
an athlete when I saw it yesterday, 
and it all popped back into my mind 
when I saw it today.  
 
Remember 90.36 Butterfly 
I remember seeing it. Making an image 
and a picture of it.  
 
Remember 89.79 Sofa 
A girl I know is called Sofia. When I 
saw the word yesterday it made me 
think of her.  
 
Remember 89.66 Tangerine 
I remembered it. It was the second 
one up yesterday.  
 
Remember 89.46 Road 
I have tried to relate the words to 
summer, I know I saw it because of the 
way I remember it, running down the 
road in the summer.  
 
Remember 89.00 Puppy 
Because I am from Belgium, we call my 
father Puppy (nickname) so I could not 
forget that word.  
 
Remember 88.79 Mother 
It was near the beginning; it was the 
second word.  
 
Remember 88.64 Boy 
I remember it appearing on the 
screen.  
 
Remember 88.00 Gun 
When I saw it yesterday I had an 
image of a gun and I thought it was a 
strange word to put in.  
 
Remember 87.95 Furniture 
My friend was moving, I remember 
thinking of that.  
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Remember 87.86 Piano 
I used to play the piano. I thought of 
that when I saw the word yesterday.  
 
Remember 87.80 Tornado 
I thought of an actual “tornado” when 
I saw it yesterday, so I remembered it 
today.  
 
Remember 87.60 Sauerkraut 
I remembered it because I could not 
pronounce it yesterday!  
 
Remember 87.32 Emerald 
I used a story: grasshopper was before 
it and I connected it with a green 
emerald.  
 
Remember 87.29 Pickle 
I was thinking of cheese and pickle 
sandwiches when it came up 
yesterday.  
 
Remember 87.27 Horse I remember thinking about my horse.   
Remember 87.27 Body 
I could remember thinking that it was 
an easy word to remember.  
 
Remember 86.72 Sofa 
I had an image of people sitting on it. I 
remembered it because I remember 
thinking about that image.  
 
Remember 85.80 Surf 
It was one of the first words that came 
up, so I was trying to memorise all the 
first words, so I remember that one.  
 
Remember 85.69 Piano 
I used to play the piano, so yesterday I 
thought of that, when I saw the word 
today I just remembered it from 
yesterday.  
 
Remember 85.37 Harp 
I remembered when I saw the word I 
quickly saw a harp in a church. The 
same picture came back.  
 
Remember 85.34 Ape 
I remembered that word with another 
word. I formed a picture of it. I knew 
as soon as I saw it because I remember 
thinking of the picture of monkeys at 
the time.  
 
Remember 85.21 Surf 
I answered “Remember” because it 
reminded me of living in Plymouth 
when I saw the word yesterday, so I 
remembered it this morning.  
 
Remember 85.15 Blood 
It conjured a strong image, so I 
remember seeing that word yesterday.  
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Remember 85.00 Surf 
It came up at the beginning and I 
associated it with “island”.  
 
Remember 84.64 Eye It was one of the first ones yesterday.   
Remember 84.63 Kilt 
It reminded me of going to Scotland 
when I saw it yesterday.  
 
Remember 84.33 Sauerkraut 
I remember I had to look at it closely 
yesterday.  
 
Remember 83.40 Cranberry 
Yesterday I was trying to use strategies 
to remember things. So I associated it 
with Delia Smith’s book, which has 
recipes full of cranberries.  
 
Remember 83.04 Car 
I created all this story surrounding the 
word “policeman” and the car was 
part of it, I remembered the story.  
 
Remember 83.00 Grasshopper 
Where I work the boss has a tarantula 
and locusts were fed to them, so I 
made that connection with 
grasshoppers.  
 
Remember 82.96 President 
When I saw it on the screen yesterday 
I was thinking of presidents’ faces.  
 
Remember 82.88 Rectangle 
Yesterday as it came on the screen I 
imagined a rectangle against an 
orange background and that image 
came back to me.  
 
Remember 82.86 Cranberry It was the first word on the list.   
Remember 82.22 President 
Yesterday I associated this word with 
the word “minister”. Today I 
automatically remembered about that 
association.  
 
Remember 82.12 Policeman 
My brother is a policeman. I thought 
of that.  
 
Remember 82.12 Piano 
The word “house” came before it, so I 
had an image of a house with a piano 
inside.  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 82.08 Tangerine 
I thought of food when I saw it and 
today that came back to me.  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 82.05 Raspberry 
I remember associating it with 
“apricot” and “plum”.  
Exp. 2.2 
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Remember 82.04 Cigarette 
Because I smoke. I remember seeing it 
yesterday because of the image that it 
conjured. The same thoughts came 
back to me yesterday.  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 82.00 Green 
I felt that when I saw it yesterday, I 
remembered that it was my favourite 
colour.  
 
Remember 81.85 Piano 
I remembered it because “musician” 
came up first and also I have a friend 
who plays the piano so I linked the two 
together.  
Exp. 2.3 
Remember 81.67 Emerald 
I recently bought a ring. I had this 
thought yesterday and it came back to 
me when I saw the word again.  
Exp. 2.3 
Remember 81.61 Broom 
When this word appeared I remember 
saying to myself that I had to try and 
remember that word.  
Exp. 2.3 
Remember 81.55 Sauerkraut 
It was probably the way it was spelled, 
I remember looking at it yesterday and 
saying; “What does that say!?”  
Exp. 2.3 
Remember 81.50 Policeman 
I remembered that it closely followed 
the word “gun”, one came after the 
other.  
Exp. 2.3 
Remember 81.30 Butterfly 
I thought of a Greek song about 
butterflies when I saw the word.  
Exp. 2.3 
Remember 80.56 Furniture 
When I first saw it I thought about 
“chairs” and “tables”. That was 
brought back when I saw the word 
today.  
Exp. 2.3 
Remember 80.52 Bluebell 
Yesterday it came up close to the word 
ring. I remembered that.  
Exp. 2.3 
Remember 80.36 Kilt 
I remembered that I thought of a 
Scottish man.  
 
Remember 79.70 Cider 
I associated it with “outsider” when I 
saw it yesterday, today I remembered 
the association.  
 
Remember 79.64 Piano 
When that word came up I thought of 
me playing the piano.  
 
Remember 79.39 Kilt 
I had a picture of someone standing on 
a hill in a kilt. That picture came back 
today.  
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Remember 79.32 Magazine 
This was also part of the story, I 
remembered an image of a magazine.  
 
Remember 79.17 Tornado 
When I saw it yesterday it reminded 
me of the ‘Rover’ advert.  
 
Remember 79.00 Nun 
I made a connection in my head: it 
came just after kids and the kids were 
on the sofa. Nun came after that.  
 
Remember 78.83 Harp 
On Friday I was in a restaurant with a 
harpist. I remember thinking of that 
yesterday.  
 
Remember 78.79 Kite 
When I read it yesterday I thought of 
another word, so that is what I 
remembered today.  
 
Remember 78.21 Orchid 
It was close to the word “cider”, so I 
made a connection between the two 
words.  
 
Remember 77.80 Rainbow 
Same reason, I remembered a 
multicoloured telephone box outside 
the hospital.  
 
Remember 77.59 Surf 
At the time I was counting the number 
of “S” words and I remembered that 
“surf” was one of them and it was 
short.  
 
Remember 77.59 Sofa 
I remember picturing a sofa yesterday 
and relating it to furniture.  
 
Remember 77.59 Athlete I had a picture of the Olympics.   
Remember 77.50 Sauerkraut 
It reminded me of my German lessons. 
It looked odd as one of the words in 
the list.  
 
Remember 77.33 Ring 
I was playing with my rings when I saw 
it yesterday.  
 
Remember 75.89 Gondola 
Because I remember relating it to 
skiing, that thought came back to me 
as I saw it today.  
 
Remember 75.83 Leopard 
Yesterday I was making associations 
when I saw the words, and I 
remembered those.  
 
Remember 75.45 Horse I had an image of an horse.   
Remember 75.45 Harp 
I remembered being present at a 
concert where music was playing.  
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Remember 75.00 Grasshopper 
Because I help this group of children, I 
thought about that yesterday and that 
stuck in my mind.  
 
Remember 74.81 Tornado 
I remember watching a program on 
television about it. I thought of that 
yesterday, and today the word 
reminded me of the program.  
 
Remember 74.20 Hotel 
My stepfather owns a hotel, yesterday 
I have tried to associate the words 
with people I knew and that is what 
came to my mind today.  
 
Remember 73.67 Cider 
I saw a program on underage drinking 
recently; so I thought of that when I 
saw the word.  
 
Remember 73.52 Furniture I thought of a chair when I saw it.   
Remember 72.83 Log 
I was thinking of “logging” in to the 
computer.  
 
Remember 70.71 Green 
I remember thinking of nature 
straightaway yesterday.  
 
Remember 70.19 Gondola 
I remember saying to myself. “What 
on earth is that?!” when I saw it 
yesterday.  
 
Remember 70.18 Tornado 
Yesterday I studied something about 
“hazards” so I associated the word 
with that.  
 
Remember 69.63 Blood 
That word came almost directly after I 
created an image of the “musician” 
playing the “piano.”  
 
Remember 66.61 Athlete 
I remembered having a conversation 
with a friend of mine.  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 60.52 Furniture 
I think that when I was trying to 
remember the words, it was one of 
the first words that came up.  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 59.63 Grasshopper 
I think the word boulder was there and 
I imagined a boulder with a 
grasshopper.  
Exp. 2.2 
Remember 46.36 Ape 
When it came up I remember thinking 
that there were lots of words with 
three letters.  
Exp. 2.2 
Know 88.57 Sauerkraut 
I remembered it because it was an 
unusual word. I knew it was there.  
Exp. 2.2 
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Know 85.45 Gun I just knew that I knew it.  Exp. 2.2 
Know 83.33 Bluebell 
I am sure about that one, there were a 
couple of words which were similar 
and were part of the category flower.  
Exp. 2.2 
Know 79.55 Bluebell 
I am sure about that one, there were a 
couple of words which were similar 
and where part of the category flower.  
 
Know 79.09 Sofa 
I was just sure of seeing the word here 
and I knew I had seen it.  
Exp. 2.2 
Know 78.93 Gun 
I remember it was there, I was sure it 
was there, it was familiar.  
 
Know 77.80 Magazine 
One of a few words that I knew I had 
seen it before and it was familiar.  
 
Know 76.90 River 
I felt I knew it was there as soon as I 
saw it.  
 
Know 72.41 Grasshopper 
I just knew it was there, there were no 
thoughts associated.  
 
Know 69.39 Car 
I just knew it was there, nothing came 
back to my mind.  
 
Know 67.78 Car 
I just knew I had seen it yesterday, 
there was no story connected to it, it 
was just very familiar.  
 
Know 65.61 Cigarette 
I just thought it was there, but again 
no story, but I knew it was there.  
 
Know 65.20 Crucifix 
I was not 100% sure of a connection, 
but I was pretty sure it was there. It 
was definitely in my head.  
 
Know 63.57 Cigarette 
I felt as if I have seen that word, I was 
sure that the word was there 
yesterday.  
 
Know 63.28 Athlete 
I am sure I saw it, but I can’t 
remember why I think I saw it.  
 
Know 63.20 Piano 
I am sure that it came up, but I do not 
remember anything in particular about 
it.  
 
Know 62.92 Grasshopper 
I did not have any images, it did not 
come up with any images, I remember 
it just being there.  
 
Know 61.67 Gun 
There was no association, I just had a 
feeling that I saw it, I was sure.  
 
Appendix B 
312 
 
Subjective 
Experience 
Mean 
Confidence 
Cue Word Justification Statement 
Item 
included 
in 
Know 59.07 Tangerine 
I recognised it as a word from 
yesterday, but I cannot really 
remember what I thought, I could not 
remember seeing it on the screen but I 
was sure it was there yesterday.  
Exp. 2.3 
Know 58.41 Orchid 
I really just recognised without 
remembering it appearing yesterday.  
Exp. 2.3 
Know 58.13 Hotel 
It is one of the words I thought it was 
there yesterday, but there was no 
particular reason . . .  
Exp. 2.2 
Know 57.86 Magazine 
I am sure it was there but I could not 
place it.  
Exp. 2.3 
Know 57.05 Pickle 
Same as paper, I do not remember 
seeing it, but I remember it was there.  
Exp. 2.2 
and Exp. 
2.3 
Know 56.25 Zipper 
I just remember it coming up, it was an 
unusual word, it seemed it came up 
before, but I did not recall anything 
about it, no thought was associated 
with it.  
Exp. 2.2 
and Exp. 
2.3 
Know 54.17 Road 
I felt I saw this word but could not find 
the exact feelings of when I saw the 
word, but I am sure I saw the word, I 
could though not find the background.  
Exp. 2.2 
and Exp. 
2.3 
Know 54.11 Log 
I just thought I recognised it, I felt that 
it was there, but there was no story 
connected to it.  
Exp. 2.3 
Know 53.86 Shrimp 
I knew it was there, I do not remember 
seeing it but it was familiar.  
 
Know 53.18 Church I just thought it came up yesterday.   
Know 52.50 Cider 
I was sure I had seen it, but I could not 
remember seeing it.  
 
Know 52.05 Rectangle 
I am sure it was there but I do not 
remember thinking about it.  
 
Know 51.88 Cigarette 
Pretty sure it was there, but I cannot 
go back to an image or anything that 
happened yesterday.  
 
Know 51.67 Nun 
I could not remember the situation but 
I knew I saw the word somewhere.  
 
Know 51.40 Gondola I just thought it was there.   
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Know 51.30 Cranberry 
It was an unusual word. I thought I 
recognised it as soon as I saw it. I 
could not remember thinking about it, 
but I thought I had seen it, I could not 
think where else I would have seen it.  
 
Know 50.36 Summer 
Nothing connected to it, it was just 
part of the whole thing yesterday.  
 
Know 49.38 Sea 
I thought I remembered it but there 
were no thoughts regarding the word, 
perhaps just the feeling of seeing it 
yesterday.  
 
Know 49.11 Furniture 
I just felt sure that it was there but I 
could not remember seeing it at the 
time.  
 
Know 48.15 Road 
In a similar way as for “river”, I was 
pretty certain, but I cannot fix in my 
mind when I saw the word.  
 
Know 48.13 Paper 
It was as if I had seen it, I am sure it 
was there yesterday, but I cannot 
remember seeing it.  
 
Know 47.73 Cigarette 
I just felt sure that it was there but I 
could not remember seeing it at the 
time.  
 
Know 47.41 Tangerine 
I literally had a feeling that it was 
there yesterday but I could not 
remember anything else.  
 
Know 46.48 Church 
I felt there was a strong familiarity 
with it, I thought I saw the word but it 
was not connected to anything.  
 
Know 41.79 Sea 
It looked sort of as if I saw it, but there 
was nothing associated to it.  
 
Know 41.67 Sea 
When I saw the word it was familiar, I 
just thought it was there but there was 
nothing else.  
Exp. 2.2 
Know 33.83 Body 
A lot of words flashed very quickly 
yesterday and I was not always 
concentrating, so I thought I saw that 
one.  
Exp. 2.2 
Know 33.45 Grasshopper 
I just thought that when I saw it I 
recognised it and I thought it was 
there, but it triggered nothing.  
Exp. 2.2 
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Know 30.56 Ring 
I think I remember seeing it, but there 
was no link or image. I can’t remember 
feeling anything.  
Exp. 2.2 
Familiar 67.58 Summer 
I knew I had seen it, I had thought 
about summer but I could not 
remember what my thoughts were, it 
was just a feeling of seeing the word.  
Exp. 2.2 
Familiar 62.08 Emerald 
It looked familiar I remember maybe 
repeating it when I was memorising it, 
but I was not 100% sure.  
Exp. 2.2 
Familiar 61.00 Hospital 
I have also been to a hospital recently 
so that could be why the word is so 
familiar to me, but I believed it was 
there.  
 
Familiar 60.68 Emerald 
I remembered that there was a jewel, 
but I cannot remember when I saw the 
word.  
Exp. 2.2 
Familiar 58.39 Harp 
I just felt that I saw the word 
yesterday. There was something about 
musical instruments.  
 
Familiar 57.86 Father 
There was something about father, 
mother and child that seemed familiar.  
 
Familiar 57.50 Tablespoon It was a familiar word to me.  Exp. 2.2 
Familiar 56.20 Butterfly 
It was one of those words that rang a 
bell.  
 
Familiar 56.06 River 
I could imagined it written across the 
screen, I thought I might have seen it 
yesterday. I felt it was there, but I do 
not know why.  
 
Familiar 54.79 Professor 
It was not in any of the little stories I 
made up to remember the words, but I 
had a strong feeling of familiarity.  
 
Familiar 54.33 Kite 
Because it was something to do with 
the sky. I was fairly confident it was 
there but there was no direct 
connection.  
 
Familiar 54.09 Furniture 
I just thought I had seen it, I 
recognised it and I was sure it was 
there. But also because I saw the word 
chair I thought maybe I was wrong but 
it was familiar.  
 
Familiar 53.28 Church I felt as if I saw it yesterday.   
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Familiar 51.17 Emerald 
I think I remember linking it to 
something, but I cannot remember 
what to.  
 
Familiar 50.40 Boy 
I reckon I saw it yesterday, I felt that I 
saw it yesterday, but I am not 
extremely sure.  
 
Familiar 50.19 Squirrel 
I remembered something about 
squirrels, but I cannot remember 
what.  
 
Familiar 48.86 Summer 
I could not remember it, but it 
sounded familiar, I think I did see it 
yesterday.  
Exp. 2.3 
Familiar 46.67 Rectangle 
I think I saw this word (but maybe it 
was triangle!), I do not remember 
visualising a rectangle but I saw it.  
Exp. 2.3 
Familiar 46.60 Grasshopper 
Like “cigarette”, no association only a 
feeling of familiarity.  
Exp. 2.3 
Familiar 46.07 Magazine 
I was pretty sure it came out, but I 
could not identify the word.  
Exp. 2.2 
and Exp. 
2.3 
Familiar 45.54 Bluebell 
I could remember that there was a 
flower, but I could not remember the 
specific flower.  
Exp. 2.2 
and Exp. 
2.3 
Familiar 44.67 Magazine I had a feeling of familiarity.  
Exp. 2.2 
and Exp. 
2.3 
Familiar 44.63 Magazine 
I think I remember seeing it, but it was 
not associated with anything, actually I 
was not sure whether it was 
“magazine” or “newspaper”.  
Exp. 2.3 
Familiar 43.33 Harbour 
It was familiar, but I was confused. I 
knew it was there but could not be 
sure.  
Exp. 2.2 
and Exp. 
2.3 
Familiar 42.07 Island 
It seemed familiar, I was not aware of 
other things.  
 
Familiar 41.38 Plum 
I think I remembered it, but I was not 
sure as nothing came back to me 
about seeing it, but I knew it was 
there, it was sort of familiar.  
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Familiar 40.86 Surf 
I had a feeling that I had seen that 
word, I kind of remember the word: 
when it came up just before it 
reminded me that I had seen it 
somewhere.  
 
Familiar 40.00 Father 
I thought I saw the word father with 
another word, but I was not sure.  
 
Familiar 40.00 Cranberry It was just familiar.   
Familiar 39.83 Kilt It seemed familiar but I wondered.   
Familiar 39.64 Sea 
I remember something about “sea” 
but I was not sure whether it was 
related to “surf” or “sea”. I was not 
sure, but I remember thinking about 
sea, but did not know whether it was 
because of seeing the word sea or not.  
 
Familiar 38.93 Whale 
I did not form any associations, it just 
seemed familiar.  
 
Familiar 38.89 Library 
I think it came back to me but I cannot 
pinpoint actually seeing it.  
 
Familiar 37.96 Car 
I had a feeling that it was there; I think 
car was there.  
 
Familiar 37.07 Boy 
It is familiar because it is connected to 
my children. But I could not find any 
feelings or thought that I had 
yesterday that were associated with it.  
 
Familiar 36.07 Keg 
It was a feeling that it was there. I was 
not sure whether it was at work or 
here that I came across that word.  
 
Familiar 36.07 Squirrel 
I thought it was there, but no thoughts 
associated. Either that or we were 
talking about “squirrels” yesterday.  
 
Familiar 35.86 Record 
I do think it had familiarity, I did not 
know whether it was because I had 
seen it before.  
Exp. 2.2 
Familiar 34.63 River 
I answered “Know” because I was 
pretty sure it was there yesterday, but 
I couldn’t remember, I could not 
specifically remember seeing it.  
 
Familiar 34.63 Sea 
I do not remember seeing it but it felt 
familiar.  
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Familiar 32.78 Rectangle 
It just sounded familiar, I couldn’t 
remember anything about it I just had 
a vague idea that it was there 
yesterday.  
Exp. 2.2 
Familiar 30.83 Party 
I think it came up but it triggered 
nothing.  
Exp. 2.2 
Familiar 30.54 Leopard 
I do not remember seeing words of 
animals, but the word is familiar, I 
cannot place it exactly, I knew I read it 
but I could not relate it to anything.  
Exp. 2.2 
Guess 62.59 Flea 
I am almost certain that it was there. 
But not entirely.  
Exp. 2.2 
Guess 57.50 Clarinet 
It seemed the sort of word you would 
remember, so I just had a feeling it 
was one of those words.  
Exp. 2.2 
Guess 55.54 Gondola 
It was the sound of the word that had 
some familiarity.  
Exp. 2.2 
Guess 55.00 Blossom 
I felt the same as for “slipper”, I saw 
this word recently.  
Exp. 2.2 
Guess 53.70 Island 
I come from an island, so it could have 
been that I saw the word on the list or 
that the word was familiar because I 
come from an island.  
 
Guess 53.39 Cranberry 
I thought that there were lots of fruit 
words yesterday, so I thought it was 
one of them.  
 
Guess 50.93 Clarinet 
It seemed the sort of word you would 
remember, so I just had a feeling it 
was one of those words.  
 
Guess 50.30 Hotel 
I remember that there were lots of 
things to do with holidays, or words to 
do with hotels, so I imagined that it 
was there.  
 
Guess 48.86 Road 
I was not sure, but I thought it was in 
one of my connections.  
 
Guess 46.60 Holiday 
I guessed that it was there as I made 
some connections with summer which 
I knew it was there, but no memories 
about it.  
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Guess 46.48 Water 
I remember that there were lots of 
things to do with sea, or words to do 
with water, so I imagined that it was 
there.  
 
Guess 45.40 Horse 
I was not certain but I thought I 
recognised it.  
 
Guess 45.37 Uniform 
When I saw the word I thought I 
recognised it, I had a feeling it might 
have been there.  
 
Guess 45.00 President 
There was no real association, but I 
remember something about seeing the 
word “president” recently!  
 
Guess 44.33 Church 
I think I tried picturing a church, but 
also someone was talking to me about 
churches the other day, so I might 
have confused the two things.  
 
Guess 44.20 Road 
Same as above, it was possible that I 
have seen it before.  
 
Guess 44.14 Gondola 
It seemed that I could recall an image 
of Venice, but I was not sure whether I 
was imagining it or whether the word 
was there.  
 
Guess 43.86 Holiday 
I am eager to go on holiday so I am not 
sure whether I saw it here or whether I 
was thinking about it.  
 
Guess 43.62 Harp 
I remember that yesterday I was 
thinking about “music”, so I took a 
guess that the word was there.  
 
Guess 43.18 President 
There was no real association, but I 
remember something about seeing the 
word “president” recently!  
 
Guess 43.15 Eye 
There were basically 3 groups of 
association, and this may not have 
been the key word, but maybe it was 
part of the association.  
 
Guess 42.32 Sky 
It was a short word, so I believed that 
it was there as there were a number of 
short words.  
 
Guess 41.61 River 
I could remember thinking of the 
word, it seemed as if I recollected it, 
but it was to vague to say I was sure.  
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Guess 41.00 Furniture 
It seemed familiar, but it was just me 
thinking of furniture in the room, or 
was it there? Also up to the point 
when “furniture” came up, I said I 
remembered all of them, so I thought 
they cannot all be right.  
 
Guess 40.80 Apricot Again it looked kind of familiar.   
Guess 40.80 Cider Again, likely to have been there.   
Guess 40.45 Paper I thought that I might have seen it.   
Guess 40.00 Nun 
I was not sure whether I had seen it or 
not, but I thought I did.  
 
Guess 39.83 Holiday 
I am eager to go on holiday so I am not 
sure whether I saw it here or whether I 
was thinking about it.  
 
Guess 39.11 Body 
I remember there was something to 
do with clothing, so I had a vague 
thought that it was there.  
 
Guess 38.93 Horse 
I was not certain but I thought I 
recognised it.  
 
Guess 38.21 Tornado 
I thought I recognised it, but I was not 
sure. I recognised it in the way that I 
thought it was more there than not. 
For example, with gun I knew that it 
was definitely not there.  
 
Guess 38.20 Raspberry 
I was not sure whether it was me 
going to pick raspberries, or whether 
the word was there yesterday.  
 
Guess 36.59 Blood I think it was there but I was not sure.   
Guess 36.30 Broom 
I felt I had seen it, but I was not sure, I 
thought guessing was the appropriate 
answer.  
 
Guess 35.83 Thorn 
It was not definitely in my head that it 
was there, but it seemed vaguely 
familiar.  
 
Guess 35.76 Water 
I had a feeling that it was there but I 
was not sure.  
Exp. 2.3 
Guess 35.34 Squirrel 
It just seemed as if it was one of the 
words that would have been there, I 
have quite a recent image of the word 
but I was not sure whether it was 
there yesterday.  
Exp. 2.3 
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Subjective 
Experience 
Mean 
Confidence 
Cue Word Justification Statement 
Item 
included 
in 
Guess 35.15 Gondola 
I kind of remember it, but I did not 
know whether it was here that I saw it 
or elsewhere.  
Exp. 2.3 
Guess 34.79 Party 
I think it was familiar but I was not 
sure.  
Exp. 2.3 
Guess 34.66 Claw 
I thought that was there but I was not 
sure.  
Exp. 2.3 
Guess 34.40 Harp 
It seemed that there were quite a few 
musical instruments, so I took a guess 
that it came up.  
Exp. 2.2 
and Exp. 
2.3 
Guess 34.32 Record 
It could have possibly been there 
yesterday.  
Exp. 2.3 
Guess 34.29 Harbour 
I lived by the sea all my life, so I was 
not sure whether I have encountered 
that word here or whether it is to do 
with home.  
Exp. 2.3 
Guess 34.24 Surf I was not sure, I thought it was there.  Exp. 2.2 
Guess 33.70 Rainbow 
I think I saw some word similar to 
“rainbow” yesterday.  
Exp. 2.2 
Guess 33.13 Ring 
I thought I recognised it but I was not 
sure. Because “ring” is familiar but I 
was not sure whether it was for that or 
whether I actually saw it.  
Exp. 2.2 
Guess 33.00 Furniture 
There were a few long words, I 
thought it could have been one of 
them.  
 
Guess 32.78 Gun 
It could have been there but I was not 
sure.  
 
Guess 32.71 Limousine 
It seemed likely it could have been 
there, I could not remember it being 
there but I had a feeling that it might 
have been.  
 
Guess 32.42 Clown 
I remembered an image but it could 
have been my imagination, I do not 
know whether it was there, so I just 
guessed.  
 
Guess 32.33 Father I think I saw it but I was not sure.   
Guess 32.32 Camera I thought it might have been there.   
Guess 32.05 Piano It could have been there.   
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Subjective 
Experience 
Mean 
Confidence 
Cue Word Justification Statement 
Item 
included 
in 
Guess 31.67 Slipper 
I saw this word somewhere recently at 
some point, but I am not sure whether 
it was there yesterday.  
 
Guess 31.21 Sea I thought I saw it but I was not sure.   
Guess 31.11 Telephone 
I was not sure whether I saw the word 
yesterday or I was thinking that I had 
to call someone.  
 
Guess 30.50 Clown 
I remembered an image but it could 
have been my imagination, I do not 
know whether it was there, so I just 
guessed.  
 
Guess 30.42 Telephone 
I was less sure that telephone was 
there than I was of butterfly for 
example.  
 
Guess 30.40 Zipper 
It was just a guess. I guessed when I 
recognised things but I was not sure 
that they were in the list, with “know” 
I was sure it was there . . .  
 
Guess 30.36 Puppy 
It was more the situation that I have 
heard that word pretty recently, but I 
was not sure whether it was here or 
not.  
 
Guess 30.00 Harp 
It was a short word and an object, so 
maybe it could have been one of 
them.  
 
Guess 29.81 Ring 
I seemed to keep pressing the “yes” 
button a lot. So I thought it was better 
saying that it was a guess, because of 
the 30%. But it seemed familiar.  
 
Guess 29.79 Library 
I thought that was one of the words 
but I was not sure at all.  
 
Guess 29.55 Uniform 
It was sort of familiar but I was not 
sure, maybe I had seen it somewhere 
else.  
 
Guess 28.57 Furniture 
It seemed familiar, but it was just me 
thinking of furniture in the room, or 
was it there? Also up to the point 
when “furniture” came up, I said I 
remembered all of them, so I thought 
they cannot all be right.  
 
Guess 28.50 Car 
I was not sure. I had a very vague 
feeling that perhaps I saw it.  
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Subjective 
Experience 
Mean 
Confidence 
Cue Word Justification Statement 
Item 
included 
in 
Guess 28.39 Library 
The word was familiar to me but the 
familiarity was not very strong.  
 
Guess 27.22 Athlete 
I was not sure, I kind of recognised it 
but I was not sure.  
 
Guess 27.04 Piano 
I felt a that there wasn’t such strong 
familiarity. Maybe I saw it, but there 
were no strong feelings.  
 
Guess 26.72 Hospital 
I thought it might have been there but 
I was not sure.  
 
Guess 26.07 City I was not sure.   
Guess 25.00 Harp 
I was not sure about it, it could have 
been there just as well as it could have 
not been there.  
 
Guess 24.66 Library 
I thought that was one of the words 
but I was not sure at all.  
 
Guess 24.14 Limousine 
It could have been there, I was not 
certain whether it was or not.  
 
Guess 22.71 Furniture 
It could have been one of the words, 
but I am not sure, so a guess seemed 
an appropriate response.  
 
Guess 22.32 Church 
I kept saying “no” so I just guessed it 
was there because you said that 50% 
of the words were there.  
 
Guess 22.17 Leopard Not sure.   
Guess 21.30 Puppy 
I was not sure that the word was 
there.  
 
Guess 20.23 Car I was not sure.   
Guess 20.00 Island I was not sure if I saw it.   
Guess 20.00 Log I was really guessing with that word.   
Guess 19.44 Bluebell 
It was a pure guess, I had a very slight 
feeling that it was there. I am not sure 
whether I saw it yesterday or before.  
 
Guess 18.15 Rainbow I really do not know, it was a guess.   
Guess 15.52 Letter 
I was not sure whether it was there or 
not.  
 
Guess 14.29 Log 
I was not sure, there was nothing 
associated.  
 
Guess 13.67 Officer It was just a guess.  Exp. 2.2 
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Subjective 
Experience 
Mean 
Confidence 
Cue Word Justification Statement 
Item 
included 
in 
Guess 12.24 Father 
I kept saying “no” so I just guessed it 
was there because you said that 50% 
of the words were there.  
Exp. 2.2 
Guess 7.50 Shrimp It was a total guess.  Exp. 2.2 
Guess 7.22 Weed I was not sure at all!  Exp. 2.2 
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B.2. FORENAME-SURNAME PAIRINGS USED IN EXPERIMENTS 3.1 AND 3.2. 
 
Forenames were obtained from the Office of National Statistics (www.statistics.gov.uk) as 
the most popular given names in England and Wales in 2007. Surnames were taken from 
the National Health Service Central Register as the 40 most common surnames in England 
and Wales in 2007. Pairing was done pseudo-randomly, with matching initial letters (e.g., 
George Griffiths) avoided. Different spellings of the same name and unisex forenames 
(e.g., Alex) were excluded, and forename-like surnames (e.g., Thomas) were excluded as 
surnames. Matching of targets and lures was done so that the lure did not have the same 
initial letter as the target forename or the surname. Target and lure forenames were also 
matched so that there were approximately equal numbers (13 or 14) of target-lure pairs 
which did and did not match on gender. 
 
Target 
Forename 
Lure 
Forename 
Surname  
Target 
Forename 
Lure 
Forename 
Surname 
Grace Molly Clarke  Jack Adam Edwards 
Ruby Dylan Williams  Thomas Jacob Wood 
Olivia Max Harris  Oliver Ryan Evans 
Emily Abigail Patel  Joshua Liam Hughes 
Jessica Poppy Brown  Harry Daisy Robinson 
Chloe Mohammed Hall  Charlie Jake Moore 
Lilly Harvey Jackson  Daniel Tyler King 
Ella Millie Davies  William Holly Thompson 
Amelia Lewis Green  James Matthew Cooper 
Lucy Amy Mitchell  Alfie Emma Wilson 
Charlotte Isabelle Johnson  Samuel Caitlin Wright 
Mia Phoebe White  George Alexander Hill 
Evie Jasmine Walker  Joseph Freya Smith 
Hannah Katie Jones  Benjamin Luke Turner 
Megan Erin Roberts  Ethan Callum Ward 
Imogen Scarlett Baker  Harrison Connor Parker 
Madison Leah Allen  Jayden Oscar Price 
Elizabeth Ava Phillips  Cameron Edward Bennett 
Sophia Lucas Watson  Archie Georgia Young 
Keira Isaac Cook  Henry Alice Griffiths 
Appendix B 
325 
 
B.3. WORD LISTS USED IN EXPERIMENT 3.3. 
 
Stimuli were 480 medium- to high-frequency words obtained from the MRC 
Psycholinguistic Database (mean familiarity rating of 545; range 488-652. Familiarity values 
refer to the printed frequency in the language and were derived from merging three sets 
of familiarity norms: Pavio, unpublished, Toglia and Battig, 1978; and Gilhooly and Logie, 
1980). Words were limited to between four and seven letters in length and were pseudo-
randomly assigned to list to achieve an equal alphabetical spread across lists. 
Counterbalancing of lists across tasks and versions is shown in Table B.3.1 (after the 12 
lists). 
 
List 1  List 2  List 3  List 4 
able lecture  arrival painter  alcohol master  ability lawn 
active near  boil poor  answer outcome  academy limp 
aisle neutral  brake rain  balloon paper  alone luxury 
aware panic  bullet regular  blow refined  assist mirror 
black pattern  claim rule  clock romance  bark misery 
bean plot  cloud safe  close sent  belt moon 
blossom pork  courage seat  control similar  bitter nurse 
blush praise  cowboy second  dome snail  broken origin 
brick public  device service  drink sore  century rapid 
button relax  error side  fault spruce  cost shiny 
cherry rent  extent sing  fertile sugar  dancing step 
cigar room  felt slush  force supply  eight tall 
content runner  flame speech  golden tale  faint tape 
deal saucer  gang stain  here theft  foreign think 
diving send  gravel support  humming thought  fresh travel 
doorway sheep  head talent  idea ticket  hardly true 
film slight  history thing  issue tired  heavy twist 
guilt stole  home tight  lady waist  incense very 
help stumble  marry value  lend willing  knight voice 
kept wind  naughty whether  look window  known well 
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List 5  List 6  List 7  List 8 
after mark  alter jewel  being past  bank lunch 
ammonia message  banker loyalty  broad piano  biology nation 
argue mind  basic mild  calf private  careful plant 
artist moment  bleach mouse  cause receipt  crowd pudding 
band nail  brain mystery  choose retain  crumb rock 
become offend  brush peddle  collar rice  date settled 
been owner  burn peel  cover roll  dream sight 
blue pair  charity pony  death seek  family singer 
burner pepper  chest pound  dreamer shell  flash soar 
capsule permit  coil repair  elbow skill  frown soul 
coffin potato  cotton repeat  engine smile  germ spring 
comedy razor  crow ring  figure smooth  gray stay 
comfort salary  diamond rough  finish song  grief surface 
dawn short  duck scab  frog squeak  hook them 
extreme tractor  else search  gentle stopped  horror touch 
filling upon  fatigue silence  hard style  itch trust 
fire vein  feet slide  jersey tempt  knee truth 
grammar warm  fortune spoke  lead trial  left twig 
human wise  gown strict  library unique  lighter utensil 
lane worm  hurt wood  mouth weapon  loud volume 
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List 9  List 10  List 11  List 12 
appeal mature  about love  anyone land  above made 
aunt merry  advice modern  bang mixture  account match 
bargain nose  area most  board mood  also menu 
beat note  avenue nest  cafe needle  bubble moose 
billed passive  beach notice  captain once  clash nickel 
brat singing  because older  charm patient  dare park 
builder snap  boast oven  common piece  diet pretty 
cast still  border perhaps  cookie place  disease quickly 
daisy symbol  boulder plate  cruiser rare  eager rate 
destroy test  bridge pond  cure reflex  easy reptile 
exhaust tidy  carrot prayer  dusty safety  faster rural 
fight toast  deck rail  feel shop  front single 
grape ugly  deliver relief  fish slice  future spider 
inch urban  drug scent  form some  garbage steam 
jelly victory  farther shrimp  further succeed  half task 
just wallet  from steal  gravy threw  hear then 
lemon when  grown wealth  hockey tickle  heel throw 
lock whisper  heap week  ideal toilet  limited vivid 
lovely wreck  intense wink  kick wave  little whisker 
mankind wrote  lion yell  labour weak  load which 
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Table B.3.1. Counterbalancing of word lists across task (Yes/No or 2AFC) and word type 
(target/lure) to create eight versions. Key to blocks: A = Pre-Exposure with Yes/No test; B = 
No Pre-Exposure with Yes/No test; C = Pre-Exposure with 2AFC test; D = No Pre-Exposure 
with 2AFC test. 
 
Word List Number by Task and Target/Lure 
 
 
Yes/No Task 2AFC Task 
 
 
1st Block 2nd Block 3rd Block 4th Block 
 
B
lo
ck
 
O
rd
er
 
P
re
-E
xp
 
Ta
rg
et
 
Lu
re
 
P
re
-E
xp
 
Ta
rg
et
 
Lu
re
 
P
re
-E
xp
 
Ta
rg
et
 
Lu
re
 
P
re
-E
xp
 
Ta
rg
et
 
Lu
re
 
V
er
si
o
n
 
A-B-C-D 
1+3 1 3 9+10 2 4 5+7 5 7 11+12 6 8 1 
3+1 3 1 9+10 4 2 7+5 7 5 11+12 8 6 2 
B-A-C-D 
9+10 2 4 1+3 1 3 5+7 5 7 11+12 6 8 3 
9+10 4 2 3+1 3 1 7+5 7 5 11+12 8 6 4 
A-B-D-C 
1+3 1 3 9+10 2 4 11+12 6 8 5+7 5 7 5 
3+1 3 1 9+10 4 2 11+12 8 6 7+5 7 5 6 
B-A-D-C 
9+10 2 4 1+3 1 3 11+12 6 8 5+7 5 7 7 
9+10 4 2 3+1 3 1 11+12 8 6 7+5 7 5 8 
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B.4. WORD LISTS USED IN EXPERIMENTS 4.1, 4.2, AND 4.3. 
 
Stimuli were 128 medium-frequency words obtained from the MRC Psycholinguistic 
Database (mean familiarity rating of 424; range 350-480. Familiarity values refer to the 
printed frequency in the language and were derived from merging three sets of familiarity 
norms: Pavio, unpublished, Toglia and Battig, 1978; and Gilhooly and Logie, 1980). Words 
were limited to between five and eight letters in length and were pseudo-randomly 
assigned to list. Words always used as fillers are shown in italics at the end of each list. 
 
List 1  List 2 
annex frill mechanic shawl  alkali dwelling outset thicket 
archery gallery military soprano  analogy farewell pancreas torment 
atrocity giant mistress strut  angel firewood peasant waltz 
brownie glare monarch syllable  armour fleece prelude warrior 
bureau glimpse prairie tally  beast fraud prune wiggle37 
cleaver havoc prong torture  booth harness remedy willow 
comrade herdsman rattle upright  brook imitator reprisal witch 
crook impetus register wiggle37  canal imprint retreat wound 
cynic insight rotation beloved  castor incline ribbon freight 
dignity janitor saddle coral  cavern kennel rogue infantry 
diner lobby scout garment  chink lodge satchel maiden 
discord lowland scroll porch  crane mayor shriek pendulum 
educator lumber sedative tunic  defiance merit slumber sardine 
emulsion meadow shaker ballot  dividend mineral spasm siren 
fielder outbreak tyrant creeper  drove olive spike troop 
forelock overlap upheaval flock  dullness otter sword slime 
 
 
                                                          
 
37
 After data collection it was discovered that the word ‘wiggle’ had been on both word lists. All data 
for this item were therefore deleted. 
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APPENDIX C: FORMULAE FOR YES/NO AND 2AFC D-PRIME CALCULATIONS 
The statistic d’ from signal detection theory is used in recognition memory to measure how 
well participants can distinguish targets from lures, independent of bias. Different 
formulae are needed to calculate d’ in Yes/No and 2AFC recognition as 2AFC is calculated 
to have a performance advantage of about √2 over Yes/No recognition. To compensate for 
this d’ should be divided by √2 in 2AFC (Hacker & Ratcliff, 1979; Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005). A correction was also introduced by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) to allow d’ to still 
be calculated if any of the component proportions were 1. In this correction, proportions 
of hits and FA (false alarms) are calculated by adding 0.5 to the raw scores, and 1 being 
added to the total number of items. This correction was used in all calculations of d’ in this 
thesis. 
 
The formula used to calculate d’ in Experiments 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 and the Yes/No blocks of 
Experiment 3.3 was: 
     
        
       
     
      
       
       (1) 
 
The d’ formula used in the 2AFC recognition of Experiments 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 was: 
    
  
        
         
     
       
         
 
  
       (2) 
Where hits A was the number of A items correctly recognised and FA B was the number of 
false alarms made to B items; relationship shown in Table C.1. 
 
Table C.1. Relationships between hits and FA in 2AFC d’ calculations 
 Response 
Correct Answer Item A Item B 
Item A Hits A FA A 
Item B FA B Hits B 
 
Thanks to Kang Lee and John Wixted from the University of California, San Diego, for their 
website explaining SDT computations (Lee & Wixted, 2004). 
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APPENDIX D: FORMULAE FOR COMPARING CORRELATIONS 
To compare correlation coefficients the Fisher (1921) r-to-z transformation is commonly 
used to transform r values, which may not have a normal distribution, into z values, which 
are normally distributed. The formula for Fisher’s transform is: 
         
     
     
         (3) 
Where j and k are the two variables you are correlating and ln is the natural logarithm. 
 
When comparing coefficients these z values can be used in different formulae depending 
on whether the coefficients you are comparing come from the same sample or different 
samples. To compare whether two coefficients from different samples are significantly 
different Fisher’s Z can be calculated using the Fisher’s transformed coefficients zjk and 
zhm and their corresponding N values. This formula was used in Experiment 3.1: 
    
          
  
 
      
    
 
      
 
       (4) 
 
Steiger (1980) compared a variety of formulae which could be used to test whether two 
correlations were significantly different when the correlations were not independent, i.e., 
they were obtained from the same sample. He concluded that the   2* test employing 
Fisher-transformed correlations was the best test for the comparison of two correlations 
which do not have a factor in common. This formula was used in Experiments 3.2 and 3.3: 
        –    
      –                 
       (5) 
Where s jk,hm is the pooled sample estimate of rjk  and rhm. 
 
Thanks to Chris Fife-Shaw from the University of Surrey for putting these formulae in a very 
easy-to-follow Excel document on his website and making it available for all to use (Fife-
Shaw, 2005). 
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APPENDIX E: FORMULA FOR GAMMA CORRELATION 
The gamma correlation is a non-parametric test of association (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954). 
It is typically used in metacognition research where the association is between predicted 
memory performance and observed memory performance (Nelson, 1984). For each 
participant a matrix like Table E.1 is produced, comparing participants’ predictions with the 
number of times they retrieve or fail to retrieve an item at each level of prediction. 
 
Table E.1. The gamma correlation with two response categories 
 Memory Performance 
Prediction of Performance Retrieved Not Retrieved 
Will retrieve a b 
Won’t retrieve c d 
 
Where the values of a, b, c, and d are frequencies. 
 
To calculate gamma ( ):  
   
     
     
         (6) 
 
In Experiment 2.4, instead of the association being between predicted performance and 
actual performance, it was between experimenter ratings of Know and Familiar and 
participants’ decisions as to which items were Know or Familiar items. For each participant 
a table like Table E.2 was produced and a gamma value calculated using the above formula. 
 
Table E.2. The gamma correlation used in Experiment 2.4. 
 Participant’s Response 
Expert Classification Know Familiar 
Know a b 
Familiar c d 
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APPENDIX F: DECISION CRITERIA QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 2.4 
Decision Criteria Questionnaire – Card Sorting Task 
Nb. On each page please complete all the questions before reading the questions on the 
next page. 
 
What are your initials? ______________ (the same as you wrote on your cards) 
 
In this study we were interested in whether you thought there were any differences in 
memory justification statements. You were given 90 cards on which were written 90 cue 
words and statements and asked to sort these into Type A and Type B statements.  
 
We are now interested in what criteria you decided to sort the statements on. In what 
way(s) did you think that the statements that you decided were Type A differed from those 
you decided were Type B? In the box below please write in as much detail as you can, in 
your own words, how your Type A and Type B statements differed. Give examples from the 
cards if you want to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How easy did you find it to sort the statements?  
 
 
Very 
easy 
 
Easy 
 
 
Neither difficult 
nor easy 
 
Difficult 
 
 
Very  
difficult 
 
How similar or dissimilar did you think Type A and Type B statements were?  
 
 
Very 
similar 
 
Quite  
similar 
 
Neither similar 
or dissimilar 
 
Quite 
dissimilar 
 
Very  
dissimilar 
 
How likely do you think it is that other people would sort the statements in the same way 
as you have?  
 
 
Very 
likely 
 
Likely 
 
 
Neither likely 
nor unlikely 
 
Unlikely 
 
 
Very  
unlikely 
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When you were sorting the statements into Type A and Type B statements which, if any, of 
the following reasons influenced your sorting decisions (please tick all that influenced you): 
 
 I thought one Type of memory statement used more emotional language than the 
other Type 
 
 I thought one Type of memory statement included more visual imagery than the 
other Type 
 
 I thought that for one Type of memory statement the participants who had made 
those statements must have been more confident in their memory performance 
than the other Type 
 
 I thought one type of memory statement used more abstract words than the other 
Type 
 
 I was mainly guessing 
 
 I thought one Type of memory statement had used a deeper level of processing 
than the other Type 
 
 I thought one Type of memory statement had included more concrete words than 
the other Type 
 
 I thought that for one Type of memory statement the people making the 
statements had recalled more information in their memories than for the other 
Type of memory statement 
 
 I sorted the statements on gut instinct 
 
 I thought that for one Type of memory statement the people making the 
statements sounded more sure of their memories than for the other Type of 
memory statement 
 
 
 
 
Again, please ask if you do not understand any of the questions on this questionnaire, or 
you need something explaining. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Please turn the page) 
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For the statements that you have labelled Type A, how confident in their memory 
performance do you think the participants were who made those statements? 
 
 % confident (0=low, 100=high) 
 
 
And for the statements that you have labelled Type B, how confident in their memory 
performance do you think the participants were who made those statements?    
 
 % confident (0=low, 100=high) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the statements that you have labelled Type A, how much information or how many 
details do you think the participants recalled in their memories for the cue words? 
 
 
A great amount 
of info/detail 
 
Quite a lot of 
info/detail  
 
 
A medium 
amount of 
info/detail 
 
Not much 
info/detail 
 
 
No info/details 
 
 
 
 
 
And for the statements that you have labelled Type B, how much information or how many 
details do you think the participants recalled in their memories for the cue words? 
 
 
A great amount 
of info/detail 
 
Quite a lot of 
info/detail  
 
 
A medium 
amount of 
info/detail 
 
Not much 
info/detail 
 
 
No info/details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Please turn the page) 
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Below are two definitions which are typically provided to participants in memory 
experiments. Participants would use these statements after they had responded YES - they 
did think a particular item had been on the list of items they had had to learn. We are 
interested in whether these definitions fit with your definitions of Type A and Type B 
memory statements? 
 
 
K   = For this item you simply Know that the item was on the previous list without any of 
the other feelings associated with vividly remembering that you have seen the 
item before. For example, if you see someone on the street you may think ‘who is 
that? Oh yes, it’s my friend Rob, I know him really well…’ 
 
 
F  = For this item you have a feeling of Familiarity with the item and because of that 
you think that the item was on the previous list. For example, if you see someone 
on the street you may think ‘who is that? They look very familiar… I don’t know 
where I know them from but they are definitely familiar…’ 
 
 
 
The definition of K fits my Type ______ (A or B) statement….  
 
 
Extremely 
well 
 
Well 
 
 
Quite 
well 
 
Only 
slightly 
 
Not at 
all 
 
 
The definition of F fits my Type ______ (A or B) statement….  
 
 
Extremely 
well 
 
Well 
 
 
Quite 
well 
 
Only 
slightly 
 
Not at 
all 
 
 
If you have any other comments to make about this experiment please write them here: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this experiment, please take this questionnaire and your cards 
back to the experimenter. 
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APPENDIX G: ITEMS ANALYSIS, EXPERIMENT 2.4 
To further examine the different results obtained for Know and Familiar items, the 
proportion of participants who had assigned each item to the correct category was 
calculated. From Table G.1 we can see that the mean proportion of items correctly 
assigned matches the means calculated by participant, as shown in Section 2.5.3.3. By 
conducting the items analysis however we can also see that the proportion of items 
correctly categorised had a larger range for Familiar compared to Know justifications, and 
the minimum and maximum proportion of items correctly categorised were also lower for 
Familiar compared to Know justifications. This suggests that there was more consistency in 
categorisation of Know justifications compared to Familiar and fits with the finding that 
Know justifications were able to be categorised correctly whereas Familiar judgments were 
not.  
 
Table G.1. Descriptive statistics for Know and Familiar items. 
Justification Type N Min. Max. Range Mean SD 
Know 47 .45 .94 .49 .74 .12 
Familiar 43 .20 .80 .59 .52 .15 
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APPENDIX H: ALTERNATIVES TO FIGURES 3.8 AND 3.9, EXPERIMENT 3.3 
When compared to their originals in Chapter 3, these alternatives: Figures H.1 and H.2, 
which include all available data, demonstrate that the reduction in N due to listwise 
exclusion of data in the ANOVAs did not lead to a change in the patterns of means.  
 
 
Figure H.1. Alternative to Figure 3.8. Proportion of items assigned to Remember (R), Know 
(K), Familiar (F), and Guess (G) in the in the Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions 
of the Yes/No task and the 2AFC task that had previously been correctly recognised. Errors 
bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Table H.1. Number of participants included in calculating the means displayed in Figure H.1 
above. 
 
Yes/No Task 2AFC Task 
Condition R K F G R K F G 
Pre-Exposure 36 31 34 26 29 27 28 19 
No Pre-Exposure 37 31 33 20 32 28 25 24 
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Figure H.2. Alternative to Figure 3.9. Mean correct recognition RTs by later subjective 
experience category, Remember (R), Know (K), Familiar (F), and Guess (G), in the in the 
Pre-Exposure and No Pre-Exposure conditions of the Yes/No task and the 2AFC task. Errors 
bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Table H.2. Number of participants included in calculating the means displayed in Figure 
H.2. 
 
Yes/No Task 2AFC Task 
Condition R K F G R K F G 
Pre-Exposure 35 31 32 18 29 27 27 17 
No Pre-Exposure 36 31 31 13 32 28 25 20 
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APPENDIX I: ALTERNATIVE TO FIGURE 4.15, EXPERIMENT 4.2 
When compared to the original Figure 4.14 in Chapter 4, this alternative, which includes all 
available data, demonstrates that the reduction in N due to listwise exclusion of data in the 
ANOVAs did not lead to a change in the patterns of means.  
 
 
Figure I.1. Alternative to Figure 4.15, Experiment 4.2. Left panel: Of the items assigned to 
each subjective experience category at Second Judgment, the mean proportion given 
correct source judgments at First Judgment. Right panel: Of items assigned to each 
subjective experience category at First Judgment, mean proportion later given correct 
source judgments at Second Judgment. Error bars = 1 SeM. 
 
Table I.1. Number of participants included in calculating the means displayed in Figure I.1 
above. 
Left panel (First Judgment: Source) Right panel (Second Judgment: Source) 
R K F G R K F G 
29 25 31 14 30 27 30 12 
 
 
 
